The Conception of Language And The Use of Paradox
In Buddhism And Taoism

Edward T. Ch'ine
Journal of Chinese Philosophy
Vol. 11 1984
Copyright(c) 1984 by Dialogue Publishing Company, Honolulu, U.S.A.

. P.375 Both the Buddhists and the Taoists advocate a form of linguistic skepticism, according to which the ultimate reality is mute in the sense of being not only pre-scriptive but also unsayable. Lao Tzu(a) and Chuang Tzu, (b) for instance, are known for their pronouncements on the Tao(c) as nameless and unnameable Lao Tzu said that the Tao is "infinite, boundless and unnameable" (sheng-sheng pu-k'o ming(d) ).(1) He also said, "The Tao is forever nameless. Though the uncarved block is small, no one in the world dares claim its allegiance....Only when it is cut are there names. As soon as there are names, know that it is time to stop."(2) Likewise, Chuang Tzu said that "the Great Way is not named" (ta-tao pu-ch'eng(e))(3) and that although "the ten thousand things differ in principle, " the Tao shows "no partiality" (pu-ssu) (f) among them and is therefore itself undifferentiated and "nameless" (wu-ming)(g) .(4) Among the Buddhists, Vimalakirti's "silence" is proverbial and paradigmatic. It is the anticlimactic climax of a series of attempts by thirty-three Bodhisattvas including Ma~nju'srii to define the Dharma-gate of Non-Duality (pu-erh fa-men)(h).(5) As such, it exemplifies a conventional Buddhist wisdom that the Tathagata as the ultimate truth is, as Vimalakirti put it, "beyond the paths of word and speech" and "cannot be revealed by word. speech, discerning and pointing."(6) To be sure, neither the Buddhists nor the Taoists did away with language entirely. To say that the ultimate reality is unsayable is already a form of saying. In fact, Lao Tzu, Chuang Tzu and Virnalakirti all said a good deal more than that. In doing so, however, they were not necessarily contradicting themselves, for, as will be shown in the following, the mode of language that they each used and affirmed not only is consistent with but actually articulates their linguistically skeptical belief that the ultimate reality is ineffable. Lao Tzu, for instance, made a number of statements P.376 on the Tao. These statements, according to T'ang Chun-i,(i) can be categorized into six distinct but not mutually exclusive types:(7) 1. Statements concerning the Tao as the prin- ciple of regularity in the universe. Here, the word Tao stands for what the myriad things in the universe share in common. It does not refer to the ultimate reality, but to what in T'ang Chun-i's terms is a "vacuous principle" (hsu-li)(j)and is likened by him to an air route in the sky. An air route has no reality in and of itself and becomes manifest only because of a flying airplane. Similarly, the Tao as the principle of regularity in the universe does not exist in its own right and has no independent existence to speak of. It depends on the myriad things for existence and can be talked about only as an observed commonality of the myriad things. Examples of this type of statement may include: (1) Chapter 40 where it is said: "Reversal is the movement of the Tao"; and (2) Chapter 77 where the Tao is compared to the "bending of a bow" : "Heaven's Way is indeed like the bending of a bow. When (the string) is high, bring it down. When it is low, raise it up. When it is excessive, reduce it. When it is insufficient, supplement it. The Way of Heaven reduces whatever is excessive and supplements whatever is insufficient."(8). 2. Statements concerning the Tao as a metaphy- sical existence, or, in T'ang Chun-i's terms, the metaphysical "substance of the Tao (tao-t'i)(k). Here, the word Tao is a designation ofr the ultimate reality which has an independent and eternal existence not only in and of itself but prior to the existence of the myriad things and is the source of the myriad things. An example of this type of statement appears in Chapter 25 where it is said: "There is something undifferentiated and yet complete, which is born before heaven and earth. Soundless and formless, it stands alone and does not change. It goes round and does not weary. It is capable of being the mother of the universe. I do not know its name;I call it the Tao."