Maintaining ethno-religious harmony in Singapore
Khun Eng Kuah
Journal of Contemporary Asia Vol.28 No.1 March 1998 pp.103-121
COPYRIGHT @ 1998 Journal of Contemporary Asia Publishers (Philippines)
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The march towards the twenty first century, the end of the cold war and the changing socioeconomic conditions experienced by most nation-states have brought about a world that is vastly different from that of the nineteenth century where Weber and Marx first sighted the significance of religion. Yet, despite changes in religion, religious secularisation and the emergence of civil religion, religion continues to exert great impact on the people. Today in Asia, America, Europe, Africa and Latin America, there is a strong resurgence in numerous religious movements for a variety of reasons. In Latin America and parts of Asia, there is the emergence of Christian-based Liberation Theology. In Eastern Europe, the Croatians and Serbians are engaged in an ethno-religious war. Elsewhere as in the Middle East and Asia, a strong religious, fundamentalist movement have taken place. In all these movements, the crux of the action is a self-renewal process - of one's position and identity in a world that is increasingly compressed in time and space. Rapid modernization has brought about communication and technologies that allowed each nation to have instant contact with the others. Diffusion of cultural values, popular cultures, attitudes (predominantly American and European), technological transfer and economic welfare, have resulted in a level of cultural homogenisation among nations. In Asia, this has been so. In Singapore, this is even more acute, especially with its information open door policy and its secular liberal education. The rise of pan-religious movements across Asia and the Middle-Eastern countries have set a trend for a renewed awareness and sensitivity towards the needs to participate in these movements. The pan-Islamic Dakwah Movement have galvanised forces among the Islamic states, including Malaysia and Indonesia. Likewise, the Hindu Revivalist Movement have set the Indian communities throughout the Asian region in motion and the Buddhist Revivalism, brought about by the formation of the World Buddhist Council, has penetrated these countries as well. These movement have lend weight to countries which are suffering from a decline in membership and are facing competition from Christian evangelists. One view argues that religious revivalism can be seen as (1) a counter-movement to rationalisation, that is, against the "demystification of the world," (2) an attempt to overcome the pressures of modernisation; (3) a type of anti-imperialist, anti-hegenionical movement; and (4) an expression of renewal generated from within a given religion (Evers and Siddique, 1993: 2). Here, revivalism is seen as "an attempt to restructure the past in a form relevant to contemporary concerns" (ibid: 2). Others view this in the form of religious fundamentalism which involves "innovation in scriptural interpretation, a less stringent application of religious codes, secularism, liberalism and rationality: in short, the adaptation of religious ideas and practices to modern culture" (Caplan, 1987:9). This trend is to cope with the impacts of modernity of the society. On the other hand, fundamentalism further pushes the modernising trend by legitimising the move. Like elsewhere, in recent years, there has also been a general revival of the main non-proselytizing religions in Singapore. The Islamic Dakwah, the Hindu Revival and Buddhist Fundamentalist movements have gathered momentum since the late seventies, in part, in response to the active proselytizing Christian evangelical movements. This article explores the introduction of a White Paper and subsequently an Act on the Maintenance of the Religious Harmony and the rationale behind it. It examines the strength of the state, through this Act, in redefining the roles of religion and the boundary that its leaders could function within. Religious Sensitivity in a Multi-Ethnic Singapore In a multi-ethnic and multi-religious Singapore, religion and religious affiliations have been taken to coincide with ethnicity. The official categorization has led to the perpetuation of the stereotypical images of Chinese as practising "Buddhism or Daoism," the Indians as "Hindus," Malays as "Muslims" unless they stated otherwise. Only the Christians do not fit his ethnic mould. Part of the reason lies in its association with colonialism and in recent years, its association with modernism. Christianity therefore is seen to cut across the ethnic boundaries. This view is reinforced by the positive correlation between ethnicity and religious affiliation where 72.5% of the Chinese population are Buddhists and Daoists; 99.4% of the Malays are Muslims and 56.6% of Indians are Hindus. In addition, 10.6% of Chinese, 0.3% Malays and 12.4% Indians are Christians (Census of Population, 1980). Of the three ethnic groups, the religious boundary of the Malays can be seen as the least elastic with the smallest number of converts while the Chinese and the Indians registered a much higher percentage of conversion. Part of the challenge of these ethnic communities is to arrest the flow to other faiths, essentially Christianity. In Singapore, Buddhism, Hinduism and Islam have traditionally abstained from systematically proselytizing the individuals. They each spread in their own time and gradually encompassing the like-minded communities. Identity between religious belief and community membership has remained unbroken among these communities. In a way, this has also created a stable relationship among the major ethnic communities in Singapore where religion continues to be a focus of ethnic culture and identity. The Singapore State, since independence, has been cautious with the religious sensitivities of its ethnic composition. It monitors closely the development and activities of the various religious groups to ensure that the ethno-religious fabric remains undisturbed. In this respect, it established policies and laws to protect the ethno-religious framework of the Singapore society. The Policy of Multi-Religiosity When the PAP government inherited a multi-ethnic population, the dice has already been casted. For the sake of social and political stability, the PAP government has adopted a policy of muti-racialism and multi-religiosity. At the first session of the first Parliament of an independent Singapore in December 1965, the newly appointed government spelt out the following policy: ... one of the cornerstones of the policy of the Government is a multi-racial Singapore. We are a nation comprising people of various races who constitute her citizens, and our citizens are equal regardless of differences of race, language, culture and religion. Whilst a multi-racial secular society is an ideal espoused by many, it is a dire necessity for our survival in the midst of turmoil and the pressure of big power conflict...