A CHINESE EXPEDITION ACROSS THE PAMIRS AND HINDUKUSH, A.D.747.(1)
BY SIR AUREL STEIN, K.C.I.E.
Indian Antiquary
1923.05-07
pp.98--103,139--145,173--177
p.98
AT the beginning of my second Central Asian
journey (1906--08), and again at that of the third
(1913--16),I had the good fortune to visit ground in
the high snowy range of the Hindukush which, however
inaccessible and remote it may seem from the scenes
of the great historical dramas of Asia, was yet in
the eighth century A.D. destined to witness events
closely bound up with a struggle of momentous bearing
for vast areas of the continent.I mean the glacier
pass of the Darkot (15,400 feet above sea-level) and
the high valleys to the north and south of it,
through which leads an ancient route connecting the
Pamirs and the uppermost headwaters of the Oxus with
the Dard territories on the Indus, and thus with the
north-west marches of India.(2)
The events referred to arose from the prolonged
conflict with the Arabs in the west and the rising
power of the Tibetans in the south, into which the
Chinese empire under the T'ang dynasty was brought by
its policy of Central Asian expansion. Our knowledge
of the memorable expedition of which I propose to
treat here, and of the historical developments
leading up to it, is derived wholly from the official
Chinese records contained in the Annals of the T'ang
dynasty. They were first rendered generally
accessible by the extracts which M. Chavannes, the
lamented great Sinologrue, published in his
invaluable 'Documents sur les Turcs occidentaux.'(3)
----------------------------
1 Reprinted from the Geographical Journal for
February, 1922.
2 The accompanying sketch-map 1 is intended to
illustrate the general features of the mountain
territories between the western T'ien-shan and the
Indus which were affected by the political
developments and military operations discussed
in this paper.
Sketch-map 2 reproduces essential topographical
details of that portion of the ground between tile
uppermost Oxua and Gilgit river valleys which
witnessed the chief exploits of the Chinese
expedition of A.D. 747 into the Hindukush region.
It has been prepared from Northern Transfrontier
Sheet No. 2 S. W. of the Survey of India, scale 4
miles to 1 inch.
For convenient reference regarding the general
topography of this mountain region may be recommended
also sheet No. 42 of the 1: 1,000,000 map of Asia
published by the Survey of India (Calcutta, 1019).
3 Documents sur les (Turcs) occidentaux, rocueillis
et comments par Edouard Chavannes, Membre de
l'Institut, etc., published by the Imperial
Academy of Sciences of St. Petersburg, 1903, see
in particular pp. 148-154.
p.99
In order to understand fully the details of the
remarkable exploit, which brought a Chinese army
right across the high inhospitable plateaux of the
Pamirs to the uppermost Oxus valley, and thence
across the ice-covered Darkot down to the valleys of
Yasin and Gilgit draining into the Indus, it is
necessary to pay the closest regard to the topography
of that difficult ground. Modern developments arising
from the Central Asian interests of two great Asiatic
powers, the British and Russian empires, have since
the eighties of the last century helped greatly to
add to our knowledge of the regions comprised in, or
adjacent to, the great mountain massif in the centre
of Asia, which classical geography designated by the
vague but convenient name of Imaos. But much of the
detailed topographical information is not as yet
generally accessible to students. Even more than
elsewhere, personal familiarity with the ground in
its topographical and antiquarian aspects seems here
needed for a full comprehension of historical details.
This local knowledge I was privileged to acquire
in the course of the two Central Asian expeditions
already referred to, and accordingly I have taken
occasion to elucidate the facts connected with that
memorable Chinese exploit in Serindia, thedetailed
report on my second journey, soon to be issused from
the Oxford University Press.(4) The bulk and largely
archa eological contents of this work may prevent
that account from attracting the attention of the
geographical student. Hence, with the kind permission
of the Delegates of the Oxford University Press,
I avail myself of the opportunity to present here
[Geographical Journal] the main results of my researches.
Some preliminary remarks seem needed to make
clear the political and military situation which
prevailed in Central Asia during the first half of
the eighth century A.D., and which accounted for the
enterprise to be discussed here.(5) After a long and
difficult struggle the Chinese under the great T'ang
emperors T'ai-tsung (A.D. 627-650) and Kao-tsung
(A.D.650-684) succceded in vanquishing, first the
Northern Turks (A.D. 630), and after a short interval
also the Western Turks. They were the principal
branches of that great Turkish nation which since its
victory over the Juan-juan (Avars) and the Hoa, or
Hephthtalites, about the middle of the seventh
century, had made itself master of inner Asia. By
A.D. 659 the Chinese had regained political
predominance, and for the most part also military
control, over the great Central Asian territories
roughly corresponding to what is now known as Chinese
Turkestan, after having lost them for about four
centuries.(6)
This renewed effort at Central Asian expansion,
like that first made by the great Hen emperor Wu-ti
(140-56 B.C.) , had for its object partly the
protection of north-western China from nomadic
inroads and partly the control of the great Central
Asian trade route passing through the Tarim basin.
Stretching from east to west between the great
mountain ranges of the T'ien-shan in the north and
the K'un-lun in the south, the Tarim basin is filled
for the most part by huge drift-sand deserts. Yet it
was destined by nature to serve as the main overland
line for the trade intercourse between the Far East
and Western Asia, and recent archaeological
explorations have abundantly proved its great
importance generally for the interchange of
civilizations between China, India, Iran, and the
classical West.
During Han times, when China's great export trade
of silk had first begun about 110 B.C. to find its
way westwards through the strings of oases scattered
along the foot of
---------------------------
4. The work has appeared since the above was written.
5. For a masterly exposition from Chinese and Western
sources of all historical facts here briefiy
summed up, see M. Chavannes' Essai sur l'histoire
des Tou-hiue occidentaux, forming the concluding
portion of his Documents sur les Turcs occidentaux,
pp. 217-303.
6. Cf. Chavannes, Turcs occidentaux, pp. 266 sqq.
p.100
the T'ien-shan and K'un-lun, the Chinese hold
upon the "Western Kingdoms" with their settled and
highly civilized populations had been threatened
mainly by inroads of the Huns and other nomadic
tribes from the north. After the reconquest under the
Emperor Kao-tsung the situation was essentially
different. The danger from the nomadic north had
lessened. Troubles with the medley of Turkish tribes
left in possession of the wide grazing areas beyond
the T'ien-shan never ceased. Yet the Chinese
administration by a well organized system of
garrisons, and still more by diplomatic skill, was
well able to hold them in check. But additional and
greater dangers had soon to be faced from other
sides. The claim to the succession of the whole vast
dominion of the Western Turks was drawing the
administration of the Chinese protectorate,
established in the Tarim basin and known as the "Four
Garrisons," into constant attempts to assert effective
authority also to the west of the great meridional range,
the ancient Imaos,in the regions comprising what is now
Russian and Afghan Turkestan.(7)
Considering the vast distances separating these
regions from China proper and the formidable
difficulties offered by the intervening great deserts
and mountain ranges, Chinese control over them was
from the outset bound to be far more precarious than
that over the Tarim basin. But the dangers besetting
Chinese dominion in Central Asia increased greatly
with the appearance of two new forces upon the scene.
