APPEARANCE AND REALITY IN CHINESE BUDDHIST

.

p.57

                   preliminary Remarks

One of the perennial problems in philosophy  turns around the
question  of the  ideality  of the phenomenal  world.  Arthur
Schopenhauer  thought  that we are aware of the world only as
mediated through our senses and intellect and hence the world
is idea or representation.(1) William  Alston  holds that the
really of the world is independent  of any sentient  being He
says:

    Realism  is  here  being  understood  as  the  view  that
    whatever  there  is [is] what it is regardless  of how we
    think of it. Even if there were no human beings, whatever
    there is other than human  thought  (and what depends  on
    that, causally  or logically) would still be just what it
    actually is."(2)

Anti-realists  flatly  reject this view.  Hilary Putnam holds
the anti-realist view:

    [T]he mind makes  up the world....Rather,if one must  use
    metaphorical  language,then let the metaphor be this: the
    mind  and the  world  jointly  make  up the mind  and the
    world....The empirical world...depends  upon our criteria
    of rational  acceptability...we  must  have  criteria  of
    rational   acceptability   to  even  have   an  empirical
    world....I  am saying  that the 'real world'depends  upon
    our values.(3)

p.58                           

Putnam  here argues in the conceptual  framework  of Immanuel
Kant.  According to Kant, we perceive something  as duck only
through the a priori forms of sensitivity  and understanding.
According to Nicholas Wolterstorff, the fundamental  issue is
whether  there are properties  which can both be grasped  and
instantiated  And  if there  are, then  the  suggestion  that
concepts  [Kant's  a  priori  forms  of  understanding]   are
graspings of properties  is obvious.(4) According to Kant and
Putnam, we cannot  experience  the world as we do unless  out
mind constructs  it out of whatever is beyond our sensitivity
and understanding.  Thus the fundamental issue is whether the
world  is the creation  of mind as we experience  it.  Is the
color gold of this watch independent of my perceiving it? The
realist  affirms  and  the  anti-realist  denies  this.  This
question  cannot  be answered  unless  there is a third agent
which  does not use the human perceptual  apparatus, and this
is at the moment  of no avail.  Until  such an agent  becomes
available, the issue will remain  an unsolved  philosophical
problem. Modern philosophers starting with Rene Descartes and
George  Berkeley  have  embraced  the idealist  view  with  a
variety  of  minor  differences.   In  China,  Hsuan-tsang(a)
(596-664)  translated  Vasubandhu's  (420-500) work  on  Mere
Ideation   (Vijnaptimatrata,  Fa-hsiang(b) )  more   than   a
miliennium  before Descartes and Berkeley and one can discern
an unmistakable  mark of this idealism  in later Hua-yen  and
T'ien-t'ai metaphysics.
    This study  examines  the relevance  of Chinese  Buddhist
metaphysics  to  the  question  of  appearance  and  reality.
Through Buddhist discourse is mainly concerned  with Buddhist
soteriology -  viz., helping sentient beings enter nirvana by
severing  their clinging  to illusory  ego and the phenomenal
world-  one  can  clearly  identify  some  aspects  of  their
metaphysical   views  that  contribute  to  the  issue  under
discussion.  Since this study will look at Chinese philosophy
from a European  view point, I will first  lay out a European
view point from which we can approach Chinese Buddhist views.