(Vasil cited in Ling, 1989: 692). Literally, the multi-racial Singapore society expected its citizenry to "intermingle and interact with each other in a spirit of tolerance, understanding and mutual appreciation" (ibid: 693). The state would facilitate and need be, intervene to ensure that such attitude becomes the prevailing norm of the nation. The Singapore state is a secular and religiously neutral state and therefore does not take the side of either majority or minority religions. And it deals with problems of a religious nature in a bureaucratic manner. As early as 1949, the Inter-Religious Organisation was formed in Singapore. This was: ... an association of individuals in Singapore professing the different faiths prevailing in the island. Since 1949 it has worked assiduously yet unobtrusively in Singapore to create a climate of religious understanding and cooperation in order that religion should be a source of national unity rather than disunity (ibid: 695). To ensure that each religious group functioned within its own boundary, the government has never failed to use appropriate occasions to remind the religious leaders and the religion of their responsibility to the wider community at large. On one occasion, addressing the conference organised by the Tamil Muslim Union in 1966, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew expressed his hope that: the leaden of the Muslim community would always interpret Islamic doctrine in a way that would be to the benefit of its followers and the general good of the community (ibid: 694). Implicit in Lee's statement was the hope that the interpretation of the Islamic doctrine would also express the values espoused by the state, i.e. multi-racialism, multi-religious tolerance, forbearance and togetherness (ibid: 694). Likewise, Encik Rahim Ishak, the then Minister of State for Education, a Muslim himself, urged the Islamic leaders to shoulder wider responsibility and of the "abundant opportunities that existed in the Republic for Muslims to improve themselves educationally and economically" (ibid: 694). The state has, since independence, acknowledged that the Malays as a minority group has to be treated sensitively. The Administration of Muslim Law was enacted and came into effect in 1966. Around the same time, the Council of Muslim Religion, Majlis Ugama Islam (MUIS) was established officially in 1968 to "assist Muslim organisations in Singapore to regulate their affairs and to administer the Muslim Law" (ibid: 694). The Buddhists were also reminded of their social responsibility when Lee addressed a Buddhist convention in 1967. He told the congregation: Let us face up to this problem of multi-culture, multi-religions and
multi-languages. Alone in Southeast Asia, we are a state without an established church (ibid: 695). In the seventies, the fervour of nationalism and national identity was in the forefront on many of the Southeast Asian states. Malaysia and Indonesia have established a national ideology encapsulating Islam as the official religion. (In the case of Malaysia, it is the National Ideology and in Indonesia, known as Pancasila). In Singapore, nation-building was one of the top priority during this period. However, the state continued its policy of religious neutrally. Prime Minister Lee continued to reaffirm this state policy and reminded the general population that "religion in a secular state like Singapore must never become a source of friction and animosity between the different religious groups" (ibid: 695). He urged the Buddhists, when addressing the Thirty-fifth Anniversary of the (Singapore) Buddhist Union to "grow in strength, and help make Singapore a more tolerant and a harmonious nation despite our many different religions" (ibid: 695). The PAP government has adopted a very consistent policy since 1965 in regards to its multi-religious policy. The Maria Hertogh incident(1) has further proven the government to be correct, that any slackening in vigilance in religious affairs among the ethnic groups could result in sectarian violence. It has also convinced the government that the only way to prevent sectarian strife from destroying the fragile ethno-religious fabric of the nation is to spell out clearly the roles and responsibilities of each religion and their organisations in Singapore. In the early eighties, the recognition by the state, hence legitimation, of the religious contribution to moral values in Singapore (through the moral education programme in school), has encouraged the main religions to adopt a higher public profile. This together with the global trend in religious revivalism, have led to aggressive proselytization by some Christian evangelical groups and Dakwah members. The latter has led to conflict of interests and dissatisfaction at both the interreligious and intra-religious levels. The established Buddhist-Daoist, Islamic and Hindu communities were dissatisfied with the proselytisation carried out by Christian evangelists. Likewise, some Muslims saw the Dakwah members and movement a threat to their Islamic practice. The Buddhists and Hindus were also forced to respond to this intense religious competition. Amidst all these rivalries and competition for membership, the state responded with the introduction of the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act, henceforth known as the Act, to prevent such tensions from becoming overt violence. This swift and decisive action was to prevent a repeat of the 1969 Racial Riot where clashes between the Malays and Chinese were grounded with religious overtones. White Paper on Maintenance of Religious Harmony (The Paper) When addressing the Parliament in January 1989, the President stressed the importance of maintaining religious harmony in a multi-religious Singapore. Religious Tolerance and Moderation. Religious harmony is as important to us as racial harmony. Singapore is a secular state, and the supreme source of political authority is the Constitution. The Constitution guarantees
freedom of religion. However, in Singapore racial distinctions accentuate religious ones. Religious polarization will cause sectarian strife. We can only enjoy harmonious and easy racial relationship if we practise religious tolerance and moderation (The Act: 1). The Religious Harmony Act, came into effect in March 1992, allows the government to take action against the various religious groups which violate the act, i. e. serve restraining orders on leaders and members of a religion who threaten Singapore's religious harmony by their words or actions, and those who conduct political and subversive activities under the guise of religion (The Paper: 9-10).
