Engaged Buddhism represents a considerably expanded discussion begun
in a 1990 panel at the American Academy of Religion entitled
"Buddhist Liberation Movements." The book consists of eleven
substantial papers that offer portraits of a variety of Buddhist
social reform organizations and their leaders sandwiched between
beginning and closing essays that address thematic and philosophical
issues raised by these movements. By and large, each movement
corresponds to a separate country and is the product of unique
cultural and historical circumstances. Hence, the collection has the
feel of a tour of South and Southeast Asia from India and Sri Lanka
through Thailand and Vietnam, although Japan is also represented
through a discussion of the Soka Gakkai movement. The book is well
organized, and most of the separate essays are quite readable and
engaging. Sometimes there is more detail on activities and fund
raising than would interest most readers, but on the whole the
various contributors maintain an evenhanded approach with attention
to the larger issues at stake.
To many readers, myself included, this is fairly unfamiliar
material. And insofar as Engaged Buddhism brings these groups to
light this is a service not only to Buddhist studies but to
political theorists and philosophers generally. The first question
that naturally arises is "What is a Buddhist liberation movement?"
Furthermore, one might wonder, to what degree does it differ from
other sons of "liberation movements"? Chris Queen's preface and
introductory essay answer by proposing "that a modern liberation
movement is a voluntary association guided by exemplary leaders and
a common vision of a new society (or world) based on peace, justice,
and freedom. Today's Buddhist liberation movements in Asia exemplify
these features, appropriately expressed in language and styles of
conduct that its members deem to be 'Buddhist'" (p. 10). As to the
meaning of the term Buddhist in this context there is less
unanimity. Just as Buddhism represents a variety of traditions
(Theravada, Mahayana, Vajrayana) and orientations (monastic versus
secular), so these movements equally share a remarkable variety of
interpretations of the doctrinal basics of Buddhism. However, the
fact that they all deal in one form or another with the basic tenets
and interpret them in ways that have hermeneutical precedent within
the tradition becomes Queen's justification for labeling these
movements Buddhist despite the tradition's own tendency to fragment,
sometimes into mutually opposing camps.
In other words, each of these movements justifies its actions and
promotes an agenda based on some interpretation of traditional
Buddhist doctrines. Furthermore, these movements share similar goals
primarily of world peace and social justice, particularly in the
form of assistance to the poor and underprivileged, goals involving
a refocus of Buddhist doctrine from an other-worldly attainment to a
"mundane awakening" "which includes individuals, villages, nations,
and ultimately all people, and which focuses on objectives that may
be achieved and recognized in this lifetime, in this world" (p. 9).
Generally, there are two directions one can go in Buddhism in making
this connection between the traditional goal of attaining nirvana
and compassionate assistance to those who suffer in the worldly
sense. The first derives more or less from the Theravada tradition
and the moral code (sila) set down for all Buddhists. The other
route is through the typically Mahayana emphasis on the concepts of
emptiness, interdependence, and egolessness.
To begin with, whatever one's Buddhist orientation, Buddhism has
always been concerned with the elimination of suffering as many of
the contributors to Engaged Buddhism point out. The Four Noble
Truths, with which especially Theravada Buddhism starts, proclaim
that (1) all existence is suffering, (2) desire and attachment are
the cause of suffering, (3) eliminating attachment is eliminating
suffering, and (4) following the eight-fold path is the means to
eliminate attachment. The eight-fold path - right view, right
thought, right effort, right speech, right action, right livelihood,
right mindfulness, and right concentration - is the means to
overcoming such attachment. The five, eight, or ten sila or moral
precepts (prohibiting killing, stealing, lying, adultery,
intoxicants, and sometimes more) follow as a minimum set of
standards consistent with this path. However, to advance along the
path to the ultimate goal of nirvana one must also acquire merit,
and often in the form of rendering compassionate assistance to those
who suffer. The culmination of such service is the four "Divine
Abodes" of metta (loving kindness), karuna (compassion), mudita
(empathy, sometimes sympathetic joy), and upekka (equanimity), all
of which contribute to the final acquisition of nirvana and freedom.
Hence, monks in ancient India were often the source of medical care
and other social services as mandated by Buddhist principles of
selfless service. In short, altruistic social engagement was a form
of right livelihood and right action, essential aspects of the
struggle for freedom from attachment.
The Mahayana approach is quite different from the path of attaining
merit through service to others. The salient principles for the
Mahayana tradition are emptiness, interdependence and egolessness,
although Theravada ethics also rely on the non - egocentric nature
of altruistic social action. Broadly, the teaching of emptiness
discredits ideologically based action, especially coercive action;
interdependence stresses our interconnection and identification with
all forms of nature; and finally egolessness and nonattachment
mandates creative engagement with those others to whom we are so
interconnected. In fact, from the Mahayana perspective,
interdependence is the very essence of reality, so that one cannot
coherently draw a rigid distinction between the state of nirvana and
the world of suffering (samsara). Since nirvana and samsara are
interdependent, two sides of the same reality, one cannot leave
samsara by going to nirvana. Hence, nonengagement with the world is
simply not an option for the enlightened. Thus, not only must we
have concern for fellow humans but the nonhuman world including the
natural environment as well. In this view, any form of dominance,
manipulation, coercion or even outright neglect is a symptom of
egocentric attachment and a product of desire. In a sense, one is
enjoined from doing anything but good works as these represent the
only alternative for selfless living. Good Buddhists do not behave
compassionately because it is the right thing to do or because they
will acquire merit toward nirvana; rather good Buddhists cannot but
be compassionate.