Already in the last quarter of the seventh century
the newly rising power of the Tibetans seriously
threatened and for a time effaced the Chinese hold
upon the Tarim basin.(8)Even after its recovery by the
Chinese in A.D. 692 the struggle never quite ceased.
Another and almost equally great threat to
China's Central Asian dominion arose in the west
through the advance of Arab conquest to the Oxus and
beyond. About A.D. 670 it had already made itself
felt in Tokharistan, the important territory on the
middle Oxus comprising the greater part of the
present Afghan Turkestan. Between A.D. 705 and 715
the campaigns of the famous Arab general Qotaiba had
carried the Muhammadan arms triumphantly into
Sogdiana, between Oxus and Yaxartes, and even
further.(9) By taking advantage of internal troubles
among the Arabs and. by giving support to all the
principalities between the Yaxartes and the Hindukush
which the Arabs threatened with extinction, the
Chinese managed for a time to stem this wave of
Muhammadan aggression. But the danger continued from
this side, and the Chinese position in Central Asia
became even more seriously jeopardized when the
Tibetans soon after A.D. 741 advanced to the Oxus
valley sad succeeded in joining hands with the Arabs,
their natural allies.
Baulked for the time in their attempts to secure
the Tarim basin, the Tibetans had only one line open
to effect this junction. It led first down the Indus
from Ladak through Baltistan (the " Greet P'o-lu " of
the Chinese Annals) to the Hindukush territories of
Gilgit and Yasin, both comprised in the "Little
P'o-lu" of the Chinese records.(10) Thence the passes
of the Darkot and the Baroghil--the latter a saddle
in the range separating the Oxus from the Chitral
river headwaters--would give the Tibetans access to
Wakhan; through this open portion of the upper Oxus
valley and through ferthe Badakhah the Arabs
---------------------------
7 For very interesting notices of the administrative
organization, which the Chinese attempted soon after
A.D. 659 to impose upon the territories from the
Yaxartes to the Oxus and even south of the Hindukush,
see Chavannes, Turcs occidentaux, pp. 268 sqq.
8 Cf. Chavannes, Turcs occidentaux, pp. 280 sqq.cz,
pp. 280 899.
9 See Chavannes, ibid, pp. 288 sqq.
10 Cf. for this identification Chavannes, ibid. p.
150, and Notes supplementaries; also my Ancient
Khotan, i. pp. 6 sqq.
p.101
established on the middle Oxus might be reached
with comparative ease. But an advance along the
previous portions of this route was beset with very
serious dificulties, not merely on account of the
great height of the passes to be traversed and of the
extremely confined nature of the gorges met with on
the Indus and the Gilgit river, but quite as much
through the practical absence of local resources
sufficient to feed an invading force anywhere between
Ladak and Badakhshan.
Nevertheless the persistent advance of the
Tibetans along this most difficult line is clearly
traceable in the Chinese records. " Great P'o-lu,"
i.e., Baltistan, had already become subject to them
before A.D. 722. About that time they attacked "
Little P'o-lu," declaring, as the T'ang Annals fell
us, to Mo-chin-mang its king: "It is not your kingdom
which we covet, but we wish to use your route in
order to attack the Four Carrisons (i.e., the Chinese
in the Tarim basin)."(11) In A.D. 722 timely military
aid rendered by the Chinese enabled this king to
defeat the Tibetan design. But after three changes of
reign the Tibetans won over his successor
Su-shih-li-chih, and inducing him to marry a Tibetan
princess secured a footing in " Little P'o-lu." "
Thereupon," in the words of the T'ang shu, " more
than twenty kingdoms to the north-west became all
subject to the Tibetans."(12) These events occurred
shortly after A.D. 741.(13)
The danger thus created by the junction between
Tibetans and Arabs forced the Chinese to special
efforts to recover their hold upon Yasin and Gilgit.
Three successive expeditions despatched by the
"Protector of the Four Garrisons, " the Chinese
Governor General, had failed, when a special decree
of the Emperor Hsuan-tsang in A.D. 747 entrusted the
Deputy Protector Kao Hsien-chih, a general of Korean
extraction commanding the military forces in the
Tarim basin, with the enterprise to be traced here.
We owe our detailed kowledge of it to the official
biography of Kao Hsien-chih preserved in the T'ang
Annals and translated by M. Chavannes. To that truly
great scholar, through whose premature death in 1918
all branches of historical research concerning the
Far East and Central Asia have suffered an
irreparable loss, belongs full credit for having
recognized that Kao Hsien-chih's remarkable
expedition led him and his force across the Pamirs
and over the Batroghil and Darkot passes. But he did
not attempt to trace in detail the actual routes
followed by Kao Hsien-chih on this hazardous
enterprise or to localize the scenes of all its
striking events. To do this in the light of personal
acquaintance with the topography of these regions,
their physical conditions, and their scanty ancient
remains, is my object in the following pages.
With a force of 10,000 cavalry and infantry Kao
Hsien-chih started in the spring of A.D. 747 from
An-hsi, then the headquarters of the Chinese
administration in the Tarim basin and corresponding
to the present town and oasis of Kucha.(l4) In
thirty-five days he reached Su-le, or Kashgar,
through Ak-su and by the great caravan road leading
along the foot of the T'ien-shan. Twenty days more
brought his force to the military post of the
-------------------------
l1 See Chavannes, Turcs occidentaux, p. 150.
12 Cf. Chavannes, ibid., p. 151. By the twenty
kingdoms are obviously meant petty hill
principalifies on the Upper Oxus from Wakhan
downwards, and probably also others in the valleys
south of Hindukush, such as Mastuj and Ohital.
13 Cf. Stein, Ancient Khotan, i. p. 7. A.D. 741 is
the date borne by the Imperial edict investing
Su-shih-li-chih's immediate predecessor; its text
is still extant in the records extracted by M.
Chavannes, Tures occidentaux, pp. 211 sqq.
14 For these and all other details taken from M.
Chavannes' translation of Kao Hsien-chih's
biography in the T'ang shu, see Turcs occidentaux,
pp, 152 sqq.
p.102
T'sung-ling mountains, established in the
position of the present Tashkurghan in Sarikol.(15)
Thence by a march of twenty days the " valley of
Po-mi," or the Pamirs, was gained, and after another
twenty days Kao Hsien-chih arrived in " the kingdom
of the five Shih-ni," i.e., the present Shighnan on
the Oxus.
