The Rules of State Policy Making of the Ideal Kings Sought a `Middle Way'
                           Between Right and Left

ABSTRACT. Although there is little discussion of distributive justice in
the Theravada canon, the Buddhist State is advised to provide all people
with a minimum income. Radiation theory sees the economy prospering through
the virtuous actions of individuals following the moral law. Early Buddhist
writings generally accept existing political and economic institutions,
even while providing a democratic social ethos revolutionary for its time.
King Asoka, greatest of all Indian emperors, pursued a highly activist
fiscal policy even though he believed only meditation could help people to
advance in moral living. But canonical beliefs about economic activity are
much more ambiguous than economic literature often indicates. Hence today
there are rightist and leftist Buddhists, differing in interpretation.

One can infer economic behavior from the principles of Theravada Buddhism,
as I reported in my previous essay, "A Buddhist Economic System-in
Principle" (Pryor, 1990). This leaves the question what influence did they
bear on economic behavior as reported in the Theravada canon. Thus we
advance from homilies to annals, and find that this branch of Buddhism was
not as "other-worldly" as Max Weber thought.
                                     I

                  Income Redistribution in the Ideal State

According to little (1988), Theravada Buddhism has "nothing comparable" to
Western analyses of "distributive justice." Although the Buddhist canon
places great stress on gift giving, it is primarily to the monks and the
sangha (monasteries). "There is, apparently, no . . . Theravadin literature
on distributive justice, nor is it the poor as such who are for the
Theravadas the primary object of beneficence." Of course, through the laws
of kamma there is a distributive cycle of cosmic proportions, i. e., one's
current social and economic position is due to one's good kamma accumulated
in a previous existence. This does not mean indifference to the poor, for
one's economic status is not only dependent on the laws of kamma, but is
also complemented by the moral virtues of compassion and generosity.' Alms
giving to the poor is regarded as increasing one's merit [viz.
Anguttara-Nikaya, V, iv, 31]. The importance of our active intervention has
some important implications for behavior of the "righteous ruler" as well.

It should be added that the revered Buddhist kings are also known for the
financial aid which they provided for the poor; indeed, the " Cakkavatti
-Sihanada Suttanta" advises kings to give their gifts to all who are poor.
Moreover, gifts to the monks and to the monasteries do not prevent them
from providing a refuge for the destitute or from redistributing such
beneficence to the indigent.

Thus although there is little discussion of distributive justice,
redistribution of income, either through the public, private, or monastery
sectors, is certainly regarded in a favorable light. In order to favor the
spiritual improvement of the population, the State is justified in taking
steps to provide all people with a minimum income. Whether the motive for
redistribution is to spread the dhamma (in a Buddhist economy) or to
increase distributive justice (in a Western economy) seems a bit
irrelevant; in both cases, it should be added, the limits of redistribution
are difficult to determine.
                                     II

                Radiation: Virtue as a Positive Externality

The Buddhist theory of radiation sees the economy prospering through the
collective impact of the virtuous actions of individuals following the
dhamma. In many respects it parallels Leibenstein's conception of
X-efficiency as determined by an "atmosphere." This, of course, provides a
considerable contrast to the views of Adam Smith who saw an economy
prospering through the self-interested, not consciously virtuous, actions
of individuals. (Of course, Smith would argue such individual actions would
be limited by moral constraints; however, he places less emphasis on the
differences between self-interest and greed than do Buddhists who see quite
different long-term consequences of the two attitudes).

Buddhists argue that since the economy can ultimately prosper only through
virtuous action, ultimately the only hope for prosperity lies in a
regeneration of human kind, e.g., through the cultivation of the Four
Sublime Abodes (loving kindness, compassion, sympathetic joy, and
equanimity). According to Reynolds (1988), Buddhists hold that any
appropriate dhammic action inevitably leads to an increase of the material
wealth of the community. Further (Reynolds and Clifford, 1980, p. 62) "As a
result of the monk's pure and selfless actions, the laity flourish"; and
they stress that it is the interaction between the laity and the monks
which brings about such virtue. On the level of the State (p. 66), "the
king legitimates his position by displaying his [merit and power]
selflessly for the soteriological good of his subjects," especially by
supporting the monasteries, and his actions and policies also increase
material prosperity. Note that from the standpoint of the king, the primary
purpose of the act is to gain individual merit, not further the social
good.

