Compassion: An East-West comparison
                                   by Patricia Walsh-Frank 
                                       Asian Philosophy
                                    Vol. 6 No. 1 Mar.1996
                                             Pp.5-16
                              Copyright by Asian Philosophy

ABSTRACT

Compassion is an emotion that occupies a central position in Mahayana
Buddhist philosophy while it is often a neglected subject in contemporary
western philosophy. This essay is a comparison between an Eastern view of
compassion based upon Mahayana Buddhist perspectives and a western view of
the same emotion. Certain principles found in Mahayana Buddhist philosophy
such as the Bodhisattva Ideal, and suffering (dukkha) to name two, are
explored for the information they contain about compassion. An essay by
Lawrence Blum is taken as representative of a Western view (but not
exclusively) and it is analyzed for its shortcomings in light of the
Buddhist view. The conclusion briefly describes the value of understanding
an eastern view on compassion as a means of filling the void one finds in
western medical ethics discourse which focuses so heavily, and redundantly,
upon issues such as patient autonomy and paternalism.

     A Chinese Ch'an Master once said: 'We are all in the path of
     enlightenment, but the question is, are we on the right track?' [1]

Compassion is an emotion that occupies a central position in Mahayana
Buddhist philosophy while it is often neglected in contemporary western
philosophy. Comparisons between Eastern and Western views on this emotion
are rare if they exist at all. Yet, such a study would prove invaluable to
the Western philosophical discipline of medical ethics. A study of this
kind would require a much larger text of research than the one presently
before you. However, one must begin somewhere and this essay is proposed as
the beginning of what is hoped will be a much longer and much broader
discourse which evaluates Eastern philosophical perspectives in terms of
Western needs in medical ethics. This essay will not attempt any
elaboration upon the idea just presented. Rather, it attempts to get at the
root of some of the differences and difficulties one uncovers when engaging
upon a more or less straight-forward comparative analysis of compassion
from two culturally different views. You will find before you first, a
short explanation of why emotions have been neglected. This is provided in
order to prove the validity of the assertion made in the opening sentence
of this essay. It also provides the reader with the insight that his or her
own attitude towards emotions may well have a negative bias which results
in a less open attitude to the ideas presented here. Having made this point
the essay turns to an explanation of certain important principles of
Mahayana Buddhism as they relate to compassion. However, the task of
extracting information regarding an Eastern view based upon Mahayana
Buddhism turns out to be a complex process. Many ideas about emotions are
embedded in this philosophy as Padmasiri de Silva points out when he says:

     Some of the central dimensions of emotions which I have described as
     presented in the western philosophy of emotions can be accommodated
     within the Buddhist perspectives on emotions . . . These observations
     are found dispersed in the discourses of the Buddha . . . [2]

From among these discourses, then, concepts such as conventional reality
(Samsara), suffering (duhkha), impermanence (anitya), the non-self
(anatman) and the doctrine of the Two-fold Truth are discussed. And, the
importance of meditation as the vehicle to enlightenment is highlighted.
The outcome of this narrower focus is that certain arbitrary decisions have
been made regarding what to include here. In my discussion about the nature
of suffering as an inherent part of Being [3] I draw upon the Heideggerian
model. In addition, considerable time is taken discussing the Bodhisattva
Ideal as it applies here. [4,5] This is followed by a brief analysis of
Lawrence Blum's essay on compassion which is taken as representative of a
Western analytic perspective, but not exclusively. [6] Certain strengths
and weaknesses of Blum's analysis are pointed out to show where one must be
careful about being too analytical when examining the topic of compassion.
Such an approach can result in a lack of depth that is one of the features
of Blum's otherwise well-written essay.

In my conclusion, I briefly discuss the value of understanding this Eastern
view on compassion since I believe aspects of it will help fill the void
one finds in Western medical ethics discourse which focuses so heavily, and
redundantly, upon issues such as patient autonomy, paternalism and informed
consent. Lastly, although Mahayana Buddhism makes no formal claim to being
an ethical theory, one cannot ignore the underlying ethical tone of many of
its doctrines. Therefore, although ethics or moral theory is not the
primary focus of this essay, in some way this is a discussion about
morality.