The marching distance here indicated agrees well
with the time which large caravans of men and
transport animals would at present need to cover the
same ground. But how the Chinese general managed to
feed so large a force, after once it had entered the
tortuous gorges and barren high valleys beyond the
outlying oases of the present Kashgar and Yangihissar
districts, is a problem which might look
formidable, indeed, to any modern commander. The
biography in the Annals particularly notes that " at
that time the foot soldiers all kept horses (i.e.,
ponies) on their own account." Such a provision of
transport must have considerably increased the
mobility of the Chinese troops. But it also implied
greatly increased difficulties on the passage through
ranges which, with the exception of certain
portions of the Pamirs, do not afford sufficient
grazing to keep animals alive without liberal
provision of fodder.
It was probably as a strategic measure, meant to
reduce the difficulties of supply in this
inhospitable Pamir region, that Kao Hsien-chih
divided his forces into three columns before starting
his attack upon the position held by the Tibetans at
Lien-yun. M. Chavanncs has shown good reason for
assuming that by the river P'o-le (or So-le, which
is described its flowing in front of Lien-yun, is
meant the Ab-i-Panja branch of the Oxus, and that
Lien-yun itself: occupied a position corresponding to
the present village of Sarhad, but on the opposite,
or southern, side of the river, where the route from
the Baroghil pass debouches on the Ab-i-Panja. We
shall return to this identification indetail
hereafter. Here it will suffice to show that this
location is also clearly indicated by the details
recorded of the concentration of Kao Hsien-chih's
forces upon Lien-yun.
Of the three columns which were to operate from
different directions and to effect a simultaneous
junction before Lien-yun on the thirteenth day of the
seventh month (about the middle of August), the main
force, under Kao Hsien-chih himself and the Imperial
Com missioner Pien Ling-ch'eng, passed through the
kingdom of Hu-mi, or Wakhan, ascending the main Oxus
valley from the west. Another column which is said to
have moved upon Lien-yun by the route of
Ch'ih-fo-t'ang, " the shrine of the red Buddha,"(16)
may be assumed, in view of a subsequent mention of
this route below, to have operated from the opposite
direction down the headwaters of the Ab-i-Panja.
These could be reached without serious diffculty from
the Sarikol base either over the Tagh-dumbash Pamir
and the Wakhjir pass
---------------------------
15 Ts'ung-ling, or " the Onion Mountains," is the
ancient Chinese designation for the great snowy
range which connects the T'ien-shan in the north
with the K'un-lun and Hindukush in the south, and
forms the mighty eastern rim of the Pamirs. The
Chinese term is sometimes extended to the high
valleys and plateaus of the latter also. The range
culminates near its centre in the great ice-clad
peak of Muztagh-ata and those to the north of it,
rising to over 28,000 feet above sea-level. It is
to this great mountain chain, through which all
routes from the Oxue to the Tarim basin pass, that
the term Imaos is clearly applied in Ptolemy's
'Geography.'
The great valley of Sarikol, situated over 10,000
feet above sea level, yet largely cultivated in
ancient times, forms the natural base for any
military operations across the Pamirs; for early
accounts of it in Chinese historical texts and in
the records of old travellers from the East and
West, cf. my Ancient Khotan, i. pp. 27 sqq.
Descriptions of the present Sarikol and of the two
main routes which connect it with Kashgar, through
the Get valley to the north of Muztagh-ata and
across the Chichiklik pass in the south, are given
in my Ruins of Khotan, pp. 67 sqq., and Desert
Cathay, i. pp. 89 sqq.
16 The term fo-t'ang, which M. Chavannes translates
"la salle du Bouddha..., " designates, according
to Dr. Giles's Chinese-English Dictionary, p.
1330, " a family shrine or oratory for the worship
of Buddha." Considering the location, the
rendering of t'ang by " shrine " seems here
appropriate.
p.103
(16,200 feet)(17) or by way of the Naiza-tash
pass and the Little Pamir. Finally, a third column,
composed of 3,000 horsemon, which was to make its way
to Lien-yun by Pei-ku, or "the northern gorge," may
be supposed to have descended from the side of the
Great Pamir. For such a move from the north, either
one of the several passes could be used which lead
across the Nicholas range, south-east of Victoria
lake, or possibly a glacier track, as yet unexplored,
leading from the latter into one of the gorges which
debouch east of Sarhad.(18) In any case it is clear
that by thus bringing up his forces on convergent but
wholly distinct lines, and by securing for himself a
fresh base in distant Shighnan, the Chinese general
effectively guarded against those difficulties of
supplies and transport which, then as now, would make
the united move of so large a body of men across the
Pamirs a physical impossibility.
The crossing of the Pamirs by a force, which in
its total strength amounted to ten thousand men, is
so remarkable a military achievement that the
measures which alone pro bably made it possible
deserve some closer examination, however succinct the
Chinese record is upon which we have to base it. So
much appears to me clear, that the march was not
effected in one body, but in three columns moving up
from Kashgar in successive stages by routes of which
Tash-kurghan, " the post of the Ts'ung-ling
mountains," was the advanced base or point d'appui.
If Kao Hsien-chih moved ahead with the first column
or detachment to Shighnan and was followed at
intervals by the other two detachments, the advantage
gained as regards supplies and transport must have
been very great. His own column would have reached a
fresh base of supplies in Shighnan while the second
was moving across the main Pamirs and the third
arriving in Sarikol from the plains. Thus the great
strain of having to feed simultaneously the whole
force on ground absolutely without local resources
was avoided, It must be remembered that, once
established on the Oxus, the Chinese Commissariat
could easily draw upon the abundant produce of
Badakhshan, and that for the column left on the
Pamirs the comparatively easy route across the Alai
would be available for drawing supplies from the rich
plains of Farghana, then still under Chinese control.
p.139
By disposing his force en echelon from Shighnan
to Sarikol, Kao Hsien-chin obtained also a
strategically advantageous position. He was thus able
to concert the simultaneous convergent movement of
his columns upon the Tibetans at Sarhad without
unduly exposing any of his detachments to separate
attack and defeat by a superior Tibetan force; for
the 'I'ibetans could not leave their position at
Sarhad without imminent risk of being cut off from
the Baroghil, their only line of communieation. At the
same time the disposition of the Chinese forces
effeetively precluded any Tibetan advance either upon
Sarikol or Badakhshan. Diffcult as Kao Hsien-chih's
operations must have been aeross the Pamirs, yet he
had the great advantage of commanding two, if not
three, independent lines of supplies (from Kashgar-
Yarkand; Badakhshan; eventually Farghana), whereas
the Tibetan force of about equal strength, cooped up
at the debouchure of the Baroghil, had only a single
line, and one of exceptional natural difficulty, to
fall back upon. Of the territories of Yasin, Gilgit,
Baltistan, through which this line led, we know that
they could not provide any surplus supplies for an
army.(19)
The problem, as it seems to me, is not so much
how the Chinese general succeeded in overcoming the
difficulties of his operations across the Pamirs, but
how the Tibetans ever managed to bring a force of
nine or ten thouasand men across the Darkot to Sarhad
and to maintain it there in the almost total absence
of local resources. It is certainly significant that
neither before nor after these events do we hear of
any other attempt of the Tibetans to attack the
Chinese power in the Tarim basin by way of the
uppermost Oxus, constant, and in the end successful,
as their aggression was during the eighth century
A.D.