(9) 3. Statements concerning the attributes of the metaphysical "substance of the Tao." The metaphysical "substance of the Tao" is in and of itself "undifferentiated" and has no attributes to speak of. However, since it is the "mother" of the myriad things which have attributes, it bears a relationship to the myriad things and, as a result, takes on a set of attributes which are contingent upon this relationship and which can and must be talked about in terms of what the attributes of the myriad things both are and are not. The Tao in its metaphysical "substance" must be talked P.377 about in terms of what the attributes of the myriad things both are and are not because its relationship to the myriad things consists of both identity and contrast and is a necessary contradiction which is entailed by the Tao's movement as "reversal" and which can only be stated in paradoxical terms. For this reason, Lao Tzu stated in Chapter 78 that "straightforward words sound paradoxical" (cheng-yen jo-fan)(l). In contrast to the myriad things which have "shape" (chuang)(m) and "thingness" (wu)(n) and which are nameable and susceptible to sensory perception through seeing and hearing, the Tao in its metaphysical "substance" is said to be a "shape without shape" and a "thing without thingness" and to be "unnameable," "invisible," "inaudible," and beyond "touch." Thus it is said in Chapter 14,'We look at it and do not see it; it is called invisible. We listen to it and do not hear it; it is called inaudible. We touch it and do not find it; it is called minute and subtle....Infinite, boundless, and unnameable, it reverts to nothingness and is what is known as the shape without shape and the thing (hsiang, (o) literally "image" or "concrete phenomenon") without thingness."(10) Conversely, the Tao in its metaphysical "substance" can also be talked about as having attributes in terms of its identity with the myriad things which it generates. Therefore, since things have "being" (yu)(p) and are spoken of as "things" with "names," the Tao in its metaphysical "substance" can also be said to have "being" and to be a "thing" whose "name ever remains" (ch'i- ming pu-ch'u)(q). Thus, when Lao Tzu spoke of the "undifferentiated and yet complete" Tao in Chapter 25, he referred to it as a "something" which "is" (yu). Similarly, he said in Chapter 21, "As a thing, the Tao is elusive and vague. Vague and elusive, there are images (hsiang) in it. Elusive and vague, there are things in it....From the time of old until now, its name ever remains so that we may see the beginning of all things. How do I know that the beginnings of all things are so? By means of this."(11) 4. Statements in which the Tao is spoken of in terms of te(r) or "virtue." In the Lao Tzu, Tao as a concept is usually distinguishable from te. Tao is the "mother" of the myriad things and is what they all hold in common whereas te pertains to the individuality of the myriad things and is what they each obtain from the Tao and must observe in order to become what they are as particulars. In this regard, Lao Tzu is rather different from Chuang Tzu who does not distinguish Tao from te as much as Lao Tzu does and who is unequivocal in advocating both "letting the te be in [one's] P.378 actions" (fang-te erh-hsing)(s) and "following the Tao in [one's] journey" (hsuun-tao erh-ch'u)(t) (12) Not surprisingly, therefore, the statements in which the Tao is spoken of in terms of te are relatively few in number in the Lao Tzu. Nevertheless, since te is what the myriad things each obtain from the Tao and has the Tao as its source, it bears to Tao the same kind of relationship that prevails between the myriad things and the Tao as metaphysical "substance." Therefore, just as the Tao as metaphysical "substance" can be talked about in paradoxical terms of what the attributes of the myriad things are and are not, so the Tao in its relationship to te can also be spoken of in terms which both identify and contrast the Tao with te. In terms of its identification with te which is embodied in things, the Tao is said to be a possession of things. As such, in Tao is viewed by Lao Tzu as a "treasure" which can even be "offered" as a present. Thus, it is said in Chapter 62, "Tao is the storehouse of all things. It is the good man's treasure and the bad man's refuge....Therefore on the occasion of crowning an emperor or installing the three ministers, rather than present large pieces of jade preceded by teams of four horses, it is better to kneel and offer this Tao."(13) As a contrast to te, the Tao is distinguished from the te of things and is spoken of by Lao Tzu as the "superior virtue" (shang-te)(u) or "profound and mysterious virtue" (hsuan-te(v): Thus, it is said in Chapter 38,"The man of superior virtue does not keep to virtue and that is why he has virtue. The man of inferior virtue never strays from virtue and that is why he is without virtue. The man of superior virtue never acts, but leaves nothing undone. The man of inferior virtue acts, but there are things left undone."