Attaa, Nirattaa, and Anattaa in the early Buddhist literature
Biswadeb Mukherjee
Chung-Hwa Buddhist Journal
Chung-Hwa Insitute of Buddhist Studies
No.6
P.391-424
.
P.391
Summary
The present article deals with the non-Buddhist
concepts of attaa and their refutation through the
doctrine of anattaa. This article is divided into
five sections.
Section I discusses Nikaaya passages which
states which the attaa is not existent either in the
sphere of the Conditioned or in the realm of the
Unconditioned. It is nothing but a figment of
imagination.
Section II refers to the different opinions held
by scholars as to the proper implications of the
term attaa.Except for the lone voice of E. Conze who
found similarity between the attaa and the Puru.sa
of the Saa.mkhya, all other scholars who cared to
ponder over this problem, seem to be preoccupied
with the relationship that could exist between the
attaa and the Aatman of the Upani.sads. This may be
due to the fact that these two terms-attaa and
Aatman-are philologically identical.The philological
identity led the scholars readily to accept the view
that these terms are also philosophically identical
without making any further investigation into the
exact onnotations of these two terms. The need for a
more objective study of the problem of equation
of attaa and Aatman is obvious, and a suitable
methodology for such a study has been suggesed.
Section III delineates the main features of the
thoughts of the 'Saa'svatavaadins, Ekacasassatavaa-
dins, the ucchedavaadins and the followers of the
Satkaayad.r.s.ti. They were the chief propagators of
the attaa heresies rejected by the Buddha.
Section IV, Part A contations the criticism of
all these heresies meant for the Buddhist monks. The
validity of such a criticism mainly rests on the
Buddha's claim to superior and higher knowledge of
which the heretics know nothing.Part B of the same
Section offers us the following two patterns of
reasonings which
P.392
were ultimately meant for the non-Buddhist ascetics
and employed for the refutation of the different
attaa heresies except the Ucchedavaada: I) To reject
the opponent's view by showing the internal
contradictions, a method which was later followed by
Naagaarjuna with great success; ii) To temporarily
accept a part of the opponent's view in order to
show that the view as such is unacceptable. This may
be taken as an instance of skillfulness of means
praised so much in the Mahaayaana.
Section V comes to the conclusion that the
anattaa doctrine was mainly formulated keeping in
view the 'saa'svatavaada and the Ucchedavaada. This
is in conformity with some statements in the
buddhist texts that the buddha preached the anattaa
doctrine as a middle way between these two extremes.
It is also clear that the attaa concepts of the
'Saa'svatavaadins and the Uccedavaadins cannot be
identical with the Aatman of the Upani.sads. the
Buddhist sages were aware of the fact the that the
attaa rejected by the buddha is
'aha^nkaara-vi.saya.h' whereas the Upani.sadic
Aatman is 'Buddhaanaam vi.saya.h'.
P.393
The doctrine of anataa forms the keynote of the
teachings of the Buddha and leterally means that the
attaa is non-existent. The denial of the attaa finds
expression in the following statement ascribed to
the Buddha in the Samyutta Nikyaaya: "Sabbam
bhikkhave anicca.m/sabbam bhikkhave dukkha.m/sabbam
bhikkhave anattaa" (1). The chapter just preceeding
the one from which we have quoted the three
statements, contains such expressions as "sabbe
bhikkhave jaraadhamma.m..... vyaadhidhamma.m........
mara.nadhamma.m....sa.mkilesadhama.m" etc(2). These
statements leave no doubt that in all these cases we
have to take the term 'sabba' as indicating the
things condition. So we find that 'sabba' is a
technical term and stands for the 'samsk.rta
dharma'. This conclusion of ours is confirmed by the
definition of 'sabba' as given in the Sabbavaggo of
the Salaayatana-sa^myutta(3) : "Ki~n ca bhikkhave
sabba.m/cakkhu ceva ruupaa ca/sota~nca saddaa
ca/ghaana~nca gandhaa ca/jihvaa rasaa ca/kayo ca
pho.t.thabba ca/mano ca dhammaa ca/idam vuccati
bhikkhave sabba.m" According to this definition
'sabba' means eye and the forms, the nose and the
smells, the ear and the sounds, the tongue and the
tastes, the body and the tangible things, the mind
and the mental objects. Here the term 'sabba' means
twelve aayatana. In a more elaborate way the Buddha
explains the same term while giving instructions on
the giving up of the 'sabba'. He states that eye,
form, eye-contact, eye-consciousness and the
different feeling due to eye-contact are to be
renounced. Similarly he preaches with references to
other sense organs.(4) Thus the term 'sabba' fully
covers the category of 'samsk.rta-dharma' and the
statement "sabbam anattaa", means the conditioned is
without any soul
────────────
(1) S.Vol. IV, p.28, XXXV, 43-45 (PTS,London, 1894)
(2) Ibid XXXV, 34-38
(3) Ibid, p.15, XXXV, 23
(4) Katamo ca bhikkhave sabbapahaanaayo dhammo/
cakkhum bhikkhave pahaatabba.m/ruupa
pahaatabbaa/cakkhuvi~n~naana.m pahaatabba.m/cak-
khusamphasso pahaatabbo/yam pida.m
cakkhusamphassopaccayaa uppajjati vedayita.m
sukha.m vaa dukkha.m vaa adukkham asukha.m
vaa/tam pi pahaatabba.m/(Sa^myutta, IV, pp15-16,
XXXV, 24(PTS, London, 1894)
P.394
(soul).
But what about the Unconditioned? Is it also
devoid of attaa? Walpolo Rahulo thinks that it is,
and refers to the three statements from Dhammapada
in support of his contention.(5) These statements
which are very similar to the passage from the
Sa^myutta Nikaaya quoted above are as follows:(i)
sabbe sa^nkhaaraa dukkhaa, ii) sabbe sa^nkhaaraa
aniccaa. iii), sabbe dhammaa anattaa. Rahulo thinks
that while the phrase sabbe sa^nkhaaraa indicates
the things conditioned, the phrase sabbe dhammaa
refers to both the Conditioned and the
Unconditioned. But it is difficult to accept this
interpretation. We may hold that the word 'sabbe'
should have the same meaning as the term 'sabbam'.
viz. the conditioned things, and it is unreasonable
to assume that the scope of the word 'sabba' while
occuring together with the term 'dhamma' is so
extended as to include even the opposite meaning,
the Unconditioned. Moreover the phrase 'sabbe
dhamma' has been used many times in the Buddhist
scriptures to mean only the Conditioned. The
Karatalaratna, a comparatively late work written by
Bhaavaviveks, described 'sarvadharmaa.h' as being of
dependent origin (sarvadharmaa.h.... pratiityasamut-
pannaa.h......ni.hsvabhaavaa.h) (6) Again in the
Culasaccakasutta of the Majjhima Nikaya (7) it is
stated: "ruupa^m bhikkhave anicca^m, vedanaa
aniccaa,...vi~n~naana^m anicca^m, ruupam bhikkhave
anattaa, vedanaa.... sa~n~naa..... samkhaaraa......
vi~n~naanam anattaa, sabbe samkhaaraa aniccaa,
sabbe dhammaa anattaa ti. "Here both the phrases
'sabbe dhammaa' and sabbe samkhaaraa obviously refer
to the five skandhas. That only the conditioned
things are meant here become evident when in the
same sutta (8) we meet with a discussion on things
which are both aniccaa and anattaa. Nibbaana is not
included on this discussion. The Upasivamaanapucchaa
of the Sutta nipaata (9) (1076) states that in case
of nibbaana all dharmas are destroyed (sabbesu
────────────
(5) Rahulo, What the Buddha taught (Grove Press,
INC.New York, 1962) , pp.57-58; Dhammapada,
Chapter 20, verses 5-7.
(6) Swaami Vidyaara.nya, Bauddha Dharma O Darsan,
p.16 ( West Bengal State Book Boards, Calcutta,
1984)
(7) Majjhima, Vol, I, p.280 (Nava Nalanda Ed.),
p.228 (PTS Ed.); also see, Sa^myutta Vol. III,
p.132
(8) Ibid. 282-87 (Nava Nalanda Ed.)
P.395
dhammesu upahatesu) . Sabbe dhammaa has been
explained as skandhas and aayatanas in the
Cullaniddesa,(10) making it clear that nibbaana is
outside the scope of this phrase. In the
Mahaaparinibbaanasutta (11) Aniruddha explains
buddha's parinibbana as 'vimokkho' of consciousness
(pajjotass'eva nibbaanam vimokkho cataso). The term
'vimokkho' has been explained by Buddhaghoso in the
Sumangalavilasini(12) as freedom from all dharmas
(vimokkho'ti kenaci dhemmena anaabara.na). Thus the
testimony of the Suttanipaata and the Mahaa
parinibbaanasutta confirms that the phrase 'sabbe
dhammaa' does not include nibbaana within its scope.
So the things conditioned were definitely held
to be devoid of attaa. But was the nirvana, the
Unconditioned also bereft of attaa? Is the attaa
non-existent with reference to the Unconditioned
also? In the Udaana (13) nibbaana is described as
anattaa which is rightly glossed as attaa-virahita
in Paramatthadii pam. Thus the attaa is non-existent
either as a sa.msk.rta-dharma or as an
asa.msk.rta-dharma. The attaa is nothing but a
figment of imagination.
