Secularization of public administration

by Thomas D. Lynch; Richard Omdal; Peter L. Cruise

 JJournal of Public Administration Research and Theory

 VVol.7 No.3

 JJuly 1997

 PPp.473-487

 CCopyright by University of Kansas




                                            At issue is the method used to define values in the discipline. For              example, when we discuss ethics, we base our inquiry on "regime              values" and ignore the broader established literature concerning the              "common spiritual values of mankind. "Like much of western culture,              secularization as a value strongly influences public administration.              This article examines the history of values in public administration              research and questions secularization with its removal of linkage              between spiritual wisdom and public values. Research in public              administration evolved from a value-neutral basis immortalized in              Woodrow Wilson's political/administrative dichotomy, to a logical              positivism basis advanced by Herbert Simon, to a call for the return              to value-based traditions. Recent research in the field, including              research on ethics for public administrators, has acknowledged that              values do play an integral role and that the value-free neutrality              approach was invalid. This article makes the case that public              administration should not narrow its choice of values to only              secularization but should use the full range of human inquiry              available to us, including the various Holy Scriptures from not only              the Jewish and Christian traditions but other traditions as well,              such as the Hindu, Buddhist, and Islamic.              Full Text: COPYRIGHT 1997 University of Kansas              The excitement and meaning of our very existence--indeed, the future              of life itself on this planet--is linked to the administrative              process. Theory, values and practice are inexorably interwoven and              enmeshed. It is this complex net which is the center of attention in              the study of public administration. (Simmons and Dvorin 1977, 3-4)              In their book Public Administration Values, Policy, and Change              (1977), Robert Simmons and Eugene Dvorin make a strong argument (as              noted above) for the importance that values play in public              administration. They note the existence of a current, so-called,              value-free neutrality approach that has been so long and assiduously              cultivated within public administration. The authors state that              public administration was not and is not now value free, but value              full. They assert that any other assumptions are "out of touch with              the value conflicts of the broader society" (p. xiii). Moreover,              according to Simmons and Dvorin, public administrators should not ".              . . hide behind the guises of `scientific objectivity' or scholarly              remoteness" (p. xiii). Adding to this discussion, a section from a              recent essay by Robert Berne, dean of the Wagner School of Public              Service at New York University, further highlights our point.              According to Berne:              Just as there is no way to separate policy from administration,              there is no such thing as value free work in public service. Like it              or not, the public sector is all about values and I believe that              some of our current problems (in public administration) stem from              our inability (as academics) to address the role that values play.              (1995, 82)              The role and treatment of values in public administration is a              debatable issue which is often focused on how to define the idea of              values themselves (e.g., Denhardt 1991).              John Rohr, in his book Ethics for Bureaucrats, An Essay on Law and              Values (1978, 65), broadly defined values as the "beliefs, passions,              and principles that have been held for several generations by the              overwhelming majority of the American people." Rohr suggests that              the use of the more specific concept regime values is the most              appropriate approach to define ethics in public administration (p.              59). He defined regime values as "the values of that political              entity that was brought into being by the ratification of the              Constitution that created the American republic.              Rohr noted that the method of regime values rests on the following              three considerations:              * Ethical norms should be derived from the salient values of the              regime.              * These values are normative for bureaucrats because they have taken              an oath to uphold the regime.              * These values can be discovered in the public law of the regime (p.              59).              As a conceptual tool, regime values have been used to determine what              is acceptable in terms of discourse in values discussions in public              administration theory. However, some do question the use of regime              values. For example, Robert T. Golembiewski, in his 1965 work Men,              Management, and Morality, raised the issue. He noted that the              failure of formal theories of organization to address the question              of individual freedom reveals an insensitivity to the moral posture              of the individual worker. He listed five values, associated with              economic life, that follow the Judeo-Christian ethic:              * Work must be psychologically acceptable to the individual.              * Work must allow individuals to develop their own faculties.              * The work task must allow the individual considerable room for              self-determination. The worker must have the possibility of              controlling, in a meaningful way, the environment within which the              task is to be performed.              * The organization should not be the sole and final arbiter of              behavior; both the organization and the individual must be subject              to an external moral order (R. Denhardt 1984, 102).              The fifth point indicates a disagreement with the idea that regime              values should be used to define the generic term values. The              question is: What should be used to form the basis for defining              values in public administration theory? Notwithstanding the problems              illustrated by the religious persecution of scientists prior to Rene              Descartes, perhaps values found in religious traditions would              provide a better basis.              The thesis of this article is that we have allowed public service to              be secularized and have largely removed the moral and spiritual              wisdom of civilization from what we teach, research, and do in              public administration (e.g., McCurdy and Cleary 1984; Adams and              White 1994). We are losing our focus due to our so-called objective              commitment, our lessened concern for social purpose, and our nonuse              of spiritual wisdom--for example, regime values as a foundation for              ethics is not adequate, as noted by Golembiewski (R. Denhardt 1984).              Limiting research on values in public administration to those              associated with a regime ignores the accumulated spiritual wisdom              developed over centuries of human experience. Similar and recurring              themes of values and morals are found in the literature of all the              major religions. Thus, it provides an alternative basis upon which              to examine the values of the profession, apart from the use of              regime values.              The roots of American public administration as a profession and              inquiry were closely linked and motivated by spiritual concerns. For              example, at the beginning of the twentieth century and the beginning              of the formal study of public administration in America, Luther              Gulick brought his background as the son and grandson of              missionaries to his work and work style in promoting and even              creating what we now call public administration. He stated that, in              selecting the first students in public administration he and the              other founders sought sons and daughters of civil servants, but they              also sought those with strong religious backgrounds. In the 1950s,              Paul Appleby, a dean at the Maxwell School at Syracuse University,              wrote a stream of articles and books on morality and public              administration. Also in the 1950s, Dwight Waldo, at the height of              logical positivism's dominance in public administration, attempted              to force the discipline away from a total reliance on Simon's              value-free perspective (Waldo 1955). In the 1970s, the New Public              Administration brought morality again to the literature of public              administration (e.g., Marini 1971). Even today we have researchers              and practitioners who address ethics in government in their              teaching, research, and practice. (Lynch and Lynch 1995, 3).              Nevertheless, many of us feel uncomfortable about linking spiritual              and moral wisdom with public administration.              This article argues that we have inappropriately secularized public              administration. The first section addresses epistemology and its              impact on public administration. The next section argues that public              administration has largely been secularized and is ignoring the              spiritual wisdom over recorded history. The conclusion suggests how              to bring that wisdom into public administration.              EPISTEMOLOGY AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION              A Definition and Redefinition of Focus              Epistemology is the branch of philosophy concerned with the theory              of knowledge. Traditionally, central issues in epistemology are the              nature and derivation of knowledge, the scope of knowledge, and the              reliability of claims to knowledge (Edwards 1967). Students and              academics interested in exploring the major epistemological views in              public administration might typically ask:              How does each view largely define accepted knowledge?              What are the implications to public administration?              Are any of the views dysfunctional?              In what ways?              What are the implications to the development of the field or              discipline?              Philosophers frequently have been divided over epistemology. For              example, rationalists such as Plato and Rene Descartes argued that              ideas of reason intrinsic to the mind are the only source of              knowledge. Empiricists such as John Locke and David Hume argued that              sensory experience is the primary source of our ideas and therefore              of knowledge. The debate between the rationalists and empiricists              continued for quite some time and later took a significant turn with              Immanuel Kant. He asked whether there could be synthetic a priori              knowledge, that is, knowledge not based on experience but which is a              condition of the comprehensibility of experience (Popkin and Stroll              1990). Kant, although antiempiricist in the derivation-of-knowledge              question, agreed with the empiricists regarding the              scope-of-knowledge question, in that knowledge is limited to the              world of experience (Popkin and Stroll 1990; Beck 1966).              