A stark contrast to this theory of economic radiation is exemplified by the
writings of such Western theologians as Reinhold Niebuhr, who have argued
that individual and social progress, in both material and spiritual senses,
may be quite different in certain situations; further, personal virtue does
not always carry directly over into social virtue.
                                    III

                          Trade Through the Market

The major parts of the Buddhist canon does not appear to discuss any
alternative means of distributing goods and services beyond the market.
Thus their analysis of trade is quite straightforward.

The Buddhist discussion on right livelihood prohibits trade in certain
goods and services, which means that all other types of trade are
apparently allowed (but not explicitly approved). In an interesting
comparison between trading and agriculture as means of livelihood, the
Buddha also notes [Discourse 99, Majjhima-Nikaya] that both can bring high
or low returns, depending on the circumstances; however, trading is an
occupation with little to do, few duties, a small administration, and small
problems, while agriculture is the reverse. In other parts of the canon
(e.g, Anguttara-Nikaya, III, ii, 20) the capable merchant is approvingly
said to know the value of goods and prices and the profits he obtains; and
to buy where the price is low and to sell where the price is high.

One of the most favored of Buddha's disciples was Anathapidika, a merchant
who was generous to the cause and who was highly praised for his piety.
Some scholars (e.g, Reynolds, 1988) claim that early Buddhism was
particularly attractive to merchants, a marginal group adopting a marginal
religion which had a strongly democratic nature. In more recent times,
anthropologists such as Keyes (1988) have argued that Buddhists in some
areas look unfavorably on merchants because they suspect that improper
means were used in amassing wealth; however, this has nothing to do with
the activity per se.

All of this raises a difficult point concerning Buddhist beliefs about the
functioning of the market. Certainly Buddhism accepts competition in
general in the sense that it is possible to compete without hurting others,
e.g., excel in virtue. For instance, King (1964, pp. 241 0 discusses the
work of a Burmese writer on economic issues, U Chan Htoon, who speaks of
"prizes in the school of life that each may strive for to obtain.... If a
man chooses to interpret this as free competition, it is still competition
without rivalry, for victory to oneself does not mean the defeat of someone
else."

How relevant is this to the economy? If we adopt the reasonable "Austrian"
view that the competitive market can not properly function without rivalry,
then it can be argued that innovation or "vigorous" market activities can
not take place in a Buddhist economy. As Schumpeter pointed out,
innovations bring the winds of creative destruction, which can cause
economic distress to the non-innovators. Similarly, rivalry in a market
where the available demand at an equilibrium price would drive a number of
firms out of business would also lead to similar distress. We can lack
attachment to our wealth and yet still experience considerable pain in the
process of being deprived of our customary livelihood. In both cases, it
must be added, the exact incidence and extent of the pain are unanticipated
by the participants who are the cause of this distress.

At this point it is important to stress the critical nature of motives in
Buddhist ethical thought. Thus, if innovations are made, but not with the
intention to ruin a competitor or to amass goods for personal use, but
rather to supply goods to the population at a lower cost and to provide
gifts to monks and the poor (including, perhaps, former competitors who
were not flexible in responding), then innovation can be quite acceptable.
Similar arguments can be made in the case of commercial rivalry.
                                     IV

                        Other Economic Institutions

According to king ( 1964, p. 177) the Buddha had little concern for society
as such and little conviction of its possible improvability. Certainly
society was not to be destroyed and social conditions might help or hinder
humans in their search for nibbana, but such conditions could never
befundamentallybettered.

One receives the strong impression that early Buddhist writings generally
accept existing political and economic institutions, even while providing a
democratic social ethos which was revolutionary for its time. For instance,
the Buddha did not appear to challenge the general framework of the
kingship; and in so far as he did not strongly urge the freeing of slaves
(who are mentioned in the canonical sources, even though they did not
appear a numerically important group), he appeared to accept the
institution of slavery (e.g, the scriptural sources cited by Gard, 1960, p.
225). The Buddha did represent a break from older social traditions in that
he did not condemn urban institutions and seemed aligned with such groups
as merchants.

It must also be noted, however, that according to the established rules of
monastic life, the monks could not have slaves, which suggests that the
institution of slavery was uncomfortable to them. In the writings of early
Buddhists who are held in particularly high regard, e.g., King Asoka, there
was no call to free slaves, but merely the "proper treatment of slaves and
servants" (Nikan and McKeon, 1966, p. 45).
                                     V

                             Economic Policies

The "Agganna Sutta" which described the origins of property also discusses
the origins of the State. As crime increased after the division of the
land, the people elected a king to maintain law and order, paying him for
his troubles. This suggests a type of social contract theory, which means
that the king has important obligations toward the people.