II
────────────
(9) PTS, London, 1913,The group of Discourses II,
p.121 (PTS, London, 1992)
(10)Cullaniddesa, (PTS.London, 1988) p.177, also
see, The Group of Discourses II p.376
(11) Diigha, Vol II, p.157. The line "pajjotasseva
nibbaana.m vimokkho cetaso" is translated in
Dialogues of the Buddha, Pt. II, p.176, as "Even
as a bright flame dies away, so was the last
emancipation of his heart'. 'pajjota' is
translated as a lamp while 'nibbaana' is taken
to be blowing out of a lamp'. On the other hand
M.Walche understand 'pajjota' in the sense of
the 'Illumined One' and translate the same line
as 'By Nibbaana the. Illumined's mind is freed'
(Thus Have I Heard, London, 1987; p.271). Both
these translations are not fully satisfactory
PTS translates 'eva' as 'like' while it would
have been better to render it as 'just, surely,
indeed'. Walche omits it. As 'pajjotassa
nibbaana' is compared with 'vimokkho cetaso',it
would be more appropriate to translate as the
'nibbana of the Enlightened One'. So the
sentence may be rendered as follows: 'The
nibbaana of the Enlightened one is, indeed, the
release of mind.'
(12)Suma^ngala-vilaasinii, Part II, p.595 ( PTS,
London, 1971)
P.396
To know the reason behind the denial of attaa we
have first to be clear about the exact implication
of the term attaa. Scholars differ as to the precise
sense in which this term has been used. But before
their views were discussed it is necessary to point
out that the praak.rt word attaa is the same as
aatman in Sanskrit. This philological identification
has led to philosophical misunderstanding among the
scholars. Some scholars automatically take attaa to
be the Aatman of the Upani.sads. They think that
the philosophical implications of these two
termsattaa and aatman-are identical and consequently
the doctrine of anattaa came to mean for them the
refutation of the Upani.sadic Aatman. The scholars
belonging to this
────────────
(13) P.Steinthal in his edition of the Udaana (PTS,
London, 1982) , p.80 adopts the following
reading of the relevant verse:
'duddasam anattam naama, na hi saccam
sudassanam
patividdhaa tanhaa jaanato, passato n'atthi
ki~ncanan ti'.
In his translation F.L.Woodward reads 'anantam'
(infinite) in place of anattam (Verses of
Uplift, The Minor Anthologies of the Canon, Pt.
II, PTS London, 1985, p.98). I prefer the
reading 'anattam' due to the following
considerations: Steinthal gives the variant
reading 'anattam' given in the commentary
(anatatan ti paa.thati) called Paramattha-dii
panii which was copied in Sinhalese script for
the PTS. This transcript which he calls 'C'
often gives right information and corrects the
incorrect readings of the other manuscripts
(see, Stienthal, Udana, p.VIII).This commentary
explains 'anattam' as 'attaa-virahitam'.Another
manuscript which he calls 'B' as well as the
Nava-Nalanda Ed. Of the Udaana follow this
reading. There is no reason why the reading
'ananttam' should not be accepted. On the other
hand it is difficult to agree with Woodward who
accepts the reading 'anantam', as it is found
only in the Nidaana.t.thakathaa of Dhammapaa-
laacariya (Ed. F.L.Woodward, PTS, London, 1977,
P.393) . Nidaana.t.thakathaa explains as
follows: 'niccasvabhavattaa anta-virahitam
amaranadhammam anirodham amatam ti attho'. 'As
nibbana is permanent by nature, it is without
an end, beyond death and cessation; it is
immortal'. It is obvious that this definition
of nibbaana also excludes attaa.
Actually speaking no scriptural evidence is
needed to prove that nibbaana is devoid of
attaa. The concept of attaa is such that it is
automatically excluded from the domain of
nibbaana.
P.397
group have unfaltering faith in the Buddha as the
unique preacher of the True Law, and as such harbour
no weakness for the honoured traditions of the
Upani.sads. the view of Walpolo Sri Rahulo, an
worthy representative of this group, will be
presented later. On the other hand those scholars
who hold both the Buddha and the Upsani.sads in high
esteem do not subscribe to this view. Let us take
note of the opinion of Radhakrishnan (14) who
belongs to this second group of scholars. According
to him the Buddha clearly tells us what the soul
(attaa) is not, though he does not give us any clear
account of what it is. It is, however, wrong to
think that there is no soul according to the Buddha.
In support of his opinion Radhakrishnan (15) refers
to the dialogue between the wondering ascetic
Vacchagotta which, according to him, shows that
something there is, though it is not the empirical
self. In another place (16) he refers to this
empirical self and states that it is the false view
that clamours for the perpetual continuation of this
small self, which the Buddha refutes. This, (17)
according to Radhakrishnan, also agrees with the
statement of the Buddha that the self is neither the
same nor different from the skandhas. He further
states (18): " It is also clear that the reduction
of the self to a number of skandhas is not ultimate.
If the self is merely an impermanent compounded of
body and mind....then when it disappears then there
is nothing which is delivered...Freedom becomes
extinction. But Nirvaa.na is timeless existence and
so the Buddha admit the reality of a timeless self."
Radhakrishanan appers to be of the opinion that
the term 'attaa' which he translates as self has
been used in two different senses. One meaning of
attaa is the small self or empirical self which the
Buddha rejects through the doctrine of anattaa. The
other implication of the term attaa is the ture self
which is same as nirvaa.na and is accepted by the
Buddha. It is the identity of this true self with
other things that the buddha rejects.
We may now discuss the opinion of Rahulo who re-
presents the other group
────────────
(14) Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, P.386 (George Allen
& Unwin, London, 1977)
(15) Ibid. p.386
(16) Ibid. p.388, note 1
(17) Ibid. p.387
(18) Ibid. p.451
P.398
of scholars. While explaining the doctrine of
anattaa Rahulo (19) refers to the different concepts
of aatman, even the concept of Brahman-Aatman of the
Upani.sads and holds that the buddha was unique in
rejecting all such doctrines through the doctrine of
anattaa. " The idea of an abiding, immortal
substance in man or outside, whether it is called
Aatman, I, soul, self, or ego, is considered only a
false belief, a mental projection. This is the
Budhist doctrine of anttaa (20). So it appears that
by the doctrine of anattaa the Buddha was denying
attaa " which was accepted by every other
philosophico-religious system". Rahulo seems to
suggest in not so abmiguous term that even the
Brahman-Aatman concept of the Upani.sads stands
hereby negated.
It is clear that the concept of the Upani.sadic
Aatman acts as a powerful background in influencing
the formulations of both the above-mentioned views.
Conze, (21) on the other hand, propounds a different
theory which is not connected with the Upani.sadic
Aatman in any way. He is not sure what notions of an
aataman were deined by the Buddha, but he believes
that these notions are of two kinds, e.g.i) the
ideas implied in the use of 'I' and 'mine', and ii)
the philosophical opinion of the Saa^mkhya and
Vaisse.sika. The basic formula absence of a self is
confined to the five skandhas, and nothing is said
either way about its existence quite apart from
them. The Buddha never taught that the self is not,
only that it cannot be apprehended.
It is obvious that the solution of this knotty
problem hinges on the proper understanding of the
nature of attaa that was rejected by the Buddha. It
is really strange that none of the scholars who
suggested the equation of attaa either with the
Upani.sadic Brahman-Aatman or with some other
non-buddhist concepts ever tried to clearly
enunciate what this attaa is. Any such suggestion
without first defining the concept of attaa is bound
to be methodologically unscientific and
unconvincing.
To arrive at a more objective conclusion the
following approach may be suggested. On the one
hand we should study those materials from the
Nikaaya and
────────────
(19) Rahulo. What the buddha taught, p.51
(20) Ibid, p.55
(21) The Buddhist Thought in India, pp.38-39 (George
Allen & Unwin, London, 1962)
P.399
Aagama which are more or less descriptive in nature,
Such materials provide us with legends and other
informantions about the attaa philosophy dominant in
the region where the Buddha was preaching his
anattaa doctrine, and so engaged his attention. The
reason for doing so is the justifiable surmise that
the attaa concept or concepts, the negation of which
forms the core of buddhism, should find some mention
in this descriptive type of scripture. On the other
hand we should carefully scrutinise another type of
material contained in the Buddhist scripture which
is more critical and philosophical in nature, and
acquaints us with detailed argumengs justifying the
rejection of the attaa philosophy. Out of such study
will also emerge the atta concept or concepts which
the Buddha was rejecting. The study of these two
types of materials will enable us to form a complete
idea of the different attaa concepts the Buddha
discarded as false views. It is only then we would
be in a position to reliably know whether the
Upani.sadic concept of Aatman-Brahman was rejected
or not.
The major non-buddhist concepts of attaa
criticised in the Nikaayas and Aagamas many be
broadly divided nito four main categories dealing
with a) Satkaayad.r.s.ti, b), 'Sa'svatavaada, c)
Ekaccassatavaada, and d) ucchedavaada. We will
discuss these heresies in the order given here.
