.

P.423

The central message  of the Buddha-suffering, its origin, its
cessation  and the way leading  to its cessation-is  directly
concerned with causality. Therefore, causality has been the
central issue in Buddhist  thought.(1) The Buddha is reported
to have said, "He who sees the pratiityasamutpaada (causality
or dependent  co-arising) sees the Dharma (Truth), and he who
sees  the  Dharma,  sees  the  pratiityasamutpaada.''(2) Many
people hold that all Buddhists have accepted the principle of
causality  as the objective law governing the consti-  tuents
of the universe although they have different  expressions  of
the meaning  of the pratiityasamutpaada.  Some scholars  even
claim that the Buddha and his disciples believed causality is
"necesarily," "eternally,"  and  "universally,"  as  well  as
"objectively," valid.(3)
    But in fact, not all Buddhists  regard  causality  as the
objective law of the world.  It is debatable  that the Buddha
believed  in  the  absolute  validity  of  the  principle  of
causation. According to Naagaarjuna, the father of Mahaayaana
Buddhism, pratiityasamutpaada is sunyataa (empty);  causality
is neither rationally  nor empirically  verificable.  For the
Maadhyamikas,  the  concept   of  causality   as  the  cosmic
principle  or reality  of all things  is as untenable  as the
concepts of aatman and dharmas. The Buddha's use of causality
is    soteriological    in    character;his    teaching    of
pratityasamutpaada did not aim to give a des-  cription or an
explanation  of the universe,but to"empty" one's attachments.
Once  all  illusions  are  cleared  up, causality  should  be
discarded.
    Naagaarjuna's  school of thought  is known as the San-lun
Tsung(a) (the  Three  Treatises  School) in China, Korea  and
Japan, for it is based upon three main texts; namely, (1) the
Middle  Treatise  (Chung-lun),  (b) ,  (2)  the  Twelve  Gate
Treatise. (Shih-erh-men-lun),(c) and (3) the Hundred Treatise
(Pai-lun).(d) According  to  Chinese  San-lun  masters,  one
should study these texts together

P.424                  

in  order  to gain  a broad  philosophical  understanding  of
Buddhist thought.(4) But contemporary  Buddhist scholars have
seldom studied  them together(5) and hence inadequately  hold
that  the  Maadhyamikas  accept  causality  as the  governing
principle  of all phenomena(6) or "the nature of reality."(7)
Naagaajuna   is   even   said   to   be  "Hiinayaanistic"   or
"Abhidharmic"  in asserting  the  validity  of the  chain  of
twelve  causal  conditions.(8) Other scholars  claim that the
Maadhyamikas  "raise  causality  (pratiityasamutpaada) to the
level   of  the  transcendental."(9)  But  in  fact   the
Maadhyamikas  accept  neither  empirical  nor  transcendental
justification of the principle of causality.  The first thing
Naagaarjuna  wanted  to do in the Twelve Gate Treatise  was to
criticize  various views of causality, and the first point he
wanted to make was that the chain of twelve causal conditions
and all other causal relations  are not justifiable.  For the
Madhyamikas, pratiityasamutpaada is not a metaphysical theory
nor specualtion on the world. Like Emptiness and the Middle
Way, it is primarily  a pedagogic  tool (chiao-ti);(e) it has
no  intellectual  validity, merely  practical  value, helping
sentient beings rid themselves of ignorance and illusions. If
any one fails  to see the "empty"  nature  of this device, he
cannot see the Buddha's Dharma.
    The main purpose of this paper is to present from Chinese
sources  the San-lun Madhyamika  treatment  of the problem of
causality. In what follows, I will first show how the San-lun
Madhyamikas  repudiate  the  intellectual  justification   of
causality  as the  ultimate  principle  of the  universe  and
clarify Nagarjuna's standpoint concerning the chain of twelve
causal conditions. I will then expound the San-lun Madhyamika
teaching of pratiityasamutpaada  as Emptiness  and the Middle
Way, and reveal how they use causality as a soteriological
device to refute various erroneous views. Finally,the central
message of Buddhism will be briefly re-examined  in the light
of the Maadhyamika teaching of causality as soteriology.

                              II.

The so-called pratityasamupada  is traditionally given in the
following formula:

    "When this is, that is;

P.425

    This arising, that arises;
    When this is not, that is not;
    This ceasing, that ceases."(10)

Most people interpret this principle as saying:

    "When this entity exists, that entity exists;
    This entity arising, that entity  arises;
    When this entity  does not exist, that entity does not exist;
    This entity  ceasing, that entity ceases."