                              I.
1.1.  The premises leading to metaphysical idealism are found
in Descartes'


p.59

distinction  between  the  mental  and  the  physical.   This
distinction  provides the basis for the identification  of a
realm of appearances as distinct from reality.  For Descartes
the direct  objects  of perception  in the mind are ideas  of
three  kinds, viz., innate, adventitious, and factitious, all
of which  are modifications  of the mind.  All of these ideas
are caused  and some have  more  reality  than others  in the
representation  of  their  corresponding  reality.(5) In  his
proof  of the external  world, Descartes  maintains  that God
creates  the world  and puts impressions  of its ideas in our
mind.(6) These  ideas do not constitute  a reality  of public
and physical  objects, they can be thought  of as a realm  of
appearance  only.  As D.W.  Hamlyn points out, idealism stems
from this -  with the additional premise that since we do not
have access to anything  beyond ideas, the only reality which
we have any justification  to assume is that of ideas, of the
appearances  themselves.(7) 1.2.  Descartes'  view that ideas
stand  as a veil of perception  between  us and the world  of
reality  is more clearly stated by John Locke.  According  to
Locke, "whatever  is so constituted  in nature as to he able,
by affecting our senses, to cause by perception  in the mind,
doth thereby produce in the understanding  a simple idea."(8)
Locke  distinguishes  ideas in the mind and qualities  in the
bodies   which   cause  them:  "it  will  be  convenient   to
distinguish  them  as they  are ideas  or perceptions  in our
minds: and as they are modifications  of matter in the bodies
that  cause  such  perceptions  "(9) For Locke  an "Idea"  is
whatsoever  the mind  perceives  in itself, in us.  or is the
immediate  object  of  perception, thought, or understanding,
and the power to produce  any idea in our mind is the quality
of the subject  wherein  that power  is.(10) Locke calls  the
solidity, extension,figure,and mobility  of any body original
or primary qualities  which produce simple ideas in us, viz.,
solidity,  extension,  figure, motion  or  rest, and  number.
Secondary qualities are such qualities  as are nothing in the
objects   themselves   but  are  powers  to  produce  various
sensations  in us by their primary qualities.  Such qualities
as color,slund and taste  which  we mistakenly  attribute  to
objects  are in truth nothing  in the objects  themselves,but
powers to produce  various  sensations  in us;  and depend on
primary  qualities, viz., bulk,figure,texture,and  motion  of
parts.(11)  According   to  Locke,  "the  ideas   of  primary
qualities  of  bodies  are  resemblances  of  them,and  their
patterns do really exist in the bodies

p.60                                             

themselves, but  the  ideas  produced  in us by the secondary
qualities  have  no resemblance  of  them  at all.  There  is
nothing   like   our   ideas,   existing    in   the   bodies
themselves."(12) In  Locke's  view, we  cannot  imagine  that
these simple  ideas subsist  by themselves, hence we accustom
ourselves to suppose some substratum wherein they do subsist,
and  from  which  they  do  result, which  therefore  we call
substance, which  is  nothing  but  a supposed  but  unknown,
support of those qualities we find existing.(13) 1.3.  George
Berkeley's idealism replaces the notion of material substance
as the substratum  with an infinite spiritual  substance.  He
says, "...  it is infinitely  more  extravagant  to say --  a
thing  which  is inert  operates  on the mind, and  which  is
unperceiving  is  the  cause  of  our  perception."(14) Thus,
Berkeley's  idealism  is a consequence  of Locke's version of
the causal  theory of perception.  If we can only see our own
ideas caused by the primary and secondary  qualities which we
can ex hypothesis  never have direct  access to, then, argues
Berkeley, it is nonsense to say either our ideas do or do not
resemble  the  primary  or  secondary  qualities  themselves.
Berkeley says that only ideas can resemble another idea;  and
"as the supposed originals  are in themselves  unknown, it is
impossible  to know  how far  our  ideas  resemble  them;  or
whether they resemble them at all."(15) Once  the  notion  of
material  substance  is removed, Berkeley's  idealism  is the
conclusion to the following argument.  All sensible qualities
are nothing  but ideas and all physical  objects  are nothing
but  sensible  qualities,  hence  all  physical  objects  are
nothing  but  ideas.   Ideas  cannot  exist  unperceived;  an
unperceived  idea is therefore  self-contradictory.  Physical
objects exist unperceived  by finite minds.Therefore,they are
perceived   by   an   infinite   mind,  namely, God.(16)  For
Berkeley,mountains,rivers,and stars  are all ideas.  So,Hegel
pointed out that Berkeley  says very little when he says that
things  are ideas since this only amounts  to recommending  a
change of nomenclature and calling things ideas.(17) 1.4. For
David  Hume, an unperceived  idea  is not self-contradictory.
For Hume,perceptions are distinct,independent,self-sufficient
and they occur in bundles  as far as we know.The  unperceived
perceptions   are   suggested   by   two   features   of  our
impressions, constancy   and   coherence.   When   I   notice
interruptions  in my impressions  of a mountain,I resolve the
contradiction  by supposing unperceived  perceptions  filling
the gaps