On the reliability of knowledge, the skeptics were a significant              influence in the history of epistemology. They questioned whether              any claim to knowledge can be upheld against the possibility of              doubt. Rene Descartes (1596-1650) focused his inquiry on the              elimination of doubt. This role of the skeptic was to increase the              level of rigor and precision necessary to posit what should be              considered as knowledge (Edwards 1967). In contemporary              epistemology, the role of the skeptic is diminished. George Edward              Moore, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and others have redirected              epistemological attention from concern about claims of knowledge due              to doubt toward analysis of their linguistic meaning.              Empiricism and Modern Science              An understanding of the empiricist perspective can be determined              from the word empiricist itself. The term comes from the Greek word,              emdeiria, which means experience. The basic tenet of empiricism is              that legitimate human knowledge arises from what is provided to the              mind of the individual by introspective awareness gained by              experience. Empirism is              a rejection of other doctrines such as the view that when the human              mind first encounters the world it is already furnished with a range                           of ideas or concepts that have nothing to do with experience; and              an acceptance of the idea that, at birth, the mind is a tabula rasa,              or              white paper, void of all characters, and that only experience              can provide it with ideas (Edwards 1967).              Empiricism has taken many forms. However, one common feature is that              it starts from experimental science as a basis for defining human              knowledge (Edwards 1967). This is opposed to the rationalist              approach, which starts from pure mathematics as the basis for              understanding human knowledge. Empiricism and its major proponents              developed during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. It              arose directly from the growing success and importance of              experimental science with its gradual separate identity from pure              mathematics. Major early proponents of empiricism were called the              British Empiricist School of Philosophy and included Francis Bacon,              John Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume. Later proponents--also              usually classified as empiricists--in the nineteenth and early              twentieth centuries include John Stuart Mill and Bertrand Russell              (Beck 1966). Russell was the major personality link between the              classical British empiricists and the beginnings of logical              positivism in the twentieth century.              Modern science, as developed by Descartes from his emphasis on              doubt, has a number of parallels to empiricism. These parallels are              important to the development of logical positivism. According to              Descartes, the solutions to the questions posed by epistemology lay              in the systematization of knowledge. In the ideal method described              by Descartes, man starts with basic axioms whose truth is clear and              distinct and he sets aside anything that can be supposed to be false              until he arrives at something that cannot be supposed to be false.              Critical to this basic analysis is that nothing is accepted as true              unless it is clear and distinct. Next, one analyzes the basic axiom,              starting with simple thoughts, and only later proceeds to more              complex thoughts. Following these steps, one reviews the entire              process so that no possible consideration is omitted (Popkin and              Stroll 1990).              Important similarities between modern science and empiricism include              the need to systematize the acquisition of knowledge. This avoids              the introduction of extraneous variables that could confuse and              cloud the final product. It also promotes the need for careful              self-correction and comprehensiveness throughout the process, thus              not overlooking or omitting important variables that could affect              the final outcome.              The most important difference between modern science and empiricism              is the issue of the existence of certain innate truths. Modern              science and Descartes propose that the universe can be explained in              terms of absolute properties or truths. By employing the appropriate              procedures described previously, we can discover knowledge that              under no circumstances can be false. Empiricists, on the other hand,              say even if systematized procedures for the acquisition of knowledge              were employed, man cannot discover absolute truths. Man can only              develop probable hypotheses about the universe. Within certain              confidence intervals and at certain levels of significance, man can              work out a theory of knowledge, but only within the bounds of the              actual achievements of scientists. Discussion of limits and bounds              along with the disputation that certain organizational absolute              truths were, in fact, proverbs, would resonate strongly nearly a              century later. They were first discussed in public administration              when logical positivists like Herbert Simon examined behavior of              individuals within organizations using concepts such as bounded              rationality and satisficing (Simon 1946 and 1947).              With the breakaway of science from classical philosophy in the late              nineteenth century, the following questions became significant:              What is philosophy apart from science?              