(14) It is also said in Chapter 65, "In ancient times those who practiced Tao well did not seek to enlighten the people, but to make them ignorant. People are difficult to govern because they have too much knowledge. Therefore he who rules the state through knowledge is a robber of the state; he who rules a state not through knowledge is a blessing to the state. One who knows these two things also knows the norm. Always knowing the norm is called profound and mysterious virtue. The profound and mysterious virtue is deep and far-reaching. And with it all things return to their original natural state with the result that complete harmony is established."(15) Statements in this category are closely related to, but analytically distinguishable from those in category\ #3 because te, though embodied in things as the principle of individuation, is nonetheless different as a concept from things understood in terms of attributes. P.379 5. Statements in which the Tao is understood in a practical sense as the technique of realizing or conforming to the Tao such as the correct method of cultivation, the right way of living and the art of good government, etc. Statements of this type are numerically most significant in the Lao Tzu. But they are not concerned with the Tao per se as the ultimate reality, even though they have implications which are relevant to any metaphysical consideration of the Tao as the ultimate reality. Esemples may include: (1) Chapter 15 where it is stated, "He who embraces this Tao does not want to fill himself to overflowing. It is precisely because there is no overflowing that he is beyond wearing out and renewal";(16) (2) Chapter 30 where it is said, "He who assists the ruler with Tao does not dominate the world with force. The use of force usually brings requital. Wherever armies are stationed, briers and thorns grow. Great wars are always followed by famines. A good (general) achieves his purpose and stops, but does not seek to dominate the world....(For) after things reach their prime, they begin to grow old, which means being contrary to Tao. Whatever is contrary to Tao will soon perish";(17) and (3) Chapter 37 where it is said, "Tao invariably takes no action, and yet there is nothing left undone. If kings and barons can keep it, all things will transform spontaneously. If, after transformation, they should desire to be active, I would restrain them with simplicity, which has no name. Simplicity, which has no name,is free of desires. Being free of desires, it is tranquil. And the world will be at peace of its own accord."(18) 6. Statements in which the discourse on the Tao is a description of a state of existence or mind which has realized the metaphysical "substance" of the Tao and is spoken of in the Lao Tzu in terms of whatever and however can be said of the Tao as the ultimate reality. Therefore, just as the Tao in its metaphysical "substance" is said to be beyond "inquiry" because it is "invisible," "inaudible" and "minute and subtle" (Chapter 14), so the "best rulers of old" who were "genuine like a piece of uncarved wood" and "undifferentiated like muddy water" are also said to be "subtly mysterious, profoundly penetrating and too deep to comprehend" (Chapter 15). Other examples of statements of this type may include: (1) Chapter 8 where it is said,'The best (man) is like water. Water is good; it benefits all things and does not compete with them. It dwells in (lowly) places that all disdain. This is why it is so near to the Tao"; and (2) Chapter 16 where it is said, "To know the eternal is P.380 to act blindly to result in disaster. He who knows the eternal is all-embracing, Being all-embracing, he is impartial. Being impartial, he is kingly. Being kingly, he is one with Nature. Being one with Nature, he is in accord with Tao. Being in accord with Tao, he is longlasting and free from danger till the end of his life."(19) Statements in this category are closely related to those in #3 and #4. They differ, however, in focus or point of reference and represent two different procedures of talking about the Tao as the ultimate reality. While #6 proceeds from that which is differentiated to the Tao as the undifferentiated in terms of what has become of the differentiated, #3 and #4 begin with the undifferentiated Tao as the "mother" of all differentiated things and speak of the undifferentiated Tao in terms of what the differentiated things are and are not. In terms of our concern with Lao Tzu's theory and use of language, T'ang Chun-i's six types may be re-grouped as two: (1) #2, #3, #4 and #6 which all refer to the Tao as the ultimate reality; and (2) #1 and #5 which do do not refer to the Tao as the ultimate reality. #1 and #5 are obviously compatible with the mystical/skeptical belief in the ineffability of the Tao as the ultimate reality which is simply not their concern. As for #2, #3,#4, and #6, it is noteworthy that what they say of the Tao as