p.61

in  the  series.  Consistency  of  the  mountain  despite  my
interrupted perceptions of it proves the mountain a bundle of
ideas  which  continues  unperceived.  Changing  objects  are
believed  to exist independently  if the impressions  of them
display  coherence.  If my fire  dies  down  slowly, the room
temperature  goes  down  whether  my  impressions  of  it are
interrupted  or not.  Hume  has  to hold  this  view  because
"spiritual  substance"  and  "corporeal  substance"  are both
pieces of meaningless metaphysical jargon."(18) Thus, neither
Locke's material substance nor Berkeley's spiritual substance
is available  to rescue unperceived  perceptions.  1.5.  Kant
agrees with his predecessors in that we are confined to ideas
or representations (Vorstellungen) even if there is in fact a
reality   of  things-in-themselves   beyond   them  to  which
experience  can have no access, he says, "we can know objects
only as they oppear to us (to our senses), not as they may be
in themselves."(19) For Kant, the phenomenal world is totally
dependent on the mind:

    All our intuition  is nothing  but the representation  of
    appear ance;  that the things  which we intuit are not in
    themselves  what  we  intuit  them  as  being, nor  their
    relations so constituted  in themselves as they appear to
    us, and that if the subject, or even only  the subjective
    constitution  of the senses  in general.  be removed, the
    whole constitution  and all the relations  of objects  in
    space  and  time, nay  space  and time  themselves, would
    vanish. As appearances, they cannot exist in themselves,
    but only in us.(20)

Kant's view,however,differs form Berkeley's  since he makes a
distinction  within experience between what is subjective and
what is objective. Kant thinks that the objective world as we
take  it to be is empiricallly  real  in the  sense  that  it
differs  from  the  products  ot the  imagination, but  it is
transcendentally   ideal  since  it  is  stil  a  matter   of
representation  by comparison  with things-in-themselves.(21)
Kant  says,  "external  objects(bodies),  however,  are  mere
appearances,and are  therefore  nothing  but a species  of my
representations,the  objects  of  which  are  something  only
through  these  representations.  Aparts  from  them they are
nothing."(22) He says


p.62                          

further, "these  external  things, namely  matter, are in all
their  configurations   and  alterations   nothing  but  mere
appearances, that is, representation in us, of the reality of
which  we are  immediately  conscious."(23) 1.6.  Francis  H.
Bradley   (1864-1924)  finds  contradictory   nature  in  the
phenomenal  world."(24) Bradley appeals  to the fact that the
perception  of secondary qualities, color, taste, sound, etc.
are  circumstance-depedent.   He  then  follows  Berkeley  in
generalizing  that primary  qualities  such as size and shape
are  also  nothing  but ideas.(25) Berkeley  concludes  that,
besides  God,  reality  consists  solely  of  ideas;  Bradley
concludes that experience is not true.(26)

    ...There  is the  one  undivided  life  of the  Absolute.
    Appearance  without reality would be impossible, for what
    then could appear? And reality  without appearance  would
    be  nothing,  for  there  certainly  is  nothing  outside
    appearance. But on the other hand Reality (we must repeat
    this) is not the sum of things.  It is the unity in which
    all  things, coming  together, are  transmuted, in  which
    they changed all alike, though not changed equally.(27)

1.7. Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, and Kant, then, agree on one
point: the phenomenal world as we experience  it is dependent
on our mind for its being.  What is presupposed  in this view
is that the mind is so marvelous and mysterious  as to create
the phenomena of the wonderful world. This point is expressed
in Chinese Buddhist metaphysics  by the dictum that the world
is the creation of the mind.  This view is explored  below in
the  works  of Hsuan-tsang(a)(596-664), Fa-tsang(c)(643-712),
and Hui-ssu(d)(515-577).  Just as the Western philosophers we
have  considered  disagree  on  the  issue  of reality  while
agreeing  broadly  on the nature  of the phenomenal  world as
appearance, Chinese  Buddhist  metaphysicians  have agreed on
the  phenomenality   of  appearance   and  disagreed  on  the
relationship between appearance and reality.