Some of the discussion about economic policy with such a social contract is
too general to be of much help to the policy maker, e.g, Buddhadasa
Bhikku's (1986, p. 95) exegesis of the traditional Ten Royal Precepts of
Kingship: generosity, morality, liberality, uprightness, gentleness,
self-restraint, non-anger, non-hurtfulness, forbearance, and
non-opposition.

However, more practical advice can also be found. For instance, one of the
canonical sources, the "Kutadanta Sutta" [Sutta V of Digha-Nikaya] speaks
of the Royal Acts to increase prosperity which include giving of seed corn
and food to farmers and of capital to merchants to start or increase their
business. The particular source emphasizes that if prosperity increases,
economic disorders and crime such as theft decrease.

Additional insight into State economic activities can be gained by
examining the records of some of the "righteous rulers" who are revered by
the Buddhists. Unfortunately, the economic parts of this literature are not
extensive because the monks writirig such manuscripts were more concerned
with their spiritual lives, rather than their statecraft, an orientation
most apparent in the well-known discussion of King Malinda. It should also
be noted that because of the participation of the State in the operations
of the irrigation systems in many of these countries, the crown had a
fairly active role in the economy.

The prototypical important righteous ruler was the revered King Asoka
(Ashoka) (ca. 274-232 B.C.E.), the grandson of the founder of the Mauryan
dynasty in indict and one of the greatest of the Indian emperors.2 From
Asoka's edicts it appears that he generally accepted the economic and
political institutions of his time. For instance, he did not condemn either
torture (although he spoke of the necessity to avoid "unjust torture" or
the killing of criminals, Nikam and McKeon, 1966, p. 61), which seems
peculiar with regard to his reverence for life, especially of animals.

However, he also took as the goal of statecraft the welfare and happiness
of the people (pp. 38, 53) an`i, although he did not discuss in detail the
means, it appears that he adopted a highly activist fiscal policy, both
with regard to current and capital expenditures. For instance, he gave
gifts to the aged, other needy, and religious orders; he set up public
education courses to teach the doctrines of dhamma; he cut back on large
public festivals; he imported and planted medicinal herbs; and he carried
out various public works projects such as digging of wells, planting of
trees, construction of rest houses and animal watering stations along main
roads in the empire. Some of his edicts appeared to enforce traditional
Buddhist beliefs, e.g, bans on slaughtering various animals. The funds
spent on the maintenance of the crown and good works were high, e.g., taxes
were apparently about one fourth of the revenue of land (p. 69).

However, a curious policy dilemma arises. Asoka quite specifically noted
that "the people can be induced to advance in dhamma by only two means: by
moral prescriptions and by meditation. Of the two, moral prescriptions are
of little consequence, but meditation is of great importance" (p. 40). In
short, he saw limits of an activist government in promoting virtue. The
definition of such limits has been a source of controversy among Buddhist
writers ever since.

Still another righteous ruler was King Ruang (all references refer to
Reynolds and Reynolds, 1982), who lived in the 14th century in Thailand,
long after the canonical scriptures had been completed. Ruang stated (p.
153) quite clearly that a righteous king brings prosperity to his sub
jects. He apparently had a much less luxurious court or a less activist
governmental expenditure policy than Asoka, since he advised (p. 151 ff.)
that taxes should be less than 10 percent of the crop (and less in a
drought) and that such taxes should never be higher than those of the
preceding king. He also urged (p. 152 ff.) that the State provide interest
free loans to those wishing to engage in commerce and that no profit taxes
should be placed upon such commercial activities.

Of course, the various writings on economic policy are both unsystematic
and diffuse; they certainly do not define very exactly what type of
economic policies should be followed or, in any very specific sense, the
economic principles underlying such action. However, one important
assumption behind such policy advice is simple a king following the dhamma
and listening to the advice of the monks will know what are the correct
policies to follow. These moral policies will bring prosperity according to
the doctrine of radiation.
                                     VI

Three Brief Meditations on the Economic Impact of Canonical Buddhism

It should be clear that canonical Buddhist beliefs and attitudes toward
economic activity and capital formation are much more ambiguous than often
stated in the economic literature (e.g., Ayal, 1963). The purpose of this
section is to delve into three economic problems posed within the framework
of canonicalhe impact of canonical Buddhism on actual economic practices
and beliefs in Buddhist countries is a much more complicated subject,
especially since these vary considerably from country to country, and they
must be left for another occasion.)