the ultimate reality including the saying that the Tao as the ultimate reality is unsayable is said in terms of what can and cannot be said of the sayable things and says nothing of the Tao as the ultimate reality in and of itself. The saying thus affirmed in #2, #3, #4, and #6 does not therefore contravene Lao Tzu's mystical/skeptical vision. Rather, it is informed by, and may in fact be viewed as an articulation of, his mystical/skeptical belief that the Tao as the ultimate reality is ineffable. Chuang Tzu, as noted a little earlier, differed from Lao Tzu in maintaining an unequivocally unitary view of the Tao and the te. As a logical correlate of this difference, Chuang Tzu advocated a form of mysticism/skepticism which is even more radical than Lao Tzu's. He extended his sense of ineffability not only to the Tao as the ultimate reality but also to things as concrete embodiments of the individualizing te and considered both the Tao and things to be ultimately beyond speech and silence. He said, "The perfection of the Way and things - neither words nor silence are worthy of expressing it. Not to talk, not to be silent - this is the highest form of debate."(20) Nevertheless, Chuang Tzu also spoke. He P.381 not only spoke but also debated, sometimes even with a sense of relish. He obviously enjoyed'Hui Shih(w) as a debating partner and felt a sense of loss after Hui Shih's death, saying, "There's no One I can talk to any more."(21) Chuang Tzu's feelings for Hui Shih as a debating partner are unsettling not only because these feelings seem to contradict his belief in the ineffability of the Tao and things but also because he explicitly condemned debate as a result of deficiency in "seeing" (chien)(x). He said, "...debates arise because there is that which [the debaters] do not see. The Great Tao is not named. Great debates are not spoken.... If the Tao is made clear, it is not the Tao. If debates are put into words, they do not suffice."(22) He also criticized the Confucians and the Mohists for arguing over what they each regarded as the right and the wrong and considered them both to have a "closed" mind which, for Chuang Tzu, is what makes an argument possible. Alluding to one of Hui Shih's paradoxes, he said, "Not being closed in mind and yet having a sense of right and wrong is [as impossible as] going to Yueh(y) today but arriving there yesterday."(23) He also said, "Because right and wrong appeared, the Way was injured. ... "(24) However,if Chuang Tzu in his engagement in speech and debate seemed to be contradicting himself, he was perfectly aware of his own contradiction. He said of himself, "Now I am going to make a statement here. I don't know whether it fits into the category of other people's statements or not. But whether it fits into their category or whether it does not, it fits into some category which is still a category in comparison with theirs. So in this respect it is no different from their statements."(25) This statement by Chuang Tzu embodies a sense of irony which is typical of Chuang Tzu. It exemplifies his impulse to double back upon himself to de-center himself as a speaker. Therefore, as a critic, Chuang Tzu is forever self-critical. He claims no privileged position for his statements which are in fact intended to be selferasing because, as statements, they are all constituted by the principle of alterity and necessarily imply their opposites as a condition of existence. For Chuang Tzu, statements and counter-statements exist for one another and are inter-penetrating and mutually producing. For this reason, they are viewed by him as intrinsically self-disrupting; there is always "this" in "that" or "right" in wrong" and vice versa. He said, Everything has Its 'that,' everything has its 'this.' From the point of view of 'that' you cannot see it, but through under- P.382 standing you can know it. So I say,'that' comes out of 'this' and 'this' depends on 'that' ─ which is to say that 'this' and 'that' give birth to each other. But where there is birth there must be death; where there is death there must be birth. Where there is acceptability there must be unacceptability;where there is unacceptability there must be acceptability. Where there is recognition of right there must be recognition of wrong; where ithere is recognition of wrong there must be recognition of right. Therefore the sage does not proceed in such a way, but illuminates all in the light of Heaven. He too recognizes a 'this,' but a 'this' which is also 'that,' a 'that' which is also 'this.' His 'that' has both a right and a wrong in it; his 'this' too has both a right and a wrong in it. So, in fact, does he still have aa 'this' and 'that'? Or does he in fact no longer have a 'this' and 'that" A state in which 'this' and 'that' no longer find their opposites is called the hinge of the Way. W hen the hinge is fitted into a socket, it can respond endlessly. Its right then is a single endlessness and its wrong too is a single endlessness.