The Insufficiency of Discourse on Emotions--Lack of Balance

     Despite a common prejudice, reason and emotion are not natural
     antagonists. [7]

There is a noticeable absence of study about emotions in philosophy which
is ascribed to a prejudice against them. They are viewed as being
irrational and, therefore, undeserving of attention. In the West [8] such
attitudes are routinely expressed in philosophical discourse. They have
their foothold in the works of ancient philosophers, such as Aristotle, and
they have been consistently reiterated and reinforced by most major Western
philosophers through the ages. During the 18th-century European
Enlightenment, the tools for analytic philosophy were finely forged with a
disproportionate emphasis upon, and valuing of, highly rational dichotomous
thinking. The legacy of this history has been a relegation of emotions to
the 'back room' of philosophy where they have been left to collect dust. In
the meantime Western philosophers have engaged in a centuries-old myopic
discussion of the virtues of reason. Over-emphasis upon reason has resulted
in the creation of something like a 'straw man' where emotions are
concerned. Often their only use has been to emphasise how useless they are.
The result is that many Western philosophers have failed to come to an
understanding of the integral role emotions play in human behaviour,
particularly moral behaviour.

Padmasiri de Silva describes negativism towards emotions saying:

     . . . they are considered antithetical to our cognitive skills, to
     think, reason, perceive and understand. Emotions have also been
     considered as states which interfere with the development of good
     character and as ethically undesirable states which ought to be
     eliminated. In the realm of human behaviour it is assumed that always
     emotions interfere with calm, voluntary and rational behaviour. [9]

The above description differs from the balancing of reason and emotions
that is found in Mahayana Buddhism during certain period of its
development. [10] Dayal indirectly addresses this balance in the Eastern
view when he discusses 'The Ten Powers' and the 'Eighteen Avenika-dharmas'
of the Buddha. The following quotation tells us that without the use of
reason and intellect the Buddha would not have the mental power needed to
fulfil his position. Dayal says:

     A Buddha possesses the knowledge of correct and faulty conclusions. He
     knows fully and truly the consequences of all actions in the past,
     present and the future with regard to their causes and circumstances.
     He is cognizant of the various aspirations and dispositions of
     different types of persons. [11]

This tells us that the Buddha is able to make sound judgments. He is able
to anticipate the outcome of actions on the basis of logical deduction (or
induction [12]). He then integrates this knowledge into a cause and effect
analysis. All of these processes are the activities of reason. However,
when Dayal says that the Buddha is 'cognizant of the various aspirations
and dispositions of different types of persons' we interpret this to mean
that the Buddha is aware that both aspirations and dispositions are based
in emotions. This means that emotions, and knowledge of them, are of great
importance to his functioning effectively. In another Dayal discussion
about the 'Eighteen Avenika-dharmas', emotions are again emphasised. He
says that a Buddha is distinguished from other beings by his deep and great
pity, love, mercy and compassion for all beings (karuna). [13] Possession
of these emotions is the mark that distinguishes a Buddha from ordinary
people.

We see an incorporation of emotions into the Dharma [14] when we consider,
for example, discussions of the five aggregates (khandha) which are
regarded as comprising personhood. These aggregates are, (1) body (rupa);
(2) feelings (vedana); (3) perceptions (sanna); (4) dispositions (sankhara)
and (5) consciousness (vinnana). The five aggregates, representing
conventional notions of personhood, [15] are then integrated into larger
principles until one arrives at a single unified doctrine. A brief review
of the Mahayana principles mentioned in the introduction of this essay
follows; it will provide us with a clearer understanding of how closely
mind (reason) and spirit (in part emotions) co-mingle in this holistic
philosophy. The tools of reason such as language and logic are used to
describe the significance of these principles in growth of the spirit.
These examples show that while reason is important in Mahayana Buddhism it
does not rule disproportionately as it does in the West. In Buddhism, [16]
de Silva says, 'an emotion can be described as an interactive complex
emerging within a causal network'. This means that emotions like compassion
are not normally subjected to Western style reductive analysis, and the
devaluation that often accompanies such a process. This is not to say that
there are not similarities between Eastern and Western views of compassion.
In both, distinctions are made between good and bad, positive and negative,
active and passive emotions. Compassion is regarded as an active, positive
emotion with volitional qualities in both cultures.