The Economic Dialectic Between the Monks and the Laity

As many have suggested, a Buddhist economy comprised only of monks (and
nuns) could not last since these people have fully given up occupational
and family duties in order to search for nibbana, relying on others to feed
them. For a Buddhist economy to survive, there must be both monks and lay
people. Simple economic considerations determine the relative numbers of
the two groups for a closed Buddhist economy.

If working incentives were not affected by giving away of food to monks, if
"radiation" was not important, and if the entire population lived at the
subsistence level, then the maximum percentage of the population who could
live as monks (hereafter "maximum monk-share") would be determined from two
factors the percentage of the economically active lay population (i e.,
engaged in production); and the difference between average production and
the subsistence level for the family members supported by the person
engaged in productive work. To these barebones, other considerations can be
taken into account:

Productivity: The higher the level of productivity (due to investment or to
a higher level of technology), the greater the maximum monk-share.

Minimum consumption level: It is unlikely that the lay population will be
content to maintain just a subsistence level and give their surplus to the
monks. The higher the amount of their surplus production they wish to
consume before giving any food to the monks, the lower the maximum
monk-share.

Disincentives: If the laity must give up a large share of their produce to
the monks, they might not work as hard as if all of their food were going
to their own consumption. Although diligence is praised in the Buddhist
canon, I could find nothing which specified exactly how hard people would
work and it is, therefore, likely that less effort would be applied. The
greater this disincentive effect, the lower the maximum monk-share.

Radiation: If the laity consume many luxuries, they may become greedy and
transgress the laws of dhamma so that negative virtue is radiated and the
maximum monk-share is lowered. If the monk population follows religious
prescriptions in a proper fashion, they and the laity together can radiate
virtue, which raises production and increases the maximum monk-share.

Actions of the ruler: The ruler's economic policies affect production and,
hence, the maximum monk-share. This raises the problem of what should be
policy goals of the ruler. For simplicity of exposition, I assume the
policies remain constant and take up the problem of policy goals at the end
of the discussion.

An interesting economic problem arises when the number of monks is less
than the maximum which can be supported and when the amount of luxury goods
consumed by the population corrupts them. Three policy options are open:
(a) The luxury foods can be collected and used not for the support of monks
(who are not at the maximum number) but for the construction of temples.
(Such investment is productive in the sense that it reduces corruption,
increases virtue, and raises the production function). (b) The people can
be persuaded to work less so that they will have fewer luxury goods, but
more time for meditation. This would, of course, lower production. (c) The
economic institutions of the society might be rearranged so that
productivity would be less, but the possibilities of increasing merit would
be greater. For instance, creation of small-scale villages where economies
of scale would be lost, but an environment more nurturing of virtuous
behavior than that of anonymous city life would be created. The second and
third options both entail reduction of consumption, but in quite different
ways.

This economic dialectic between the monks and laity has a strong influence
on capital formation. More specifically, gifts to the monks would lower the
ratio of investment to the GDP if the laity were unwilling to lower their
standard of living to an equal amount since the resources would come out of
resources previously used in investment, which seems a reasonable
assumption This situation also leads to trade-off between the relative
number of current and future monks who can be supported. If a Buddhist
government wishes to encourage the achieving of nibbana, it makes good
sense to encourage capital formation so that in the long run a higher share
of the population can become monks and engage in the necessary
contemplation. The exact amount of capital formation depends, of course, on
the social discount rate.

What should be the policy goals of a ruler in such Buddhist societies? If
achievement of nibbana of as many people as possible were the goal, then
policy should be aimed for increasing material prosperity so that more
monks could be supported (since they have a higher probability of achieving
nibbana and of encouraging as many of the laity as possible (according to
the conditions presented in the diagram) to join the monasteries in order
to achieve this goal.

This interdependence between laity and monks has some important
implications for the nature of Buddhist society. First and foremost, it
means that there is a strong complementarily between the nibbanic and the
kammic strands of Buddhism. For nibbana to be achieved by some, the others
must exist as well; and the two strands of Buddhism are thus inextricably
tied.

It also means that many of the interpretations tying Buddhism to lack of
economic progress are misguided. As noted in a number of different ways
above, Buddhism is not inimical to material prosperity. Further, Buddhism
is not just a religion of the monks, but also of the laity; and, therefore,
both groups require attention before generalizations can be made about the
impact of the religion on the economy.