p.63

2.1.  Hsuan-tsang's  Cheng Wei Hsih Lun(e) (Completion of the
Doctrine  of Mere Ideation) echos the views of Berkeley, Hume
and Kant.
    According  to the Mere Ideation theory,(28) the phenomena
of both  ego  and things  of the external  world  are equally
evolved   by   consciousness.    Though   both   are   within
consciousness, they  seem  to be manifested  in the  external
world.  Thus, the seeming  ego and external  things which are
evolved within the consciousness, although  they do not exist
in one sense, nevertheless  do not have the nature  of a real
ego and real objects, despite  their  seeming  appearance  as
such.(29) In other  words, what  we believe  to  be  external
objects are established  in accordance with mistaken beliefs,
and do not exist in the same way as does consciousness. Inner
consciousness, however, being  the  causation  on  which  the
appearance  of external  objects depends, is not non-existent
in the same way as the external objects."(30)
    This view seems to be identical with Berkeley's  idealism
since for Berkeley only the infinite mind, God, and ideas are
created  thereby The two views differ, however, in that while
mountains  and rivers as ideas are real and distinct from the
infinite   mind   for   Berkeley,  they   are   nothing   but
consciousnesses themselves for the mere ideation theory.  The
mere ideation theory, however, provides an explanation of the
rela-  tionship  between ideas and the mind in terms of three
evolving   agents, namely,  the   maturing   consciousness(f)
,intellection(g) and discrimination(h).

    As  regards   the  (external)  localization   (of  mental
    representations), what  is  meant  is that  the  maturing
    consciousness,  through  the  'maturing'   influence   of
    its'universal'seeds  evolves  the  manifestations  of the
    seeming  matter, etc.,of the receptacle-world,that is,the
    external  major  elements  and  the  matter  formed  upon
    them.Although  what is evolved by sentient beings in this
    way is separate for each, the resulting  appearances  are
    each like the other,so that  there  is no differentiation
    in their (external) localization.The case is like that of
    the  illuminations  cast  by  many  lamps,  which  though
    separate for each,seem to form a common whole."(31)

p.64                           

Thus, such objects as mountains and rivers are evolved out of
the universal  seeds which belong  all to Alaya consciousness
in common.  Again, this  view  is identical  with  Berkeley's
idealism  and more coherent than Hume's phenomenalism  which,
as we saw, implies such unperceived perceptions  as mountains
and dying fire.  However, the mere ideation theory denies any
reality  to such  mountains  and fires  if they  are not mere
ideas evolved out of the storehouse consciousness.
    Hume's claim that such notions as spiritual substance and
corporeal substance are meaningless  metaphysical  jargon, is
echoed by the Mere Ideation theory.  According to the theory,
there  are three  evolving  categories  of consciousness  and
their mental qualities, all of which are capable  of evolving
into two seeming aspects: that of the perceiving division and
that  of the perceived  division.(32) The evolved  perceiving
division  is termed  "discrimination", because  it takes  the
perceived  division as the object of perception.  The evolved
perceived division is termed 'what is discriminated', because
it is taken  by the  perceiving  division  as the  object  of
perception.  According  to this principle, there  are no real
ego or material  objects aside from what is thus evolved from
consciousness.(33) What  is denied  is not mental  functions,
Hume's  bundles, as inseparable  from  consciousness, but the
'real'  things apart from the aspects  of consciousness.  The
seeming reality of ego and material  objects results from the
discriminating   aspect   of  consciousness.   In  this   way
discrimination evolves what seem to be external objects which
consist of a false ego and material objects.(34)
    The  Mere  Ideation  theory, however, anticipates  Kant's
world view which admits the noumenal  world, for it maintains
that  the  true   nature   of  all  things   is  chen   ju(i)
(Bhutatathata)  or  Jenuine  Thusness.Genuine  Thusness,  the
reality of all,does not evolve or change,remaining  under all
conditions, constantly   thus   in  its  nature.(35)  Genuine
Thusness as the nature of all phenomenal objects is in no way
connected   with   the  specific   character   of  phenomenal
objects.The  thing as in itself is separate  forever from the
thing  for us.Genuine  Thusness  or noumenon  will  never  be
perfumed  by actual  life;  it has  no relation  at all  with
phenomenon.(36) This is exactly  Kant's  view concerning  the
relation  of noumenon  and phenomenon  when he says  that the
concept of causality is true only of