The boldness of the plan which made Kao
Hsien-chih's offensive and crowned it with deserved
success must, I think, command admiration qnite as
much as the actual crossing of the Darkot. The
student of militay history has, indeed, reason to
regret that the Chinese record does not furnish us
with any details about the organizstion which
rendered this first and, as far as we know, last
crossing of the Pamirs by a large regular force, But
whatever our opinion may be about the fighting
qualities of the Chinese soldier as judged by our
standards--and there is significant evidence of their
probably not having been much more serious in T'ang
time than they are now---it is certain that those who
know the formidable obstacles of deserts and mountains
which Chinese troops have successfully faced and overcome
during modern times will not feel altogther surprised
at the power of resource
------------------------
* Reprinted from the Geographical Journal for
Fobraury, 1922.
19 Cf, Ancient Khotan, i. pp. 11 sqq.
p.140
and painstaking organization which the success of
Kao Hsien-chih's operations indisputably attests in
that long-forgotten Chinese leader and those who
shared his efforts.
The location of Lien-yun near Sarhad, as
originally proposed by M. Chavannes, is confirmed by
the description of the battle by which the Chinese
general rendered himself master of the Tibetan
position and of the route it was intended to guard.
The three Chinese columns operating, as I have shown,
from the west, east, and north, " had agreed to
effect their junction on the thirteenth day of the
seventh month (August) between seven and nine o'clock
in the morning at the Tibetan stronghold of Lien-yn.
In that stronghold there were a thousand soltliers;
moreover, at a distance of 15 li (about 3 miles) to
the south of the rampart, advantage had been taken of
the mountains to erect palisades, behind which there
were eight to nine thousand troops. At the foot of
the rampart there flowed the river of the valley of
P'o-le, which was in flood and could not be
crossed.(20) Kao Hsien-chih made an offering of three
victims to the river; he directed his captains to
select their best soldiers and their best horses;
each man carried rations of dry food for three days.
In the morning they assembled by the river-bank. As
the waters were diffcult to cross, officers and
soldiers all thought the enterprise senseles. But when
the other river-bank was reached, neither had the men
wetted their standards nor the horses their
saddle-cloths.
" After the troops had crossed and formed their
ranks, Kao Hsien-chih, overjoyed, said to Pien
Ling-ch'eng (the Imperial Commissioner) : 'For a
moment, while we were in the midst of the passage,
our force was beaten if the enemy had come. Now that
we have crossed and formed ranks, if is proof that
Heaven delivers our enemies into our hands.' He at
once ascended the mountain and engaged in a battle
which Iasted from the ch'en period (7-9 a.m.) to the
ssu period (9-11 a.m.). He inflicted a great defeat
upon the barbarians, who fled when the sight came. He
pursued them, killed 6,000 men, and made 1, 000
prisoners; all the rest dispersed. He took more than
1,000 horses, and warlike stores and arms beyond
counting."
The analysis given above of the routes followed
by the Chinese columns, and what we shall show below
of Kao Hsien-chih's three days' march to Mount
T'an-ch, or the Darkot, confirm M. Chavannes in
locating the Tibetan stronghold of Lien-yun near the
present Sarhad, the last permanent settlement on the
uppermost Oxus. It is equally clear from the
description of the river crossing that the Chinese
concentration must have taken place on the right or
northern bank of the Ab-i-Panja, where the hamlets
constituting the present Sarhad are situated, while
the stronghold of Lien-yun lay on the opposite left
bank.
Before I was able to visit the ground in May
1906, I had already expressed the belief that the
position taken up by the Tibetan main force, 15 li
(circ. 3 miles) to the south of Lien yun, must be
looked for in the valley which debouches on the
Ab-i-Panja opposite to Sarhad.(21) It is through this
open valley that the remarkable depression in the
main Hindukush range represented by the Baroghil and
Shawitakh saddles (12, 460 and 12, 560 feet
respectively), is gained. I also surmised that the
Chinese general, apart from the confidence aroused by
the successful river crossing, owed his victory
mainly to a flanking movement by which his troops
gained the heights, And thus successfully turned the
fortified line behind which the Tibetans were
awaiting them.
---------------------------
20 M. Chavannes has shown (Turces occidenttaux,
p.154) that this name P'o-l is a misreading
easily explained in Chinese writing for So-le
mentioned elsewhere as a town in Hu-mi or Wakham.
21 See Aneient Khotan, i, p. 7
p.141
The opinion was confirmed by what I saw of the
valley leading to the Oxus on my descent from the
Baroghil on 19 May 1906, and by the examination I
was able to make two days later of the mountain-side
flanking its debouchure front the west. The valley
into which the route leads down from the Baroghil is
quite open and easy about Zartighar, the southernmost
hamlet. There a ruined watch-tower shows that defence
of the route had been a concern also in modern times.
Further down the valley-bottom gradually contracts,
though still offering easy going, until, from a point
about 2 miles below Zartighar to beyond the scattered
homesteads of Pitkhar,(22) its width is reduced to
between one-half and one third of a mile. On both
sides this defile is flanked by high and very
precipitous rocky ridges, the last offshoots of spurs
which descend from the main Hindukush watershed.
These natural defences seemed to provide just the
kind of position which would recommend itself to the
Tibetans wishing to bar approach to the Baroghil, and
thus to safeguard their sole line of communication
with the Indus valley. The width of the defile would
account for the comparatively large number of
defenders recorded by the Chinese Annals for the
enemy's main line; the softness of the ground at its
bottom, which is almost perfectly level, covered with
fine grass in the summer, and distinctly swampy in
the spring owing to imperfect drainage, would explain
the use of palisades, at first sight a rather strange
method of fortification in these barren mountains.(23)
Finally, the position seemed to agree curiously well
with what two historical instances of modern times,
the fights in 1904 at Guru and on the Karo-la, had
revealed as the typical and time-honoured Tibetan
scheme of defence-to await attack behind a wall
erected across the open ground of a valley or saddle.