These rather obvious strictures are not taken into account in many
analyses. For instance, in a discussion entitled "The Other-Worldliness of
Buddhism and Its Economic Consequences," Max Weber (1968, pp. 627-30) notes
that the impact of Buddhism varies from country to country, depending upon
the cultural milieu in which it is found. However, in all of them "no
motivation toward a rational system for the methodical control of life
flowed from Buddhist . . . piety." Although the doctrine does leave "room
for the acquisitive drive of the tradesman, the interest of the artisan in
sustenance, and the traditionalism of the peasant," it accepts "this world
as externally given" and does not provide for a "rationalized ethical
transformation" of existing conditions which is necessary either to improve
one's own economic condition or that of society in general. Although a type
of capitalism has existed in these countries in a modest sense, "there was
no development toward 'modern capitalism', nor even any stirrings in that
direction. Above all, there evolved no 'capitalist spirit' in the sense
that is distinctive of ascetic Protestantism."[3]

Clearly Weber is focusing his attention only on one of the complementary
strands of Buddhism. If he had directed his attention to the Buddhist lay
people and lay ethic, he might have discovered quite a different economic
and social consequence of the religion, e.g, business management and
capital accumulation in a "modern fashion," combined with the accumulation
of merit by giving away some of the surplus to monks and other poor people.
Certainly Zen Buddhism, which has had an extremely strong cultural impact
on Japan, has certain important other-worldly aspects, and yet this has not
prevented Japan from achieving an impressive degree of economic
development. Of course, it is the lay people, not the monks, who are the
producers and investors. Nevertheless, the relationships between
"other-worldly" Buddhism and economic and political are much more
complicated than Weber suggested (a matter explored by a number of writers,
e.g., Tambiah [1984], Sarkisyanz [1965]).

Although Weber's exclusive focus on only one of the two complementary
social groups in a Buddhist economy appears one-sided, he maywell be
correct that in certain situations, Buddhism does raise difficulties for
economic development, but for quite different reasons than he argued, e.g,
where traditional cultural values are antithetical to economic development
and where these values and Buddhism are inextricably tied.

The Problem of Needs and Wants

Underlying much of the discussion in the canonical works is a distinction
between needs and wants which provides a fulcrum for the doctrinal
treatment of consumption. Needs, for instance, are embodied in the Four
Requisites (food, clothing, shelter, and medicine) Although asceticism is
condemned, the doctrine of non-attachment has been interpreted by many to
mean that we should lead a life of simplicity and consume little more than
our needs.

How needs are defined is the key question; but I have found little
systematic evidence in the canonical scriptures on the matter. An
interesting ambivalence appears On the one hand, there appears to be an
implicit assumption that our needs are both biological and social, i.e.,
related to the station of life in which one finds oneself. On the other
hand, the various stories of generous giving suggest that even those of
very high station can live in simplicity consuming only enough to fulfill
their basic biological needs after they have disposed of almost all of
their wealth to the monastery.

If one's consumption needs are limited, then under normal conditions it may
not be necessary to spend much time in work if one is diligent in the few
hours when it is necessary to earn one's daily bread. Although Buddhism, in
common with the doctrines of other religions, does not appear to treat such
incentive problems, this is not worrisome since meditation and other
spiritual exercises can be carried out in the greater amount of free time.
I have found no evidence of any belief in the Protestant saying that "the
devil finds work for idle hands."

Such considerations give rise to a puzzle. What does the Buddhist canon
mean by "prosperity" in describing the result of spiritual radiation?
Clearly the economic needs of all people are filled and perhaps the
quasi-necessities as well. Given the doctrines against attachment and
pride, it does not seem likely that luxury consumption should be very high,
except in the situation where people are mindful of the impermanence of the
situation and would be willing to relinquish all such luxury consumption.

The reduction of consumption to the level of needs--never very clearly
defined--has a certain appeal among modern Buddhists and is supported by
some interesting arguments. For instance, the Thai monk Buddhadasa Bhikkhu
( 1986, p. 61) argues that the multiplication of individual wants is always
at the expense of society since if people consumed only according to their
needs, there would be enough for all and in all times. From the rest of his
argument it is clear that he is relying on the story of the creation of
property presented above, where the world had sufficient food for all
before people started acting with pride and maximizing utility by storing
food (and thereby saving daily trips out to the fields).

