Ethics in Early Buddhism
Reviewed by Richard King
Asian Philosophy Vol.6 No.2 July 1997 pp.163-165
COPYRIGHT 1997 Journals Oxford Ltd. (UK)
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This book represents the mature reflections of an established
scholar of Buddhism and is an excellent attempt to provide a
unified account of early Buddhist thought which integrates
Buddhist epistemology with ethics, ontology and religious
practice. Kalupahana grounds early Buddhist ethics in the early
Buddhist conception of the world. Each short chapter is full
of insights and establishes connections between the different
aspects of the early Buddhist world-view. Comparisons with
western ethical theory are also included and are generally
helpful and sensitive to context.
The monograph comprises of three sections. The first section
is an analysis and discussion of pre-Buddhist moral theories in
India and a contextualisation of early Buddhist ethics within
this historical framework. These early chapters also contain a
number of comparative reflections with regard to western ethical
theories. Some of Kalupahana's points here are of interest,
particularly to western philosophers wishing to understand the
early Buddhist position and how it might be compared constructively
with western approaches to ethical theory-formation. However, this
discussion makes the early chapters of the book rather difficult
reading in places and perhaps precludes their usefulness at an
undergraduate level for students of religion uninitiated
in the abstrusities of modern western ethical theory.
Section two provides an outline of early Buddhist morality and its
justification.
According to Kalupahana the early Buddhist justification of the
moral life is grounded in fruithfulness or pragma (p. 78) and
rejects the extreme position of a fixed or absolutistic attitude
towards ethical decision-making. There is room for a comparison
here with Christian situation-ethics and the ethics of upaya-kausalya
in Mahayana Buddhism, though Kalupahana does not venture into
these areas.
Finally, in section three the author considers the social, political
and economic dimensions of early Buddhist ethics. This section
provides perceptive discussions of those Buddhist texts
(especially from the Digha Nikava) which are relevant to the question of
Buddhist social ethics -- in particular the Agganna Sutta,
the Cakkavatthi-Sihanada Sutta and the Sigalovada Sutta.
As one would expect from reading earlier works by Kalupahana, the
author places a great deal of emphasis upon the pragmatic nature of
Gautama and his rejection of absolutism in ethics, ontology and
theory-formation in general. Of course a distinctive feature of
Kalupahana's approach to Buddhism is the `pragmatism' that he sees at
work in early Buddhism and any of its `authentic' successors. One
wonders for instance, why Kalupahana finds it necessary to locate
early Buddhist theories in terms of the western debate between
positivists on the one hand and empiricists and pragmatists on
the other (see chapter 2). According to the author the early
Buddhists took the view "that morals as well as the moral principle
are like rafts" (p. 95). Equally, for Kalupahana the early Buddhist
conception of nirvana did not involve an ontological transcendence of
the world but rather an enlightened and compassionate engagement
with it (chapter 9).
Again comparisons can be made with later Mahayana conceptions of
nirvana as enlightened re-engagement with samsara. Another interesting
feature of this section is Kalupahana's claim that the Buddha utilised
the doctrine of karma and rebirth as a moral wager (rather like Pascal)
to convince those without knowledge of previous lives to lead a moral
life (chapter 11).
Another notable feature of Kalupahana's approach is the distinction
he makes between absolutist and non-absolutist trends within Buddhism (p.
58).
Kalupahana clearly has a preference for the latter and sees this as
most authentically representing the Buddha's original teachings. Putting
aside the problems involved in reconstructing the teachings of the
founder from the materials contained in the Pali Nikayas (issues that
the author never really addresses), I should state my own general
agreement with Kalupahana's distinction between absolutistic and
non-absolutistic trends in Buddhism as a useful one. However, the
problem with his analysis is the continual tendency in polarise
Theravada and Mahayana as if they were two competing schools of
thought in Buddhist India (p. 84). Equally problematic is Kalupahana
association of Mahayana Buddhism with an absolutistic ontology. Whilst
such trends may exist within Indian Mahayana (most notably in the
`tathagatagarbha' literature), Mahayana doctrine, at least in its
Indian forms is generally as antithetical to absolutism as
Kalupahana's `early Buddhism'. The issue of the interpretation of
Mahayana thought is of course beyond the purview of this particular
book, thought Kalupahana occasionally refers to the Vajracchedika-
prajnapramita-sutra in what seems to be generally favourable terms
(e.g. p. 91).
One presumes that it was a decision by the author to provide an
account of Buddhist teachings that contains a minimum of references
to secondary literature by western scholars in the main body of the
text. However, this does not detract from the discussion and in
fact makes the study all the more readable and accessible.
What is most remarkable about this small book is the way the author
manages to combine perceptive analysis and quality scholarship in a
highly readable style. The discussion in each small chapter remains
accessible enough to be useful as an undergraduate text and yet
contains enough insights and erudition to be of interest to the
specialist scholar of Buddhism. Kalupahana's primary achievement
in this study is to establish the inner coherence of the ethical,
psychological and philosophical aspects of the early Buddhist
world-view. He does this by demonstrating the interdependence of
early Buddhist notions of impermanence (anitya) and co-dependent-
arising (pratityasamutpada) with Buddhist ethical decision-making
and attitudes to society.