There remained the question whether the defile of
Pitkhar was capable of being turned by an attack on
the flanking heights such as the Chinese record seemed
plainly to indicate. The possibility of such a
movement on the east was clearly precluded by the
extremely precipitous character of the flanking spur,
and still more by the fact that the summer flood of
the Ab-i-Panja in the very confined gorge above
Sarhad would have rendered that spur inaccessible to
the Chinese operating from the northern bank of the
river. All the greater was my satisfaction when I
heard from my Wakhi informants of ruins of an ancient
fort, known as Kansir, situated on the precipitous
crest of the flanking spur westwards, almost opposite
to Pitkhar. During the single day's halt, which to my
regret was all that circumstances would allow me at
Sarhad, I was kept too busy otherwise to make a close
inspection of the ground where the Tibetan post of
Lien-yun might possibly have been situated. Nothing
was known locally of old remains on the open alluvial
plain which adjoins the river at the mouth of the
valley coming from the Baroghil; nor were such likely
to survive long on ground liable to inundation from
the Oxus, flowing here in numerous shifting channels
with a total width of over a mile.
---------------------------
22 The Pixkhar of sketch-map 2 is a misprint.
23 In my note in Ancient Khotan, p. 9, I had
ventured to suggeste that, considering how scanty
timber must at all times have been about Sarhad,
there was some probability that walls or
"sangars" constructed of loose stones were really
meant by the "palisades" mentioned in the
translation of the passage from the Tang Annals.
This suggestion illustrates afresh the risk run in
doubting the accuracy of Chinese records on quasi
topographical points without adequate local
knowledge. On the one hand, I found that the
peculiar nature of the soil in the defile would
make the construction of heavy stone walls
inadvisable, if not distinctly difficult. On the
other, my subsequent march up the Ab-i-Panja
showed that, though timber was as scarce about
Sarhad itself as I had been led to assume, yet
there was abundance of willow and other jungle in
parts of the narrow river gorge one march higher
up near the debouchure of the Shaor and Baharak
streams. This could well have been used for
palisades after being floated down by the river.
p.142
Even if the exact posittion of Lion-yun thus
remained undetermined, my short stay at Sarhad
sufficed to convince me how closely local conditions
agreed with the details of Kao Hsien-chih's exploit
in crossing the Oxus. The river at the time of the
summer flood must, indeed, present a very imposing
appearance as it spreads out its waters over the
wide valley bottom at Sarhad. But the very sepration
of the waters markes fording always possible even at
that season, provided the passage takes place in the
early morning, when the flood due to the melting snow
and ice is temporarily reduced by the effect of the
night's frost on the glaciers and snow-beds at the
head of the Ab-i-Panja. The account in the Annals
distinectly shows that the river passage must have
been carried out at an early hour of the morning,
and thus explains the complete success of an
otherwise difficult operation.
I was able to trace the scene of the remaining
portion of the Chinese general's exploit when, on May
21, I visited the ruined fortifications reported on
the steep spur the debouchure of the Baroghil stream
from the west and known as Kansir. After riding across
the level plain of sand and marsh, and then along the
flat bottom of the Pitkhar defile for a total distance
of about 3 miles,we left our ponies at a point little to
the south of some absolutely impracticable rock faces
which overlook Pitkhar from the west. Then, guided by
a few Wakhis, I climbed to the crest of the western
spur, reaching it only after an hour's hard scramble
over steep slopes of rock and shingle. There, beyond
a stretch of easily sloping ground and about 300 feet
higher rose the old fort of Kansir at the extreme
north end of the crest. Between the narrow ridge occupied
by the walls and bastions and the continuation of the
spur south-westwards a broad dip seemed to offer an easy
descent towards the hamlet of Karkat on the Oxus.
It was clearly for the purpose of guarding this
approach that the little fort had been erected on
this exposed height. On the north and east, where the
end of the spur faI1s away in unscalable cliffs to
the main valley of the Oxus and towards the mouth of
the Pitkhar defile, some 1600 to 1700 feet below,
structural defences were needles. But the slope of
the ridge facing westwards and the narrow neck to the
south had been protected on the crest by a bastioned
wall for a distance of about 400 feet. Three bastions
facing west and south-west, and one at the extreme
southern point, still rose, in fair preservation in
parts, to a height of over 30 feet. The connecting
wall-curtains had suffered more, through the
foundations giving way on the steep indine. Of structures
inside the little fort there remained no trace.
Definite archaelogical evidence as to the
antiquity of the little fortifcation was with regular
thin layers of large sun-dried bricks. New this
systematic use of brushwood Iayers is a
characteristic peculiarity of ancient Chinese
construction in Central Asia, intended to assure
greater consistency under climatic conditions of
particular dryness in regions where ground and
structures alike are liable to constant wind erosion.
My explorations arround Lop-nor and on the ancient
Chinese Limes of Tun-huang have conclu-sively proved
that it dates from the very commencement of Chinese
expansion into Central Asia.(24) At the same time
my explorations in the Tarim basin have shown also
that the Tibetan invaders of the T'ang period, when
building their forts, did not neglect to copy this
constructive expedient of their Chinese predecessors
and opponents in these regions.(25) On
---------------------------
24 Cf., Desert Cathay, i. pp. 387 sqq., 540 sqq.;
ii. pp. 44, 50, etc.
25 This was distinctly observed by me in the Tibetan
forts at Miran and Mazar-tagh, built and occupied
in the 8th century A, D.,; cf. Serindia, pp. 457
1285 sqq.
p.143
various grounds which cannot be discussed here in
detail it appears to me very probable that the
construction of the Kansir walls was due to the
Tibetan invaders of Wakhan. But whether the
fortification existed already when Kao Hsien-chih
carried the Tibetan main position by an attack on
its mountain flank, or whether it was erected by the
Tibetans when they returned after the retirement of
the Chinese some years later, and were, perhaps,
anxious to guard against any repetition of this move
outflanking a favourite defensive position, I am
unable to say.
The victory thus gained by Kao Hsien-chih on the
Oxus had been signal, and it was followed up by him
with the boldness of a truly great commander. The
Imperial Commissioner and certain other high
officers feared the risks of a further advance. So
Kao Hsien-chih decided to leave them behind together
with over 3,000 men who were sick or worn out by the
previous hardships, and to let them guard Lien-yun.
With the rest of his troops he " pushed on, and after
three days arrived at Mount T'an-chu; from that
point downwards there were precipices for over 40 li
(circ. 8 miles) in a straight line. Kao Hsien-chih
surmised: 'If the barbarians of A-nu-yueh were to
come to meet us promptly, this would be the proof of
their being well-disposed.' Fearing besides that his
soldiers would not care to face the descent [from
Mount T'an-chu], he employed the strategem of sending
twenty horsemen ahead with orders to disguise
themselves in dress as if they were barbarians of the
town of A-nu-yueh, and to meet his troops on the
summit of the mountain. When the troops had got up
Mount T'an-chu they, in fact, refused to make the
descent, saying, 'To what sort of places would the
Commissioner-in-Chief have us go?' Before they had
finished speaking, the twenty men who had been sent
ahead came to meet them with the report: 'The
barbarians of the town of A-nu-yueh are all
well-disposed and eager to welcome you; the
destruction of the bridge over the So-yi river is
completed.' Kao Hsien-chih pretended to rejoice, and
on his giving the order all the troops effected their
descent."