III
a) Satkaayad.r.s.ti : In the Sa^myutta Nikaaya
(22) we come across the following description of a
false view which later came to be known as
Satkaayad.r.s.ti: " Those recluses and Brahmanas who
while seeing in various ways see the attaa (soul),
they actually see the five aggregates of attachment
or any of them. Which five? In this connection,
monks, an uneducated ordinary person... envisages
matter as a soul, or a soul possessing matter, or
matter in a soul, or a soul in matter. Or he
envisages, feeling, perception, the gormative
forces, or consciousness as a soul, possessed by a
soul, in a soul, or soul in them. Envisaging thus he
gets a thought "I am"...Being ignorant he thinks
this, or "I am this" or "I shall be" "I shall not
be" or I shall be material "or" I shall be having
perception "or" I shall be
────────────
(22) Sa^myutta, Vol.III 46f; Taisho, vol.II,
p.11b1ff. A.K. Warder,Indian Buddhism, pp.123ff
P.400
without perception (a-samj~nin)" or "I shall have
neither perception nor non-perception. But one who
is educated, abandons ignorance and gets
knowledge... and does not have any of these
thoughts."
The passage quoted above shows that the attaa in
which these recluses and Braahma.nas believed could
be in four different ways connected with the five
skandhas and this connection is constant. The
existence of an attaa without any reference to the
skandhas was unthinkable. This association of the
soul with the skandhas gave rise to certain
ego-centric thoughts in which both these
elements-the soul and the skandhas-are present, e.g.
"I am this" "I shall be material" etc.
Here we have a succinct description of a false
view that draws our attention to its two main
features: 1) attaa refers to an individual soul
whose essence consists of an awareness of 'I' (22a);
2) attaa is invariably connected with the skandhas.
Its existence is always conceived in association
with skandhas. This heresy, as already noted, came
to be known as satkaayad.r.s.ti (Pali:
Sakkaayadi.t.thi). The term satkaaya refers to the
five aggregates of attachment (pa~ncupaadaanakkhand-
haa) (23) and Satkaayad.r.s.ti to a false view that
fails to see the skandhas merely as skandhas, but
always views them through the prism of an attaa. The
most subtle from of satkaayad.r.s.ti is discernible
in the feeling " I am" which lingers in anybody who
is spiritually below the status of an arhat. He may
no longer consciously believe in
────────────
(22a) In the Alagaddupamasuttam of the Majjhima
Nikaaya (PTS), Vol. I, pp.138ff. (Nalanda
Ed.), Vol.I, pp.185 ff. We read that the
feelings of 'I' and 'mine' are interdependent.
And with "I" and "mind" to be really and truly
existing, the possibility of this false view
would also be there: "That is the world, that
is attaa. I shall be after death, everlasting,
abiding eternal, unchanging and I shall remain
as such for eternity". The feeling of 'I'and
'mine' being absent, the possibility of the
false view would not be there. So a staunch
belief in the reality of 'I' and 'mine' is the
fulcrum on which the illusory image of an
eternal soul rests.
(23) Satkaaya or Sakkaaya means pa~ncupaadaanakkhandhaa
or five aggregates of attachment: "Pa~nca kho
ime.... upaadaanakkhandhaa sakkaayo vutto
bhagavataa seyyathidam rupupaadaanakkhandho,
vedanupaadaanakkhandho. Sa~n~nupaadaanakkhandho,
vi~n~naanupaadaanakkhandho, samkhaarupaadaana-
kkhandho (Cullavedallasutta, Majjhima Nikaaya,
Vol.I, pp.369-70(nalanda Ed.), p.299 (PTS).
P.401
it, he may even intellectually refute it, but he is
not yet free from the vestige of this pernicious
heresy.(24)
We may refer to passage in the ko'sa literature
that helps us to understand more clearly the
different modes of relationship existing between the
soul and the five skandhas (Conze, p.33). This
passage, like the Sa^myutta Nikaaya account,
distinguishes between the twenty bases of grasping
at the notion of soul. One regards (1-5) the soul as
the five skandhas, as the flame of a lamp is
identical with its visual appearance; (6-10) the
soul as having or possessing the five skandhas, like
the shadow of a thing; (11-15) the skandhas in the
soul, as the scent in a flower; (16-20) the soul in
the skandhas, as the gem in the casket.(25)
────────────
(24) In this connection we may refer to the episode
of khemaka recorded in the Sa^myutta Nikaaya,
Vol. III, pp.127ff. (PTS Ed.) Some monks ask
Khemaka whether he sees in the five aggreates
of attachment any self (attaa) or anything
pertaining to self (attaniiya). Khemaka replies
in the negative but at the same time admits
that he is not yet an arhat. "I am not an arhat
free from all impurities, Oh friends, with
regard to the five aggregates of attachment. I
have a feeling 'I am' but I do not clearly see
'This is I am'". Then Khemaka explains what he
calls 'I am' is neither matter, feeling,
perception, mental formation (sa^nkhaara) nor
consciousness nor anything without them. But he
has the feeling 'I am' with regard to the five
skadhas, though he could not see clearly 'This
is I am'. He says it is like the smell of a
flower, it is neither the smell of the petals,
nor of the colours, nor of the pollens, but the
smell of the flower. Khemaka further explains
that this feeling 'I am' disappears when one
progresses further, just as the chemical smell
of a freshly washed cloth disappears when it is
kept in a box.
(25) See, E.Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, p.33.
It is to be noted that the same comparison of
attaa with smell of a flower also occurs in the
Sa^myutta Nikaaya (see, note no.24). We should,
however, observe that though Khemaka feels 'I
am' he does not treasure this feeling; he wants
to get rid of it as something unreal. But to a
follower of 'Saa'svatavaada this feeling
indicates something real which is the very
essence of his eternal being. The spiritual
experience is same in both the cases, though
the wisdom needed to interpret the experience
correctly is absent in case of the
'Saa'svatavaadins.
P.402
This account of the Sathaayad.r.s.ti acquaints
us with the most basic form of attaa heresy.
Satkaayad.r.s.ti merely postulates a relationship
between the soul and the five skandhas. It neither
advocates the eternity of the soul nor holds the
soul to be co-terminous with the body.
Satkaayad.r.s.ti is neither 'Saa'svatavaada nor
Ucchedavaada. But the following statement recorded
in the Sa^myutta Nikaaya (26) imaa kho gahapati
ditthiyo sakkaayaditthiya sati honti-shows that the
satkaaya d.r.s.ti is the root cause of all other
heresies, including the 'Saa'svatavaada and the
Ucchedavaada. A person believing in a soul and
having desire for existence (bhava-t.r.s.naa)
willingly believes that the soul survies the body
and accepts the false view of its permanetnt
existence (bhava-d.r.s.ti). On the other hand, a
person thirsting for non-existence (vibhava-t.r.s.naa),
willingly believes that death is the ultimate end of
every thing, and comes to believe in the false view
of non-existence (Vibhavad.r.s.ti) the annihilation
of soul after death (Ucchedavaada).(27)
b) 'Saa'svatavaada: The account of the
'Saa'svatvaada as given in the Brahma-jaalasutta
(28) may be abridged as follows:-
There are recluses and Brahmanas who accept the
philosophy of eternalism (sassatavaada) and proclaim
that both the soul and the world are eternal. And
why they do so? Some recluse and Brahmana by means
of exertion and proper mental attention attains to
such a cencentration of mind that they are able to
recall to mind many hundreds of thousands of past
births. And they think: "There
────────────
(26) Sa^myutta, Vol.IV, p.287
(27) Lamotte, Indian Buddhism, pp.35,48,51. In this
connection we may refer to the Sattaasavasutta,
Majjhima Nikaaya, (Nalanda Ed. Vol.I,
pp.12-13), which also states that it is due to
ego-centric thoughts (e.g. atthi me atta etc.)
that such a wrong view arises: "This is my
self, which speaks and feels, which experiences
the fruits of good and bad actions now here,
now there, this self is permanent, stable,
everlasting, unchanging, remaining the same for
ever and ever." This false view is given the
designation of 'Saa'svatavaada in the Sa^myutta
Nikaaya; "That is the self, that is the world
(loka) . He takes rebirth, he is eternal,
stable, unchanging - this is the eternalist
veiw-point." Cf. S. Part III, pp.98-99; 182
(28) Diigha Nikaaya, Vol. I ( PTS Ed. By T.W.Rhys
Davids) London, 1973, pp.13-14; T.W.Rhys
Davids, Dialogues of the Buddha, Part I,
pp.27-28(PTS, London, 1977)
P.403
I was born of such a name (eva.m-naamo), of such a
lineage and caste (eva.m-gotto, eva.m-va.n.no).(29)
My food was such (eva.m-aahaaro) . I was the
experiencer of such pleasures and pains
(evam-sukha-dukkha-pa.tisa.mvedii) and had such a
span of life (evam-aayu-pariyanto). Falling from
there I was born here." (30) Thus they remember
their past existences in full detail. And each of
them says to himself:"sassato attaa ca loko ca
va~njho kuta.t.tho esika.t.thaayi.thito, te ca
sattaa sandhaavanti sa.msaranti cavanti upapajjanti,
atthi tveva sassata-saman ti." (31) T.W.Rhys Davids
translates as follows: "The soul is eternal; and the
world giving birth to nothing new, is steadfast as a
moutain-peak, as a pillar firmly fixed; and that
though these living creatures transmigrate and pass
away, fall from one state of existence and spring up
in another, yet they are (atthi) for ever and ever."
