The Journal of Religion
Vol.77 No.2
April 1997
Pp.337-340
Copyright by University of Chicago
Any addition to the meager literature on Buddhist ethics is welcome,
and the appearance of this volume from David Kalupahana suggests
that the subject is at last beginning to attract the attention it
deserves. It is encouraging to see scholars who have so far
concentrated on more traditional aspects of Buddhist philosophy turn
their attention to ethics, a comparatively new field where much
vital and challenging work remains to be done. It must be said at
the outset, however, that this slender volume does not mark a major
contribution to the discipline. The 146 pages of text are
distributed over seventeen short chapters, giving an average chapter
length of under nine pages. The initial suspicion that this is a
short book that spreads itself too thin is soon confirmed on
reading, particularly as there is a fair amount of material that is
of questionable relevance to ethics.
The volume is divided into three parts, entitled "Historical
Background and Problems," "The Moral Life, the Principle, and
Justification," and "Applications of the Principle." Part I begins
with a twenty-five-page discussion of pre-Buddhist moral theories.
Although this contains the headings "Deontology" and
"Utilitarianism," these terms are neither defined nor explained, and
the content is largely a summary of pre-Buddhist religious and
philosophical ideas of the kind that would be found in an
introduction to Indian religion. The need for such an introductory
survey is questionable in a book of this length, particularly since
no clear conclusions about Buddhist ethics are drawn from it. When
pre-Buddhist religious developments are characterized with ethical
terminology, furthermore, it is done in an offhand way, as if no
demonstration is required. For example, Arjuna's dilemma in the
Bhagavadgita is simplistically set up as illustrating the difference
between deontology and utilitarianism. Kalupahana writes: "Arjuna,
the hero of the Bhagavadgita, was reluctant to engage in battle
against his kith and kin, fearing that it would lead to unnecessary
death and destruction, thereby paving the way for the disintegration
of the family, social structure, and moral and religious values. He
therefore started as a utilitarian unwilling to cause pain and
suffering to human beings, not prepared to disrupt the social fabric
but willing to lay down even his own life in order to guarantee
'maximum happiness'" (p. 7). But since when did unwillingness to
cause pain and suffering make someone a utilitarian? The essence of
Arjuna's dilemma is surely that of a conflict between duties - his
duty as a ksatriya versus his duty to his relations and friends. His
initial decision not to fight - and to accept death as the price of
his decision - is not the result of a computation made according to
some hedonistic calculus but the simple recognition that he is
unable to do what his duty requires.
In the section on utilitarianism beginning on page 10, Kalupahana
again attempts to set up a contrast between deontology and
utilitarianism, regarding them as belonging to "two different
cultures" in India. He writes: "While the Bhagavadgita represents
the ultimate development of the deontology of the Brahmanical
tradition . . . utilitarianism was part of the tradition that came
to be identified as the ascetic, or sramana" (p. 10). This is an
extraordinary claim. Why should the sramana movement be thought
utilitarian? Because, according to the author, the movement
subscribed to the theory of the four stages of life (asramadharma),
and the duties required in the four stages of life could be
incompatible with caste duty (varnadharma). But what does this have
to do with utilitarianism? This is not explained, and the author
moves on to describe Kautilya as an early exponent of
utilitarianism, making further questionable claims such as that he
"established utilitarian thought on a moral foundation," that Mill
was his "Western counterpart," and that Mill and Kautilya "tried to
reconcile the [sic] deontology and utilitarianism" (p. 15).
Virtually no arguments are offered in support of these assertions.
Toward the end of this section there is a reference to the Buddha's
"moral pragmatism" (p. 16) without any clarification of what this
means. Since the Buddha was a sramana, should he not be classed as a
utilitarian rather than a pragmatist? What is the difference between
the two? Questions of this kind are left hanging in the air while
the discussion moves on to summarize the views of the five heretical
teachers, including a disproportionate five-page review of the
teachings of Jainism. It is hard to resist the impression that some
of this material has been pasted into a discussion of ethics rather
than written specifically for it.
Chapter 2, entitled "Knowledge," is a summary of Buddhist theories
of epistemology that has almost nothing to say about ethics till the
end. Chapter 3, "The Fact-Value Distinction," is notable for its
remarks about Aristotle, such as that "Aristotle's araetic [sic], or
virtue-based, ethics appears to be what eventually led to emotivism"
(p. 38). It is hard to think of a less likely source for emotivism
than Aristotle. The claim that Aristotle "shied away from
formulating any moral principles" also needs qualification - is the
Doctrine of the Mean not an example of one such moral principle? On
a positive note, the recognition that Buddhism does not aim at the
suppression of feeling but only the abandoning of "excessive desire
and lust (chandaraga)" is well made (p. 41). The two remaining
chapters contain little of note, and at the end of part 1 the
impression is of a superficial discussion around tangential themes
with few points of any substance having been made.
The forty-five pages that make up part 2 are concerned with
summarizing aspects of Buddhist ethics such as brahmacariya, the
virtues, and the Eightfold Path. This part is less confused than
part 1, but once again there are many statements calling for
clarification. For example, on page 80: "We have already observed
that virtues are the stepping-stones of the moral life and that they
are not valued for their own sake. The Buddha wanted to recognize
their usefulness and then proceed to explain something more useful,
namely the moral life." The claim that virtues are not part of the
moral life would strike most ethicists as strange. What Kalupahana
is suggesting is that the virtues (by which he seems to mean sila)
are the preliminary to the Eightfold Path. The latter forms a
"bridge between the life of virtues and ultimate freedom" (p. 81).
Kalupahana seems unaware that this means-end concept of morality in
Buddhism has been the subject of major critique in recent years by
several authors. Indeed, the book shows no awareness at all of
recent work in the field of Buddhist ethics and appears to have been
written in a vacuum.
Part 3 is the most interesting part of the book. Although only
thirty-three pages long, some useful points are made in the five
chapters dealing with society, economics, politics, law, and nature.
These chapters discuss important contemporary issues, and one wishes
they had been given a more central place. Although little of
substance is said, some interesting lines of argument are introduced
that could be developed in interesting ways.
Ethics in Early Buddhism is too slight to be an important
contribution to the study of Buddhist ethics. The attempt to
characterize Indian religions in terms of Western ethical categories
is not well handled. Labels are applied to movements and texts
without proper discussion, and terms like "deontology" and
"utilitarianism" are used with little consideration of how
appropriate they are. Kalupahana's notion of the Western philosophy
that has most in common with Buddhist ethics turns out to be
"Jamesean pragmatism," but we learn this in the glossary of all
places. The author also states there (p. 159) that the Buddha "could
not subscribe" to a moral absolute, defined as "a principle that is
universally binding, not only because it applies to all people at
all times under any circumstances, but also because it can never be
overridden by any other principle." But does not the First Precept
embody a principle of this kind? Perhaps the author thinks it does
not, but the complete absence of any discussion of the matter one
way or the other is a major defect, and typical of the book's
reluctance to engage with serious issues and alternative
perspectives.