After three more marches the Chinese force was in
reality met by " the barbarians of the town of
A-nu-yueh " offering their submission. The same day
Kao Hsien-chih sent ahead an advance guard of a
thousand horsemen, charging its leader to secure the
persons of the chiefs of "Little P'o-lu" through
aruse. This order having been carried out, on the
following day Kao Hsien-chih himself occupied
A-nu-yeh, and had the five or six dignitaries who
were supporting the Tibetans executed. He then
hastened to have the bridge broken which spanned the
So-yi river at a distance of 60 li, or about 12
miles, from A-nu-yueh. " Scarcely had the bridge been
destroyed in the evening when the Tibetans, mounted
and on foot, arrived in great numbers, but it was
then too late for them to attain their object. The
bridge was the length of an arrow-shot; it had taken
a whole year to construct it. It had been built at
the time when the Tibetans, under the pretext of
using its route, had by deceit possessed themselves
of Little P'o-lu." Thus secured from a Tibetan
counter-attack on Yasin, Kao Hsien-chih prevailed
upon the king of Little P'o-lu to give himself up
from his hiding-place, and completely pacified the
territory.
The personal acquaintance with the ground which I
gained in 1906 on my journey up the Yarkhun, or
Mastui, valley and across to Sarhad, and again on my
move up Yasin and across the Darkot in 1913, has
rendered it easy to trace the successive stages here
recorded of Kao Hsien-chih's greet exploit, All the
details furnished by the Chinese record agree
accurately with the important route that leads across
the depression in the Hindukush range, formed by the
adjacent Baroghil and Shawitakh Passes, to the
sources of the Mastuj river, and then, surmounting
southwards the ice-covered Darkot Pass (circ. 15, 400
feet), descends
p.144
the valley of Yasin to its debouchure on the main
river of Gilgit. The only serious natural obstacle on
this route, but that a formidable one, is presented
by the glacier pass of the Darokot. I firsf ascended
it on 17 May 1906, from the Mastuj side, under
considerable difficulties, and to a description of
that visit and the photographic illustrations which
accompany it I may here refer for all details.(26)
============
Owing to a curious orographic configuration two
great ice-streams descend from the northern face of
the Darkot pass. One, the Darkot glacier properly
so-called, slopes down to the north-west with an easy
fall for a distance of nearly 8 miles, pushing its
snout to the foot of the Rukang spur, where it meets
the far steeper Chatiboi glacier. The other
ice-stream which on the map is shown quite as long,
but which reliable information represents as some-
what shorter, descends towards the north-east and
ends some miles above the summer grazing ground of
Showar-shur on the uppermost Yarkhun river. Thus two
divergent routes offer themselves to the traveller
who reaches the Darkot pass from the south and wishes
to proceed to the Oxus.
The one, keeping to the Darkot glacier, which I
followed myself on my visit to the Darkot pass, has
its continuation in the easy track which crosses the
Rukang spur, and then the Yarkhun river below it to
the open valley known as Baroghil-yailak. Thence it
ascends over a very gentle grassy slope to the
Baroghil saddle, characteristically called Desht-i-
Baroghil "the plain of Baroghil." From this point
it leads down over equally easy ground, past the
hamlet of Zartighar, to the Ab-i-Panja, opposite
Sarhad. The other route, after descending the glacier
to the north-east of the Darkot Pass, passes down the
Yarkhun river past the meadows of Showar-shur to the
grazing ground of Shawitakh-yailak; thence it reaches
the Hindukush watershed by an easy gradient near the
lake of Shawitakh or Serkhin-zhoe. The saddles of
Baroghil and Shawitakh are separated only by about 2
miles of low gently sloping hills, and at Zartighar
both routes join.
The distances to be covered between the Darkot
pass and Sarhad are practically the same by both
these routes, so far as the map and other available
information allow me to judge. My original intention
in 1906 was to examine personally those portions of
both routes which lie over the n v-beds and glaciers
of the Darkot. But the uncertain weather conditions
prevailing at the time of my ascent, and the
exceptional difficulties then encountered owing to
the early season and the heavy snowfall of that
spring , effectively prevented my plan of ascending
from the foot of the Rukang snur and descending to
Showar-shur.In 1913 I was anxious to complete my
examination of the Darkot by a descent on the latter
route. But my intention was unfortunately frustrated
by the fact that the passage of the glacier on the
Showar-shur side had been blocked for several years
past by an impracticable ice-fall which had formed at
its end.
Having thus personal experience only of the
north-west route, I am unable to judge to what extent
present conditions justify the report which
represents the glacier part of the north-eastern
route as somewhat easier. It is, however, & fact that
the Pamir Boundary Commission of 1895, with its heavy
transport of some six hundred ponies, used the latter
route both coming from and returning to Gilgit. The
numerous losses reported
-------------------------
26 See Desert Cathay, i. pp. 62 sqq. In 1913 I
crossed the Darkot from the Yasin side towards the
close of August, i.e., at the very season when Kao
Hsien-chih effected his passage. The difficulties
then encountered in the deep snow of the neve beds
on the top of the pass, on the great and much-
crevassed glacier to the north, and on the huge
side moraines along which the descent leads,
impressed me as much as before with the greatness
of Kao Hsien-chih's alpine feat in taking a
military force acres the Darkot.
p.145
of animals and loads show that here, too, the
passage of the much-crevasscd glacier and the
treacherous snow-covered moraines proved a very
serious diffculty for the transport. Nevertheless,
inasmuch as for a force coming from the Wakhan side
the ascent to the Darkot pass from the nearest
practicable camping ground would be about 1,300 feet
less by the Showar-shur route than by that passing
the Rukang spur, I consider it probable that the
former was used.
Kao Hsien-chih's biography states that it took
the Chinese general three days to reach " Mount
T'an-chu," i.e., the Darkot, but does not make it
quite clear whether thereby the arrival at the north
foot of the range or on its crest is meant. If the
latter interpretation is assumed, with the more rapid
advance it implies, it is easy to account for the
time taken by a reference to the ground; for,
although the Shawitakh-Baroghil saddle is crossed
without any difficulty in the summer after the snow
has melted, no military force accompanied by baggage
animals could accomplish the march from Sarhad across
the Darkotin less than three days, the total marching
distance being about 30 miles. Even a four days'
march to the crest, as implied in the first
interpretation, would not be too large an allowance,
considering the high elevations and the exceptional
difficulties offered by the glacier ascent at the
end.