They  give ontic  status  to the principle, interpreting  the
terms  "this"  and  "that"  in the  formula  as referring  to
entities  or  objects  which  possess  essential   nature  or
self-nature.   The  principle   of  causal  relation  is  the
objective  law  governing  the constituents  of the universe.
This is the onotological  interpretation  of causal relation,
which most early Scholastic  Buddhists seemed to follow.  For
them, this  principle  gives  "the  real description"  of the
reality of the universe.  Whatsoever exists is a cause; cause
and existence are synonymous.
    The notion of causation is used by Hinayana Buddhists  to
describe both moral and physical phenomena.  The principle of
causal relations shows necessary connections  between various
events and can be stated  as a moral law and a physical  law.
When  the principle  is enunciated  as a moral  law, it means
that there are good deeds and rewards for them; and there are
bad deeds  and punishments.(11) When the principle  is stated
as a physical  law, it means  that every  individual  fact is
conditioned    by   or   dependent    on   something    else;
pratiityasamutpaada is the causal law regulating the rise and
fall of all factors or elements (dharmas).(12) There are four
"external" causal conditions (wai-yin-yuuan(f))(13) and twelve
"internal"  causal conditions (nei-yin-yuuan(g))(14) which are
usually enumerated in early Buddhist treatises. Each of these
is  conditioned  (paticcasamuppanna) as well  as conditioning
(paticcasamuppaada) .(15) When  viewed  from  the  antecedent
cause, each  is an effect, but when  viewed  from the effect,
each  is  a cause.  The  chain  or  cycle  of  twelve  causal
conditions is the true picture of the wheel of existence.
    The principle of causality was bel ved by early Buddhists
to be "objectively," "necessarily," and  "eternally"  as well
as "universally" valid.(16) But

P.426            

according  to Nagarjuna, the thesis that pratiityasamuttpaada
is the objective law governing the constituents  of the world
can  be  stated  and  known  only  from  the  standpoint   of
conventional truth.  Ordinary experience seems to show that a
thing  or event  is never found  by itself  alone, but always
together With others  which  stand around  it and constitute  its
circumstances and "causal conditions." Causality is useful in
our  ordinary  life.  However, were  we  to try  to find  out
intellectually  what a causal  relation  or a causal  process
actually is, we would be baffled.
    Naagaarjuna  argued that it is impossible  to explain the
relationship  between  a cause  and  an effect  and to relate
entities.   Any   view   of   causation   leads   to  certain
contradictions or absurdities. In his writings, he critically
examined many possible relationships between cause and effect.
(17)
    Naagaarjuna  used  the  tetralemma  as the  main  logical
apparatus to investigate the rational explanation of causal
relationships. The so-called tetralemma states that there are
four possible views for every aspect of reality: (1) thesis,
(2) antithesis,  (3) both  thesis  and  antithesis,  and  (4)
neither thesis nor antithesis.  If there is a causal relation
among  things  in the universe, Naagaarjuna  askcd,what is that
relation? Is an effect  already  real in a cause  and then is
produced by the cause? Is an effect at the outset unreal in a
cause  and yet is produced  by the  cause? Is an effect  both
real and unreal in a cause and then is produced by the cause?
Is an effect  neither  real nor unreal  in a cause and yet is
produced  by the cause?(18) By showing  that all these causal
relations  cannot  be  established, Naagaarjuna  argued  that
causal production is really impossible.
    "An effect is real in a cause and then is produced by the
cause," for  the Maadhyamikas, this  is an absurd  statement.
For the so-called  effect  is that  which  is caused, made or
produced.  But before  causal making  or production, there is
not that  which  is made  or produced.  How can there  be any
effect  in the  cause? If the  so-called  effect  is not that
which  is made, but that  which  is yet to be made, an effect
cannot be real in a cause either, for that which is yet to be
made  is not  yet  real.  How  can  it  be  real  in a cause?
Furthermore, if an effect  is already  real  in  a cause, why
must  it be produced  again? It is like  that which  has been
done  does  not  need  to be done, and that  which  has  been
achieved  does  not need to be achieved.  Nothing  new is produced and
hence there cannot be a causal  production  in this case.  If
there  were  causal  production, then  there  would  be sons,
grandsons, great-grandsons and