To maintain this harmony, it is the policy of the government to prevent and a tacit understanding among the various religions to refrain from aggressive proselytization and conversion. In the White Paper on Maintenance of Religious Harmony, the goal is: to preserve harmony, Singaporeans, whether or not they belong to any
organised religious group, must not cause disharmony, ill-will or hostility between different religious or non-religious groups. In particular, religious groups, in exercising their freedom of religion, should: a. acknowledge the multi-racial and multi-religious character of our
society, and the sensitivities of other religious groups; b. emphasise the moral values common to all faiths; c. respect the right of each individual to hold his own beliefs and to accept or not to accept any religion; d. not allow their members, followers, officials or clergy from acting disrespectfully towards other religions or religious groups; and e. not influence or incite their members to hostility or violence towards other groups, whether religious or non-religious (ibid: 5). The state keeps a close watch on the religious activities of the various groups. So long as the groups adhere to the guidelines laid down in the Act, the state have, till recently, refrained from intervening in the religious affairs and religious groups were given autonomy in running their activities. Here again, the emphasis is on religious sensitivity. The government argues that respect and sensitiveness for other religions are important for the social stability of the nation-state. The Maria Hertogh case continued to impact on the government's treatment of religions, reflecting on their fear of another eruption of ethnic violence if religious issues were not handled carefully. Added to this is the global trend towards ethno-religious revivalism and the outburst of violence among religious sectarian groups in Sri Lanka and ethnic cleansing among some East European countries, which served as a reminder of the potentially volatile situation at home. 71be state keeps a close guard on the religious affairs of its citizenry, forcing the major religious groups to practice within their own religious boundary. Religion and Politics On the one level, the Singapore government viewed the ethno-religious conflicts in Sri Lanka and the former Yugoslavia as examples of the failure of the state to separate religion and politics in a clear fashion. It was also the weakness of the state which caved in to the pressures and ethnic chauvinism of one ethnic group as the Sri-Lanka case illustrated when the majority urban Buddhist Singhalese were determined to reestablish Sri Lanka as a Buddhist state. The Tamil minority retaliated with militancy to protect their own religious interests. The bitter war fought between the Muslim Serbs and the Christian Croats emerged as a result of the disintegration of Soviet Union where, without a strong central government, the original ethnic proclivities reasserted their territorial claims. On the other level, the government was determined to prevent any overt conflicts by monitoring closely the development of religious activities, especially the influence from overseas. The Christian Liberation Theology Movement which found its followers from the underclasses in Latin America and the Philippines were closely monitored by the state when it started appearing in Singapore. Likewise, prominent foreign Muslim leaders and scholars expounding the Dakwah ideology were also subjected to close observation. Several events in Singapore in the mid-eighties illustrated the volatile nature and the need for careful treatment of religious activities. One widely publicised incident was the arrest of several Catholic priests and lay workers by the government.(2) This action was criticised by some Singaporeans and given wide foreign media coverage by foreign journalists. The incident began in the mid-eighties when a number of Catholic priests became interested in the discussion of various social issues surrounding the nation. Most of the priests were already involved in some kind of welfare work, for example visiting prisons and preaching to the prisoners. Several of the Catholic priests namely Fathers Patrick Goh, Edgar D'Souza, Joseph Ho and Arotcarena formed the Church and Society Group with an objective to discuss social issues and made known their view to the congregation.(3) Through various in-house publications, including the Catholic News, the team sought to discuss various topics including the roles of trade unions, National Wage Council and rights of workers; the roles of multinational corporations in Singapore; the amendments to citizenship laws, the Newspaper and Printing Presses Act, Government policies on TV3 and foreign workers. The tone of the publications, according to the state, is an attempt to appeal to the masses on grounds that they were "victims of injustice, lies and untruths" (ISD in Act: 16). It upset the government which prided itself of fair treatment and justice to the people. To the government, this was an act of irresponsibility and if Liberation Theology(4) were to be of this nature, then it has no place in the Singapore society for the government perceived its motive was to rock the very basic stability of the nation which the PAP government have so painstakingly created for the past three decades. According to a report, to the Catholic priests and lay workers, in line with the teachings of Liberation Theology, they felt that it was their responsibility to be involved in social issues and to create social consciousness among its congregation. The general view was that the citizens were apathetic, apolitical and at times, too afraid to speak their mind. They should be encouraged to do so as in the social liberal societies of the European and American worlds. Such actions were seen as leftist leanings towards Marxism, hence a Marxist conspiracy to subvert the existing sociopolitical system.(5)