The Bodhisattva Ideal

According to Dayal the word 'Bodhisattva' designates an individual who is
actively seeking to live a saintly life based upon the Buddha's life and
Dharma. Bodhisattva is a Sanskrit word that has 'Bodhi' as its root meaning
'Enlightenment'. [17] 'Sattva' can mean both 'any living or sentient being'
and 'a being of (or destined for) Enlightenment'. Taken as a whole this
word exemplifies the belief that each person has the seed of Buddhahood
within. Some time in the third century after the Buddha's death the ideal
of the arhat, as a person who emulated the teaching of the Buddha and was
free from worldly contamination, underwent a change. Monks, called arhats,
began to ignore important aspects of fundamental Buddhist teachings. They
became increasingly self-centred and ceased to be committed to zealous
missionary work among the people. To counter this unwelcome change, the
whole arhat ideal was challenged by a new one, the Bodhisattva doctrine,
which promulgated the ideal of compassionate action. Its history is as
follows:

     . . . bodhisattva doctrine was promulgated by some Buddhist leaders as
     a protest against lack of true spiritual fervor and altruism among the
     monks of that period, The coldness and aloofness of the arhats led to
     a movement in favor of the old gospel of 'saving all creatures'. The
     bodhisattva ideal can be understood only against this background of
     saintly and severe, but inactive and indolent monastic Order . . .
     [18]

This statement concludes by saying that it borders on blasphemy to think of
a Buddha who is not loving and altruistic. The new Bodhisattva Ideal made
the selflessness of compassion a requirement for the Bodhisattva. This
requirement dictates that the Bodhisattva must sacrifice entering nirvana
himself because to do otherwise would mean abandoning those suffering in
samsara whom he must teach. His vow is to 'lead all being to Liberation . .
. ' staying in samsara ' . . . till the end, even for the sake of one
living soul'. [19] Statements such as this reveal the underlying ethics
found in Mahayana Buddhism. In the Bodhisattva Ideal one comes to
understand that suffering is not necessarily disclosed to those who suffer
yet, nevertheless, exists. Suffering (duhkha) is the ground from which the
Being of human beings arises. [20] It is a deeper suffering than the
physical or emotional or psychological although these forms of suffering
are symptomatic of this deeper affliction. Such suffering is a universal
circumstance of all beings. In this essay it is called the primordial [21 ]
nature of suffering as an affliction of all living human beings.

The Doctrines of Non-self and Two-fold Truth

     Virtuous man, since the time without beginning all living beings have
     been thinking wrongly of the I and of the one loving the I. As they do
     not know that they are just the rise and fall of consecutive thought,
     they give rise to love and hate and indulge in the five desires;
     (arising from the objects of the five senses).[22]

Compassion is an emotion that is 'other' directed, it involves a concern
for the well-being of others rather than our own. Thus, it moves us away
from the ego-centric self towards the non-self. In developing compassion
one comes to understand and acknowledge the interdependence of things upon
each other (pratitya samutpada). We become enlightened to the fact that
when we help others we help ourselves. We also recognise that the
ego-centric assumptions we make about our own individuality and
independence are falsely grounded in our cravings and desires. Gadjin Nagao
tells us that:

     It is a matter of course that in Buddhism defilements based upon
     ego-consciousness are to be removed. The aim of this removal . . . .
     is to elucidate . . . the dependent nature of the 'doer', 'goer' and
     so forth all of which are wrongly assumed to have independent and
     absolute existence. The subject that is freed from ego-consciousness
     and is of the other dependent nature can attain the perfect
     enlightenment. [23]

In Mahayana Buddhist doctrine we are called upon to free ourselves from the
defilements of the samsaric world which arise because of our
ego-consciousness. A central notion of the ego-centric person is that he
is, in some way, the centre of the universe and that the things of this
world are his. He sees himself as an independent ruler of his life and as a
powerful person who has some control over the impermanence (anitya) of all
things. Believing in his power he also believes that he has a right to
ownership of the things of this world just as he clings to these very
beliefs themselves. His attitude is concerned with the satisfaction of
one's own desires without consideration, oft-times, of others. Such ego
drive carries with it a profound misunderstanding of what it means to have
Being in this world. Such is the sense in which we should understand
Nagao's statement about how an ego-centric view 'wrongly' assumes that it
has an 'independent and absolute existence' that is without attachment to
others. In his wisdom the Buddha understands that this ego-centric view of
the world is wrong; it is an artificial creation of our imagination which
leads us away from the real truth of our interdependent natures. To be
freed of these false pretences we must free ourselves of the 'self', the
ego and its drives which sway our perspective. [24] Nagao explains:

     Through our cognitions, or discriminations, or intellect, we are
     always projecting some kind of imagination (which is always false
     imagination from the Buddhist point of view) onto the world that is
     originally neutral. This projection of false imagination changes or
     contaminates the world. People become attached to this contaminated
     world, thinking that it is the real world. This attachment gives rise
     to all forms of human suffering, discontent, conflict, defilement and
     so on. [25]

Compassion, because it takes us away from our selves, is intimately linked
to the ability to free ourselves from false assumptions and the elements of
the samsaric world which we falsely perceive (ditthi [26]) as real.
Clarence Hamilton [27] describes how loss of ego-centredness into selfless
compassion is an integral part of the Bodhisattva Ideal. He says of
Bodhisattvas:

