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        P.361

            The publication of Hsueh-li Cheng's Empty  Logic
        represents  the attempt  to address  the need  for a
        general  introduction  to the  'topic  of Madhyamika
        Buddhism, and  particularly  of Chinese  Madhyamika.
        The text covers  the basic philosophy  and arguments
        of Madhyamika, as well  as discussing  its  possible
        influence   on  other  forms  of  Buddhist  thought,
        including Zen.
            It is difficult to find a comprehensive text  on
        Madhyamika   which   on  the  one  hand  takes  into
        consideration the recent developments in scholarship
        and on the other  hand  does  not confuse  the issue
        with  misunderstandings  and mistranslations  of the
        basic  terms  of Madhyamika.  The most popular  text
        available  up  until  now  was  T.K.V.  Murti's  the
        Central Philosophy of Buddhism.  This text fell into
        the  common  trap  of  treating   Madhyamika   as  a
        "nihilistic"    from   of   Buddhist    thought,   a
        misconception that modern scholarship has managed to
        correct.  One lesser  known but more effective  text
        was Richard Robinson's Early Madhyamika in India and
        China.  Although covering much of the same territory
        as  Cheng's  book,  Robinson's  work  is  much  more
        technical  and probably better suited to the scholar
        with more experience in handling the intricacies  of
        Madhyamika thought.
            Beside these studies, the student of  Madhyamika
        also has recourse to several of the original  texts.
        Nagarjuna's  Doctrine of the Middle Way, for example
        has been translated numerous times, including Mervyn
        Sprung's version of Candrakirti's  Prasannapada  and
        Kenneth      Inada's     translation      of     the
        Mulamadhyamikakarikas.  Others, including  Frederick
        Streng,   have   also   provided   translations   of
        Nagarjuna's  central  work.  All  of these, however,
        face the same problem  of preserving  the texture of
        Madhyamika  logic  without  resorting  to nihilistic
        terminology.  This  is  also  a problem  in  Cheng's
        previous  translation  of  Nagarjuna's  Twelve  Gate
        Treatise (Shi Er Men Lun).  As I will point out, the
        danger  of fixing  the Madhyamika  position  without
        failing  into  misuse  of language  is difficult  to
        overcome.


        P.362

            Professor  Cheng  goes about his task  by  first
        providing   a  general   introduction   to  Buddhist
        thougth, followed  by  a discussion  of  the  Indian
        roots  of Madhyamika.  The rest  of the introductory
        material  centers around the subsequent  development
        of the  philosophy  in India  and China.  The second
        chapter deals with principle  Madhyamika  doctrines,
        such  as the notion  of the Middle  Way, the Twofold
        Truth, Chi  Tsang's  notion  of "The  Refutation  of
        Erroneous Views as the Illumination of Right Views,"
        and finally he discusses the meaning of Emptiness or
        Sunyata   (Kung) .   Chapter   Three  examines   the
        connections  and continuity  between Madhyamika  and
        Zen, particulary  in terms of the ideas presented in
        Chapter  two.  Chapter Four presents  the Madhyamika
        treatment  of various philosophical  issues, such as
        the  problems  of God, Reality, and Knowledge, while
        Chapter  Five compares  Nagarjuna  with Wittgenstein
        and Kant.
            In  addition  to the material presented  in  the
        text, there are also some useful  additions  for the
        scholar.  Included are a listing of Chinese terms, a
        glossary  of various Buddhist  terms, and indices of
        names and subjects. Finally, a selected bibliography
        is also  provided.  These  are welcome  items, as is
        Cheng's custom of providing the Chinese and Sanskrit
        terminology   for   terms   that   resist   adequate
        translation.
            There are problems,however,with the presentation.
        A  minor  criticism   is  that,  although  the  book
        purports to be a discussion of "Madhyamika Buddhism,
        from Chinese  Sources," the table  of contents  does
        not list anything even vaguely Chinese.  Cheng does,
        however, discuss the works of the important  San Lun
        masters  such  as Chi Tsang,  Kumarajiva, Seng Chao,
        and others, but the casual  reader  would  be apt to
        get  the wrong  impression  if he were  to scan  the
        table  of contents  for a clue  as to what  the book
        were about.
            More  significant  problems  arise  during   the
        philosophical discussion, however. In his discussion
        of  the  "Twofold  Truth," Cheng  uses  this  common
        translation  for the Chinese  term  "Er Di Yi."  The
        Chinese  term  more  accurately  indicates  what  is
        meant, since  even Cheng  agrees  that this" ....two
        fold truth refers neither to two fixed sets of truth
        nor stands  for two realities."  "Er Di Yi"  is more
        effectively  translated as "levels of understanding"
        or, as Soothill's  Chinese Buddhist Dictionary  puts
        it, "two forms of statement"  or "two meanings."  If
        Cheng  agrees, as he seems  to, that "Truth"  is not
        the issue  here, then why use the term  in the first
        place? Surely it can only be