p.65

the phenomenal world.
2.2.  Fa-tsang's  Chin shih-tzu  chang(j) (Essay  on the Gold
Lion) provides  a clearer analogy to illustrate  the relation
between appearance and reality or phenomenon and noumenon. Of
the Gold Lion, the gold  metal  symbolizes  noumenon  and the
figure of the lion symbolizes phenomenon. Fa-tsang identifies
the noumenal  world  with  the  realm  of principles  and the
phenomenal  world with the realm  of things.(37) The point of
the  analogy  lies  in explaining  how  the phenomenal  world
arises out of the noumenal  world.  Gold is the primary cause
and the artisan the contributing or secondary cause (material
and  efficient   causes   respectively,  to  use  Aristotle's
terminology).  For Fa-tsang, all  things  and  events  in the
phenomenal  world arise only through the combination  of such
causes.
    Once   the  relation   of  phenomenon   to  noumenon   is
illustrated, the Essay explains  the nature of the phenomenal
world.  Just as the outward  aspect  of the lion is illusory,
the phenomenal  world is devoid of its own reality  while the
noumenal world is free from generation  and destruction  like
the gold in the analogy."(38) Things of the phenomenal  world
are all manifestations  of illusions or sole imagination like
Descartes'  factitious  ideas.  Fa-tsang  explains  the three
characters of things:

    The fact  that, from (the point  of view  of) the senses,
    the  lion  exists,  is  called  its  (character  of) sole
    imagination.  The fact that (from a higher point of view)
    the lion only seemingly  exists, is called its (character
    of) dependency on others.  And the fact that the gold (of
    which  the lion  is made) is immutable  in its nature, is
    called (the character of) ultimate reality.(39)

The implication of this analogy is that the events and things
of the pheonmenal  world have illusory being as the result of
causation but lack any inhernt nature of their own.All beings
in the phenomenal  world depend  on something  else for their
existence.Underlying  these  appearances,however,there is the
immutable  noumenon,which is the ultimate reality,the reality
which Descartes  calls 'substance'  in its primary  sense.The
immutability   of  the  noumenon   in  the  Essay  is  called
'non-generation'.(40)
    The generation of the events and things of the phenomenal
world


p.66                           

is explained in terms of primary and contributing causes. For
Locke   ideas   of  secondary   qualities   are  the   mental
representations  of the secondary qualities  themselves.  For
Fa-tsang, matter is the contributing  cause of mind, and mind
is the primary cause of matter.  Through  the combination  of
these causes, illusory  manifestations  are generated.  Being
thus generated through causation, they cannot have any nature
of their own.(41) Descartes  and Locke on the nature  of what
they call 'idea' seem to have been anticipated by Fa-tsang:

    Matter  is  not  self-caused,  but  necessarily   remains
    dependent  on mind.  Mind, however, does not derive  from
    itself,  but  is  likewise   dependent   on  (phenomenal)
    causation.  Because  of this mutual  dependency, what  is
    generated through causation is indeterminate.  It is this
    fact     of    indeterminateness     that    is    called
    non-generation.(42)

The claim that matter is dependent on mind resembles  Locke's
view that secondary qualities such as color, sound, taste and
odor are, being  ideas, dependent  on mind  for their  being.
Descartes'  adventitious  ideas  as  modes  of the  spiritual
substance depend on matter in the external world.  Ideas last
as long as they are in the mind.  There  is no experience  of
sweetness  in the lump  of sugar  on the  table  until  it is
produced  as an idea  in  the  mind.  Fa-tsang  says, "matter
[dust] is manifestation of mind.  But having thus manifested,
it becomes the contributing  cause of mind.  There must first
be this causation before any 'mental things' (hsin fa(k)) can
arise."(43) Thus, Locke's  causal theory of perception  seems
to have been anticipated by Fa-tsang.
    Mind  and  matter  discussed  here  still  belong  to the
phenomenal  world  in Kant's  conceptual  scheme  if mind and
matter somehow  cause each other.  As Fung Yu-lan points out,
(44) the central element in Fa-tsang thought is a permanently
immutable 'mind' which is universal  of absolute in its scope
and  is the  basis  for all phenomenal  manifestations.  This
absolute and immutable mind is more like Berkeley's  infinite
spirit  or  God  in  which  all  events  and  things  of  the
phenomenal  world  subsist  as archetypal  ideas  and  become
ectypal ideas in time. Thus, Fa-tsang