     They do not become enervated by prosperity, and do not lose composure
     in adversity . . . They are unwearying in clothing the nakedness of
     others . . . they acquire the roots of virtue by keeping themselves
     aloof from passion, hatred and folly . . . They are skilled in
     bringing solace to those in trouble and misfortune. They do not
     hesitate to enter all kinds of service . . . They are free from sin .
     . . they love their enemies . . . [28]

The Doctrine of the Two-fold Truth is inextricably linked to the doctrine
of the Non-self (anatman). This doctrine provides a way of explaining the
relationship between samsara and nirvana, but it should not be taken simply
as a literary device. Samsara is the material world of the everyday, it is
the world into which we are born and then leave in death. [29] Samsara is
filled with ignorance and suffering because our ego-centric view prevails
in it. Its falsity is even expressed in words which, by their nature, set
limits to our experience. Words describe our erroneous beliefs and, thus,
perpetuate our ignorance of the true nature of Being. Nirvana, on the other
hand, is the ideal world of enlightenment. It is free of ignorance and
suffering. Yet, it is not a material world as samsara is. Rather, it is
'the ultimate goal of Buddhist striving, a suprapersonal and non-dual
experience of voidness which is the end of all duhkha and the highest
happiness. [30] If samsara is ruled by ignorance, nirvana is the home of
perfect wisdom. Nagao explains the equation between wisdom and nirvana;
through wisdom nirvana is met. [31] The limits of language make it
difficult to explain nirvana because it is unexplainable. To reduce nirvana
to linguistic formulations objectifies it, yet, it is not an object but an
extraordinary experience. Language places limits, yet, nirvana is
unlimitable. Thus, in a sense, language puts an end to nirvana's existence.
In silence alone nirvana is.

Nagao says that the Two-fold Truth opens a channel in which "Language
recovers itself in spite of its falsehood and ignorance". As the 'silence'
of nirvana is true wisdom (prajna), logic which was recovered and moulded
in the form of language, represents the 'great Compassion' (maha-karuna) of
the Buddha toward the illusory world. Logic and language are the means by
which suffering humans in the samsaric world are taught that there is a way
out of their situation. [32] The compassion of the Buddha is so great that
he provides a means of explaining the unexplainable in order to draw others
towards nirvana. Thus, his message of salvation's way can be transmitted to
all who are reached through the Bodhisattva's missionary zeal. The doctrine
of the Two-fold Truth allows us to speak the unspeakable for purposes of
explaining the difference between samsara and nirvana.

Wisdom, Meditation and Compassion uiring great wisdom one advances to
nirvana or enlightenment. Although wisdom and nirvana are not the same we
cannot have one without the other. When we speak of 'wisdom' we are not
speaking of ordinary wisdom but that which transcends the mundane to a
profound understanding of the true nature of Being as arising from the
ground of universal primordial suffering. Meditation is the vehicle of this
profound insight. It brings one to the necessary conclusion that one must
become detached from the cravings and desires of this world if one is to be
free of the suffering originating in our primordial nature. In meditation
one enters the realm of the non-self and, thus, one becomes purified of the
self-centred defilements of this world. Our cravings and desires to which
we have clung are of no importance any longer. In wisdom we understand m a
most profound way that these defilements are the ground of all human
suffering. It is how we perceive the world that makes the difference.
Meditation of the profound nature recommended in Mahayana Buddhism is the
vehicle for changing our perspective.

Achievement of the nirvanic state is primarily a mental process. Although
we may be completely unaware of our physical bodies when in nirvana, we are
not (strictly speaking) physically transported beyond the samsaric word.
Thus, a samsaric state of mind and nirvanic state of mind might be best
described as two different, non-simultaneous states of consciousness in the
same individual whose physical body is in the samsaric world. A scriptural
passage that comes to mind to describe this state of being is, 'He (Jesus)
was in this world but not of it'. The enlightened live in this world beside
the unenlightened. But, in wisdom they:

     . . . are free of all false imagination and attachment, for them, the
     world is no longer imagined and contaminated; it is pure and
     consummated. The world in which they live their lives differs in no
     way from our own. [33]

"Compassion" by Lawrence Blum

Discussions about compassion are dispersed in Western philosophical
discourse and focused primarily under the categories of moral theory,
emotions or theories of emotion. And, while compassion is a central notion
in Mahayana Buddhism, it is more of a peripheral topic in the West.
Lawrence Blum's essay on compassion provides us with an analysis of this
emotion that will be the basis of the discussion about to be undertaken.
His remarks are taken as representative, although not exclusively, of an
analytic perspective in Western philosophy.