The conflicts of ideology between the government and the Catholic priests reflected deep seated differences between the pragmatists on the one hand and the social democrats on the other. Being rationalists and pragmatists, the government, having gone through the decolonisation process, the separation from Malaysia and the struggle for survival during the early years of independence, finally reaching the present stage of industrialisation, economic progress and achieving the status of a developed nation, was not prepared to let a few radical voices destroyed this very fragile fabric. Otherwise, the three decades of progress could be destroyed within a matter of months if the radicals managed to incite mass movement. Also, attempts to bring the various ethnic groups together and mutually co-exist in harmony by implementing all the multi-ism policies could also be destroyed overnight. The government has consistently stressed that the interests of the wider state is paramount and all other sentiments should be subsumed under it. While arrest was made to individual members, the government assured the general population that it was not an attack on the Church itself. The Church continues to function as before, but religion and politics needed to be clearly separated. A second incident underlying the need for the separation of religion from politics was a series of lectures given by foreign Muslim theologians which the government regarded as provocative and aimed at inciting resentment against the government. In 1973, a lecturer named Imaduddin Abdul Rahim from Indonesia was invited to deliver a religious talk to the Muslim in Singapore. During this period, the government was carrying out massive resettlement schemes for its population. Many villages and rural population were resettled in new towns. It was a extremely difficult task to persuade villagers and families to relocate and acceptance was slowly coming from these people. The speech argued that such policy would eventually lead to a demolition of mosques and that "in new housing estates such as Queenstown and Toa Payoh one could see church steeples piercing the skyline and large non-Muslim prayer houses around" (The Paper: 16). He further branded "local Muslims and Malays as stooges' in their own country for failing to fulfil their obligations" (ibid: 16). In 1982, another Muslim theologian, Ahmed Hoosen Deedat, in his speech compared Singapore Muslim with South African Malays and commented that Singapore Muslims were passive and soft and that they should be more militant. He criticized that "the early local Muslim inhabitants of being complacent and failing to convert the Chinese immigrants, so that the Chinese had taken over power from the Muslims" (ibid: 17). He was also heard to be making disparaging remarks on Christianity. In 1984, a Malaysian religious teacher, Mat Saman bin Mohamed, at a religious function in Singapore "expressed his disappointment over the demolition of mosques in areas affected by urban redevelopment, saying that this was tantamount to the destruction of Allah's house" (ibid: 17). In 1986, again at the invitation of the Muslims, he was reported as making a speech asserting that "Singapore belonged to the Malays as they were natives of the island" (ibid: 17). He further commented that "Malays had become a minority as a result of the influx of foreigners to Singapore, and were now subservient to the non-Malays" (ibid: 17), calling for Malay unity against the majority race and saying that their plight would be supported by the Malaysian Malays (ibid: 17). With the resurgence of ethnic nationalism and chauvinism throughout the world, it was not surprising that these radical theologians should expound such views. But it was equally predictable that the Singapore government would react by banning the three from re-entering the country again. It should be clear by now that ethnic sensitivities have been accorded top priority in governmental policies and been taken very seriously by all concerned. The issues surrounding Malay identity and Islam continued to be very sensitive in this part of the world where the Singapore nation state with a Chinese majority has to co-exist peacefully in a fragile geopolitical balance with its Indonesian and Malaysian neighbours, which have a majority Muslim population.(6) Islam is the state religion of both Indonesian and Malaysia. Besides, the policies of giving preferential treatment to the Bumiputras in Malaysia have also caused discontent in some Muslim quarters in Singapore. While Singapore adopted a policy of meritocracy, it also has to calm down latent tension and dissatisfaction in the discontented quarters. The 1969 racial riot was simply too high a cost to be repeated again. The government did not tolerate incitement of any kind from external forces, neither was it prepared to allow its Muslim population to be influenced by them. To them, the speeches made by these Muslim theologians justified the ban on their re-entry. A third incident concerned the Sikh and Indian communities in Singapore. The assassination of Mrs Indira Gandhi by Sikh extremists in 1984 brought about increased tension between the two groups in Singapore. There were four reported cases of assaults on Sikhs, acts of vandalism on Sikh properties and several threatening phone calls to Sikh individuals and institutions. Some Indian stall-holders refused to serve Sikh customers while some Sikhs closed their shops when they anticipated troubles. Some Hindu temples and organisations made plans to hold condolence gatherings for the late Indian prime minister. There was also a Brahmin temple planning to place a condolence message in the Straits Times and held prayers for Mrs Gandhi. The government viewed the activities of the Sikh and Hindu activities with alarm. It acted by advising against such a display of emotions both in the temple and in the newspaper as it felt that such actions would only aggravate the already tense situation between the two communities in Singapore. It also argued that the politics of India should not be the concern of the Singapore Indians and Sikhs, so advising calmness in the treatment of this assassination. On the part of the Sikh community, since 1984, some Sikh temples commemorated the storming of the Golden Temple and prayer sessions were held for those Sikhs who were killed. Speeches were also made, condemning the Indian Government and urging the Singaporean Sikhs to assist their Indian counterparts in their struggle for an independent Sikh state. In 1989, a few Sikh temples held requiems for the two Sikhs executed by the Indian government for the assassination of Indira Gandhi. They also placed announcement in the obituaries column of the Sunday Times, informing the intended prayer time for these two executed Sikhs. Photographs and newspaper cuttings were also displayed at the temple. The government reacted swiftly to this. The Police called up the Sikh leaders and temple officials, warning against holding further requiems for the two and not to import foreign politics into Singapore or involve their religious organisations in politics (ibid: 18). The government advised the Sikh temples and their members against providing funds and logistics support to militant Sikh separatist groups in India and United Kingdom (who were fighting for an independent Khalistan state in Punjab). While it is difficult to stop individuals from donating to such cause, the government came down hard on those temples that allowed its leaders or members to make emotional appeals to congregation for donations for such cause.