(32)
Though this translation tallies with the
traditional Buddhist explanation, it is difficult to
accept it, as it raises some problems. From the
legend we have seen that the living beings in this
world could only remembers the details of their past
lives here. And an awareness of an unchangeable 'I'
(cf. I was born with such a name etc.) links all
these past lives together and gives rise to the
notion of an eternal soul (attaa). The same soul was
thought to be born again and again as different
individuals. The attaa and sattaa are not identical.
The skandhas are admitted to be different in each of
these births, though the attaa characterised by the
awareness of an'I' remains unchanged.
The above translation from Rhys Davids of the
stock description of 'Saa'svatavaada is not in
aggreement with the implications of the
'Saa'svatavaada legend. In this translation not only
the two verbs of motion ( sandhaavanti and
sa.msaranti) indicating repeated deaths and rebirths
and so underlining changes are connected with the
sattaa but also the verb of existence (atthi)
indicating permanency becomes associated with the
same sattaa. If we accept this translation we have
to admit that the 'Saa'svatavaadins thought the
concept of eternity to be compatible with the
────────────
(29) In the Mahaapadaanasutta we have evam-jaati in
place of evam-vanno. Both the terms mean social
class or caste. (Diigha Nilaaya, Vol. II.p.8)
(30) Diigha Nikaaya, Vol.I,p.13 (PTS,London, 1975)
(31) Ibid, p.15
(32) Dialogues of the buddha, Part I.p.28(PTS,
London, 1977)
P.404
notion of change. The soul's enternity was not at
variance with its identity with the changeable
skandhas. But there is no reason to believe that the
'Saasvatavaadins were so unrealistic as to support
such an unreasonable view. We have seen that
according to the 'Saa'svatavaada the eternal soul
characterised by a sense of 'I' was different from
the changing individuals. Moreover, other religious
groups contemporary of the 'Saa'svatavaadins were
also not supporters of such a view. The
ucchedavaadins (33) took the soul to be identical
with the skandhas, and consistent with this view
they held that the soul is destroyed together with
the body. The Ekaccasassatavaadins (34) believed the
Mahaabrahmaa to be eternal as they did not appear to
have known that the Mahaabrahmaa was also identical
with the skandhas, created, and subject to death.
All the religious groups including the
'Saa'svatavaadins thus seem to have held the view
that the soul to be eternal must have an existence
independent of the skandhas. So the translation
making the sattaa eternal cannot be accepted. The
only other possibility is to take 'atthi' in the
sense of a singular number and to connect it with
'attaa'. Then we get the following translation: "The
soul is eternal; and the world giving birth to
nothing new, is steadfast as a mountain-peak, as
pillar firmly fixed; and these living beings move on
and on, transmigrate, fall from one state of
existence, rise up in another, but (the soul) exists
for eternity."
For our purpose it is, however, important to
know how the buddhists would understand this
philosophy. From our discussion of the
Satkaayad.r.s.ti it is clear that according to the
Buddhist's interpretation of the false view the soul
must be either identical with or closely related to
the Skandhas. This relation is such that the
existence of a soul apart from the skandhas is
unthinkable. The changes which the skandhas undergo
even during one's lifetime are obvious. Moreover the
acceptance of the repeated deaths and rebirths
shows that the skandhas do not remain unchanged. In
short, according to the buddhist interpretation, the
'Saa'svatavaadins admitted the changeable nature of
the skandhas, accepted the close relationship
existing between the soul and the skandhas, and yet
held the soul to be eternal (sassato). This also
seems to be the opinion of Buddhaghosa (35) as
────────────
(33) Diigha Nikaya, Vol I, see, p.34; also see, p.12
(34) See, p.10 ff.
P.405
expressed in the Suma^ngalavilaasinii, But, as
already shown, Buddhist presentation of the
eternalism is not the same as the original
philosiophy of the 'Saa'svatavaadins. The
'Saa'svatavaadins themselves regarded 'attaa' to be
independent of body and mind, i.e. of the skandhas,
to use the Buddhist terminology. This seems to be
reason why the 'Saa'svatavaadins themselves did not
relate the soul to any of the skandhas in the stock
description of their own philosophy. Even the
logicians and thinkers (takkii, viima^nsii) (36)
among them have nothing to say about the
relationship existing between the soul and the
skandhas.
Whatever may be the case, it is of no
consequence for our present study that the Buddhist
presentation of the attaa of the 'Saa'svatavaadins
does not tally with the original concept. What
really matters is the idea the Buddhists had of such
a concept. For when they reject a concept of an
eternal soul, they do so in the light of their own
understanding of it. So it is important to take note
of their idea of the attaa concept which may be
described as follows: The attaa is an eternally
existent indiv idual soul which is either identical
with the skandhas or so closely attains liberation
nor gets annihilated.
C) Ekaccasassatavaada: A concept of attaa
different from that of the eternalists has been
recorded in the Brahmajaalasutta of the
Diigha-Nikaaya.(37) This is the concept of an
eternal soul unique to the Mahaabrahmaa as held by
the followers of the Ekaccasassatavaada. The Buddha
in order to explain the origin of the
Ekaccasassatavaada relates the following legend
about the past lives of the upholders of this
philosophy:
When the world system dissolves the beings are
reborn in the Aabhassara world. They are made of
mind. Now the world system begins to come into
exitence and an empty Braham-vimaana (Brahma-palace)
appears. One of the beings at the end of merits or
span of life falls from the Aabhassara world and is
reborn in the Brahma-palace. There he lives, made of
mind (manomayo), feeding on joy (piiti-bhakkho),
radiating light. Etc. and thus does remain there for
a
────────────
(35) Suma^ngalavilaasinii, Vol.I, p.105(PTS, London,
1968)
(36) Diigha Nikaaya, Vol.I,p.16
(37) Ibid.pp.17-19; Dialogues of the Buddha, Part I,
pp.30-32
P.406
long time. And the feels lonely and longs for
companions. Just then some beings die in the
Aabhassara world and are born in the Brahma-palace.
They are just like the being who was first born. As
these beings were born after he desired for company,
he thought himself to be Brahmaa Mahaabrahmaa,
Creator, Father of all that are and are to be. And
the other beings also thought that they have been
created by Mahaabrahmaa. Their lives are of shorter
duration than that of Mahaabrahmaa. They die in the
Brahma-palace and are reborn here in this world.
Here one of them leads a religious life and can
remember his past existence in the Brahma-palace,
but not beyond that. He thinks of Mahaabrahmaa as
creator permanent, fixed, eternal, of a nature which
is not subject to transformation (nicco, dhuvo,
sassato, aviparinaamadhammo) while he regards
himself and other beings as created by Mahaabrahmaa,
impermanent, not fixed, eternal, and having the
nature of dying (ancicaa, addhuvaa, appayukaa,
cavanadhammaa).
The last part of the above account seems to be a
stock description which formed a part of the
original philosophy of the Ekaccasassatavaadins.
According to their philosophy only the uncreated is
eternal while the created is impermanent. Only
Mahaabrahmaa is eternal and the other beings are
impermanent. The information that Mahaabrahmaa was
made of mind were most probably not included in
their philosophy, for it is not mentioned in the
utterance of him who remembers his past existence.
Otherwise we have to assume that according to the
Ekaccasassatavaadins mind can be both created and
uncreated. So it appears that this extra bit of
information has been added in accordance with the
Buddhist dogma. Thus as per the understandings of
the Buddhists, the followers of the
Ekaccasassatvaada believed in an eternal soul only
in case of mahaabrahmaa and this soul was made of
mind, uncreated and immortal.
Two other groups of the Ekaccasassatavaadins
(38) believed in many eternal individual souls. But
the eternity is not absolute in these cases; it may
be lost either due to the lack of self-controll or
due to envy. The fourthe group of the
Ekaccasassatavaadins (39) were comprised of the
logicians and the thinkers who concluded by
reasoning that there are two souls, one impermanent
and the other
────────────
(38) Diigha Nikaaya, Vol.I, pp.19-21
(39) Ibid, p.21
P.407
permanent. The soul consisting of ear, nose tongue
and body is impermanent, not fixed, not eternal and
having the changeable nature. But the soul which is
thought or mind or consciousness (cittan ti va mano
ti va vi~n~naanan ti va) is permanent, eternal etc.
d) Ucchedavaada: the seven groups of
Ucchedavaadins (40) identified an individual soul
variously with physical body, or sensual desire, or
mind, or infinite space, or infinite consciousness,
or nothingness, or neither perception nor not
perception. The first group believed in one soul
made of gross matter while the other groups believed
in more than one souls. And all these groups upheld
the doctrine that the soul is annihilated with the
destruction of the body. It appears that even before
the Buddhists the Ucchedavaadins denied the belief
in an eternal individual soul (attaa) which was
identical with one of the skandhas. Therefore this
philosophy came to be known as the doctrine of
nirattaa.
So far we have discussed the Satkaayad.r.s.ti,
'Saa'svatavaada, Ekaccasasvatavaada and the
Ucchedavaada, and these are the only dominant
heresies regarding attaa and relevant to our study
that have been recorded in the Aagamas and Nikaayas.