  p.67

explains  the phenomenal  world as arising  from the noumenal
world in terms of 'causation  by the realm of noumenon (li fa
chieh(p))'.  If we take  the term  'noumenon'  in the Kantian
sense, the philosophical  problem  of how what is outside  of
time and space can be the cause of the phenomenal world which
is within  the realm of space  and time, the problem  remains
unsolved.
    The view of Tung-shan.  Liang-chieh (807-869) on noumenon
(li(m) and  phenomenon  (shih(n)) expounded  in his work  The
Five Ranks (wu-wei(o)) can be of some help.  Two concepts  in
the fivefold  formula cheng(p) and p'ien(q) signify literally
"the  straight"  and  "the  bent."  They  refer  to  what  is
absolute, one, identical, universal, and  noumenal  set up in
tension   with   what   is   relative,  manifold,  different,
particular,  and  phenomenal.(45) The  relation  of  the  two
realms  is  explained  in the  statement  that  the  absolute
becomes  manifest  in  appearance.  In  this  view,  however,
absolute  and relative  phenomenal  are regarded  as non-dual
because  they are correlative.  Relative  phenomenal  is also
called "marvelous  being" and absolute  "the true emptiness."
The two are then identified by the expressions "the marvelous
being of true emptiness" and "the true emptiness of marvelous
being."   These  terms  express   the  quintessence   of  the
enlightened  view  of  reality.(46) Thus,  noumenon  as  true
emptiness is the gold of the gold lion in the sense that gold
is devoid  of the  form  of lion.  The  phenomenal  world  as
representation  is empty  of its own reality  and yet it is a
marvelous appearance of the noumenal.
2.3.  In the Ta-ch'eng chih-kuan fa-men(47) (Mahayana  Method
of Cessation and Contemplation) traditionally  attributed  to
Hui-ssu  (515-577), one finds what may be called the absolute
idealism of Bradley. Just as Bradley believes that appearance
without  reality  is be impossible, so the T'ien-t'ai  school
regards the whole universe as consisting of a single absolute
mind, known as Chen ju(i)(genuine  thusness, Bhutatathata) or
Ju-lai    chang(s)   (Storehouse    of   the    thus    come,
Tathagata-garbha) .   These  two  concepts   were  previously
met(2.1) in our discussion  of the mere ideation school.  The
T'ien t'ai(t) school demonstrates  an unmistakable  influence
of idealism. Thus, we read:

p.68                            

    All things depend upon this mind to have their being, and
    take  mind as their  substance.  Regarded  in themselves,
    they  are all void and illusory, and their  being  is not
    (real) being.  In contrast  to these illusory  things, it
    (mind) is said to be genuine.  Furthermore, though really
    not existent, they, because  of illusory  causation, have
    the appearance of undergoing  generation and destruction.
    Yet  when  these  void  things  undergo  generation, mind
    itself   is  not  generated   nor,  when   they   undergo
    destruction, is it destroyed.(48)

Concerning  the identity  of the reality in all beings in the
phenomenal world, the text continues: "The Buddhas of all the
three ages together  with sentient  beings, all equally  have
this one mind as their  substance.  All things, both ordinary
and  saintly, each  have  their  own differences  and diverse
appearances, whereas  this genuine  mind is devoid  of either
diversity or appearance."(49)
    The  phenomenal   world  as  appearance   of  reality  is
explained   in  terms  of  the  substance   and  function  of
Tathagata-garbha  or "the Storehouse  of the Thus Come."  The
storehouse  in its substance (ti(u)) is everywhere  the same,
and  in actual  fact  is  undifferentiated.  It is devoid  of
differentiation. In its functioning (yung(v)), however, it is
diverse, and hence embodies  the natures of all things and is
differentiated."(50)  The  best   simile   in  the   Buddhist
literature-  as  in  the  Awakening  of  Faith  in  Mahayana-
concerning substance and its function is water and waves.(51)
The two cannot  be separated  from each other.  Water  is the
substance of waves and waves are appearance of water.  In the
T'ien-t'ai  school, the ultimate  reality of the universe  is
taken to be the clear and pure mind, and is thus a version of
absolute  idealism: "We known that all things are the product
of  mind."(52) Thus,  in  this  school, nothing  real  exists
outside  of mind, and hence all phenomena  are manifestations
of that mind.