P.427

great-great-grandsons  in the womb  of a mother, for  effects
are, in  principle, already  real  in  a  cause;but  this  is
absurd.  Besides if an effect is already real in a cause, the
so-called  "cause"  would  be only a location  and cannot  be
called  a cause.  It may be argued  that the claim  that  "an
effect  is real in a cause and then is produced  by the case"
means  that an effect  is "potentially  real"  in a cause and
becomes    "actually    real"    later    on.     But,    for
the Maadhyamikas, this is unintelligible.  For how
can one and the same thing or entity be potential  and actual
in that way? If it were real  in that way, it would  have two
opposite  or different  essences  or natures, and hence would
not be "one"  and  the "same"  thing.  Moreover, if an effect
were potentially  real  in a cause, it should  be observable,
for whatever  can be conceived  to exist can be perceived  to
exist.  But the effect is not perceivable  before production.
So the thesis  that an effect  is real in a cause and then is
produced by the cause cannot be established.(19)
    On the other hand, one cannot  claim that an effect is at
the  outset  unreal  in a cause  and yet  is produced  by the
cause.  Nagarjuna  argued  that if an effect  is unreal  in a
cause  and yet is produced  by the cause, then, in principle,
anything  should be capable  of being produced  from anything
else. For example, carts, horses, food and other things would
be produced from strings. If "something" can be produced from
"nothing," why are only rugs produced from strings? Actually,
if an effect  were  at the  outset  unreal  in a cause, there
would be no "particular or distinct" relation between the two
and hence the one would not be the "real cause" of the
other.(20) Thus  in Madhyamika  thought, the  denial  of  the
thesis that an effect  is real in a cause does not entail the
validity  of the antithesis  that  an effect  is unreal  in a
cause.  Nagarjuna's  critical  analysis of causality  was not
meant to establish  any view of causation  but to refute  all
possible  views.  For him, the third  view that an effect  is
both  real  and unreal  in a cause  is also  untenable.  "For
'real'  and  'unreal'  are contradictory  in nature.  How can
those that are contradictory  in nature be together?"(21) The
third view may mean that an effect is partially real and
partially  unreal in a cause, and hence it does not involve a
contradiction.However, this  viewpoint  implies  (1) that  an
effect  can be real  in a cause  and then is produced  by the
cause and (2) that an effect can be unreal in a cause and yet
is produced  by the cause.  But both (1) and (2) have already
been shown  to be untenable.  So the third viewpoint  is also
unten-

P.428          

able.  According  to Naagaarjuna, to say  that  an effect  is
neither real nor unreal in a cause is tantamount to accepting
that there is no causal  relation  between  the cause and the
effect. If there is no causal relation, how can one be called
a cause, and the other  an effect? So one cannot  say that an
effect is neither real nor unreal in a cause.(22)
    Thus   Naagaarjuna    refuted   all   possible   rational
explanations  of causal rela-  tion and thereby  showed  that
causal relations are empty.  Since causal relations cannot be
established, it makes  no sense  to say  that  all things  an
"causally related" and that there is a "necessary connection"
between cause: and effect.
    Naagaarjuna  also argued that causality as such cannot be
established.  Hence  it also makes  no sense  to assert  that
causation is universal and uniform.  If there is a reality of
casuality  or  an  act  of  causal  production,  it  must  be
"self-caused, " "other-caused, " "both self-caused and
other-caused," or "noncaused."  A thing cannot  cause itself.
If a thing causes itself, it is the subject and the object at
the same time. But this is impossible because the subject and
the object are two different  things.  A thing cannot be said
to be  caused  by another  either.  If  a thing  is caused  by
another, it has the other as its substance.  But how can they
have the same substance" If they have the same substance,they
are one and the same thing.  The so-called  other  cannot  be
called  "other."  And one cannot  say  that  a thing  is both
self-caused  and other-caused  either, for this implies  that
there  can  be  the  acts  of  self-caused   production   and
other-caused production. But this is impossible because there
can be neither self-caused nor other-caused  production.  For
Naagaarjuna, the act of non-caused production is not possible
because "a thing is caused by no cause" is a contradiction in
terms and hence makes no sense. If something can come from no
cause, anything can be the cause of anything else;but this is
absurd.
    A cause  is  often  defined  or  described  as  either  a
necessary  condition  or  a sufficient  condition  or as both
necessary and sufficient conditions  for the occurrence of an
event.  As pointed out, early Buddhists  held that all things
are conditioned  by four causal conditions.  The Maadhyamikas
contented   that  these  conceptual   and  other  ontological
interpretations  of causation cannot be the right description
of the occurrence  of real events  or entities  in the world.
They argued that it is unintelligible  to hold that there are
real events  or entities  in causal  conditions, or that real
events or entities are con-

P.429

ditioned or dependent upon something else. Naagaarjuna asked,
"How is it possible  for a real event or an entity  which has
essential  nature  to be something  which  is caused?"(23)
According  to  him, it  involves  contradiction, for  "to  be
caused"  is  "to  be  conditioned"or  "to  be dependent  upon
something  else."  But a real  event  is supposed  to have  a
certain  definite  or essential  nature;  and  a thing  which
has essential  nature is not something which is produced, but
something  which  is independent  of other  things.(24) If an
entity  is caused, it is something  which  is dependent  upon
something  else.  But this  is impossible.  So the  causal
principle  cannot be the causal principle of entities or real
events.
    People  might  argue that, although  causal  relation  or
causality cannot be established on rational or logical
grounds,  it  can  be  established  by  experience.Our   past
experience  shows us that there is a causal relation  between
thing.  For example, when we examine  our empirical  facts we
see that sesame oil is always produced  out of sesame, but we
have  never  seen  sesame  oil produced  out of sand.  So our
experiences justify our claim that there is a causal relation
between  oil and sesame, but not between oil and sand.  Hence
we seek oil in sesame, not in sand. But, for Naagaarjuna, the
principle   of  causation   cannot   be  justified   even  by
experience.  The observation  of the constant conjunction  of
events does not justify  the principle  of causation.  To say
that we do observe  is not a good answer, but rather  it just
begs  the question.  Why? If causation  had been established,
then  one could  say that  since  we have  seen  that  sesame
produces  oil but have never  seen sand produce  oil, we seek
oil in sesame but not in sand. However, whether there is such
a  thing  as  causation  or  production   has  not  yet  been
established, and  hence  one cannot  legitimately  make  that
claim.  Therefore, the  example  that  we  have  seen  sesame
produce oil is based upon the very notion of causation  which
is to be established. In short, according to Naagaarjuna, any
"empirical"  justification  of  the  principle  of  causation
assumes the very principle it tries to prove.(25)
    One of the main reasons why Buddhists  have spent so much
time in discussing  causality  is that  they want to know the
nature of human life.  The so-called  chain of twelve causal
conditions  (shih-erh-yin-yuan)(h) is often given  to explain
the causal process of human existence. Naagaarjuna's position
about the reality of the chain of twelve causal conditions is
not clearly presented in the Sanskrit Muulamadhyamakakaarikaa and
the Chinese Middje Treatise.(26)

