Desire, Death and Goodness:

The Conflict of Ultimate Values in Theravada Buddhism

Reviewed by James P. McDermott

The Journal of the American Oriental Society

Vol.116 No.3

July-Sep 1996

P. 605

Copyright by American Oriental Society


         It is generally admitted that the Nikayas of the Theravada Buddhist 
            Pali canon consist of a number of strata, some of them earlier and 
            some later. Text critical studies have made clear that the verses of 
            the Suttanipata, especially the Atthakavagga and the Parayanavagga, 
            are to be counted among the earlier strata, which present a picture 
            of a Buddhism fairly different from what is taken by many scholars 
            to be representative of earlier, or "primitive" Buddhism. In Indian 
            Buddhism: A Survey with Bibliographical Notes (Hirakata City, Japan: 
            Kansai University of Foreign Studies Publication, 1980), 57-58, 
            Hajime Nakamura summarizes some of the distinctive features of this 
            relatively early layer of textual tradition as follows: Certain core 
            Buddhist doctrines and peculiarly Buddhist technical vocabulary do 
            not appear. A skeptical attitude toward what might be called "dogma" 
            (i.e., ditthi) is expressed. And the life of Buddhist monks was 
            fairly different from the later, fully developed monastic life. 
            In her book Desire, Death and Goodness, Grace Burford presents a 
            detailed textual analysis of the Atthakavagga of the Suttanipata, 
            focusing on the values which it propounds. Burford finds the 
            Atthakavagga "exceptional within even the earliest Buddhist 
            literature in its non-metaphysical presentation of the summum bonum" 
            (p. 190). These teachings are then carefully compared with the 
            interpretations of the text contained in two classical Theravada 
            commentaries on the Atthakavagga, namely in the Mahaniddesa and in 
            the Paramatthajotika, generally ascribed to Buddhaghosa. The 
            commentaries are also compared with one another. Through her 
            analysis, Burford finds that "[i]n the commentaries, a new set of 
            metaphysical values has been appended to the Buddha's ideal as it is 
            presented in the Atthakavagga" (p. 188). The commentaries are thus 
            more expressive of the teachings of the later years of the Nikayas 
            and, thus, of the more fully developed Theravada than is the 
            Atthakavagga itself. In this respect, Burford argues that the value 
            system propounded by the Atthakavagga is more consistent and more 
            coherent than is the later tradition with its inclusion of 
            metaphysical concepts and a transcendent vision in its understanding 
            of the ultimate goal. These she considers "to be a detrimental 
            'addition' to the teaching of the Atthakavagga," finding its 
            understanding of the ideal "much less problematic than that imposed 
            on it by the commentators" (p. 188). 
            Burford is at her best when she undertakes close textual and 
            philological analysis, although her translation of the 
            Paramatthajotika commentary on verse 794 of the Atthakavagga is 
            rather opaque (p. 137). 
            Theravada Buddhists and scholars alike are likely to find her 
            broader argument and conclusions more provocative, controversial, 
            and at points grating, however. For example, she is particularly 
            harsh on normative, authoritative Theravada thought, holding that 
            its value theory lacks "internal consistency and coherence." 
            Similarly, she argues that its "combination of conflicting 
            conceptions of the ultimate goal . . . undermines the theoretical 
            truth-claim of this teaching" (p. 5).