Religion and Subversion Another area of controversy was how different groups of people viewed actions as being politically subversive. The so-called Vincent Cheng and Marxist Conspiracy incident,(7) which attracted international media coverage and attention of human rights groups, fully illustrated the fear of the government, and the difficulties in defining what constitutes social consciousness and what constitutes subversion. Cheng and his cohorts were arrested under the Internal Security Act and imprisoned without being given a trial. Subsequently, most have been released after they publicly confessed to their activities and admitted their mistakes. To the government, Vincent Cheng and his cohorts were engaged in activities that aimed at destabilising the country. He was seen to be using Christianity (specifically Liberation Theology) and the Church to advance the Communist cause (ISB in the Paper: 18).(8) He was seen to embark "on a systematic plan to infiltrate, subvert and control various Catholic and student organisations, including the Justice and Peace Commission of the Catholic Church, and Catholic student societies in the National University of Singapore and Singapore Polytechnic. He planned to build a united front of pressure groups for confrontation with the government" (ibid: 18). The Internal Security Branch further reported that "under the aegis of the Justice and Peace Commission, he organised talks, seminars and workshop to arouse feelings of disaffection with society and the urge for revolutionary change. He was seen to manipulate Church publications like the Highlights and Dossier to subtly propagate Marxist and leftist ideas, and to politicise his readers who included priests and lay Catholics. Some of the articles were perceived by the government as adopting familiar Communist arguments to denounce the existing system as "exploitative," "unjust" and "repressive" (ibid: 18). In an extracted confession and broadcasted to the public via the Singapore Broadcasting Corporation, Cheng was seen to be making the following remark: I would foresee that the building up of pressure groups would develop to a stage where they would come into open confrontation with the government. This confrontation ... would start off with peaceful protests, public man petitions, which could lead further to
more mass events like mass rallies, mass demonstrations, strikes, where more people are mobilised. And leading to public disorder and maybe even rioting, bloodshed" (FEER, 27 Oct. 1987: 23). The link between Cheng and the exiled radical student leader of the seventies, Tan Wah Piow (and in 1985 stripped of Singapore citizenship under a new law), led the government to conclude that there was some kind of Communist conspiracy plot in the brewing (ibid: 22-25). In a highly critical article, Haas (1989) charged that the Singapore government has confused political freedom with subversion and leftish leanings with Communism, that there was no basis to prove that Cheng and his cohorts were Marxists nor were there any plot to overthrow the government. Haas also argued that the government's theory of "Nip in the bud" was a dangerous way of viewing social events. He said "to analogize politics to the biological determinism of a bud opening into a flower or the growth of cancer is to espouse an organismic theory of politics, long discredited .... (Haas, 1989: 68). He further argued that to wrest without trial under the Internal Security Act goes against the very grain of what the PAP government had fought for in the fifties against the British colonial rule. In 1955 when the British colonial administrators enacted the Internal Security Act, Lee Kuan Yew spoke against it: If it is not totalitarian to arrest a man and detain him when you cannot charge him with any offence against any written law -- if that is not what we have always cried out against in fascist states -- then what is it?... If we are to survive as a free democracy, then we must be prepared, in principle, to concede to our enemies... as much [sic) constitutional right as you concede yourself... We say we dislike communism because, under that form of government, they have arbitrary powers of arrest and detention without trial.... ... to curtail a fundamental liberty, and the most fundamental of them all -- freedom from arrest and punishment without having violated a specific provision of the law and being convicted for it.. But no man should be deprived of his liberty (Haas, 1989: 70). The case of Vincent Cheng, his involvement in Liberation Theology and his activities have once again draw attention to the difficulties inherent in the political structure, of the ruler and the ruled. It has also touched upon the inherent differences between politics and academic discourses. The hardline approach taken by the government by invoking the Internal Security Act in arresting Vincent Cheng and his groups was seen by many critics as tantamount to the "storm in a teacup" syndrome. But the government's critique on bystanders are that they are not in the forefront of decision-making and are ultimately not responsible for the actual course of events. Given the course of history, the government, in the final analysis, would prefer to err on the side of caution. The Ikhwan, Muslim Brotherhood was also considered to have subversive intention, hence undesirable in Singapore. The Internal Security Branch reported that: A few Muslim activists have also attempted to carry out subversive activities under the guise of conducting religious activities. In mid-1978, a university graduate formed a clandestine group of extremists called "Ikhwan" or Muslim Brotherhood, with the long-term
aim of establishing an Islamic state, by armed means if necessary. The group comprised 21 members, mostly recruited from religious classes conducted by a Malaysian religious teacher then living in Singapore. Ikhwan planned to recruit pre-university students and undergraduates
by setting up religious discussion groups in their respective school and institutions. They were to be trained as writers and religious teachers in order to disseminate revolutionary ideas and sow disaffection among the Muslims. Led by the Ikhwan, the Muslims would then demand that the Government implement Islamic laws similar to those in Saudi Arabia or Iran. If the Government refused, the Ikhwan would spearhead an armed uprising. By September 79, the Ikhwan had managed to penetrate the Malay language societies of the then Ngee Ann Technical College and the Singapore Polytechnic, and to take over a moribund Muslim organisation, the Pertubohan Muslimin Singapura (PERMUSI), as a front for their clandestine activities (ISD in Act: 19). In this case, the Singapore government has invoked the ISA to arrest five leading Ikhwan members while others were given warning. The religious adviser from Malaysia was expelled and prohibited from entering Singapore. The government reassured the Muslim population that the arrest was targeted at individuals whose intention was to subvert the state, but not at Islam per se. Islamic militancy has now become the hallmark of many Islamic Jihad groups throughout the world and any seed for the germination of such a movement in Singapore would not be viewed kindly at all. The separation of politics and religion was henceforth spelled out clearly in the Act. Thus the White Paper states that; Religious groups must not get themselves involved in the political process. Conversely, no group can be allowed to exploit religious issues or manipulate religious organisations, whether to excite disaffection or to win political support. It does not matter if the purpose of these actions is to achieve religious ideals or to promote secular objectives. In a multi-religious society, if one group violates this taboo, others will follow suit, and the outcome will be militancy and conflict. We will spell out these group rules clearly and unequivocally. All political and religious groups must understand these ground rules, mid abide by than scrupulously. If we violate them, even the best intentions, our political stability will be imperilled (The Paper. 