Each of these movements adopts one form or another of these
justifications in appealing to Buddhist principles in support of
their work. And interestingly, many of them mix both types of
approach whether they come from a Mahayana or a Theravada
background. For example, Santikaro Bhikku gives a fascinating
account of his mentor, Buddhadasa Bhikku, a Thai monk and religious
reformer who broke ranks with the native Theravada clergy,
establishing what he took to be a more authentic and accessible form
of Buddhism. He also wrote extensively about the political
implications of Buddhism and incorporated much of the Mahayana
emphasis on emptiness and interdependence in order to justify his
version of what he called "Dhammic Socialism," sometimes
provocatively, "Dictatorial Dhammic Socialism." I leave the details
for the reader to gamer, but briefly emptiness provided Buddhadasa
with a defense of the nonideological nature of his approach with
interdependence and hence man's inherent sociality providing the
socialist part. Whether such a grafting is ultimately successful in
terms of Buddhism remains to be seen, and there is controversy over
this point, especially from more traditionalist elements. I myself
have to confess a certain uneasiness over the label "socialism,"
since such an economic program seems rather too specific to be based
simply and straightforwardly on the mere fact of human sociality.
Other movements are more straightforwardly traditionalist and
Theravada. The Sarvodaya Shramadana (shramadana means "work camp" in
this context) founded by A. T. Ariyaratne in Sri Lanka offers such
an example. Originally a college professor who taught Buddhism and
was heavily influenced by other engaged Buddhist leaders such as
Ambedkar, Ariyaratne urges his students to go forth from a
cloistered setting and put their principles to work helping Sri
Lanka's villagers (irrespective of their ethnic background I might
add). In his view, the process of awakening and pursuing nirvana is
not simply individual but involves collective advancement.
Furthermore, in order to advance to the supramundane level one must
first address mundane suffering. In short, the traditional Theravada
view of the various stages of progression toward eventual
enlightenment are broadened to include the society of which the
individual is inextricably a part. One cannot pursue one's own
enlightenment without pursuing equally that of the village's, and
first their mundane suffering of poverty and hardship must be
addressed.
In fact, much of the work of other groups in India especially and
principally in support of the so-called scheduled castes or former
untouchables follows the lines of this socialization of the
Theravada dhamma. TBMSG (Trailokya Bauddha Mahasanga Sahayaka Gana)
and Dr. B. R. Ambedkar's advocacy of a socially conscious Buddhism
for untouchables certainly follow such a route. Chris Queen and Alan
Sponberg each offer an interesting look at this movement, Queen
covering Ambedkar's very public search for a religion that would
address the needs of the downtrodden untouchables in an independent
India and Sponberg the activities of English-born Sangharakshita and
his continuation of Ambedkar's vision. Indeed, Ambedkar is a
fascinating figure within Buddhism, for although he converted to
Buddhism taking some 380,000 of his followers with him at the same
time, he embraced a form of Buddhism very much of his own making,
systematically reinterpreting the Four Noble Truths and dropping
much of the more "mystical" and even spiritual doctrines such as
karma and rebirth.
"For Ambedkar, the first noble truth for the present age was the
widespread suffering of injustice and poverty; the second truth was
social, political, and cultural institutions of oppression ... the
third truth was expressed by the European ideal of 'liberty,
equality, and fraternity'; and the fourth truth was the threefold
path of Ambedkar's famous slogan,'Educate! Agitate! Organize!' (p.
62). The problem this raises is, of course, whether such a doctrine
is Buddhism. I have to admit doubts on this matter which is not to
say I find Ambedkar's ideals un-Buddhist. Queen defends Ambedkar as
an authentic Buddhist but fails to connect this admitted
reinterpretation of fundamental doctrine to any deep-level
principles within Buddhism, other than Buddhism's distinctive
tendency to reinvent itself. The problem with Ambedkar is that he
argues that these are the only or best interpretations of the
Buddha's teaching. And Ambedkarites have argued that Buddhism itself
is ripe for a "new way," a navayana. However, Sponberg notes that
TBMSG, which continues Ambedkar's work, may owe its success, where
other more politically oriented Ambedkarite movements have failed,
to its emphasis on Buddhist spiritual practices (pp. 105-106). In
other words, a Buddhism shorn of the teachings regarding
egolessness, interdependence, and the relation between desire and
suffering is just too thin to be religiously engaging.