The most striking evidence of the identity of
"Mount T'an-chu" with the Darkot is supplied by the
description given in the record of "the precipices
for over 40 li in a straight line "which dismayed
the Chinese soldiers on looking down from the heights
of Mount T'an-chu; for the slope on the southern face
of the Darkot is extremely steep, as I found on my
ascent in 1913, and as all previous descriptions have
duly emphasized. The track, mostly over moraines and
bare rock, with a crossing of a much-crevassed
glacier en route, descends close on 5,000 feet in a
distance of little more than 5 miles before reaching,
near a ruined "Darband," or Chiusa, the nearest
practicable camping ground above the small village of
Darkot.
p.173
Well could I understand the reluctance shown to
further advance by Kao Hsien-chih's cautious "
braves," as from the top of the pass I looked down on
17 May 1906, through temporary rifts in the brooding
vapour into the seeming abyss of the valley. The
effect was still further heightened by the wall of
ice-clad mountains rising to over 20,000 feet, which
showed across the head of the Yasin valley
south-eastwards, and by the contrast which the depths
before me presented to the broad snowy expanse of the
glacier firn sloping gently away on the north. Taking
into account the close agreement between the Chinese
record and the topography of the Darkot, we need not
hesitate to recognize in T'an-chu an endeavour to
give a phonetic rendering of some earlier form of the
name Darkot, as accurate as the imperfections of the
Chinese transcriptional devices mould permit.
p.174
The stratagem by which Kao Hsien-chih met and
overcame the reluctance of his troops, which
threatened failure when success seemed assured, looks
characteristically Chinese. The forethought shown in
preparing this ruse is a proof alike of Kao
Hsien-chih's judgment of men and of the extreme care
with which every step of his great enterprise must
have been planned. But such a ruse, to prove
effective, must have remained unsuspected. I believe
that, in planning it, full advantage was taken of the
peculiar configuration of the Darkot, which
provides, as seen, a double route of access to the
pass. If the party of men sent ahead to play the role
of the "barbarians of Little P'o-lu" offering their
submission was despsatched by the Baroghil and Rukang
route, while the troops marched by the
Showitakh-Showar-shur route, all chance of discovery
while on the move would be safely guarded against. As
I had often occasion to note in the course of my
explorations, Chinese military activity, from
antiquity down to modern times, has always taken
advantage of the keen sense of topography widely
spread in the race. So Kao Hsien-chih was likely to
take full account of the alternative routes. Nor
could it have been particularly difficult for him to
find suitable actors, in view of the generous
admixture of local auxiliaries which the Chinese
forces in Central Asia have at all times
comprised.(27)
The remaining stages of Kao Hsien-chih's advance
can be traced with cqual ease. The three marches
which brought him from the southern foot of the pass
to " the town of A-nu-yueh " obviously correspond to
the distance, close on 30 miles, reckoned between the
first camping ground below the Darkot to the large
village of Yasin. The latter, by its position and the
abundance of cultivable ground near by, must always
have been the political centre of the Yasin valley.
Hence it is reasonable to assume that we have in
A-nu-yueh a fairly accurate reproduction of the name
Arniya or Arniah, by which the Dards of the Gilgit
valley know Yasin.
The best confirmation of this identification is
furnished by the statement of the Chinese record that
the bridge across the River So-yi was situated 60 li
from A-nu-yueh. Since the notice of Little P'o-lu
contained in the T'ang Annals names the River So-yi
as the one on which Yeh-to, the capital of the
kingdom, stood, it is clear that the Gilgit river
must be meant. Now, a reference to the map shows
that, in a descent of the valley from Yasin, the
Gilgit river is reached at a distance of about 12
miles, which exactly agrees with the 60 li of the
Chinese account. It is evident also that, since the
only practicable route towards Gilgit proper and the
Indus valley leads along the right, or southern, bank
of the Gilgit river, the Tibetan reinforcements
hurrying up from that direction could not roach Yasin
without first crossing the river. This explains the
importance attaching to the bridge and the prompt
steps taken by the Chinese leader to have it broken.
As the Gilgit river is quite unfordable in the summer,
the dest ruction of the bridge sufficed to assure safe
possession of Yasin.(28)
------------------------
27 The T'ang Annals specifically mention in the
account of Shih-ni, or Shighnan on the Oxus that
its chief in A.D. 747 followed the Imperial troops
in their attack on Little P'o-lu, and was killed
in the fighting: c.f. Chavannes, Tures
occidentaux, p. 163.
28 The biography of Kao Hsien-chih calls this
bridge"pont eo rotin" in M. Chavannes' trranslation,
Turcs occidentaux, p. 153. But there can be no doubt
that whae is meant is a " rope bridge," or jhula,
made of twigs twisted into ropes, a mode of construction
still regularly used in all the valleys between
Kashmir and the Hindukush. Rope bridges of this kind
across the Gilgit river near the debouchure of the
Yasin valley were the only permanent means of access
to the latter frrrom the south, until the wire
suspension bridge near the present fort of was built
in recent years.
p.175
It still remains for us to consider briefly what
the biography in the T'ang Annals tells us of Kao
Hsien-chih's return from Little P'o-lu. After having
secured the king and his consort and pacified the
whole territory, he is said to have retired by the
route of "the shrine of the red Buddha" in the eighth
(Chinese) month of A.D. 747. In the ninth month
(October) he rejoined the troops he had left
behind at Lien-yuan, i.e., Sarhad, and by the end of
the same month regained " the valley of Po-mi," or
the Pamirs.
Reference to the map shows that there are only
two direct routes, apart from that over the Darkot
and Baroghil, by which the upper Ab-i-Panja valley
can be gained from Gilgit-Yasin. One leads up the
extremely difficult gorge of the Karambar or Ashbuman
river to its headwaters east of the Yarkhun river
sources, and thence by the Khora-bhort Pass over the
main Hindukush range and down the Lupsuk valley to
the Ab-i-Panja. This it strikes at a point close to
Karvan-balasi, half a march below the debouchure of
the Little Pamir, and two and a half marches above
Sarhad.(29) The other, a longer but distinctly easier
route, leads up from Gilgit through the Hunza valley
to Guhyal, whence the Ab-i-Panja headwaters can be
gained either via the Kilik and Wakhjir passes or by
the Chapursan valley. At the head of the latter the
Irshad pass gives access to the Lupsuk valley already
mentioned, and down this Karwan-balasi is gained on
the Ab-i-Panja.(30) All three passes are high, close
on or over 16,000 feet, but clear of ice and
comparatively easy to cross in the summer or early
autumn.
Taking into account the distinct statement that
Kao Hsien-chih left; after the whole " kingdom " had
been pacified, it is difficult to believe he should
not have visited Gilgit, the most important portion
of Little P'o-lu. In this case the return through
Hunza would have offered manifest advantages,
including the passage through a tract comparatively
ferthe in places and not yet touched by invasion.
