The Golden Yoke: The Legal Cosmology of Buddhist Tibet

Reviewed by Yelle, Robert A.

The Journal of Religion
Vol.77 No.2 (April 1997)
pp.343-344

COPYRIGHT 1997 University of Chicago


            This book addresses a profound gap in our knowledge of Tibetan 
            culture prior to the complete takeover by the Chinese in 1959: the 
            structure and operation of the secular legal system. Rebecca Redwood 
            French traces the existence of this gap to the Western view of Tibet 
            as "overwhelmingly exotic, oriental and therefore consumingly 
            'Other'" (p. 12), assumed to be subject to the despotic control of 
            the Buddhist theocracy. Such an assumption had validated the neglect 
            of the legal sphere of the Tibetan laity by rendering it flat and, 
            consequently, invisible. French defines her project as a recovery of 
            the thickness and three-dimensional reality of Tibetan secular law: 
            "One of the basic tasks of a study of legal cosmology is to collect 
            and present material from as many angles and in as many different 
            forms and voices as possible. Multiple refractions from multiple 
            vantage points, each added to the next, begin to create an awareness 
            of the space that law occupies in another society" (p. 313). In 
            these terms, she succeeds admirably. The result of her efforts is a 
            richly compelling account of the Tibetan legal cosmology, an account 
            as important for calling into question a number of our basic 
            assumptions about what constitutes "law" or a "legal system" as it 
            is for presenting one significant aspect of a unique and threatened 
            culture. 
            French reconstructs the secular legal system in large part through a 
            series of intensely interesting and detailed narratives of Tibetans 
            in exile, the "many different voices" referred to above. While such 
            a method might seem inappropriate for the presentation of a legal 
            "system," it is perfectly suited to what French calls the Tibetan 
            "legal cosmology": "Tibetans understand law, much as they understand 
            the universe, as a kaleidoscopic cosmology: that is, as realigning 
            sets of patterns and actions that are both constant and ever 
            changing, integrating and disintegrating, coherent and incoherent" 
            (p. 16). The Tibetan concept of the radical particularity of 
            experience supports a focus on the unique elements of each legal 
            case and a corresponding lack of attention to precedent or the 
            development of a complete system of legal rules. As French reveals, 
            while there were various secular legal codes in Tibet from as early 
            as the Empire period (620-866 C.E.), these codes were less rigid, 
            less fully prescriptive, in short, less systematic than legal codes 
            in the modern West. According to French, the real basis of the 
            Tibetan legal cosmology is found not in a system of rules but in 
            those "cosmological categories" that are the "conceptual and 
            practical building blocks that structure legal reasoning and action" 
            (p. 59). 
            Following the brief but excellent introduction in part 1 to the 
            culture, history, and legal codes of Tibet prior to 1959, part 2 
            addresses these cosmological categories, including notions of karma, 
            time, myth, and language, in relation to the law. The overarching 
            category, representative of the entire legal cosmology, is the 
            integrating symbol of the mandala, which French argues was effective 
            in the Tibetans self-understanding of their legal system (pp. 
            175-91). Nearly every chapter in parts 3 and 4 is centered on the 
            narrative of a particular case, with French's exegesis and relevant 
            background information. Part 5 consists of two chapters, the first 
            on crime and punishment and the second a brief biography of Kungola 
            Thubten Sangye, the Tibetan official who was French's mentor and 
            collaborator in the reconstruction of the Tibetan secular legal 
            system. Throughout the book, and despite her eschewal of the Western 
            focus on law as a system of rules, French nevertheless provides 
            detailed information on a wide range of issues of procedural and 
            substantive law, information that will be of great interest to 
            comparative legal scholars. The entire book reflects French's 
            interpretation of the Tibetan legal cosmology as a mandala: the 
            various chapters, radically particular in their focus on specific 
            concepts or cases, finally cohere to present an integrated and 
            incredibly vivid image of Tibetan law. 
            Both the structure and the details of French's account challenge 
            modern Western ideas of "law" and "legal system." Indeed, it is her 
            explicit intention to problematize such notions as the American 
            separation of myth and law, a separation that coexists with a mythic 
            understanding of "law as a form of rational science, a neutral 
            procedural system independent of religion and the supernatural' (p. 
            84). French contrasts the Tibetan understanding of law as 
            represented by the integrating "All-One" symbol of the mandala with 
            such Western dualistic categories of thought (pp. 176-77) and 
            questions the appropriateness of analyzing the Tibetan legal 
            cosmology in terms of these categories and their hierarchizing 
            tendencies (p. 343). While French's rather simple classification of 
            Tibet and the "West" according to these different modes of thought 
            may itself be questionable, her book demonstrates the success of the 
            model of the mandala as a more appropriate "symbolic metaphor" or 
            "descriptive device" (p. 180) for Tibetan legal cosmology than 
            Western categories. Much more could be done with French's critique 
            of positive law, which remains largely implicit in this book. 
            Readers of The Golden Yoke may hope that its author develops this 
            critique in the future; or else, emboldened and enriched in 
            perspective by her marvelous work, they may do so themselves. 
            ROBERT A. YELLE, Chicago, Illinois.