Praying for Power: Buddhism and the Formation of Gentry Society in
Late-Ming China
Reviewed by Roger V. Des Forges
Pacific Affairs
Vol.67 No.4
1994.Winter
Pp.603-604
Copyright by University of British Columbia (Canada)
The notable revival of Chinese Buddhism in the late Ming and early
Qing (circa 1550-1700 C.E.) can be explained by the idea that
Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism were one, but Timothy Brook, in
this carefully researched and engagingly written book, argues that
it was primarily a result of the growth in population and trade in
the late Ming. These forces produced a larger and wealthier gentry
class, and, as the number of civil service degrees and official
posts remained constant, even good scholars were increasingly unable
to distinguish themselves through public service. The upper gentry,
therefore, turned to patronizing Buddhist monasteries to
differentiate themselves from a burgeoning lower gentry as well as
from wealthy merchants and commoners. In the course of presenting
this thesis, the author delves into many aspects of Ming-Qing social
history. He begins by providing some historiography, rightly
emphasizing the gentry as a "concrete historical formation." He
discusses the concept of the "public sphere" and convincingly
identifies its "core dynamic" in China. He surveys Buddhist
monasteries in social context, recognizing them as "part of the
realm of si (private/self) that the gentry was seeking to enlarge,
rather than of the realm of gong (public/official) from which they
were excluded" (pp. 33-34). We are introduced to Zhang Dai, a
typical seventeenth-century dilettante who held a theatrical party
in a monastery but denied being a lay devotee. We see how Buddhism
revived in complex interaction with Neo-Confucianism and how even
the "radical" Li Zhi used Buddhism merely to challenge Confucianism
not to replace it. We are shown how Buddhism supported gentry
culture in "the definition of elite status" and in "the search for
local autonomy from the late-imperial state" (p. 125). The author
describes Dinghu Mountain, a monastery in Guangdong which, very
untypically, refused any support from land rent. He shows how the
gentry patronized monasteries with money, land, guanxi, and
literature, all of which peaked in the late Ming. He analyzes
appeals based on gender, kinship, religion, social welfare, and
culture, all of which contrasted with pitches made to merchants. A
section on "Patronage in Context" features three case studies of
poor Zhucheng county in Shandong, wealthy Yin county in Zhejiang,
and "late-developing" Dangyang county in Hubei. The author collates
name lists in gazetters to reveal that it was upper-gentry lineages
that provided the most consistent support for key monasteries, even
though there was also significant court and official patronage (and
even some commoner patronage in Dangyang). The author compares
conditions in the Southern Song, late Ming, and late Qing. He finds
cycles of Buddhist resurgence and gentry dominance combined with a
secular trend toward "the separation of state and society" that led
to the end of the empire in 1911. He concludes that "history was
ultimately unkind to the Chinese gentry," if only because "the
infant nation-state had no place for an elite that had learned to
enlarge its power at the state's expense while simultaneously
expecting other actors to be permanently excluded from the political
realm" (p. 330). While shedding much light on many topics, this
study also raises questions that deserve further attention. Were
Ming scholar-officials so beholden to the state that only Buddhism
could provide a basis for their autonomy? Did late-Ming gentry
patronize monasteries only to represent their private interests as
the public good or also to reassert the ideal of the virtuous
gentleman (junzi) in an ever-widening world? Should Western terms
such as "empire" and "church" - or even "state" and "gentry" - be
applied to China without definition or qualification? If
modernization theory is indeed unacceptably teleological, is the
notion of "late imperial China" any more helpful in understanding
the longterm process of continuity and change in Chinese history?
Can one accurately analyze the relationship between the Ming-Qing
period and the present without referring to early Chinese experience
before the Qin? Finally, is the "history of gentry society" really
"over," or are there still elites (in China as elsewhere) intent on
creating public spheres that serve their private interests at the
expense of the majority? This fine book implicitly raises such
questions; it will also undoubtedly inspire further research to
answer them. ROGER V. DES FORGES State University of New York at
Buffalo