(41) Presumably these were the four main type of
heresies that attracted the attention of the Buddha
and the early Buddhists. It is obvious that the
attaa concepts discussed in the Ucchedavaada and
Satkaayad.r.s.ti can in no way be connected with the
problem of attaa's identity with the Upani.sadic
Aatman. It is only ths 'Saa'svatavaada and
Ekaccasassatavaada concept that deserves to be
considered in tis connection.
In course of our discussion we have noted the
following characteristics of an eternal soul as
envisaged by the followers of the 'Saa'svatavaada
and Ekaccasassatavaada. The first group of
Ekaccasassatavaada believed that only the
────────────
(40) Ibid, pp.34-35
(41) I have not mentioned the other attaa heresies
described in the Brahmajaalasutta, as they are
not radically different from what we have
discussed in the present article. All these
heresies are also based on the Satkaayad.r.s.ti
and so share the characteristics of the
Satkaayad.r.s.ti. These heresies must also be
partially similar to the 'Saa'svatavaadins or
the Ekaccasassatavaadins. I could not trace any
other sutta devoted to the rejection of any
of these heresies. The Buddhists themselves, it
seems, did not think it necessary to discuss
these false views separately and elaborately.
P.408
soul of Mahaabrahmaa, who is uncreated, is eternal.
But the 'Saa'svatavaada and the other groups of
Ekaccasassatavaada recognise numerous, eternal,
individual souls who are either identical with the
skandhas or so closely related to them as to be
dependent on them for their very existence. The
second and third groups of the Ekaccasassatavaadins,
however, are of the opinion that the eternity is not
absolute, for the beings die if they indulge in
sensual pleasures or are afflicted with jealousy.
The first type of Ekaccasassatavaada explicitly
states that the souls, including that of the
Mahaabrahmaa, are made of mind. This view seems to
have been accepted by the second and third groups of
the Ekaccasassatavaadins who made the eternity of
the individual souls dependent on the purity of
mind. According to the fourth group of the
Ekaccasassatavaadins which consists of the logicians
and the thinkers, the individual soul is identical
with citta or manas or vij~naana. Thus we find that
the Ekaccasassatavaada concept of soul belonged to
the sphere of mind and at least in most cases could
not rise beyond the Ruupaloka. Moreover the eternal
souls are confined within space and time and are
characterised by the subject-object split.
The Upani.sadic Aatman, on the other hand, is
not an individual soul. The Aatman is the supreme
reality, the only Being that is beyond speech,
beyond the reach of mind and the notion of space.
And such an Aatman can by no strech of imagination
be equated with any of the skandhas. In short, the
sassato attaa of the Buddhist scriptures and the
Aatman of the Upanisads are two diametrically
opposing points of view.
So long we have discussed scriptural materials
which are more or less descriptive in nature. Now we
pay attention to a more critical type of
Aagama-Nikaaya passages which acquaint us with the
reasons for the rejection of different types of ataa
heresies, and thereby provide us with some extra
details regarding these heresies.
IV
We have seen that four kinds of relationship
between the attaa and the skandhas were recognised.
Out of these only one type of relationship viz. that
of identity between the attaa and the skandhas,
finds prominent mention in the Nikaayas and the
Aagamas. This appears to have been the dominant
heresy at the
P.409
time of the Buddha. Only in a few cases the early
buddhist canon takes note of other types of
relationship, viz. attaa has skandhaka or attaa is
not a particular type of skandhaka. Again the nature
and contents of such a criticism of attaa heresy
vary depending on the type of persons for whom it
was meant. The discourses which are held for the
benefit of the Buddhist monks are quite different
from those meant for non-Buddhist asceties.
With these preliminary remarks we will proceed
to arrange the relevant materials according to the
type of heresies criticised and the type of persons
addressed.
A: Criticism of heresies meant for the Buddhist
monks
i) Rejection of Satkaayad.r.s.ti: The sa^myutta
passage referred to above is a plain form of
instruction discarding the heresy of
Satkaayad.r.s.ti. the Buddha points out that some
recluses and Brahmans by erroneous observations of
the skandhas give rise to the false notion of a
soul, but those who are wise never make this
mistake. Here the talk is about the mere existence
of a soul with reference to the skandhas, and not
the eternity or impermanence of soul. It is apparent
that the Buddha is rejecting the Satkaayad.r.s.ti.
The Buddha does not find it necessary to offer any
extra argument in favour of his view, as he
addresses his own disciples who have absolute faith
in his wisdom.
ii) Criticism of 'Saa'svatavaada: In the account
of the Brahmajaalasutta which we have already
discussed, the Buddha gives critical description of
the heresy of 'Saa'svatavaada in the form of a
legend. He points out that some recluses and
Brahmanas believe in eternal individual soul for
they can remember their past lives in this world.
The sutta implies that the memory of the past lives
is genuine though the interpretation of such
experiences is wrong. In this passage no logical
argument is advanced justifying the rejection of
this heresy. It will, however, be clear later from
our discussion of another passage from the same
sutta that the Buddha rejects this view on the basis
of his more extensive knowledge and higher
knowledge.
iii) Criticism of Ekaccasassatavaada: Like the
legend about the 'Saa'svatavaada, the legend
concerning the Ekaccasassatavaada in the
Brahmajaalasutta implicitly contains the criticism
of the concept of an eternal soul. The legend states
that
P.410
the beings who died in the Brahmaa world were born
in this world. While in this world they could
remember their past birth in the Brahma-vimaana, but
had no knowledge of their still earlier birth in the
Aabhassara world, nor could they know that
Mahaabrahmaa is also subject to death. This legend
suggests that the incomplete experience coupled with
imperfect knowledge led these beings to interpret
wrongly their genuine spiritual experiences.
Consequently they came to believe in the false
notion of an eternal Mahaabrahmaa who is made of
mind. So the Buddha is here criticising
Ekaccasassatavaada on the basis of his more
extensive knowledge.
iv) Criticism of heresies in general: There is
no legend criticising the Ucchedavaada. This is
because the Ucchedavaada tradition most probably did
not record any legend justifying this philosophy.
The Ucchedavaada philosophy only recognised the
present life and denied the existence of any life
before birth and after death. So there was no scope
for the development of any such legend.
In the Brahmahaakasyttam however, we come across
a general criticism of all the false views noted in
this sutta.(42) Here the criticism is based on the
more extensive knowledge and higher knowledge of the
Buddha. The passage in question states that the
Buddha knows of all these false views and also knows
of into what sort of future existences fall those
who grasp at and become attached to such views.
Knowing this and knowing (other) higher things (ta~n
ca Tathaagato pajaanaati, tato ca uttariitaram
pajaanaati ) the Tathaagata does not get involved,
he knows about extinction; and having truly known
the rising and passing away of sensations
(vedanaanam samudaya~n ca atthamagama~n ca), their
taste, danger, their not being the refuge,
Tathaagata, due to the non-attachment, is free
(vimutto).
These are those other things, profound,
difficult, to understand.. not to be grasped at by
mere logic, which Tathaagata having himself realised
and seen face to face, has set forth."
The higher knowledge which is profound and
beyond logic is different from the knowledge of
future existences and past lives of the beings. The
phrase-"knowing this and knowing(other) higher
things"-clearly shows that two different types of
knowledge are referred to. The higher knowledge
refers to the
────────────
(42) Diigha Nikaaya, Vol.I, pp.16-17, 21-22, 24, 28,
29 etc.
P.411
rising and passing away of vadanaa (sensation or
feeling),i.e.the knowledge of the pa.ticcasamuppaada
which only the Buddha possessed. That the statement
reggarding 'vedanaa' refers to the truth of the
dependent origination is confirmed by another
passage of the same sutta (D. 1.3.71). all the false
views are rejected because they are contradicated by
the law of dependent origination. Of all the links
of the Pa.ticcasamuppaada, Vedanaa is specially
mentioned, for the awareness of 'I' is directily
dependent on vedanaa.
In corroboration of the the conclusion reached
above we may take note of another sutta where the
rejection of a false view on the basis of pa.ticca-
samuppaada is explicitly mentioned.
V) Rejection of the Ekaccasassatavaada:The Buddha
in his instruction to his disciple Keva.t.taputto
Saati is rejecting the Ekaccasassatvaaada on the
basis of pa.ticcasamuppaada.(43) Saati gave out that
it is the self-same vij~naana that passes from one
existence to another. Here Saati is speaking in
favour of 'Saa'svatavaada. This statement is
elaborated in the Papa~ncasudani (44) to bring out
its full significance: 'That which speaks,
experiences now here now there, the fruits of his
good and evil actions is that consciousness
(vij~naana) that I am speaking about.' The same
vij~naana is enjoying the fruits of his actions.