                           III.

What  can we say to Alston, Putnam, and  Wolterstorff? Is the
lump of sugar on the table white, sweet, and hard when no one
sees, tastes or


p.69

feels it? Alston and Worterstorff  think so while Putnam does
not.  What about color and the sound of my stereo  in my room
where there is no one inside? The tape recorder and camcorder
cannot favor the realists  view since there is no third agent
to watch  and  listen  to them  who  does  not  have  a human
perceptual apparatus.
    Descartes, Locke, and Kant  admit  a reality  behind  the
veil of perception  and hold that the phenomenal  world  from
the  epistemological  point  of  view  is  an idea  or mental
representation.  Berkeley  cannot  allow  any real  existence
outside  of God's mind, so he takes  the phenomenal  world as
reality  in the mind of God.  These philosophers  all provide
premises  for  Schopenhauer  to conclude  that  the world  is
nothing hut the representation of the will.
    The Buddhist  schools presented  above all agree that the
phenomenal world is the production  of the mind.  There seems
to be no conclusively  valid argument  or proof for the truth
of this view;  Buddhist  views  seem to be based on intuitive
insight.  If  we agree, as  in  the  West, that  all  of  the
qualities  we ascribe to physical  objects are in reality our
own ideas caused by the objects, then, since cause is utterly
different  from effect (ideas) and since we can ex hypothesis
never  directly  perceive  the  cause  (reality) .  then  the
Buddhist  mere  ideation  theory  can he identified  with the
subjective idealism of Berkeley's version, for one admits God
who can be independent of any phenomenal world he creates and
the other  Chen  hui (genuine  thusness) as ultimate  reality
which  is  independent  of  the  appearance  of  mind  as the
phenomenal world.
    Fa-tsang  and Hui-ssu, both influenced  by the philosophy
of  mere  ideation   regard  the  phenomenal   world  as  the
manifestation  of mind.  Just as deluded  beings can only see
waves without  seeing  water, deluded  beings  do not see the
phenomenal  world  as  the  manifestation  of  mind.  Here, I
suspect   that   the  notion   of  Chen  ju(Bhuttathata)  and
Storehouse  of the Thus  Come (Tathagata-garbha) are Buddhist
resurrections of the Vedic Brahman as S. Sharma contends.(53)
Brahmanism is, of course, absolute idealism.
    Surprisingly enough, then, we can say that the problem of
appearance and reality has troubled philosophers  of the East
and the West.  I remain unsure  whether  Putnam or Alston  is
right. I have only an intuition


p.70

that  my  phenomenal  world  is  the  representation   of  my
sentience  caused  by the external  world.  My mind is like a
flash light in the night, without  which things cannot appear
with all their qualities.