Blum complains that emotions, and compassion in particular, have received
insufficient attention in philosophy. It is his belief that compassion is
'central to morality'. [34] The goal of his essay is 'to bring out
compassion's particular moral value, as well as some of its limitations'.
From the beginning of his discussion it is evident that Blum engages in the
prevailing Western philosophical tradition of dichotomous thinking. For
example, he claims that compassion is an object-orientated emotion. This
subject-object dichotomy creates a distance between those needing
compassion and those offering it that is virtually unbridgeable. In the end
this distance is maintained in such a way that it is clear that Blum does
not have in mind a discussion of compassion of the depth found in Mahayana
Buddhism. His analysis never arrives at a discussion of the universal
nature of suffering as a primordial condition of human existence. He tends
to deal mostly in surfaces such as the observation of adverse conditions in
a person's life which arouse compassion in the observer. For this reason,
his analysis is regarded as superficial although, perhaps, not in the most
usual understanding of this word. That is, his remarks are not totally
without depth such as when he speaks of the psychology of a 'creative
imagination' that allows the observer to put himself in the place of victim
for whom compassion is felt.

The notion of distancing oneself from the object of our compassion comes
through strongly in Blum in a number of ways. For example, he says
'compassion does not require that its subject have experienced the sort of
suffering that occasions it'. [35] He says that we can feel compassion for
someone who has lost a child even though we may be childless. This is true,
of course. But, such a statement reveals how very different Blum's focus is
than the Mahayana Buddhist. In Mahayana it is not so much the loss of
the-child that is the cause of suffering as it is our clinging to the child
whom we desire to be still alive and our clinging to memories of the child.
We suffer because we cling. This interpretation provides a depth of focus
that is not found in Blum. According to Mahayana thought, Blum is
expressing the faulty view that we feel compassion for another because of a
particular circumstance in his life rather than having the understanding
that the suffering the parent experiences over the loss of a child is
symptomatic of a deeper problem that is universal and primordial in nature.
Since his view is on the particular it allows the observer to sustain a
distance from the object of compassion because he (the observer) does not
always share in the object's experience.

Blum says that compassion may be "part of a complex attitude (of a subject)
towards its object". By this, he means that one may feel compassion for
another because of something in that person's life which brings out this
feeling. Yet, his focus remains upon the symptoms, i.e. death, hunger, and
the like, rather than upon the deeper primordial disorder. In fact, his
analysis takes us further away from compassionate identification since
there are those we can observe as having nothing in common with us. Such
dislocation of self-identification with others risks taking us further away
from compassionate identification which motivates us to act in behalf of
others.

One observes in Blum an almost continual distance between subject and
object, the observer and observed, It is as if the latter suffers but the
former does not. This attitude is apparent when Blum discusses the origin
of the word compassion as involving a 'feeling with' another person. He
says:

     In one sense this means that the subject and the object have the same
     feeling-type: distress, sorrow, . . . But in a more important sense
     the feelings are not the same: for the relation between their subjects
     and their objects are different. The focus of my neighbor's distress
     is his own homelessness; the focus of my distress in having compassion
     for him is my neighbor's homelessness. [36]

Here Blum points out that differences between the subject and object are
more important than any shared experience. He continues by saying that when
I suffer with my neighbour it is not the same as his suffering, I suffer
less than he. Suffering is a matter of degree. This idea is troublesome in
this comparison of views because on the Eastern perspective compassion is
not discussed as a matter of degree. The fact that a Bodhisattva volunteers
to give up entering nirvana until all are saved strongly suggests that he
has suffered at least equally; his first hand knowledge of suffering is one
of the main motivating forces for his compassionate behaviour. The fact
that he has known the same suffering as his fellow human beings forms a
bond of unity between he and them. In Mahayana this bond is expressed as
gotra or family in what is regarded here in the purest sense of the word;
one with others.