P.430

This  has  made  many  Madhyamika  scholars  perplexed  about
Nagarjuna's  viewpoint and even led them to think that his
position is Hinayanistic. For example,Kenneth K. Inada says,

    "With  the  discussion  of Nirvaana  in the last  chapter
    (Chapter XXV of the Muulamadhyamakakaarikaa) the treatment
    from the stanpoint  of the Mahayana had basically come to
    a close.  In this  chapter  and  the final  one to follow
    (Chapters  XXVI andd XXVII of the Muulamadhyamakakaarikaa),
    Nagarjuna   goes   into  the  analysis   of  Hinayanistic
    doctrines.  The present chapter discusses  the twelvefold
    causal analysis which is the basis of the endless process
    of  suffering   incurred   by  all  living  beings.   The
    discussion is Hinayanistic and it reveals that the source
    of trouble lies in ignorance  which in turn initiates all
    kinds  of mental  conformations...The  discussion  of the
    doctrine   of  causal  analysis   indicates   the  strong
    influence of Hinayanistic or Abhidharmic teachings during
    this period."(27)

    It  seems   that  the  question   whether   Naagaarjuna's
standpoint  is Hinayaanistic  can be solved  by study  of the
first  chapter  of the Twelve  Gate Treatise  in which he has
clearly  presented  his view  of the chain  of twelve  causal
conditions, and demonstrated  that the chain of twelve causal
conditions  cannot  be conceived  as the causal  law  of the,
world.  He even used a scriptural  passage  from  the Seventy
Treatise to support his standpoint:

    "[The chain of twelve]  causal conditions  really have no
    production.  If it is said  that they have production, do
    they have it in one mind-moment  or in many mind-moments?
    "(28)

    The chain of twelve causal conditions  are supposed to be
the    internal    causal    phenomena     of    the    world
(nei-yin-yuan-fa).(i) Naagaarjuna argued that if they are the
real causal law of the world, they must happen or be produced
(a) in one mind-moment, or (b) in  many mind-moments. But one
cannot  say that  all twelve  causal  factors  appear  in one
mind-moment, for  if  they  occur  in  one  mind-moment, then
causes  and  effects  happen  at  the  same  time.   This  is
impossible  because  a cause  is supposed  to be prior  to an
effect. Nor can one say that the twelve causal factors appear
in many mind-moments,

P.431

for if they occur  in many different  mind-moments, they  are
distinct from one another and have no particular  relation to
each other.  Each would  occur  within  a certain  particular
mind-moment  and then disappear  within that mind-moment.  If
this  is  the  case, how  can  anyone  of  them  be  a causal
condition?  Thus,  the  cases,  (a)  and   (b) ,  cannot   be
established, and hence the chain of twelve causal  conditions
cannot conceivably  be the real internal causal law: they are
empty.
    As  pointed  out, early  Buddhists  considered  that  the
principle of causation  was a moral law as well as a physical
law: for any good deed, there  must be a reward;  and for any
bad deed, there  must  be a punishment.  But the  Madhyamikas
argue that the "necessary connection" between a good deed and
a reward  and between  a bad deed  and punishment  cannot  be
rationally
explained and justified.(29) They are not "objective laws" in
the world nor in society, but just the subjective  projection
of the mind.  Naagaarjuna  said, "Defilements, karmas, doers,
rewards, and punishments  are all similar  to mirages,dreams,
shadows and echoes."(30)

                              III

According  to  the  San-lun  Maadhyamikas, the  Buddha  is  a
pragmatic teacher.  The chief aim of his teachings  is not to
make a report  about the world but to help people  to get rid
of ignorance  and  illusions  so as to obtain  salvation.  In
order to save all sentient  beings, the Buddha  has presented
different  teachings  to different people in compliance  with
their  abilities.  All  statements  given  by the Buddha  are
simply skillful  means (fang-pien,(j) upaaya).  In the strict
sense, they are nothing but words and letters, and should not
be  considered  as standing  for  any  definite  entities  or
realities  in the  world.  Actually, the entities  which  the
words  are supposed  to denote  are empty.  They are "utterly
empty, like a dream, like a phantom, nothing but the thoughts
of deluded  worldings."(31) Kumaarajiva  (344-413  A.D.), who
introduced Maadhyamika Buddhism to China,(32) said,