1). Inter and Intra-Religious Tensions Part of the reason why this Act was introduced was the perception, hence fear, of the state over the implications of uncontrolled religious activities which would tore the basic social structural fabric of Singapore society. Hence, it viewed the recent heightened religious fervour in this light: In recent years, there has been a definite increase in religious fervour, missionary zeal, and assertiveness among the Christians, Muslims, Buddhists and other religious groups in Singapore. Competition for followers and converts is becoming sharper and more intense. More Singaporeans of many religions are inclining towards strongly held exclusive beliefs, rather than the relaxed, tolerant acceptance of and coexistence with other faiths. This trend is part of a world-wide religious revival affecting many countries, including the US and the Middle East. Its causes lie beyond Singapore, and are not within our control. But in Singapore this trend increases the possibility of friction and misunderstanding among the different religious groups. Religion is a deeply felt matter, and when religious sensitivities are offended emotions are quickly aroused. It takes only a few incidents to inflame passions, kindle violence, and destroy the good record of religious harmony built up in recent decades. The Maria Hertogh riots were a classic example (ibid: 3). We therefore cannot assume that religious harmony will persist indefinitely as a matter of course. Conscious efforts are necessary to maintain it, especially by religious leaders and groups. So long as Singaporean understand that they have to live and let live, and show respect and tolerance for other faiths, harmony should prevail. Religious groups should not exceed these limits, for example by denigrating other faiths, or by insensitively trying to convert those belonging to other religions. If they do, these other groups will feel attacked and threatened, and must respond by mobilising themselves to protect their interests, if necessary militantly. Similarly, if any religious group used its religious authority to pursue secular political objectives, other religions too must follow suit. Tensions will build up, and there will be trouble for all. Two vital conditions must therefore be observed to maintain harmony. Firstly, followers of the different religions must exercise moderation and tolerance, and do nothing to cause religious enmity or hatred. Secondly, religion and politics must be kept rigorously separated (ibid: 4). Aggressive and Insensitive Proselytisation Various reports commissioned by the government regarding religious activities in Singapore have concluded that there is an increasing trend towards aggressive proselytisation among different religious groups.(9) This coincided with numerous complaints received by various government bodies over aggressive evangelism, carried out mostly by some Protestant churches and organisations. The Internal Security Branch reported on the following: University students have been harassed by over-zealous Christian students. These student-preachers tried to convert fellow students who felt depressed after failing their examinations. In hospitals, some doctors and medical students have tried to convert critically ill patients to Christianity on their death beds, without regards for their vulnerabilities or for the sensitivities of their relatives (ISB in the Paper 13). It also reported on the inter and intra-religious tensions among the various religious groups as a result of proselytisation where each group tried to convert others to their faith. The following comments were extracted from their report: Christians and Hindus The complaints by other religious groups are more serious. Hindus have been perturbed by aggressive Christian proselytisation. In August 1986, officials and devotees of a Hindu temple found posters announcing a forthcoming Christian seminar pasted at the entrance of their temple. The Hindus also objected when Christian missionaries distributed pamphlets to devotees going into temples in Serangoon Road (ibid: 13). Christians and Muslims The Muslims are extremely sensitive to any attempt to convert them to other faiths. They reacted indignantly when some Christian groups stepped up evangelical activities in 1986. A few groups distributed pamphlets in Malays that used the word "Allah" for God. The Muslims accused these groups of harassing and misleading them, since to them the word "Allah" was specific to Islam. Some Muslims also received extracts from an unidentified book containing inflammatory remarks -- did Islam was a "cruel" and "devilish" religion which encouraged "the killing of Christians" (ibid: 13). Burial of Muslim Converts There have also been disputes over the funerals of non-Muslims who had converted to Islam. Two cases in July 1988 and January 1989 involved Chinese converts. One belonged to a Christian, and the other to a Buddhist family. The families wanted to cremate the bodies according to their respective Christian and Buddhist rites. But a Muslim organisation applied for court orders to claim the bodies and bury them according to Islamic rites. This naturally upset the families, who considered themselves as next of kin entitled under the law to decide on funeral arrangements. Fortunately, these two disputes were settled amicably out of court after government officials mediated (ibid: 14). Intra-religious Tensions a) Muslims and Ahmadis There is a long-standing dispute between orthodox local Muslim organisations and their Ahmadiyya Muslim Mission. In the mid-1980s, when the Ahmadis called their new building at Onan Road a mosque, local Muslim organisations protested. In early 1989, the Ahmadiyya mission deposited literature in letter-boxes, including boxes belonging to Muslim residents. Some orthodox Muslim were enraged, and expressed grave concern that the pamphlets would mislead and confuse Muslim youths. Meanwhile, the Ahmadis continued to assert that they were true Muslims, and mounted a propaganda campaign to refute allegations that they were a deviant sect (ibid: 14). b) Hindu In October 89, Hindu sect, the Shiv Mandir, burnt an effigy of Ravana, a Hindu mythological king, during a religious festival. The Shiv Mandir claimed that the ritual was an ancient practice marking Lord Ramachandra's triumph over the demon king Ravana and symbolised the triumph of good over evil. Tamil Hindus were incensed by the ceremony. Some saw it as an Aryan attempt to humiliate and belittle the Dravidians, for Ramachandra was an Aryan while Ravana a Dravidian. A few asserted that Ravana was not a demon king. They wanted to stage a protest demonstration at the Shiv Mandir function and threatened to burn the effigy of Lord Ramachandra in retaliation (ibid: 14-15). c) Christians Some Protestants have distributed pamphlets and booklets denigrating the Roman Catholic Church and the Pope. Some of these materials described the Pope as a Communist, and even as the anti-Christ. The Catholic Church publication, the Catholic News, has responded by condemning these attempts by "fundamental Christian groups to confuse Catholics." Some Protestant groups have also criticised other denominations, including Charismatics and Ecumenists, in their publications (ibid: 15). In all these cases, it involved complaints to the government departments which took action to mediate the tensions among the groups concerned. In all cases, the leaders of these religious groups were summoned to the Internal Security Department and warned against instituting activities that would cause misunderstanding and conflict. In all cases, the groups involved halted their activities.