Another way that Blum distances us from identification with others is by
introducing analysis that serves to distract us from a discussion about
compassion. He claims that one may also have other feelings towards a
person which may or may not over-ride compassion. For example, one may feel
compassion for the blind person because of his blindness but feel
over-riding admiration for this person because he has become the successful
president of his own business. Blum's point is that sometimes we must sort
out our feelings of compassion from other feelings to determine which is
more appropriate. In a sense, he is recommending that we reason through our
compassion to another emotion. Such an idea moves us further from any core
notions about the universality of suffering and compartmentalises our
thinking on the topic. Analysis of this kind takes us away from not only an
intuitive response to the suffering of others by rationalising but may well
move us into a position where we feel no compassion at all. If we decide we
admire someone more than we feel compassion for them then we risk
rationalising our feelings and so may find an excuse not to act
compassionately when it truly is the appropriate response. This particular
part of Blum's analysis discloses the Western tendency to intellectualise
our emotions by ranking reason over emotions. [37] For him the 'objects.'
of compassion are people "capable of feeling or being harmed". One might
conclude from this that everyone qualifies to be the object of compassion.
However, Blum maintains a clear distinction, hence distance, between the
'object' of this emotion and subject or observer. The people he has in mind
live in compassion arousing circumstances 'suffering some harm,
difficulty,' or 'danger' which is 'past, present, or future'. [38] Blum
refers to these conditions as 'negative' and says there are many of them
but not all such conditions are "possible objects of compassion". [39] For
him, compassion involves a selection process, that is, we decide who we
feel compassion for on the basis of our evaluation of their condition. He
describes a negative condition as follows:

     The negative condition must be relatively central to a person's life
     and well-being, describable as pain, misery, hardship, suffering,
     affliction, and the like. Although it is the person and not merely the
     negative condition that is the object of compassion, the focus of
     compassion is the condition. [40]

Such an analysis implies that some are exempt from compassion because they
do not have the condition which draws upon this emotion. The difficulty
with this view is that it tends, once again, to focus upon the surface or
observable characteristics of suffering (symptoms) rather than the disease.
According to Blum we feel compassion when we observe a 'negative condition'
in another such as blindness or hunger. He says, too, that compassion is
not always focused upon specific individuals, it also may be directed
towards classes of people such as starving communities. Here again, he
relies upon our observations of the plight of others, which by its nature
deals with surfaces. In Mahayana Buddhism, deep meditation which sees
surface conditions as illusory, brings with it profound knowledge of the
very origins of human suffering. Compassion arises within the Bodhisattva
because he recognises that he and all other humans are one in their shared
primordial suffering. From this knowledge, compassion is extended outward
to all humans and until all are saved the Bodhisattva will not enter into
nirvana.

Blum's idea of a 'negative condition' being 'relatively central to a
person's life' tells us that he misses the mark where his understanding of
compassion and the conditions which arouse it are concerned. Much of his
discussion sets in place boundaries for compassion as to who its recipients
should be. By maintaining the subject-object perspective, he not only
distances one person from another, but he tends to dilute the importance of
compassion as the above discussion has shown.

While Blum says that compassion "involves a sense of shared humanity" his
understanding of what it is we share is considerably different than what we
find in the Mahayana. The 'could' in the following quotation shows this.

     . . . compassion involves a sense of shared humanity, of regarding the
     other as a fellow human being. That means that the other person's
     suffering (though not necessarily their particular afflicting
     condition) is seen as the kind of thing that could happen to anyone,
     including oneself insofar as one is a human being. [41]

The 'could' is understood to suggest that the suffering Blum is discussing
is not common to all. 'Could' implies that something might happen but not
universally. By extension, the 'could' sets limits upon the dimension of
compassion; not everyone qualifies for it since he does not identify the
negative conditions which are the basis for arousing compassion as
universal. Surely, without intending it, Blum is denying that suffering
exists on the level explained in the eastern view. Such denial sets limits
upon the very nature of compassion as a deeply felt, volitional emotion
that all should experience both as givers and receivers which is how the
Eastern view is taken. There is no indication from Blum's text that
suffering arises because of false views and ignorance.

Distance between subject and object and dilution of the importance of
compassion are two unfortunate features of Blum's essay. it is not that his
analysis is not thorough because in a number of ways it is very careful and
well-explained. The problem for this reader is that he fails to place the
origins of compassionate feelings in the right location. The result is less
depth of discussion. There are a number of ideas in Blum's essay that might
be added to this comparison but such an effort would extend the length of
this essay beyond reasonable length.

Conclusion

This essay has been an attempt to come to a better understanding of
compassion by identifying some of its characteristics as found in both an
Eastern and Western view. In Eastern philosophy, represented here by
Mahayana Buddhism, compassion is central to its doctrinal teachings.
However, Blum's essay, as representative of a Western view dichotomises and
compartmentalises this emotion into categories of lesser emotions such as
'feeling sorry for' and, in the process of such analysis, reduces
compassion's importance as a motivator for ethical behaviour. His analysis
provides us with a restrictive sense of its use since it relies heavily
upon our observing a 'negative condition' in others.