    "Not  apprehending  and  not  craving  the  dharma  is my
    Buddha-Dharma."(33)

P.432  

    Although   all  verbal  and  conceptual   teachings   and
doctrines   of  the  Buddha   are  empty,  without   absolute
intellectual  validity, they have practical  value.  They can
help people to gain enlightenment.  According to Chi-tsang(k)
(549-623  A.D.), the  greatest  Chinese  San-lun  Maadhyamika
master, they serve as

    "convenient  means to lead sentient  beings and to enable
    them to be free from various attachments."(34)

    Like    all    other    teachings    of    the    Buddha,
pratityasamutpaada, according to the Maadhyamikas, should not
be understood as an actual description  of the reality of the
universe  but  rather  as  a  soteriological  device.  It  is
presented  by the  Buddha  as a tool  of salvation.  For  the
Madhyamikas,  although   causality   is  neither   rationally
justifiable  nor  empirically  verifiable, it can serve  as a
useful  means of helping  people rid themselves  of ignorance
and  illusions.  Naagaarjuna  did  not  deny  that, from  the
practical, conventional  point of view, all things  appear to
be produced from causes and conditions.  What he did deny was
that this causal principle  can be proved  and that it is the
"ultimate principle" of the universe.  Naagaarjuna's critique
of causality  does not "raise  causality  to the level of the
transcendental" as some scholars say it
does.(35)
    Naagaarjuna   seemed   to  find  that  while  people  are
searching  for  the knowledge  of the true-nature  of things,
they tend to describe  the true state of things as "real"  or
"unreal"  and advocate absolutism  or nihilism.  The Buddha's
teaching  of  pratiityasmutpaada  serves  to  keep  one  from
falling  into these extreme  views.  The true state of things
cannot be absolutely  real, because  all things  appear to be
impermanent and are dependent upon causes and conditions.  If
a thing  is absolutely  existent, it should  be self-existent
and is not subject  to causal  change.  But things seem to be
dependennt upon something else and are subject to change.  So
the true nature of things cannot be absolutely real.  Nor can
the true nature of things be absolutely unreal. If all things
are  absolutely  non-existent, there  would  be  no  changing
phenomena  and  sensible  appearances  would  not arise.  But
myriad  things  do  appear  to  arise  from  various   causal
conditions and hence cannot be absolutely non-existent.  This
point was succinctly  stated by Seng-chao(1)(374-414 A.D.) as
follows:

P.433

    "For  what  reason? If you  say  that  they  exist, their
    existence  arises  non-absolutely.  If you say that  they
    non-exist, their forms have taken shape.  Since they have
    forms  and  shapes,  they  cannot  be  the  same  as  the
    non-existent. So, this explains the idea of the emptiness
    of the non-absolute."(36)

    Thus,    pratiityasamutpaada     performs     the    same
"soteriological"  function as the Middle Way and Emptiness in
avoiding the extreme views of absolutism and nihilism:hence
Nagarjuna once said,

    "It is pratiityasamutpaada that we call Emptiness;it is a
    provisionary name;it is also the Middle Way."(37)

    In  Madhyamika  thought, Emptiness, the  Middle  Way  and
pratiityasamutpaada are interchangeable.  The word "empty" or
"emptiness," for the Maadhyamikas, has  no meaning  by itself
but  obtains  a meaning  in  the  process  of salvation.  The
doctrine  of emptiness  is not a metaphysical  theory;it  is,
instead, primarily  a soteriological  device  for eliminating
extreme  views so that one may be "empty"  of any attachment.
The  doctrine  was  first  expressed  as the doctrine  of the
Middle  Way in the Buddha's  First  Sermon.(38) The so-called
Middle Way is a way of emptiness as it is a path refuting all
speculative     reasonings.     Like    the    Middle    Way,
pratiityasamutpaada is essentially a way of emptiness;  it is
a  path   for  freeing   one  from  conceptual   speculation.
Naagaarjuna opened the Middle Treatise with these words:

    "I salute  the Buddha,
    The foremost  of all teachers.
    He has taught
    The   doctrine   or   dependent   co-arising (pratiityasamutpaada),
    The  cessation  of all conceptual  games."(39)

    The Buddha's  teachings  of Emptiness, the Middle Way and
pratiityasamutpaada  all have  the same  purpose, namely, the
liberation  of  one's  mind  from  metaphysical  speculation.
Conceptual  reasoning, for  the  Maadhyamikas, is  often  the
svabhaavic  or  substantive  way  of thinking.  When  one  is
engaged  in philosophical  reasoning  he tends  to ascribe  a
definite nature or essence to an object, thing or event.  The
object is believed to possess a determinate or