The recent rising tide of religious fervour among all religious groups have meant that groups and individuals dike were swept along with the whirlwind, which created its own momentum. The state was determined that this whirlwind force would not get out of control. The White Paper spelled out further on this issue: Many religions enjoin their followers to proselytise others who have
not embraced the same faith, in order to propagate the religion. Christian refer to this as "bearing witness," while Muslims engage in dakwah activities. This liberty to proselytise is pan of the freedom of religion protected by the Constitution. However, in Singapore it must be exercised very sensitively. It is one thing to preach to a person who is interested in converting to a new faith. It is another to try to convert a person of a different religion by denigrating his religion, especially if he has no desire to be converted. In such cases, the potential for giving offence is great. For this reason, the Government has always discouraged Christian groups from aggressively evangelising among the Malay Muslim community in Singapore. Harm can be done even without the direct contact of proselytization.
Each religion has its own comprehensive doctrines and theology. Some faiths, for example Buddhism, readily accept other religions and practices, but others, including both Christianity and Islam, are by their nature exclusive. Each religious group, in instructing its own followers, will naturally need to point out where its doctrines differ from other religions, and indeed from other branches of the same religion, and why it regards the others as being mistaken. While it is legitimate, it is possible to go too far. An unrestrained preacher pouring forth blood and thunder and denouncing the followers of other faiths as misguided infidels and lost souls may cause great umbrage to entire communities. If they then retaliate with equal virulence, or worse escalate the quarrel by attacking the persons and desecrating the places of worship of the opposing faithful, the tolerance and mutual trust which forms the basis of Singapore society will be permanently destroyed. The futures of Christianity, Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism as world religions are secure regardless of how many Christians, Muslims, Hindus or Buddhists there may be among Singaporeans. However, if any religious group in Singapore seeks to increase the number of its converts drastically, at the expense of the other faiths or attempts to establish a dominant or exclusive position for itself, it will be strenuously resisted by the other groups. This is a fact of life in Singapore which has to be faced squarely (The Paper. 4-5). Another area which the Act specifically seeks to contain is the use of religion for political causes. This was in response to the emerging Liberation Theology Movements found in certain section of the Christian churches and the Fundamental Islamic Movement which led to the arrest of some Christian clergy and lay Christians and the expulsion of some Muslim theologians in the mid-eighties. The Paper states that: ... religious leaders and members of religious groups should refrain from promoting any political party or cause under the cloak of religion. The leaders should not incite their faithful to defy, challenge or actively oppose secular Government policies, much less mobilise their followers or their organisations for subversive purposes.... Members of religious groups may, of course, participate in the democratic political process as individual citizens. They may campaign for or against the Government or any political party. But they must not do so as leaders of their religious constituency. Religious leaders are in a particularly delicate position. An Archbishop, Pastor, Abbot, or Mufti is a religious personage, whether or not be puts on his robes or mounts his pulpit. It is not to be expected that every religious leader will always agree with every policy of the Government. But whatever their political views, they should express them circumspectively. They should not use their religious authority to sway their followers, much less actively incite them to oppose the Government (ibid: 6). The Paper also stipulated that the views of the sacred and the profane might differ vastly, especially on issues which to the Government are legitimate concerns for public policy, but which to some faiths pose moral and religious questions. But issues such as these should be left to the individuals to decide. Many Christians, particularly Catholics, consider abortion to be morally wrong. The Government's policy is to allow women wanting abortions to get one. However, whether or not a pregnant woman wants to undergo an abortion, and whether or not a doctor or nurse wants to carry out abortions, are clearly issues of conscience, to be decided by each person for himself or herself. On such issues, religious groups may and do properly take positions and preach to their followers. Jehovah's Witnesses believe that their religion forbids them to do any form of National Service. Under the law this is criminal conduct, not conscientious objection. Followers of this sect who refuse to obey call up orders are court martial and serve jail sentences. Some Christian groups consider radical social action, as practised in Latin America or the Philippines, to be a vital part of Christian faith. Whether or not this is the practise elsewhere, if para-religious social action groups become an active political force in Singapore, they will cause heightened political and religious tensions (ibid: 7). In formulating the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act, the purpose "is to establish working rules by which many faiths can accept fundamental differences between them, and coexist peacefully in Singapore" (emphasis-mine) (ibid: 7). Under this Act, the government is empowered to take actions it deems as appropriate to prevent religious disharmony. Individuals engaged in the following conduct could be prosecuted in the court and be subjected to fine or imprisonment: a. Causing feelings of enmity, hatred, ill-will or hostility or prejudicing the maintenance of harmony between different religious groups; b. carrying out activities to promote a political cause, or a cause of any political society while, under the guise of, propagating or practising any religious belief; c. carrying out subversive activities under the guise of propagating or practising any religious belief; or d. exciting disaffection against the President or the Government. The Orders has power to prohibit the individual from: a. addressing any congregation, or group or worshipper on any subject specified in the order, b. Printing, publishing, distributing or contributing to any publication produced by that religious group; c. holding office in any editorial board or committee of any publication produced by that group (ibid: 9-11). Establishing a Stable Tension -- Presidential Council for Religious Harmony A meditating body, the Presidential Council for Religious Harmony, would be set up "to consider and report on matters affecting the maintenance of religious harmony, which are referred to it by the