In the course of this comparison some of the weaknesses of Western analytic
tradition are visible. Such weaknesses include over-analysis which moves us
away from a discussion centred on compassion with a disproportionate
emphasis upon reason above emotions and perpetuation of a dichotomous
perspective that tends to stereotype thinking into inflexible categories of
ideas which contribute to both staleness and redundancy not only in
mainstream Western philosophical discourse but in medical ethics as well.
And, lastly, it relegates emotions to the 'back room' of philosophy
resulting in a long-standing neglect of the important impact emotions have
upon ethical behaviour.

A study of both views on this emotion enables us to understand some of the
advantages as well as limitations inherent in both. The Eastern view opens
us to a considerably broader perspective on this emotion but suffers from
being too idealistic. It calls for certain behavioural changes that must be
made in order to experience compassion in the fullest sense as an
 enlightened person. This includes engaging in meditation, giving up
egocentric ways and seeing oneself in the continuum of existence, or
co-dependent origination (pratitya samutpada), rather than taking the view
of being an isolated individual with only oneself to be concerned about.
All of these Eastern ideals go largely against the grain of Western
(American) society which cherishes the ideal of individualism and speedy
high-tech thinking. Perhaps, one of the most important insights arising
from the Buddhist view is the idea of suffering (duhkha) as universal and
primordial. It is important because from this idea arises the even more
important notion that since suffering is universal those who understand its
source are virtually mandated to help others.

Now, you may be wondering how this comparison between Blum's essay and
Mahayana Buddhism might be beneficial to Western philosophical discussions
in medical ethics. There are a number of ways. First, it reintroduces the
topic of virtuous behaviour (virtue theory) into a discussion laden with
repetitious discussion of ethical theories such as utilitarianism and
Kant's deontological ethics which have very limited applicability in the
medical setting. Second, utilitarian theory risks imposing the tyranny of
the majority upon minority populations and always raises the question, 'Who
decides what is best?' Third, Kant's deontology is regularly criticised for
being content-less in part because it speaks from an idealised view that is
difficult to apply in specific cases. When Kant and utilitarian theory are
presented as options to the same problem they bring us to contradictory
conclusions. Thus, decision making involving medical ethics problems
becomes confusing if not seriously hampered.

The reintroduction of virtue-based ethics, such as recommending expansion
of the discourse on compassion, offers the hope of arriving at a more
generally acceptable approach to the pedagogy and problem solving of
medical ethics. When we add to this discussion principles of Mahayana
Buddhism such as suffering (duhkha), the doctrine of the non-self
(anatman), clinging, and the idea of on-going change we arrive at a
conversation in medical ethics that advocates kindness, giving, sacrificing
self-interest, acceptance (particularly of death as part of the life cycle)
and the renewed awareness that we live in a world community of humans who
are very much related to one another. If health care personnel are taught
these Eastern views then there is the hope of introducing these ideas to
society at large since these are the people workers in the health care
field deal with on a daily basis. In Eastern cultures where Mahayana
Buddhism flourishes, what is offered in this essay is not particularly new
information. But, in the secular West, suffering from spiritual collapse in
many quarters, the lessons to be learned from our Eastern relatives offer
the hope of renewal not only in the field of medical ethics but in our
daily lives as well.

NOTES

[1] INADA, KENNETH K. (1995) Preface to Philosophy 555 (Buffalo, SUNY).

[2] DE SILVA, PADMASIRI (1991) Twin Peaks, Compassion and Insight: Emotions
and the Self in Buddhist and Western Thought (Singapore: Buddhist Research
Society) p. 44.

[3] Being is capitalized here to distinguish it as the Being of being human
from ordinary use of the word. This idea follows from Heidigger. For a
discussion of this use of the word Being see: HEIDEGGER, MARTIN (1962)
Being and Time, JOHN MACQUARRIE and EDWARD ROBINSON, (Trans.) (New York,
Harper and Row) pp. 21-32.

[4] Regrettably, I am not a Buddhist scholar of the first order although I
have studied this philosophy in translation over the last several years.
Therefore, I have had to rely upon translated texts from the original
Sanskrit such as the Dayal text which was recommended to me by Dr Kenneth
Inada.

[5] DAYAL, HAR (1991) The Bodhisattva Doctrine In Buddhist Sanskrit
Literature (Singapore, Buddhist Research Society).

[6] BLUM, LAWRENCE (1980) Compassion, in: Examining Emotions, AMELIE RORTV
(Ed.) (Berkeley, University of California Press) pp. 507--517.