This is the same as preaching 'Saa'svatavaada as it
will be clear from a passage of the Sabbaasavasutta
of the Majjhima Nikaaya and a passage from the
Sa^myutta Nikaaya. The Majjhima passage runs thus
(45): Atha va pana assa evam di.t.thi hoti: yo me
ayam attaa vado vedeyya tatra tatra kalyanapapakanam
vipaakam patisa.mvedeti so kho pana me ayam attaa
nicco dhuvo sassato aviparinamodhammo sassatisamam
tath'eva thassati' 'Or a wrong view occurs to him
thus: the soul of mine that speaks, experiences now
here and now there the fruits of his good and evil
actions is indeed that soul of mine that is
permanent, stable, not subject to change, that will
stand firm for eternity.' The Sa^myutta passage (46)
states: One and the same person both acts and
────────────
(43) M.I, Mahaata~nhaasa^nkhayasutta, pp.256ff. idam
vi~n~naana^m sandhaavanti, sa.msaranti
ana~n~nam. Ibid. p.256
(44) Papa~ncasuudanii, Vol.II, p.305 (PTS, London,
1979)
(45) Majjhims, Vol.I,p.8(PTS, London, 1976)
(46) Sa^myutta Nikaaya, Vol.II, p.20
P.412
experiences (the results). This Kassapa which you
called at first'suffering self-wrought' ammounts to
the Eternalist theory.(47)
It is also to be noted that Saati is identifying
the eternal soul with the vij~naana only. This
reminds us of the view of the logicians among the
Ekaccasassatavaadins who held that indriya etc. are
impermanent while the citta (thought), or manas
(mind), or vij~naana (consciousness) is eternal. So
the eternalism which Saati is preaching actually
ammounts to the Ekaccasassatavaada of the logicians.
To reject this view the Buddha refers to the law of
dependent origination (pa.ticcasamuppaada). The Bud-
dha condemned the view of Saati and corrected him by
pointing out that vij~naana can only originate
through cause and conditions (a~n~natra paccayaa
na'tthi vi~n~naanassa sambhavo ti) (48) and so
cannot be eternal.
In the preceding pages we have dealt with such
criticisms of the false views regarding attaa as
were meant for the loyal disciples of the Buddha.
For his disciples the unquestionable veracity of
these criticisms ultimately rests on their
unflagging faith in the claim of the Buddha to the
more extensive and higher types of knowledge. It was
not necessary for the Buddha to analyse critically
the different heresies in order to expose the flaws
in them, or to adduce extra reasons to justify their
rejection. The approach, however, changes when the
discourses are meant for the non-Buddhist ascetics.
B : Criticism of heresies meant for non-Buddhist as-
cetics
i) Rejection of Ssaa'svatavaada: (49) The
Anattaa-lakkhana-sutta of the Sa6myutta Nikaaya (III
XXII, 59) (50) while giving a clear exposition of
the anattaa doctrine,
────────────
(47) Kindred Sayings, Vol.II, p.16 (PTS, London,
1982)
(48) Majjhima, Vol.I, p.259. It appears that Saati
misunderstood the Buddhist doctrine of rebirth.
It is said in the Sa^myutta Nikaaya (I, 122;
II, 67, 103) that it is only when vi~n~naana
obtains a footing on something (aarammana) that
there is the possiblity of the birth of a
being, and not otherwise, and the moment the
vi~n~naana ceases (cuti), one is regarded as
dead. Also see, Nalinaksha dutt, Early Monastic
Buddhism, Vol.I,P.255 (Calcutta, 1941).
(49) Sa^myutta, Vol.II, pp.66-68 (PTS.London, 1960);
Vinaya, Vol.I, p.13-14 (PTS,London, 1964)
P.413
adduces reasons for the denial of attaa in the
following manner: From (ruupa) is not soul (attaa).
If it were, this form could not turn oppressive, and
with regard to form it would be possible to achieve
the intention that "let my body be thus, let my body
be not thus". And so with vedanaa, sa~n~naa,
sa^mkhaara, and vi~n~naana. "What do you think is
form permanent or impermenet?" "It is impermanent,
Oh Lord". "But is the impermanent ill (dukkha) or
ease (sukha)?" "It is ill, Oh Lord". "But is it
fitting to consider that which is impermanent linked
to suffering, doomed to reversal as 'this is mine, I
am this, this is my soul"'. "No, indeed, Oh Lord".
And so for vedanaa, sa~n~naa ect. Therefore whatever
form there is, past or future, inner or outer, gorss
or subtle, low or exalted, near or far away, would
be seen by right wisdom as it really is, i.e. "all
this form is not really mine, I am not really this,
this is not my soul (attaa)." And so vedanaa,
sa~n~naa etc. Seeing this the well-disciplined holy
disciple become disgusted with the skandhas."
From a careful study of the passage quoted above
the concept of the attaa rejected here clearly
emerges. The ruupa and other skandhas cannot be
attaa for they turn oppressive and cannnot be
changed according to one's liking. So it follows
that the attaa or the individual soul enjoys
complete self-mastery and remains ever happy.
Moreover the five skandhas are not attaa for they
are impermanent and subject to change and suffering.
This shows that the attaa concept rejected here was
believed to be identical with the skandhas,
permanent, changeless, happy and characterised by an
awareness of an 'I' and 'mine'. So the concept of
attaa which emerges wholly conforms to the
Ssaa'svatavaada.
Two opposing trends of thought are discernible
in this sutta. One represent the viewpoint of the
'Saa'svatavaada as presented above. The other trend
shows the Buddha's acceptance of the notion of I and
mine as a basis for further argumentation in order
to disprove the soul's identity with the skandhas.
The line of reasoning, partly explicit and partly
implicit, may be presented thus: the idea of 'I' and
'mine' is the characteristic feature of attaa and
implies complete self-mastery of oneself. Wha t one
refers to as 'I' and 'mine' must be its own master.
Moreover the individual soul is permanent. But the
body (ruupa) is beyond one's control.
────────────
(50) Diigha Nikaaya, Vol.I, pp.179, 182 ff, ;
Dialogues of the Buddha, Part I, p.246ff. Also
see, A.K.Warder, Indian Buddhism (Motilal
Banarasidas, Delhi, 1991) pp.124ff.
P.414
It grows, becomes old and ultimately dies without
anybody being able to do anything to arrest this
process. In short this philosophy upholds the
self-mastery and permanency of an individual soul
but advocates in the same breath the identity of the
soul with the five skandhas which are impermanent
and lack self-mastery. Thus it is clear that the
viewpoint of the 'Saa'svatavaadins suffers from
internal contradiction and cannot be accepted.
It should be noted that the Buddha did not
criticise this philosophy on the basis of any
Buddhist doctrine. The impermanence of body etc, is
a matter of common experience and no higher philophy
is needed to prove it.The Buddha neither referred to
the skandhas constituting a being nor to the law of
pa.ticcasamuppaada in order to deny the existence of
a permanent ego-centric entity. Rather he made use
of the notion of 'I' which is taken to be the
tell-tale sign of an individual soul to refute the
'S aa'svatavaada. This approach appears to be all
the more intriguing as the Buddha is preaching to
his own disciples, and not to the non-Buddhist
ascetics. And from the dialogue between the Buddha
and his disciples it is obvious that his disciples
has not turned into supporters of this false view,
but had remained faithful to his teachings. Moreover
it would be preposterous to hold that the Buddha
actually supported the existence of a permanent
individual soul, although he denied its identity
with the five skandhas. What, then, is the reason
for this particular mode of preaching? We can
reasonably surmise that he was instructing his
disciples how to meet the challenges of such an
erroneous view. The inadvisability of trying to
discard this false view by referring to the Buddhist
doctrine is obvious, for the non-Buddhists cannot be
expected to have any faith in the teachings of the
Buddha. So the Buddha was teaching his disciples how
such false doctrines could be successfully countered
even while basing one's argumants on such articles
of faith as forming an integral part of the
philosophy they were criticising. He was trying to
show how the logical implications of one aspect of
this false doctrine would render null and void
another aspect of the same doctrine. In other words
the Buddha was teaching his disciples to expose the
contradictions inherent in the doctrines of the
'Saa'svatavaadins in such a way that even the
upholdres of this philosophy would be forced to
admit the justification of the criticism. In the
Anattaa-lakkhana-sutta the point which the Buddha
drives home is that the logical implications of the
notion of 'I'
P.415
which were acceptable to the protagonists of this
philosophy, would contradict the other part of the
philosophy, viz. the identity of the individual soul
with the skandhas. It is also clear that the sutta
was ultimately meant for the 'Saa'svatavaadins
themselves.
ii) a)The Po.t.thapadasutta and the rejection of
Satkaayad.r.s.ti: this sutta starts with a
discussion of the rising and the cessation of
perception (sa~n~naa or abhisa~n~na) and then
follows it up with a judgement about the problem of
identity between the soul and perception. We will
just have a glimpse of the discussion as it will
help us to understand the nature of perception. The
Buddha gave a gradual discoures on the higher and
higher stages of perception leading to the summit of
perception ( sa~n~naggam) and then to the cessation
of perception (nirodha). Except the final stage, at
every other stage a perception of a lower type is
replaced by a perception of a higher type. The
Buddha showed that a certain type of perception
arose due to a cetain type of thinking, a cetain
type of mental training. When the thinking ceased,
the perception also ceased. With the cessation of
all thoughts, the possibility of the rising of any
new perception comes to an end.
Next Po.t.thapaada raises the question of a
soul. "Is perception the soul of a man, Sir, or is
perception one thing and soul another?" The Buddha
asked, "What, now, Po.t.thapaads, do you assume a
soul?" "I presume a gross soul sir, material, made
of four great elements, feeding on solid food". "Yet
if your soul were gorss, Po.t.thapaada, material,
made of four gross elements feeding on solid food,
in that case for you perception would be one thing,
soul another. Just let this gross soul be, Po.t.th-
apaada, for then a man's perception occurs as one
thing, ceases as another thing". Po.t.thapaada next
proposes to assume a mental soul, with perfect
faculties, complete in its faculties. The Buddha's
objection remains the same: perception would then
occur as one thing but cease as another thing.