Government or Parliament. It will also consider Prohibition Orders issued by the Minister" (ibid: 11). The Presidential Council for Religious Council, provided for by the Religious Harmony Act, was established in August 1992 with representatives from the main religious bodies in Singapore. They include one representative from the Buddhists, Muslims, Roman Catholics, Christian Protestants, Hindus and Sikhs communities. Included in this is the former Chief Justice who is the chairperson and two lay representatives. The main objective of the Council is to ensure religious harmony among the various communities. The functions of the Council include the following: (1) to consider and report to the minister on matters affecting the maintenance of religious harmony which are referred to it by the minister or Parliament; (2) to consider and make recommendations on restraining orders referred to it by the minister; (3) the council could also advise the President whether he should confirm restraining orders imposed by the minister, (4) it could also summon those under restraining orders to hear their views (ST, 2 August 1992: 1). In a way, this Council would serve as a bridge between the state on the one hand and the religious organisations and public on the other. In creating this Council, the state has in fact passed over the responsibility of the maintenance of religious harmony to the people themselves. The leaders of each religion would ensure that those under their care would fall in line and that tension and violence would not break out. In short, self imposed restraints become important. While not denying that tensions would always remain in situations of intense competition and rivalry, the idea is to established a stable tension among the religious groups. Enshrined in the Constitution of Singapore is the clause pertaining to the freedom of workship. And the Religious Harmony Act spelled precisely what this freedom of worship means. At the individual level, the individuals could choose whatever they want to workship. They could also encourage family members, friends and colleagues to participate but not coerced and forced them to join. The line dividing the act of persuasion and coercion is very thin. If there is no complaints, then it is the act of persuasion. But if there is dissatisfaction and complaints, it becomes coercion. But when a group engages all its members to go out and persuade others, whom they do not know, particularly those in public places, it is coercion. And within the law, they could be stopped from this act of proselytisation. Religious competition can be seen as a healthy sign. It prevents the various religious groups from becoming complacent. In a way, it forces these groups to be vigilant and to cater to the needs of their adherents. The demands of the adherents would set in motion the internal dynamics which would usher in changes and development. Alternatively, it could revert back to orthodoxy. In the case of Singapore, the two forces of change and a return to orthodoxy are in action. The availability of these varieties of religions allowed the lay people to shop the one that suits their needs most. However, each group is not allowed to dominate through the use of force, or intense and unscrupulous acts of proselytisation. The Act thus intends to define and maintain the religious boundary of these groups. So long as all the players adhered to the rules of the games, the maintenance of a stable tension would be upheld and is beneficial to all. The Singapore State, with its visionary leadership and efficient bureaucracy, once again, is able to dominate and set the agenda. Conclusion To the state, there is a clear cut separation between religion and the secular institutions. Any activity that fall outside the realm of religion should be treated as such. By introducing the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act, it is sending a message to its citizenry to confine its religious pursuit within the known religious boundary. Any other non-related and non-religious activities within the religious boundary would not be acceptable to the state. The Singapore state has once again pre-empted and taken immediate actions in their dealing of religious affairs. Furthermore, by establishing the Presidential Council for Religious Harmony and recruiting the religious leaders from the mainstream religious groups as members of the council, the state is, in fact, placed not only the responsibility of religious activities but the maintenance of religious harmony among the major religious and ethnic groups squarely on the shoulders of these religious leaders. In short, these religious institutions inter alia their leaders are now accountable to the state for their own conduct as well as the religious well being of other groups. Notes: (1.) The Maria Hertogh Riot Incident involved the case of a Dutch Eurasian girl. Baptized in 1937 after her birth, she was given away in 1943 when her parents were arrested by the Japanese. She was adopted and raised as a Muslim by a Malay family. In 1948 her parents discovered her whereabout and brought out a lawsuit for custody of her. But Maria Hertogh was returned to her foster parents in 1950 and was rushed into marriage. A further court hearing removed her from her Malay husband. All the while, there was heightened ethno-religious tension between the two groups, resulting in a riot. For a further discussion, see Clutterbuck, R., 1973: 72-73. (2.) For a discussion on this, see Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 June 1987; 2 July 1987; 22 October 1987, 17 December 1997. (3.) See Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 June 1987, p. 9. (4.) For a discussion on the origin of Liberation Theology, see Smith, C., The Emergence of Liberation Theology, (Chicago: Chicago University Press. 1991). (5.) See Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 October 1987, pp. 22-24. (6.) In 1993, there were comments by the Indonesian government questioning the loyalty of its Chinese population over the issue of their increased investment in the People's Republic of China, instead of investing in Indonesia. (7.) For a critical analysis of this, see Haas, M., "The Politics of Singapore in the 1980s," in Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 48-77. (8.) This was a report filed by the Internal Security Branch (ISB) and included in the annex of the White Paper. (9.) See Tong, C. IC, 1988 and 1989; Kuo, E. C. Y., Quah, J. S. T. and Tong, C. K., 1988, and Quah, J. S. T., 1987. References: Brown, D. (1994) "Ethnicity and Corporatism in Singapore," in The State and Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia, London: Routledge. Caplan, L. (Ed.) (1987) Studies in Religious Fundamentalism, London: Macmillian Press. Chan, H. C. (1975) "Politics in an Administrative State: Where Has the Politics Gone?," in Seah, C.M. (Ed.), Trends in Singapore, Singapore: Singapore University Press. Chua, B. H. (1995) Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore, London: Routledge. Clutterbuck, R. (1973) Riot and Revolution in Singapore and Malaya 1945-63, London: Faber and Faber Limited. 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