The Journal of Religion
Despite the increasing importance of ethics in the study of Buddhism
and the globalization of the field of bioethics, Buddhist
perspectives on bioethical issues have usually appeared in piecemeal
form. Now Damien Keown develops the position he argued for in his
first book, The Nature of Buddhist Ethics (New York, 1992), into the
first systematic treatment of a range of bioethical issues from a
Buddhist perspective. The result is a strongly argued yet
controversial volume that will be of interest to Buddhologists and
bioethicists alike.
If Keown is right, Buddhism prohibits abortion, suicide, euthanasia,
the withdrawal of food and hydration from patients in a persistent
vegetative state, and most forms of embryo research and reproductive
technology. While these conclusions contrast with some recent work
on these issues, especially by Western scholars and practitioners of
Buddhism, they are neither as original nor as controversial as the
method by which they are reached. Keown grounds his arguments in the
Pali canon (especially the monastic discipline [vinaya]) and the
commentarial tradition (limited to Buddhaghosa) while recognizing
that these sources are insufficient. First, they do not directly
address many current bioethical issues, and even when they do, the
circumstances are radically different from today. Second, the vinaya
consists of judgments about particular cases rather than principles
enabling one to generalize about kinds of cases. Third, the truth of
scriptural teachings is grounded in their conformity with the nature
of things, so that the texts are "a window through which the
principles of natural law are discerned" (p. 16). Keown therefore
adopts the natural law ethic of John Finnis and Germain Grisez to
reconstruct what he believes is the theoretical framework that
underlies the textual tradition and makes it possible to apply that
tradition to current problems. Central to this natural law ethic is
the claim that human fulfillment consists in basic goods that human
choices must never directly oppose or subordinate one to another.
Buddhism, according to Keown, recognizes life, knowledge, and
friendship as basic goods in this sense. Hence, it is always wrong,
for example, to act directly against life. Keown draws on the
scriptures and Buddhaghosa to formulate distinctively Buddhist
beliefs about human nature, rebirth, when individual life begins and
ends, and the moral status of nonhuman life. These beliefs
concerning life, coupled with the principle that it is always wrong
to act directly against life, lead to the above-mentioned
conclusions regarding ethical issues at the beginning and end of
life.
Keown's proposal is bold and his positions well argued. However, his
project raises many questions. While drawing from sources that
Theravadins are more likely to adhere to as authoritative, Keown
also puts forth his position as the Buddhist view. This requires
agreement with Mahayana textual sources and with actual Buddhist
practice. While his arguments against adherents of other schools
(mostly Zen) who disagree with him are convincing, Keown engages
non-Theravadin sources selectively. Moreover, when beliefs and
practices in Buddhist societies (and texts) disagree with him, he
attributes it to non-Buddhist cultural influences while assuming
that beliefs and practices in agreement with his conclusions are
devoid of such influences. Even those who share his textual
perspective may question whether his focus on the vinaya and
Buddhaghosa is too narrow. While Buddhism does regard its teachings
as grounded in the nature of reality, it is unclear why, of the
competing ways of articulating this claim, Keown chose the natural
law theory of Finnis and Grisez. The Buddhist prohibition against
intentional killing, which Keown wants above all to preserve, does
not require the notion of life as a basic good to explain or justify
it. Moreover, Keown himself seems to realize that his natural law
ethic is inconsistent with Buddhism at some points. He admits that
this ethic prohibits contraception because the latter acts directly
against the transmission of life (pp. 128-29). Yet, recognizing the
ambivalence of Buddhism regarding contraception, he treats the
prohibition as an ideal that need not be adhered to in all acts of
sexual intercourse (p. 132). More generally, Keown admits the
difficulty of finding a doctrine of the basic goods, and especially
of life as a basic good, in Buddhist sources. Other proposals for a
Buddhist natural law ethic, such as those based on the doctrine of
dependent origination, do not face this problem. In the end Keown
may be driven too much by what he thinks is necessary to combat
moral subjectivism and contribute to public bioethical debates.
These reservations indicate that Keown has started a debate rather
than ended one - a debate that has implications for Buddhist social
ethics in general and comparative religious ethics as well as
bioethics. Bioethicists will appreciate Keown's general competence
in their field and his articulation of Buddhist beliefs that account
for crucial differences with Western secular and religious views.
Nonspecialists, however, will be annoyed by the omission of a key to
the standard abbreviations of Pali texts.