P.434  

substantial  nature,and is regared as the ultimate reality or
basic element of the universe. Traditional Hindu philosophers
employed  this way of thinking  and held  that AAtman  is the
ultimate reality of the universe.  Early scholastic Buddhists
also  used  the  svabhaavic  way  of thinking  and held  that
dharmas  are  the real  constituents  of the  world.  For the
Maadhyamikas, the monistic philosophy of traditional Hinduism
is  an  extreme  view,  and  the  pluralistic  philosophy  of
scholastic  Buddhism  is  another  extreme  view.  All  those
philosophers  have the same error, namely, the svabhaavic way
of  reasoning.   Pratiitysamutpaada  has  been  used  by  the
Madhyamikas to refute this.  The concept of a definite nature
or real essence (whether it is ascribed to AAtman, dharmas or
other ontological  entities) is contradictory  to or at least
incompatible  with the empirical  phenomena  that things  are
subject  to causal change.  So it cannot  be used to describe
the  true  state  of  our  experience.  Consequently,  it  is
unintelligible  to use  Atman, dharmas  or other  ontological
entities to explain the reality of the universe.  Naagaarjuna
said, "Things are produced from various conditions, and hence
have no self-nature  (tzu-hsing,(m) svabhaava).  If they have
no  self-nature, how  can  there  be such  things?''(40) Thus
causality  serves  as  a  means  to  refute  the  concept  of
self-nature  and thereb to eliminate  the ontologization  of
any entiey or object.
    The Buddha's  teaching  of pratiityasamutpaada, according
to  the  Maadhyamikas,  is  concerned   not  only   with  the
conceptual  description  of the reality  of the universe  but
also with the conceptual explanation of human behavior. The
fatalist  claims that all things are causally determined  and
man cannot shape his future, while the fortuitist argues that
everything  happens by chance and man is not responsible  for
his actions. For the Buddha, fatalism and fortuitism were two
extreme views: either one could make human responsibility and
religious discipline impossible.  He refuted them by teaching
pratiityasamutpaada.  Fatalism  is  untenable  because  it is
contradictory  to the empirical  fact that  the existence  of
everything  is conditional  and subject to change.  Moreover,
the absolute "necessary  connection"  beween events cannot be
established  and hence  it makes  no sense  to hold  that all
things are absolutely predetermined and man cannot change his
future.  Fortuitism  is  also  untenable  because  it is also
contradictory  to the fact that all things are dependent upon
causal conditions.  Thus, pratityasamutpada is, again, used
as a way  of avoiding  the  extreme  views  of fatalism.  and
fortuitism, and hence makes human responsibility and reigious
discipline

P.435

possible.  So pratiityasamutpaada  is given  to "save"  or to
acount for the possibility  of moral evaluation and religious
training in daily life.(41)

                              IV.

The  way of pratiityasamutpaada  as Emptiness  and the Middle
Way   is   essentially   the   way   of  salvation.   To  see
pratiityasamutpaada  is to have the unattached  insight  that
all things are empty and that all speculative  reasonings are
unintelligible  and should be eliminated.  This unattached
insight  is enlightenment.  It, for  the Maadhyamikas, is the
central message of the Buddha's Dharma.  So, the Buddha said,
"He who sees the pratiityasamutpaada  sees the Dharma, and he
who sees the Dharma sees the pratiityasamutpaada.''  The aim
of the Buddha's  Dharma is not to find the cause of suffering
or  to  have  a  conceptual  understanding  of  any  causal
phenomenon, but  rather  to see  that  all  things, including
suffering  and its cause, are empty, and hence  to cease  all
conceptualization.  So, when someone  wanted  to discuss  the
cause of suffering with the Buddha, he remained silent:

    " 'Is suffering  made by itself?' The Buddha  kept silent
    and did not answer.  'World-honoured! If suffering is not
    made  by itself, is it made  by other?' The Buddha  still
    did not answer.  World-honoured! Is it then made by itself
    and   other?  '  The  Buddha   still   did  not   reply.
    'World-honoured! Is it then made by no cause at all?' The
    Buddha  still did not answer.  Thus as the Buddha did not
    answer these four questions, we should know that suffering
    is empty."(42)

    The  so-called  Four  Noble  Truths, according  to San-lun
Buddhists, were  given  by the  Buddha  from  the  practical,
conventional  standpoint.  Ordinary  people  believe  in  the
"reality" of suffering and the "universal" and "objective"
validity  of causality.  In order to help sentient  beings to
obtain  enlightenment,  the  Buddha  used  words, such  as
"suffering"  and "happiness," "the origin  of suffering"  and
"the  cessation  of suffering," "cause"  and "effect," "true"
and "false," to expound  his Dharma.  Actually, all the words
and statements he made are empty. Naagaarjuna said,

P.436     

    "Words have no essence.  Whatever is expressed by them is
    also without essence."(43)

    The Buddha's  verbal  teachings, for Naagaarjuna  and his
San-lun followers, are merely instruments to assist people in
eliminating conceptualization  so that they may be "empty" of
all intellectual and emotional attachments. Once one realizes
this  "empty"  nature  of the Buddha's  Dharma, he will  have
abandoned conceptual speculation of everything, even the Four
Noble Truths. Naagaarjuna said,

    "In Suunyataa  (emptiness) one gives  up conceptualization
    or playing the language game."(44)

    "Things   are  not  obtainable,
    Conceptualizations   are  eliminated.
    There  is neither  man nor place (nirvaana).
    The Buddha has nothing to say either."(45)

If one is attached  to causality  and insists  on speculating
about  the  cause  of suffering, he cannot  see the  Buddha's
Dharma.

UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII AT HILO

                              NOTES

1.  See   David   J.   Kalupahana,  Causality:  The   Central
    Philosophy  of  Buddhism, Honolulu, University  of Hawaii
    Press,  1975.  See  also  T.  R.  V.  Murti, The  Central
    Philosophy  of  Buddhism,  London, Allen and Unwin, 1970,
    p. 166, and N.  Dutt,  Aspects  of Mahaayaana  Buddhism
    and   Its   Relations   to   Hiinayaana.   London,  Luzac,
    1-930,p.51.
2.  Majjhima-nikaaya,I,190-191.
3.  See David J. Kalupahana, Op.  Cit., pp.  89-109. See also
    T. R.  V.  Murti, OpCit., pp.  167-168.  Scholars such as
    Fritjof  Capra  compare  the  Buddhist   concept  of  the
    pratiityasamutpaada   to  the   'bootstrap"   theory   of
    high-energy  physics The so-called bootstrap theory holds
    that  the  universe  is  an extremely  complex  dynamical
    mechanism  which  is self determining.  In terms  of high
    energy sub-

P.437

    atomic particles  (hadrons), each particle helps generate
    other particles which in turn generate it.  The whole set
    of particles  generates  itself this way, or pulls itself
    up  by  its  bootstraps.   The  existence,  quality   and
    characteristic  of each particle is determined or defined
    by its relation  to all  other  particles.  For this  new
    interpretation  of the Buddhist  theory of causality, see
    Fritjof Capra, "Bootstrap and Buddhism," American Journal
    of Physics 42, Jan., 1974, pp.  15-19;see  also Donald W.
    Mitchell, "Buddhist  Theories  of  Causation," Philosophy
    East and West vol. 25, 1 Jan., 1975, pp. 104-106.
4.  These works comprise the canonical literature  of the Ssu
    lun  Tsung(n) (the  Four  Treatises  School), the  Pan-jo
    Tsung(o) (the  Wisdom  School), the  K'ung  Tsung(p) (the
    Emptiness  School, the Chung-tao Tsung(q) (the Middle Way
    School) ,  the  Cheng-shih   Tsung(r)  (the   Satyasiddhi
    School), the Ching-t's  Tsung(s) (the  Pure  Land School)
    and the Hua-yen Tsung(t) (the Garland School).

5.  Modern Maadhyamika scholars have paid little attention to
    the Twelve  Gate Treatise  which exists  only in Chinese.
    They accept the Prasannapadaa of Candrakirti (c.  600-650
    A.D.)  as   the   authentic   Mulamadhyamakakaarikaa   of
    Nagarjuna  and  usually  use  it as the  main  source  of
    Madhyamika thought. Actually, the Chinese three treatises
    were  composed  more than two hundred  years  before  the
    Prasannapadaa was written.
6.  T.R.V.Murti, Op.Cit.
7.  See   Frederick   J.   Streng,   "The   Significance   of
    Pratiityasamutpaada  for  Understanding  the Relationship
    between Samvrti and Paramaarthasatya  in Nagarjuna, " The
    Problem  of Two Truths in Buddhism  and Vedaanta, ed.  by
    Mervyn  Sprung,  Boston, D.  Reidel  Publishing  Company,
    1973, pp. 27, 30 and 36.
8.  See  Kenneth  K.  Inada, Naagaarjuna: Translation  of His
    Mulamadhaymakakaarikaa   With   An  Introductory   Essay,
    Tokyo,The Hokuseido Press, 1970, p. 160.
9.  David  J.  Kalupahana, Buddhist  Philosophy: A Historical
    Analysis, Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1976,p.
    139.
10. See Walpola  Rahula, What the Buddha  Taught  (New  York:
    Grove  Press, Inc., 1962), p.  53;  Majjhima-nikaaya, III
    (PTS   edition) ,  p.   63;   Samyutta-nikaya.   II  (PTS
    edition),pp.28 and 95.
11. This sometimes  called  the special  theory of causation;
    see Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, vol. 1,p..136.
12. This is called the general theory of causation. Ibid.
13. The so-called four conditions  are the following: (a) The
    cause  condition  (yinyuan).(u) This  acts  as the  chief
    cause, for example, the wlnd  and water  that  cause  the
    wave.  (2) The  sequential  condition  (tz'u-ti-yuan).(v)
    This immediately  follows a preceding  condition, such as
    waves following one another.(3) The appropriating
    condition  (yuan-yuan) .(w) This  is  the  objective  (or
    subjective) environment,like the basis  or the boat.  (4)
    The upheaving  condition  (tseng-shang-yuan).(x) This  is
    that which brings  all conditions  to the climax, such as
    the last wave that upsets the boat.