This assumption receives support also from the long
time, one month, indicated between the start on the
return march and the arrival at Lien-yun. Whereas the
distance from Gilgit to Sarhad via Hunza and the
Irshad pass is now counted at twenty-two marches,
that from Gilgit to the name place by the Karambar
river and across the Khora-bhort is reckoned at only
thirteen. But the latter route is very difficult at
all times and quite impracticable for load-carrying
men in the summer and early autumn, when the Karambar
river completely fills its narrow rock-bound gorge.
The important point is that both routes would
have brought Kao Hsien-chih to the same place on the
uppermost Ab-i-Panja, near Karwan-balasi, which must
be passed by all wishing to gain Sarhad from the
east, whether starting from Hunza, Sarikol, or the
Little Pamir. This leads me to believe that the "
shrine of the red Buddha," already mentioned above as
on the route which Kao Hsien-chih's eastern column
followed on its advance to Sarhad, must be looked for
in this vicinity. Now if is just here that we find
the small ruin
--------------------------
29 Regarding Karwan-balasi and the route along the
Oxus connecting Sarhad with the Little Pamir. cf.
Desert Cathay, i. pp. 72 sqq.
30 The Hunza valley route was followed by me in 1900.
For a description of it and of the Kilik and Wakhjir
passes, by which it connects with the Ab-i-Panja,
valley close to the true glacier source of the
Oxus, see my Ruins of Khotan, pp. 29 sqq.
The branch of this route leading up the Chapursan
valley and across the Irshad pass, was for the
most part seen by me in 1913. The Chapursan valley
is open and easy almost throughout and shows
evidence of having contained a good deal of
cultivation in older times;see my note in
Geographical Journal, 48, p. 109. On this account,
and in view of the fact that this route is some 18
miles shorter than that over the Wakhjir and
crosses only one watershed, it offers a
distinctly more convenient line of access to the
Oxus headwaters from Gi1git than the former
branch.
p.176
known as Karwan-balasi, which has all the
structural features of a Buddhist shrine, though now
reverenced as a Muhammadan tomb.(31) We have here
probably another instance of that continuity of local
cult, which has so often converted places of ancient
Buddhist worship in Central Asia and elsewhere into
shrines of supposed Muhammadan saints.(32)
According to the Annals the victorious general
repaired to the Imperial capital, taking with him in
triumph the captured king Su-shih-li-chih and his
consort. The Emperor pardoned the captive chief and
enrolled him in the Imperial guards, i.e., kept him
in honour able exile, safely away from his
territory. This was turned into a Chinese military
district under the designation of Kuei-jen, and a
garrison of a thousand men established there. The
deep impression which Kao Hsien-chih's remarkable
expedition must have produced in all neighbouring
regions is duly reflected in the closing remarks of
the T'ang-shu:"Then the Fu-lin (Syria), the Ta-shih
(i.e., the Tazi or Arabs), and seventy-two kingdoms
of divers barbarian peoples were all seized with fear
and made their submission."
It was the greatness of the natural obstacles
overcome on Kao Haien-chih's victorious march across
the inhospitable Pamirs and the icy Hindukush, which
made the fame of this last Central Asian success of
the T'ang arms spread so far. If judged by the
physical difficulties encountered and vanquished, the
achievement of the able Korean general deserves fully
to rank by the side of the great alpine feats of
commanders famous in European history. He, for the
first, and perhaps the last, time led an organized
army right across the Pamirs and successfully pierced
the great mountain rampart that defends Yasin-Gilgit,
and with it the Indus valley, against invasion from
the north. Respect for the energy and skill of the
leader must increase with the recognition of
traditional weakness which the Annals' ungarnished
account reveals in his troops.
Diplomatic documents reproduced from the Imperial
archives give us an interesting glimpse of the
difficult conditions under which the Chinese
garrison, placed in Little P'o-lu, was maintained for
some years after Kao Hsien-chih's great exploit. As I
have had occasion to discuss this curious record
fully elsewhere, it will suffice to note that the
small Chinese force was dependent wholly upon
supplies obtained from Kashmir,(33) exactly as the
present garrison of Indian Imperial Service troops
has been ever since it was placed in Gilgit some
thirty years ago.
In view of such natural difficulties as even the
present Kashmir-Gilgit road, an achievement of modern
engineering, has not succeeded in removing, it is not
surprising to find that before long resumed Tibetan
aggression threatened the Chinese hold, not merely
upon Gilgit-Yasin, but upon Chitral and distant
Tokharistan too. A victorious expedition undertaken
by Kao Hsien-chih in A.D. 750 to Chitral succeeded in
averting this danger.(34) But the fresh triumph of
the Chinese arms in these distant regions was
destined to be short. Early in the following year Kao
Hsien-chih's high-handed intervention in the affairs
of
-------------------------
31 Regarding the ruin of Karwan-balasi, cf. Desert
Cathay, i. pp. 76 sqq.,; Serindia, i. pp. 70 sq.
32 For references, see Ancient Khotan, i. p. 611,
s.v. " local worship "; also my " Note on Buddhist
Local Worship in Muhammadan Central Asia," Journal
of the Royal Asiatic S'ociety, 1910, pp. 839 sqq.
33 Cf, Ancient Khotan, i. pp. 11 sqq.; for the
official documents embodied in the 'Tse fu yuan
kuei' (published A,D, 1013), see Chavannes, Turcs
occidentaux, pp. 214 sqq. In the former place I
have pointed out the exact parallel which the
difficulties experienced since 1890 about the
maintenance of an Indian Imperial garrison in
Gilgit present to the conditions, indicateted by
the Chinese record of A.D. 749. The troubles
attending the transport of supplies from Kashmir
necessitated the construction of the present
Gilgit Road, a difficult piece of engineering.
34 Cf. Chavannes, Turcs occidentaux, pp. 158, 214
sqq., 296.
p.177
Tashkend, far away to the north, brought about a
great rising of the populations beyond the Yaxartes,
who received aid from the Arabs. In a great battle
fought in July 751, in the plains near Talas, Kao
Hsien-chih was completely defeated by the Arabs and
their local allies, and in the ensuing debacle barely
escaped with a small remnant of his troops.(35)
This disaster marked the end of all Chinese
enterprise beyond the Imaos. In Eastern Turkestan
Chinese domination succeeded in maintaining itself
for some time amidst constant struggles, until by
A.D. 791 the last of its administrators and
garrisons, completely cut off long before from
contact with the Empire, finally succumbed to Tibetan
invasion. Close on a thousand years were to pass
after Kao Hsien-chih's downfall before Chinese
control was established once again over the Tarim
basin and north of the T'ien-shan under the great
emperor Ch'ien-lung.