The Problem of Economic Complexity

In common with all religions which emerged in peasant economies, Buddhism
has a number of doctrines which point toward the relationships within a
small community as a behavioral ideal. The emphasis on simple living
discussed above reinforces this idea. Further, according to Gard (1964, p.
112), Buddhism has a strong personalistic ethic, e.g., a preference for
settling questions of equity and justice on a person-to-person basis,
rather than by a legalistic technique or stated principles. Their belief
that work should enable a person to overcome ego-centredness by joining
with others in a common purpose is another sign pointing to the benevolent
nature of the small scale community, in contrast to the large, urban
community. Modern Buddhists, e.g., Buddhadasa BhikLu (1986, p. 86) or
Sivaraksa (1986, pp. 54 ff.) argue that social problems seem to grow as
people begin living in larger and larger groups and that such complexity
and development leads to an overvaluation of "quantity" and an
undervaluation of "quality. "

The canonical scriptures appear to provide few direct guideposts for living
in highly complicated and impersonal urban complexes. Two approaches are
possible to imagine: (a) Traditional doctrines would be extrapolated to
meet the new situation, e.g, rightmindedness could be reinterpreted for the
needs of such a setting; (b) Attempts would be made to avoid the creation
of such conditions. The latter alternate would require the deliberate
maintenance of small, face-to-face communities; small factories;
considerable self-sufficiency; dampening of the class struggle of workers
and property owners by social forces, and maintenance of high direct and
indirect barriers to trade with the outside world.

Of course, all of this would be accompanied by a considerable loss of
productivity and lower living standards. This, however, would be quite
consistent with the beliefs about production for needs, rather than wants,
and for simplicity of life style. Such self-contained communities would
also reduce external trade and thus reduce the temptation of merchants to
deviate from the dhamma by becoming too attached to their profits of trade.
In a small community, it may be easier to enforce social controls to
prevent trade profits from being too high. Finally, the fall in income from
the loss of economies of scale which occurs in small-scale economic
communities is, as noted above, one way of reducing the possible corruption
of attachment arising from consumption of luxury goods.

Although I have not seen proposals for such small-scale, autarkic
communities in the Buddhist literature available to me, some--such as
Mahatma Gandhi (who drew upon both Buddhist and Hindu traditions) and E. F.
Schumacher (who drew upon Buddhist ideas)--have viewed this idea with
favor. Certain of Gandhi's disciples (e.g., Das, 1979) have explored at
considerable length how the modern society and economy could be arranged
under such a principle while minimizing the loss of production.
                                    VII

            Buddism as a Guidepost for a Modern Economic System

On a local level the uses of Buddhism are elastic, and doctrinal sources
can be used either to justify the building of yet another temple or to
provide religious support for village development work (e.g., Macy [1983]).
On a national level, a similar doctrinal flexibility is found.

In bygone years some Buddhist social commentators took a very passive view
toward economic policy, arguing that it is even useless to try to correct
some obvious shortcomings of the economy. For instance, in Burma the
Buddhist ShwayYoe, writing at the end of the 19th century (cited by King,
1964, p. 231), says that the rich and powerful man has a right to govern
because in a previous life he was pious and good; the poor man must be
content with his lot because he must have been bad before he entered this
existence.

In more recent times this appears to be changing and a considerable number
of Buddhist intellectuals start their analysis of economic systems with a
critique of the obvious defects of both capitalism and communism, then to
argue that since Buddhism is a doctrine of the Middle Way, it is possible
to draw upon the positive aspects of both types of systems while, at the
same time, arranging matters so as to avoid the general materialism and
spiritual sickness which is found in both systems. The real question, of
course, is what must the economy look like and what must the State do to
avoid the various specified evils, while increasing virtue.

The Buddhist canon provides arguments for all sides of the political
spectrum for reconstructing the economy. For purposes of illustration it is
useful to compare the ideas advanced by the far left (Buddhist socialists
or communists) and right (Buddhist traditionalists). Representing the left
I draw upon the doctrines of the Buddhist socialists as summarized by
Sarkisyanz (1965, 1978); representing the right I draw upon the writings of
a Thai monk, Buddhadasa Bhikkbu (1986).4 I have not been able to locate any
intellectual in recent years justifying some type of laissezfaire
capitalism by recourse to the Buddhist canon, although it is not hard to
imagine updated versions of the arguments advanced by Shway Yoe (noted
above) combined with some notion that it is primarily individual actions,
rather than governmental moral prescriptions and policies, which lead to a
virtuous society.