If Ambedkar's Buddhism represents the extreme of a materialistic
adaptation of traditional, especially Theravada beliefs, Buddhadasa
and Thich Nhat Hanh, of Thailand and Vietnam respectively, represent
a more traditional emphasis on the spiritual. Both have incorporated
many Mahayana elements in their teaching, Thich Nhat Hanh because
Vietnamese Buddhism has always and Buddhadasa as part of his own
critique of traditional Thai Buddhism. For them, the path to
enlightenment is still Buddhism's appropriate preoccupation, but in
characteristic Mahayana fashion they construe that path in terms of
compassionate engagement with the world. Concern for fellow humans
and amelioration of their suffering is an entirely expected, natural
expression of a Buddhist life. For Buddhadasa, social action has
largely been in the form of political theorizing and writing
although, given the political climate in Thailand, this can be a
harrowing undertaking. He describes his "Dhammic Socialism" as
"living for the benefit of society, not for the individual benefit
of each person" (p. 166). While this seems somewhat vague,
Buddhadasa did see such a policy as realistic and consistent with
what he viewed as "true" democracy, although his version of
democracy more closely resembles simple egalitarianism.
Interestingly, in contrast to the Theravada and Mahayana approaches
a third form of justification for Buddhist social engagement, which
I shall label pragmatic, seems to emerge from the various
discussions in Engaged Buddhism. The pragmatic approach stresses not
so much a reformulation of Buddhism's fundamental principles but a
recognition of the realities involved in attaining enlightenment. If
one is hungry, then as Ambedkar and others noted, there will be
little capacity to concentrate on spiritual ends. In many ways such
an approach echoes Aristotle who recognized a wide variety of goods
essential to happiness not the least of which was health and a
modicum of material well-being. And indeed, a number of authors in
this collection emphasize a correlation for many engaged Buddhists
between the promotion of human happiness and the elimination of
dukkha or suffering. Of course, it remains to be seen just how
materially focused Buddhism can become without unduly compromising
its soteriological aims.
A number of important themes emerge in these discussions both for
Buddhism and political theory. For Buddhism, the more socially
engaged one becomes as a Buddhist, the more compelled one is to
either completely reinterpret the fundamental teachings, as in the
case of Ambedkar, or to draw on the disparate varieties of Buddhist
doctrine both Theravada and Mahayana despite their historical
antagonism. While the ethical codes and rules in Theravada provide a
practical guide and focus for action, the teachings of selflessness
and interdependence in Mahayana provide a larger framework of
inspiration. Additionally, engaged Buddhists are inevitably faced
with the question of participation in politics, a point nicely
handled by coeditor Sallie King in her discussion of Thich Nhat Hanh
and in her conclusion to the book. Obviously, the issue is complex
and, to some extent, different in different contexts. Generally, the
question comes up in terms of the desirability of a Buddhist
political party, and in this regard the case of Soka Gakkai in
Japan, which sponsored its own opposition party in the Japanese
parliament, is instructive as it has suffered from charges of
corruption and betrayal of its principles in the process of
political compromise. However, as the book makes abundantly clear,
not all political action need be in the form of partisan
electioneering, and Chris Queen emphasizes NGO status as something
of a defining feature of Buddhist liberation movements.
In terms of political theory, these movements raise important
questions regarding the political and economic implications, which
are mostly communitarian, of Buddhism in general. While the Indian
and Sri Lankan groups concentrate on issues of social justice, most
others move in the direction of both endorsing democracy and some
form of socialism. Universally they reject unbridled capitalism as
thoroughly inconsistent with Buddhist ethical principles. Even Soka
Gakkai, situated within the thriving and capitalist economy of
Japan, advocates "a democratic welfare state" dedicated to removing
"the causes of social inequality" (pp. 385-86). However, not all
unequivocally embrace democracy and unfettered political freedom.
Ajarn Buddhadasa in particular, as noted, goes to some lengths to
distinguish "political" from "moral" democracy, arguing that not all
forms of political democracy are moral, especially liberal
democracy." As Santikaro Bhikku expresses the point," forms of
democracy ... that encourage or give too much freedom to
selfishness" are to be rejected in preference to "Dictatorial
Dhammic Socialism" as" a middle way between the contending
ideologies of liberal democracy and vengeful communism" (pp.
177-78).
There is much in this volume I have failed to cover which is some
indication of its richness as a resource for understanding this
phenomenon of engaged Buddhism. Not least of these issues emerges in
Nancy Barnes's treatment of the status of the bhikshuni or Buddhist
"nun's" orders. Obviously, the way Buddhism grapples with a legacy
of discrimination under contemporary challenge will be instructive
for understanding its full political and moral dimensions. Let me
conclude by adding that so often people speak of Buddhism and the
Buddhist view in monolithic terms that it is genuinely refreshing to
see work which introduces readers to the complexities, nuances,
stresses, and strains that mark the Buddhist tradition.