        P.363

        a source of confusion, perpetuating  the traditional
        misunderstanding of this distinction.
            Another misuse of the term " Truth " occurs when
        he uses  it, repeatedly, as  a translation  for  the
        term "Dharma"  (fa)(b).  Surely by now most Buddhist
        scholars  agree that Buddha  was not concerned  with
        the "Truth" per se, but rather with presenting a set
        of techniques  designed to encourage individuals  to
        become  liberated.  The  notion  that  one thing  is
        "true" and something  else is not, can only serve as
        a limitation  in  this  project.  In  general, Cheng
        seems to be prone to the indiscriminate use of terms
        such as "Absolute Truth."
            His  discussion of Yogacara reveals a  confusion
        between  "mind"  and  "ideas",  as  he  accepts  the
        popular misunderstnading  of Yogacara as "Idealism."
        He claims  (page  26) that "The Yogacara  maintained
        that  behind   the  phenomenal   world  there  is  a
        noumenal,  ultimate   reality;   this   is  mind  or
        consciousness.  It is not the ordinary psychological
        mind  but  Suchness  … " We are  just  starting  to
        understand that Yogacara was not presenting a system
        of ontology, but rather a system of closure.  Rather
        than  claiming  the Mind  is the only  Reality, they
        would  seem  to be saying  that  the  nature  of the
        reality is determinable solely through consciousness
        or experience of reality, that the nature of reality
        is consciousness. We need not read ontology into the
        Yogacara   project,  since  that  assumes   a  basic
        contradiction  of the fundamental Buddhist notion of
        "Wu Wo, Wu Fa," or "absence  of reality  in self and
        in dharmas (in this sense read 'things)."
            Cheng  also betrays his carelessness in the  use
        of language  when he refers to the "Madhyamika  view
        of God." I don't think that a true Madhyamaka  would
        claim to have any particular "view" of God.
            Besides this carelessness, Cheng also gives  too
        little    attention    to   some    very   important
        considerations. For instance, he does not seem to be
        aware of the existence of the Svatantrike  school of
        Madhyamika thought when he claims that "According to
        the teaching  of emptiness  as the middle way, it is
        even  erroneous   to  hold  a  contextual   view  of
        meaning."  Surely  this is true if we consider  only
        Candrakirti;s  Prasangika school of thought, but the
        Svatantrika  school of Bhavaviveka  thought that the
        only  possible  view of meaning  is provisional  and
        contextual.
            Perhaps the most troubling phlosophical point in
        the  text  is  the  apparent  contradiction  between
        statements made by Nagarjuna in two


        P.364

        different  contexts.  Cheng paraphrases  Nagarjuna's
        agrument against Sunyata as nihilism from the Twelve
        Gate Treatise:

              "....if  the essence  of all things were fixed
              and determinate  [as would  be the case if one
              were  not to accept  the  notion  of Sunyata],
              there  would  be no such phenomena  as change,
              origination, and destruction, and hence  there
              would be no suffering. Since there would be no
              noble  truth of suffering, there  could  be no
              noble  truth  of the origin  of suffering, the
              cessation of suffering, and the way leading to
              the cessation  of suffering.  If there were no
              Four  Noble  Truths, there  would  be  no four
              fruits of 'sramana.'  Without the four fruits,
              there would be no goal for religious  life and
              realization   of  the  Sangha   would  not  be
              possible."

            He goes on to quote Nagarjuna: "Without the noble
        truths the true Dharma would not exist.  Without the
        Dharma and Sangha, how could there be the Buddha?"
            This seems to contradict Nagarjuna's comprehensive
        dismissal  of causal efficacy in the Doctrine of the
        Middle Way, especially  the chapter  on Nirvana, and
        elsewhere. The only way to reconcile these two types
        of statements  is to bear in mind that Nagarjuna  is
        making  statements  in  a corrective  manner, not  a
        propositional  one.  In each instance, he is arguing
        primarily  against Buddhist philosophers  who on the
        one hand claim causal efficacy with its implications
        of  positive   existence,  and  on  the  other  hand
        denounce the nihilistic implications  of Sunyata, or
        emptiness.  Nagarjuna  is trying  to show that  both
        positions  lead to logical  contradictions.  This is
        not made clear in Cheng's treatment of the issue.
            In  general, the  text must be considered an im-
        portant  work for its usefulness  as an introductory
        text  in an area where  no such  introductory  texts
        axist, but the reader should be aware that Professor
        Cheng sometimes  displays  some carelessness  in his
        use of terminology.  Certainly  the  decision  as to
        what to include and what not to include in a text is
        a personal  one, but sometimes  the lack  of context
        obscures the issues involved.


        P.365

        A 虛
        B 法
        C 無我
        D 無法