Lastly Po.t.tapaada proposes an immaterial soul,
consisting of perception. The objection of the
Buddha is still the same.
The denial of the identity between the soul and
perception is based on the following pattern of
reasoning. If the soul is material like body, then
the soul cannot be identical with perception. For in
that case the perception would be rising as one
thing and ceasing as another. It means that as long
as the perception is in existence, it can be assumed
to be soul (as body). But when it ceases to be, it
P.416
can no longer be equated with the soul, for the
living material soul would be still in existence.
Hence the statement about the perception as rising
as one and ceasing as another. This reasoning also
holds good while showing the difference between the
perception and soul as mind, for the cessation of a
particular perception does not mean the annihilation
of mind. But this type of reasoning is not valid
when one assumes the soul to be made of perception.
In this case the cessation of perception will auto-
matically mean the annihilation of soul, and con-
sequently the argumant that the perception ceases as
another is no longer tenable. This part of the
discussion appears to be a later mechanical
addition.
Whatever may be the case, it is obvious that
Po.t.thapaada is equating attaa with a skandhaka. In
his query about the identity of the soul with
perception as well as in his suggestion that the
soul may be made of four gross elements, or of mind,
or of perception, Po.t.thapaada is equating soul
with one of the skandhakas. He is not concerned
about the eternity of the soul or otherwise. In
other words we are dealing here with the
Satkaayad.r.s.ti, the root cause of all other false
views.
In rejecting the Satkaayad.r.s.ti the Buddha is
not denying the existence of attaa on the basis of
pa.ticcasamuppaada as he did while instructing his
own disciples. He is even accepting-for the sake of
argument, or we may say as a skillful
means-Po.t.thapaada's point of view regarding the
existence of soul or the constitution of soul, and
then rejecting the suggested identity by exposing
the logical inconsistencies involved in the
suggestion. He is showing that the acceptance of the
view that the soul is made of mind or four gross
elements contradicts the other aspect of the
suggestion, viz. soul is identical with perception.
b) Mahaanidaanasutta and the rejection of a dii-
ierent type of Satkaayad.r.s.ti (51)
Mahaanidaanasutta ( 52 ) rejects a new type of
Satkaayak.r.s.t.i which may be formulated as soul
possessing feelings. The relevant passage is given
below: "Herein, again, Aaanada, to him who affirms:
'Nay, my soul is not feeling, nor is it non-
────────────
(51) For Sanskrit parallels to different attaa
concepts discussed in the Mahanidaanasutta,
see, Nidanasa^myukta, C.B.Tripathi, Deutsche
Akademie der Wissenschaften Zu Berlin, IO,
1962.
(52) Diigha nikaaya, Vol.II, XV.31, p.67(PTS London,
1982), Dialogues of the Buddha Part II, p.64
(Pts, London, 1977)
P.417
-sentient; my soul has feelings, it has the property
of sentience '--answer should be made: -'My friend,
were feelings of every kind to cease absolutely,
then there being, owing to cessation thereof, no
feeling whatever, could one then say: --"I myself
am'?"
'No, lord, one could not.'
'Wherefore, Aananda, it follows that this
aspect: -'Nay, my soul is not feel feeling, nor is
it non-sentient; my soul has feelings, it has the
property of sentience'-does not commend itself".
Here the Buddha is teaching Aananda how to
refute the heresy of Satakaayad.r.s.ti. The view
that the soul is not feeling, but possesses feelings
shows that the feeling is not intrinsic to attaa but
external to it. It, therefore, follows that the
presence of absence of feeling should not at all
affect the basic nature of soul. But, as the Buddha
points out, our daily experience shows that in the
absence of all feelings there cannot be any
I-awareness which is the very essence of attaa. So
the feeling is not external to soul; soul cannot be
regarded as having feelings. The accepted idea that
attaa essentially means I-awareness goes against the
view that attaa has feelings.
The attaa heresy under discussion is concerned
with the relationship existing between the soul and
the skandhakas, and so falls under the category of
satkaayad.r.s.ti.
It is by way of expediency that the Buddha
accepts I-awareness as the very core of an assumed
attaa and thereby shows that the present heresy
suffers from internal contradiction. It is also to
be noted that the Buddha's instructions, though
addressed to Aananda, is ultimately meant for the
non-Buddhist ascetics.
iii) The Mahaanidaanasutta and the rejection of
the Ekaccasassatavaada
The Mahaanidaanasutta (53) also contains
passages rejecting the heresy that the soul is
feeling. The relevant part of the sutta runs as
follows: -"Herein, Aananda, to him who affirms' My
soul is feeling'-answer should be thus made: -'My
friend, feelings is of three kinds. There is happy
feeling, painful feeling, and neutral feeling. Of
these three feelings, look you, which do you
consider your soul is?'
────────────
(53) Dialogues of the Buddha, Part II, pp.63-64;
Diigha Nikaaya, Vol. II, XV.28; 29, pp.66-67
P.418
'When you feel a happy feeling you do not feel a
painful feeling or a neutral feeling, you feel just
a happy feeling. And when you feel a painful
feeling, you do not feel a happy feeling or a
neutral feeling, but just a painful feeling. And
when you feel a neutral feeling, you do not feel a
happy feeling or a painful feeling; you feel just a
neutral feeling.'
"Moreover, Aananda, happy feeling is
impermanent, conditioned (sa~nkhata), the result of
cause or causes, liable to perish, to pass away, to
become extinct, to cease. So too the painful
feeling. So too is neutral feeling. If when
experiencing a happy feeling one thinks-'this is my
soul'-when that same happy feeling ceases, one will
also think-'my soul has departed'-So too when the
feeling is painful or neutral. Thus he who say-'My
soul is feeling'-regards, as his soul something
which, in this present life, is impermanent, is
blended of happiness and pain, and is liable to
begin and end. Wherefore, Aananda, it follows that
this aspect-'My soul in feeling'-does not commend
itself."
The passage in question rejects the view that
the individual soul is feeling. The daily experience
of people shows that the feeling is impermanent, a
blending of happiness and pain, and subject to
origination and destruction. This characterisation
of feeling will be, in the main, also acceptable to
the Ekaccasassatavaadins, for they as we have
already noted, accepted the idea that the created is
impermanent. The feeling so characterised is
different from soul. The soul thus appears to be
permanent, beyond origination and destruction, and
experiencing unmixed happiness. It is identical with
one of the skandhas.
This concept of attaa is, in all its essential
features, identical with that held by the logicians
among the Ekaccasassatavaadins who also believed the
individual soul to be eternal, and identical with
one of the skandhas belonging to the sphere of mind.
It is to be noted that the Buddha is denying the
Ekaccasassatavaada not on the strength of the law of
pa.ticcasamuppaada or any other Buddhist dogma. It
is obviously because his invoking of the higher
knowledge would cut no ice with the non-Buddhists.
He is, on the other hand, showing that the
philosophy under criticism suffers from internal
contradiction, and hence untenable. He shows that
the Ekaccasassatavaada concept of feeling is
diametrically opposed to the Ekaccasassatavaada
concept of soul, and so the view that the soul is
identical with feeling
p.419
is to be discarded.
The Mahaanidaanasutta passage supports our
conclusion that the Buddha also taught his disciples
how to defeat the upholders of the attaa heresy in
debate. Here the Buddha is teaching Aananda how to
refute the view of the Ekaccasassatavaadins. In
other words his teaching is ultimately meant for the
followers of the Ekaccasassatavaada.
iv) The mahaanidaanasutta rejects an atypical
attaa heresy: In the Mahaanidaanasutta (54) we come
across a heresy which does not conform to any of the
types mentioned before. The relevant passage
recording a negative formulation the heresy is given
below:-
"Herein, Aananda, to him who affirms: 'Nay, my
soul is not feeling, my soul is not sentient' -
answer should thus be given " 'My friend, where
there is no feeling of anything, can you there
say: 'I am?' 'You cannot, Lord,' 'Wherefore,
Aananda, it follows that this aspect: 'Nay, my
soul is not feeling, my soul is not
sentient'-does not commend itself."
The view that the individual soul is not feeling
and sentient is rejected because there cannot be any
aareness of 'I' without feeling and sentience. Hence
there cannot be any soul without feeling and
sentience. Here the criticism is based on the
assumption of 'I-awareness' as the essence of the
individual soul. The proposition admits of the
existence of an individual soul, asserts the soul's
difference from feeling and sentience, and is silent
about the question whether the individual soul is
eternal or not. This is now type of attaa heresy
which is neither 'Saa'svatavaada nor Ucchedavaada.
Strictly speaking this negative formulation is not
even all illustration of Satkaayard.r.s.t.ti, as it
denies instead of affirming, the relationship
existing between the soul and the skandhas.
Against our contention one may argue that the
formulation-attaa is not feeling -was merely used to
imply that the soul is identical with some other
skandha. In this case this implication should be
treated as the main proposition, which is different
from the given proposition. If this were so, the
Buddhist criticism
────────────
(54) Dialogues, Part 11, p.64; Diigha Nikaaya Vol.II,
XV.30,p.67
P.420
would have been directed against a proposition
asserting the identity of soul with skandhaka and
not against the formulation of the soul not being
feeling. But as this is not the case, we have to
take the given proposition as the main proposition.