What kind of knowledge (if any) results from philosophical activity?                           Is philosophy different from science? (Popkin and Stroll 1990)              In the twentieth century several influential philosophical movements              developed, each with answers to these and other important questions              in philosophy and science. Important to the development of logical              positivism was the perspective of logical atomism and the works of              Whitehead, Russell, Wittgenstein, and eventually, the Vienna Circle.                           From Logical Atomism to the Vienna Circle              After more than ten years of work, Alfred North Whitehead and              Bertrand Russell, in a series of three volumes entitled Principia              Mathematica (1962), described a new type of logic. It was broader in              scope than what was then the standard and accepted logic system              based on the works of the Greek philosopher Aristotle. This new              system of logic described the relationship of symbols to each other,              or symbolic logic. The importance of the work by Whitehead and              Russell lay in the fact that it did not reject the centuries of work              by philosophers since Aristotle, but refined it through mathematics              to a degree of precision never before seen. This symbolic logic              could also be used to develop a precise new symbolic language,              beyond that of natural languages like French, English, or Spanish,              that could clarify the meanings of sentences for further              philosophical analysis (Popkin and Stroll 1990).              Principia Mathematica and the writings of Whitehead and Russell              received further explanation and elaboration with Ludwig              Wittgenstein (1899-1951), who many regard as the greatest              philosophical genius of the twentieth century. Wittgenstein thought              of philosophy as an autonomous discipline (e.g., separate from              science) dealing with its own sort of particular problems. He did              not believe that science could solve philosophical problems, and in              later life he would say that even philosophy could not provide any              factual information about the world (Popkin and Stroll 1990). The              great body of his work launched the logical positivist movement.              Moreover, because of several statements in Wittgenstein's 1922 work              Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1961) a small group of students in              Austria, led by a University of Vienna professor, Moritz Schilick,              began the famous Vienna Circle.              The logical atomist perspective of Whitehead and Russell received              its most comprehensive explanation in Tractatus              Logico-Philosophicus. Wittgenstein's version of logical atomism              became known as picture theory. A perfect language, according to              Wittgenstein, is like a map, as it pictures or mirrors the structure              of reality. As philosophers attempt to utilize the logical atomistic              perspective and symbolic logic to develop aspects of the structure              of reality, they would be actively engaged in the process and not in              a merely passive and reflective stance as in the past (Berg 1967).              This single part of Wittgenstein's massive work would become              extremely significant for the eventual development of logical              positivism. Wittgenstein's contention that philosophy is a genuine              activity just as science is would become a major focus for the              Vienna Circle. But, unlike science, philosophy does not discover new              facts or new knowledge. Philosophy describes the structure of the              world and how its basic ingredients are constructed. This is              knowledge, but not the same kind of knowledge that science develops              (Popkin and Stroll 1990). The philosophical system of logical              atomism was a metaphysical system in the traditional sense. As such,              it would be rejected by thinkers who would use the same symbolic              logic developed by logical atomists to contend that metaphysical              knowledge developed by such thinking was itself not sense (Bergmann              1967).              Logical positivism is often thought to have been initiated by the              "philosophy as activity" remarks of Wittgenstein in the Tractatus              Logico-Philosophicus. However, the group associated with the              beginnings of the logical positivism movement were individuals who              met in the early 1920s in seminars in Vienna that were conducted by              Moritz Schilick. The original members of the group were committed to              science either by scholarship or profession. To them, philosophy was              an avocation. Among the group's members were Hans Hahn, Fredrich              Waismann, Herbert Feigl, Otto Neurath, and Rudolf Carnap. The              original focus of the group was empiricism. However, they were              heavily influenced first by Whitehead and Russell and then, more              profoundly, by Wittgenstein (Gross 1970).              In elaborating upon Wittgenstein's view that philosophy was not a              theory but an activity, the Vienna Circle held that philosophy does              not produce propositions that are true or false. Instead, philosophy              merely clarifies the meaning of statements and in that process it              shows some to be scientific, some to be mathematical, and some to be              nonsensical (Wedberg 1984). Four principles of logical positivism              eventually were developed by the Vienna Circle. The first principle              is that of logical atomism. The truth of all complex statements              depends on simple statements about what may be sensed. However, none              of these simple statements may entail any others.b