P.438             

14. The twelve internal  causal conditions  can be stated  as
    follows: (1)suffering, such  as old age and death;  which
    is due to (2) birth; which  is  due  to (3) formation  of
    being;  which  is  due  to  (4) our  mental  clinging  to
    objects;  which  is  due  to  (5) thirst  or  desire  for
    objects; which is due to perception;  which is due to (7)
    contact;  which  is due to (8) the six sense organs;which
    are due to (9) name-form; and these cannot happen without
    (10) conscious  mind;  which  is due to (11) the will  to
    live;which is due to (12)ignorance.
15. Walpola Rahula,Op. Cit.,p.54.
16. See   David   J.   Kalupahana,  Causality:  The   Central
    Philosophy of Buddhism, pp. 89-109.
17. For  example,  he  critically   discussed  the  following
    possible  causal  relations:
    (1) An effect  is real  in a cause (or an assemblage  of
        causes and conditions), or an  effect  is unreal  in
        a cause.
    (2) A cause  gives  to an etfect a causal nature before
        it ceases to be, or a cause does  not  give  to  an
         effect  a causal  nature  before  disappearing.
    (3) A cause and an effect appear  together simultaneously,
        or a cause  and  an effect  do not appear together
        simultaneously.
    (4) A cause becomes an effect, or a cause  does  not
        become  an effect.  (5) A cause  is within an effect,
        or an effect  is within a cause.
    (6) A cause  is  identical  with  an  effect,  or  a
        cause  is  different  from  an effect.  Generally
        speaking, the way  Naagaarjuna  criticized each
        relation is more or less the same.  In this paper
        I will briefly  discuss the first of  these
        relationships  and show how he critically  analyzed
        pratiityasamutpaada.  For a detailed  discussion, see the
        first  three chapters  and the last four chapters  of the
        Twelve Gate Treatise.
18. The issue of whether an effect is already real in a cause
    or at the outset  unreal  in a cause is also the issue of
    whether an effect pre-exists in a cause or not.
19. The  Twelve  Gate  Treatise,  II,  (Taishoo  1568) , pp
    160b-161c.
20. Ibid., pp. 161c-162a;the Middle Treatise, I:6.
21. Ibid.,p, 162a;the Mlddle Trearise,I:7.
22. (Ibid.
23. The Middle Treatise. XV:1 and 2a.
24. Ibid.,XV:2b.
25. The Twelve Cate Treatise. II,p.161c-162a.
26. Naagaarjuna  stated the chain of twelve causal conditions
    in Chapter XXVI.
27. Kenneth K. Inada, Op. Cit. A.  K. Warder even claims that
    Naagaarjuna's  philosophy  as  a  whole  is  not  against
    Hiinayaanism.   See  Warder's  article,  "Is  Nagarjuna  a
    Mahayanist?" in The Problem of Two Truths in Buddhism and
    Vedaanta, pp. 78-88.
28. The Twelve Gate Treatise. I:2.
29. Sea the Middle Treatise, XVII: 1-32.
30. Ibid.,XVII:33.
31. Kumaarajiiva,  Ta-ch'eng-ta-i-chang(y)  (Taisho  1856) ,
    section 12.

P.439

32. He  translated  the  Middle  Treatise,  the  Twelve  Gate
    Treatise and the Hundred Treatise into Chinese.
33. Kumaarajiiva,   Op. Cit.,  section   15.
34. Chi-tsang,  San-lun-hsuan-i(z) The  Profound  Meaning  of
    Three Treatises, Taishoo  1852,p. 7.
35. David  J.  Kalupahana, Buddhist  Philosophy: A Historical
    Analysis, pp. 138-139.
36. Seng-chao, Chao-lun,(aa) part II.p. 152.
37. The Middle Treatise, XXIV: 18.
38. For  a detailed  discussion  of the  San-lun  Maadhyamika
    doctrines  of  Emptiness  and  the  Middle  Way,  see  my
    article, "Zen and San-lun Maadhyamiks  Thought: Exploring
    the   Theoretical   Foundation   of  Zen  Teachings   and
    Practices," which will be published in Religious Studies,
    September, 1979.
39. The opening statement of the Middle Treatise:
40. The  Twelve  Gate  Treatise.  1:1, See  also  the  Middle
    Treatise, I; 2, 13 and XV:1-4
41. See  the  Twelve  Gate  Treatise,  VIII  and  the  Middle
    Treatise, XXIV.
42. The Twelve Gate Treatise, X,p. l66a.
43. Naagaarjuna,Hui-cheng-lun,(ab) 25.
44. The   Middle   Treatise,  XVIII:  5.   For   the  San-lun
    MaadhyamikaS,language  is like a game.  'The meaning of a
    term  lies  in the  context  rather  than  in an "object"
    outside the language.
45. Ibid.,XXV:24