[7] DE SOUSA, RONALD (1990) The Rationality of Emotion (Cambridge, MIT
Press) p. xv.

[8] The word "West" and "Western" are used essentially in the same way and
will also be used to describe Blum's ideas as they represent a Western view
vs an Eastern or Mahayana Buddhist view.

[9] DE SILVA, op. cit., note 2, p. x.

[10] Dayal tells us that Mahayana Buddhism underwent a series of changes
over the centuries of its development where reason and emotions were
alternately upheld then set aside.

[11] DAYAL, op. cit., note 5, p. 20.

[12] The word "induction" is used here according to a definition of this
process found in: HOWARD KAHANE and PAUL TIDMAN (1995) Logic & Philosophy:
A Modern Introduction (Wadsworth, Belmont.) p. 5, which says: "The basic
idea behind inductive reasoning is that of learning from experience. We
notice patterns, resemblances, or other kinds of regular/ties in our
experiences, some quite simple, . . . some very complicated . . . and
project them onto other cases".

[13] Dayal's citation indicates that this information was obtained from
several Sanskrit sources including: LEVI, S. (1907) (Ed./Trans.)
Mahayana-sutralankara (Paris). GHOSA, P. (1902-13) led.) Sata-sahasrika
Prajna-paramita (Calcutta). COWELL, E.B. & NEIL, R.A. (1886) Divyavadana
(Cambridge). NANJIO, B. (1923) (Ed.) Lankayatara-sutra (Kyoto). For a
complete copy of this citation, see Dayal, p. 327.

[14] Phra Khantipalo's definition of Dharma is being used here. He says:
"Dharma--When used . . . with a capital D it always refers to the Teaching
or Law of Buddha". See KHANTIPAL, PHRA (1964) Tolerance: A Study Front
Buddhist Sources (London, Rider) p. 160.

[15] In reviewing this remark, Dr Kenneth Inada made the following
observation: "Five khandhas represent only the conventional notion of self
or personhood, but they depict the organic (genetic) way in which the
conventional self functions".

[16] De Silva's remarks are of a general nature regarding Buddhism but his
remark applies here.

[17] Dayal, op. cit., note 5, p. 18 from the following primary source:
MINAYOFF, I.P. (Ed.) (1989) Sanatideva's Bodi-cary-avatara, (Zapiski) vol.
iv, pp. 155-225; vii, 18.

[18] Dayal, op. cit., note 5, p. 3.

[19] Ibid., p. 17.

[20] Being with a capitol 'B' is used here to denote the Being of human
beings much in the same sense that Heidigger uses this word.

[21] Primordial is used here in somewhat of the Heideggerian sense. It
denotes a quality of human existence that is fundamental to our Being that
goes before all other experiences. It is the ground out of which we arise.
It precedes all experience and, in a sense, shapes it. It goes before us
and follows after us. It is only removed upon full Enlightenment.

[22] KHANTIPALO, PHRA (1964) Tolerance: A Study from Buddhist Sources
(London, Rider) p. 93. Original Sanskrit source cited: Sutra of Complete
Enlightenment, Section 6.

[23] NAGAO, GADJIM M. (1991) Madhyamika and Yogacara, LESLIE S. KAWAMURA
(Trans.) (Albany, State University of New York Press) p. 11.

[24] A discussion similar to this occurs in: TACHIBANA, S. (1975) The
Ethics of Buddhism (London, Curzon Press), p; 180:

[25] Nagao, op. cit., note 23, p. 63.

[26] The word 'ditthi' is from the Pali while 'ditti' (an equivalent word)
occurs in Sanskrit.

[27] HAMILTON, CLARENCE H. (Ed.) (1952) Buddhism: A Religion of Infinite
Compassion (New York, The Liberal Arts Press).

[28] Hamilton, Ibid., pp. 107-108.

[29] Khantipalo, op. cit, note 22, p. 163.

[30] Ibid, p. 162.

[31] Nagao, op. cit., note 23, p. 32.

[32] Ibid, p. 64.

[33] Ibid, p. 64.

[34] BLUM, LAWRENCE(1980) Compassion, in: AMELIE RORTY, (Ed.) Explaining
Emotions, (Berkeley, University of California Press) pp. 507-517.

[35] Blum, Ibid., p. 510.

[36] Ibid, p. 510.

[37] For an entire text that deals with this idea see: DESOUSA, RONALD
Reason And Morality.

[38] Ibid, p. 508.

[39] Ibid, p. 511.

[40] Ibid, p. 511.

[41] Ibid, p. 513.