                           NOTES

1.  Die  Welt  as Wille  und  Vorstellung, translated  as The
    World as Will and Representation  by E.F.J  Payne, 2 vols
    (Indian Hills, Colo.,1958).
2.  William  Alston,"Yes, Virgina.  There  is a Real  World,"
    Paul K. Moser ed., Reality In Focus (Englewood Cliffs,
    N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1990), p.18.
3.  Hilary  Putnam,  Reason, Truth, and  History  (Cambridge:
    Cambridge University press, 1981), pp.134-135.
4.  Nicholas  Wolterstorff, "Realism  vs.  Anti-Realism,"  in
    Moser, Reality in Focus, p.62.
5.  Rene  Descartes,"Meditations  on  First  Philosophy,"  in
    Ralph  M.   Eaton  ed.   Descartes   (New  York:  Charles
    Scribner's Sons, 1955), Meditation III.
6.  Ibid., Meditation V.
7.  D.W. Hamlyn, Metaphysics (Cambridge: Cambridge University
    Press, 1984), pp.15-16.
8.  John  Locke, An  Essay  Concerning  Human  Understanding,
    Comp., Collated, & Annotated by Alexander Campbell Fraser
    (New  York: Dover  Publishing  Co., 1957), Bk.II  Ch.VIII
    (Vol.One), p.166.
9.  Ibid., p.168 [Locke's emphasis]
10. Ibid., p.169
11. Ibid., p.173
12. Ibid., p.173
13. Ibid., Ch.XIII, pp.390-392
14. Ibid., p.198
15. George  Berkeley,  "Three  Dialogues  between  Hylas  and
    Philonous,  "  in  David  M.  Armstrong  ed.   Berkeley's
    Philosophical  Writings (London: Collier-Macmillan  Ltd.,
    1965), p.208.
16. Ibid., pp.174-175.
17. H.B. Acton,"Idealism," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
    8 vols. ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan, 1967), IV,
    p.115. Acton refers to Hegel's Lectures on the History of
    Philosophy.
18. David Hume, A Treatise  of Human Nature  ed.  Selby-Bigge
    (Oxford, 1896),


p.71

    Bk.1, Pt. iv; Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed.
    C.W. Hendel (New York, 1958), Sec.XII.
19. Immanuel  Kant, Prolegomena  to Any  Future  Metaphysics,
    trans, L.W.Beck (New York, 1951), Sec.10.
20. Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Reinen Vernunft (Hamburg: Felix
    Miener Verlag, 1956), Seite, 83.  Quoted from Norman Kemp
    Smith trans, Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (New
    York: St. Martin's Press, 1968), p.82.
21. Ibid., pp.346-347.
22. Ibid., p.346.
23. Ibid., 437.
24. F.S.   Bradley,  Appearance   and  Reality  (Oxford:  The
    Clarendon Press, 1893, 1968), Chapters I & II.
25. Ibid., pp.10-12.
26. Ibid., Chapter IV.
27. Ibid., p.432.
28. Taisho shinshu taizokyo(w) [hereafter "I"] (Tokyo: Taisho
    lun].  31:1b. I owe this study to Fung Yu-lan's Chung-kuo
    ssu-hsiang  hsih(x) and Derk Bodde's English  translation
    of  the  work: A History  of  Chinese  Philosophy  Vol.II
    (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953).
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. I 1585.31:10a. Fung, History, pp.307-308.
32. I 1585.31:38c.
33. Loc cit.
34. Loc cit.
35. I 1585.31:48a.
36. I 1585.31:48a.
37. I 1875 (Hua-yen yi-hai pai-men(y)).45:627b.
38. I     1880     (Chin     shih-tsu     chang     yun-chien
    lui-chiai(z)).45:663c-664a.
39. I 1880.45:664a. Derk Bodde's translation.
40. I 1880.45;664a.
41. I 1875.45:627b-c.
42. I 1875.45:727b-c. Bodde's translation.
43. Ibid.
44. Fung Yu-lan, Chung-kuo  ssu-hsiang  hsih, p.749;  Bodde's
    trans., History of Chinese Philosophy, p.359.
45. Heinrich  Dumoulin, Zen Buddhism: A History, trans., J.W.
    Heisig and P. Knitter (New York: Macmillan, 1988), p.225.
46. Ibid.
47. I 1924.46:641-664.
48. I 1924.46:642b. Bodde's translation.

p.72

49. Ibid.
50. Ibid., 648a.
51. I 1664 (Ta-ch'eng ch'i-hsin lun(aa)).32:576c.
52. Ibid., 650b.
53. See his A Critical  Survey  of Indian Philosophy  (Delhi:
    Motilal Banarsidass, 1960), pp.121-123.


CHINESE GLOSSARY

a 玄奘                  p 正
b 法相                  q 編  許
c 法藏                  r 大乘止觀  法門
d 慧思                  s 如來藏
e 成唯識論              t 天台
f 異熟識                u 體
g 思量                  v 用
h 子別                  w 大正新修大藏經
i 真如                  x 中國思想史
j 金獅子章              y 華嚴義解百門
k 心法                  z 金獅子雲間類解
l 理法界                aa 大乘起信論
m 理
n 事
o 五位