Buddhadasa has little discussion of public ownership of the means of
production, apparently taking a pragmatic stand in favor of current
arrangements based on the necessity of private property arising from human
frailities. The Buddhist socialists have favored considerable
nationalization of the means of production. For instance, U Nu supported
land nationalization by arguing that by eliminating private bwnership of
land, the class struggle based on the illusion about the importance of
property could be eliminated as well (Sarkisyanz, 1978). The Burmese
government of Ne Win, who overthrew U Nu, carried out considerable
nationalization of industry and banks.

Both the right and the left Buddhists favor a certain minimal
redistribution of income so that the basic consumption needs of all are
covered. However, based on traditional arguments, Bhikkbu can still support
the maintenance of class distinctions, albeit based on function and duty
rather than inherited wealth. Others on the Buddhist right have argued that
redistributing income is "patchwork, like social service" and that true
Buddhism takes away the instinct of possessiveness; and that sharing can
come only after the overcoming of self. On the left U Nu argued for
considerably more redistribution on the grounds that this would increase
the number of those economically capable of performing works of piety
(Sarkisyanz, 1965, p. 171). Others of the left argued for redistribution,
drawing upon arguments about the rough economic equality found in the
monastery.

With regard to governmental activism in the economy, the important role of
the governments in the irrigation economies of Southeast Asia received
mention above. Nevertheless, the dilemma mentioned above concerning King
Asoka--how to define the limits of intervention-is still an unresolved
issue.

On the right, Buddhadasa Bhikkhu has drawn those limits rather widely: He
called his ideal system "dictatorial dhammic socialism" which, among other
things, means that moral governmental policies should be carried out
"expeditiously"; this differs from tyranny, he argues, since in the latter
the policies carried out do not serve the general interest. In any case he
is not shy in urging governmental coercion to force people to contribute
their labor to public works construction.

The Buddhists on the left have urged considerable governmental
intervention, and both the Burmese governments of U Nu and Ne Win carried
out a variety of direct and indirect measures to guide the economy. It also
seems possible, however, for a Buddhist to draw upon the canon to urge
relatively little intervention, not only on the grounds that "each must
find refuge in himself" to achieve virtue but also on the grounds of the
effect of such a concentration of political and economic power in the
government upon the personnel in the government itself.

In short, the vagueness of the Buddhist canon on economic matters combined
with its complexity and length allows room for quite different
interpretations of an ideal economic system in modern times, especially
since conditions are very much different than they were more than 2000
years ago when the Buddha lived. Of course, this situathon is little
different from that of Christianity. The really difficult problem is to
determine what part of the canon will be taken seriously under what
circumstances, but this would require a much different kind of approach
than the textual exegesis offered here.

Many of the writings of religious figures applying the ideals of Buddhists
to problems of economics are incredibly naive, but this is similar to
writings of other religions as well. The Buddhists' moral critiques of
modern economies have cogency, as do their investigation of possible
alternative economic policies. The increasing interest in Islam has given
rise to an exploding literature on Islamic economics; the increasing
interest in Buddhism might give rise to a similar development of Buddhist
economics as well.

Notes

[1.] From one perspective, this gives rise to an interesting puzzle: if i
give alms to a poor stranger, is such generosity a consequence of his
previous behavior and thought, or merely a random event which provides him
with pleasure? Is the deed a consequence of my accumulated merit so that
our kammic-trajectories intersect at this particular point, or is it merely
a random event which provides me with unexpected merit?

[2.] Asoka's edicts have been collected and systematized by Nikam and
McKeon (1966); and my discussion is based on their book. Strong (1988)
argues that it is not the historical Asoka or his writings which are famous
and revered, but rather the legendary Asoka Although this may well be
correct, for purposes of this essay, this is irrelevant.

An important righteous ruier before Asoka was Prince Vessantara, who was
Siddhartha Gautama in his immediately previous existence. Of particular
note, the Prince gave away all of his wealth to anyone who requested it;
this including his children, his wife, his magic white elephant which
brought rain, and the kingship itself. He represents the ideal of
non-attachment and generosity; it is noteworthy that he did not give funds
to monks and their sangha since, of course, they did not appear until the
Prince in his next life became the Buddha His other economic policies are
not well known.

[3.] In this passage Weber also makes an argumentative leap from the
doctrines of the religion to the actual practices of the sociery which, as
I have indicated above, does not appear warranted. Certainly there is
little in the kammic strand of Buddhism which would hinder the development
of accounting and other aids to rational business calculation; indeed, the
injunctions for good stewardship would encourage such developments. Keyes
(1988), for instance, speaks of the "innerworldly asceticism" and "work
ethic" of the Buddhists in northeastern Thailand.