Thought the negative formulation states that the
individual soul is not the same as feeling, it
should not be interpreted to mean that the soul is
not connected with any of the five skandhas. For the
Sa^myutta Nikaaya passage quoted above shows that
the negative formulation of this type is also the
result of the Satkaaya.r.s.ti.
To sum up, the attaa concepts held by the
followers of the 'Saa'svatavaada, Ekaccasassatavaada,
Ucchedavaada, and Satkaayad.r.s.tti mainly have been
criticised and rejected in the Nikaayas and Aagamas.
None of these concepts are identical with the
Upani.sadic Aatman-Brahman.
Except the Ucchedavaada, all other concepts
regarding attaa have been criticised in two
defferent ways. When the criticisms rejecting the
attaa heresies were addressed to his own disciples,
the Buddha referred to his more extensive knowledge
that could see farther into the past and future
lives of the beings, and his superior knowledge of
the law dependent origination (Pa.ticcasamuppaada).
But when the criticisms were meant for the
non-Buddhist ascetics all references to these two
types of knowledge were avoided. The Buddha by way
of expediency makes use of a part of the opponent's
proposition for the sake of further argumentation,
and thereby lays bare the internal contradictions
involved in the proposition. This method of reductio
ad absurdum which the Buddha introduced, was later
applied by Naagaarjuna with great success.
The Ucchedavaada was criticised only on the
basis of the Buddha's extensive knowledge and
superior knowledge but not on logical grounds, as
the Ucchedavaada philosophy does not suffer from any
logical inconsistencies.
V
We have shown that the early Buddhist scripture
rejected any notion of attaa which was either
identical with the skandhas or dependent on them for
its very existence. The Buddha specially took great
paints to discard the 'Saa'svatavaadins and the
Ucchedavaadins who preached the philosophy of attaa
and nirattaa respectively. The Buddhists were aware
of this fact and gave expression to it in
P.421
canonical and non-canonical texts. We will cite a
few quotations from the Buddhist texts in support of
our view. In the Du.t.tha.t.thakasutta (No.8) of the
Suttanipaata we read the following verse; (55)
"attam nirattam na hi tassa a.t.thi adhosi se
di.t.thimidha sabbaa"
Here the belief in attaa and nirattaa are
counted among the false views (di.t.thi) which a
follower of the Buddha has given up. Again the
following two verses from Lalitavistara (56) and
Madhyamikakaarikaa (57) while confirming the
Buddhist rejection of both attaa and nirattaa give
some extra information regarding these heresies:
i) astinaastivinirumktamaatmyanairaatmyavarjitam
prak.rtyaa jaatinirde'sam dharmacakram ihocyate.
ii) astiiti 'saa'svatagraaho nastiityucchedaa-
dar'sanam tasmaadastivanaastitve naa'sriyeta
vicak.sana.
From the verses quoted above it is evident that
the existence of an eternal indireidual soul (attaa0
was preached in the philosophy of the
'Saa'svatavaada and term 'asti' in its vocabulary
did not convey the ordinary meaning of mere
existence but acquired the special sense of eternal
existence. On the other hand the Ucchedavaada which
preached the philosophy of nirattaa (nairaatmya),
coined the term'nasti' to signify simultaneous
annihilation of the temporarily existing attaa and
the physical body. It is in these special senses
that the Pali Buddhist texts use these two terms
'asti' and 'nasti' while recording the dialogues
between the Buddha and the non-Buddhist ascetics.
Any lack of awareness of the special imports of
'asti' and 'naasti' may result in drawing wrong
conclusions from such dialogues.
As the ego-centricity and absolute dependence on
the Skandakas-the two
────────────
(55) PTS, London, 1913; also see, The Group of
Discourses, II(PTS, London, 1992) p.304
(56) Leffman, Lalitavistara, p.426
(57) Maadhyamikakaarikaa, 15.10
P.422
hallmarks of the concept of attaa-can be no means by
associated with the Upani.sadic Aatman-Brahman, it
is but natural that the Nikaaya criticisms do not
contain any reference to the Upani.sadic concept.
The post-canonical early Buddhist texts also never
confused attaa with the Aatman-Brahman of the
Upani.sads. In the Vajracchedikaa Praj~naapaaramitaa
(58) aatman is used together with such terms as
jiiva, sattva and pudgala. All these terms are put
in the same category and are used to denote
different aspects of the same ego-centric entity.
'Sacet Bodhisattvasya sattva sa.mj~naa pravarteta na
sa bodhisattva iti vaktavya. Tat kasya hetoh? na sa
Subhuute bodhisattvo vaktavyo yasya aatma-sa.mj~naa
pravarteta, sattva-sa.mj~naa vaa jiivasa.mj~naa vaa
pudgala-sa.mj~naa va pravarteta'.'If in a Bodhisattva
the perception of a being should take place, then he
could not be called a Bodhisattva. And why? He is
not to be called a Bodhisattva in whom the
perception of a soul, or a being, or a living being,
or a person would take place'. (59) Similary in the
early Maadhyamika literature we read:'Ko 'yam aatmaa
yo 'ha^nkaaravi.saya.h', which may be translated as
follows: What is this aatman that is the domain of
ego? (60) Here aatman(Pali: attaa) is characterised
by aha^nkaara. In this context we may refer to the
definition of 'upadhi' in sopadhi'se.sanirvaa.nam as
given by Candrakiirti(61) in the Prasannapadaa:
tatra upadhiyate asminn aatmasneha ity upadhi.h,
upadhi 'sabdenaatmapraj~napti-nimittaa.h pa~ncop-
aadaanaskandhaa ucyante'. Here the concept of aatmaa
is held to be caused by the five aggregates of
attachment. The same idea is expressed by
Buddhaghosa (62) while defining 'attabhaava'.
'Attabhaavo vuccanti sariiram. Khandha-pa~ncakam eva
vaa, tam upaadaaya pa~n~natti-matta sabhaavato'.
Conze translates: 'Personal existence means the
body, or the five Skandhas together, because
dependent on them this mere concept cones about.'
(63) Thus it is clear that these early Buddhist
texts while discussing the concept of attaa never
thought about the Upani.sadic Aatman, but remained
faithful to the Nikaaya
────────────
(58) Vajracchedikaa Praj~naapaaramitaa (E.Conze,
Rome, Is.M.E.O. 1957)p.29
(59) Also see, ibid.pp.66-67
(60) Poussin, Muula-Madhyamaka-Kaarikaas, Ch.18,
p.340
(61) Conze, ibid. p.94;Poussin, ibid. p.519-520
(62) Visuddhimagga (h.c.Warren, 1950) IX,54
(63) Vajracchedikaa Praj~naapaaramitaa, p.100
P.423
characteristics of attaa, viz. the ego-centricity
and its invariable relationship with the skandhas.
This point has been clearly stated by Vasubandhu. In
his Vi.m'satikaa-v.rtti Vasubandhu(64) states: 'Yo
baalair dharmaanaam svabhavo graahyagraahakadi.h
parikalpitas tena parikalpitenaatmanaa te.saam
nairaatmyam, na tv anabhilaapyenaatmanaa yo
buddhaanaam vi.saya.h 'It is because of that
imaginary aatman which the ignorant people think to
the things' self-being consisting of subject and
object etc., that the things are devoid of aatman,
not because of the ineffable Aatman which is the
domain of the Buddhas'. The attaa rejected by the
Bhaddhas is "aha^nkaara-vi.saya.h" whereas the
ineffable Upani.sadic Aatman is 'buddhaanaam
vi.saya.h'.
────────────
(64) Vi.msatikaa-v.rtti(Ed. S.Levi, paris. 1925)p.6
Key words :
1.Attaa 2.Nirattaa 3.Anattaa 4.Upani.sad
P.424
提要
本文共分五節，討論外道持的 attaa( 我 )觀究竟如何
，佛教又如何用 anttaa (無我 )論來破它。
第一節引《阿含》和《尼柯耶》，肯定在有為界與無為
界都沒 attaa，它只不過是想像的產品。
第二節介紹近代學者對 attaa 一詞函義的種種看法。
其中只有 Conze 一人發現，佛教講的 attaa 和數論所謂的
puru.sa 有相似處。其他所有思考過此一問題的學者或許
由於 attaa、aatman 二詞對等，單單關心 attaa 與奧義書
aatman 有何關聯，而未經系統的研究，確信二者之間有關
係。此一觀念顯然有必要重新評估。本節則提出較客觀、適
當的研究方法。
第三節簡要敘述持 attaa 見的常論者和持 nirattaa
見的斷論者主要思想。
第四節分析佛教如何破 attaa 的信念。在反駁 attaa
的基礎上分別擬構出常論者和斷論者所持的論點，並發現佛
教用三種推理方式來破 attaa。尤其破常見及身見者的方式
顯示辯論的兩種重要特色: 一、以揭發對方說法內在矛盾來
駁斥。這個方法後來的大乘佛教用得非常成功。二、先接受
對方部分說法，把它當做進一步顯示該說法謬誤的基礎。這
或許可以看做大乘教所推崇的 [ 方便 ]。
第五節指出，佛陀提 anattaa 的中道是針對常論者和
斷論者的極端見解。同時證明常論、斷論所謂 attaa，並非
奧義書的 aatman。