[4.] Although my boef presentation of Bhikkhu's economic ideas make them
sound rather similar to doctrines of national socialism in Germany, this
connection should not be drawn Bhikkbu is a strong believer in non-violence
and has a profound moral conception of human kind; unfortunately, his
economic ideas are naive. Sarkisyanz (1965) presents an interesting summary
of active economic policy by Buddhist kings from Asoka onwards.

References

(For additional references not cited in the text of this article, see the
bibliography of my previous article, "A Buddhist Economic System--in
Principle," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 49, No. 3,
(July, 1990), pp. 339-49).

Anguttara-Nikaya, Volumes Hl and IV, trans. by E. M Hare. The Book of
Gradual Sayings for Fali Text Society London: Luzac, 1961,1965.

Anguttara-Nikaya, Volumes I and 11, trans. by F L. Woodward, The Book of
Gradual Sayings for Pali Text Society. London Luzac, 1962, 1970.

Ayal, Eliezer, "Value Systems and Economic Development in Japan and
Thailand," Journal of Social issues, 19, No. I ()an. 1963), pp. 35-51.

Buddhadasa, Bhikkhu, Dhammic Socialism, translated and edited by Donald K.
Swearer. Bangkok: Thai Inter Religious Commission for Development, 1986.

Digha-Nikaya, trans. by T. W Rhys Davids. Dialogues of the Buddha, Part 1,
Pali Text Society. London: Luzac, 1965.

Digha-Nikaya, trans. by T. W Rhys Davids and C A. F Rhys Davids. Dialogues
of the Buddha, Partill, 5th edition, Pali Text Society. London: Luzac,
1965.

Das, Amritandanda, Foundations of Gandhian Economics New York st. Martin's,
1979.

Gard, Richard A., Buddhism. New York: George Braziller, 1962.

King, Winston L., In the Hope of Nibhana LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court,
1964.

Little, David, "Ethical Analysis and Wealth in Theravaa Buddhism: A
Response to Frank Reynolds," in Sizemore and Swearer (1988).

Majjhima-Nikaya, Volumes 1,11, and 111, translated by 1. B Homer for Pali
Text Society. The Collection of Middle Length Sayings London: Luzac, 1957,
1967.

Nikam, N A and Richard McKeon, eds. The Edicts of Asoka. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1966.

Reynolds, Frank E., "Ethics and Wealth in Theravada Buddhism: A Study in
Comparative Religious Ethics," in Sizemore and Swearer (1988).

-----, "Four Modes of Theravada Action," Journal of Religious Ethics, 7,
No. 1 (Spring 1979), pp. 12-26.

Reynolds, Frank E. and Regina T. Clifford, "Sangha, Society, and the
Struggle for National Identity: Burma and Thailand," in Frank Reynolds and
Ludwig, Theodore, eds. Transition and Transformations in the History of
Religions. Leiden: Brill, 1980, pp. 56-91.

Reynolds, Frank E. end Mani Reynolds, Three WorldsAccordingtoKinBRuang: A
ThaiBuddhist Cosmology, University of California Research Series 4.
Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1982.

Sarkisyanz, E., "Buddhist Backgrounds of the Burmese Socialism," in
Bardwell L. Smith, ed. Religion and the Legitimkation of Power in Thailand,
Laos, and Burma. Chambersburg, Pa.: ANIMA Books, 1978.

Sarkisyanz, E., Buddhist Backgrounds of the Burmese Revolution. The Hague:
Maninus Nijhoff, 1965.

Schumacher, E. F., "Buddhist Economics," in his Small is Beautiful:
Economics as if People Mattered. New York: Harper and Row, 1973, pp. 53-63.

Sivaraksa, Sulak, A Buddhist Vision for Renewing Society. Bangkok: Tienwan
Publishing House, 1986.

Tambiah, Stanley Jeyaraja, The Buddhist Saints of the Forest and the Cult
of Amulets: A Study in Charisma, Hagiography, Sectarianism, and
Millennia/Buddhism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.

Weber, Max, Economy and Society, edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich,
Volume II. New York: Bedminster Press, 1968.

Weber, Max, The Religion of India: The Sociology of Hindukm and Buddhism,
transl. by Hans H. Gerth and Don Manindale. Glencoe: Free Press, 1958.

~~~~~~~~

BY FREDERIC L. PRYOR[*]

[*] [Frederic L. Pryor, Ph.D., is professor of economics at Swarthmore
College, Swarthmore, PA 19081.]
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