(26) Moreover, as that which contains within itself the principle of its own negation, a statement is viewed by Chuang Tzu not only as self-erasing but also as infinitely substitutable by any other statement. For this reason, Chuang Tzu advocated "walking on two roads" (liang-hsing)(z) . according to which "the sage harmonizes with both right and wrong and rests in Heaven the Equalizer."(27) Significantly, Chuang Tzu's "hinge of the Way," though it must be fitted into a "socket," is directionally not hinged anywhere in particular. Being without a directional center and capable of "responding endlessly" in all directions, the "hinge of the Way" symbolizes Chuang Tzu's ideal of speech or language use as a philosophically nomadic performance which, as the title of his first chapter suggests, "wanders freely and easily" and which does not yearn for the certainty of a center. There is in the Chuang Tzu an almost Derridian celebration of the Nietzschean " joyous affirmation" of "the noncenter otherwise than as loss of the center."(28) On the other hand, however, this celebration does not for Chuang Tzu, as it does for Derrida, take place simply on what in Edward Said's terms is "a field, or space, of language."(29) For, according to Chuang Tzu,alterity is P.383 not just a grammatological principle; it is also an ontological principle of reality. Therefore, unlike Derrida for whom the inter-substitutability of statements is merely a "play" of signs with one sign leading to another alternately as signifier and signified,(30) Chuang Tzu envisioned his "play" as a cosmic drama which acts out not only in the linguistic theater of human signs but also on the ontological stage of the Tao as the ultimate reality. For Chuang Tzu, the Tao does not remain self-same and things transform from and into one another. Therefore, reality is the setting up of unitary opposites and is itself self-erasing; it shuttles perennially and dialectically between "being" (yu) and "nothingness" (wu)(aa), between "beginning" (yu-shih)(ab) and "not yet beginning to be a beginning" (wei-shih yu-shih)(ac), and between "not yet beginning to be a beginning" and "not yet beginning to be a not yet beginning to be a beginning" (yu wei-shih fu wei-shih yu-shih)(ad) as accomplices of one another. Chuang Tzu said, There is a beginning. There is a not yet beginning to be a beginning. There is a not yet beginning to be a not yet beginning to be a beginning. There is being. There is nothingness. There is a not yet beginning to be nothingness. Suddenly there is nothingness. But I do not know, when it comes to nothingness, which is really being and which is nothingness. Now I have just said something. But I don't know whether what 1 have said has really said something or whether it hasn't said something.(31) As the above quotation indicates, Chuang Tzu's affirmed mode of language use as a self-erasing practice is anchored in his ontological vision; it is an imitation of the Tao as dialectical transformation. As such, it has a doubleness not only in its discursive specificity as both statements and counter-statements but also in its very being as both speech and silence. Just as things transform from and into one another and just as statements and counter-statements implicate and produce one another, speech and silence are mutually involved and substitutable. There is speech in silence and silence in speech. Because there is speech in silence, silence is capable of erasing itself to become speech. Conversely, because there is silence in speech, speech is also capable of erasing itself to become silence. In this sense, Chuang Tzu spoke of his words as "no words" (wu-yen)(ae) and said, "With P.384 words that are no words, you may speak all your life long and you will never have said anything. Or you may go through your whole life without speaking them, in which case you will never have stopped speaking."(32) Being an imitation of the Tao,however, Chuang Tzu's language is not assured of adequacy of representation and is in fact forever incomplete and uncertain vis-a-vis the Tao. Precisely because the Tao does not remain stable and has no definable enduring identity, language in its ideal use as an imitative representation of the Tao can never be complete or certain of its meaning. "The Way," Chuang Tzu said, "has never known boundaries; speech has no constancy."(33) If, therefore, language is to be composed for use, it must be decomposed as it is being composed. Chuang Tzu compared this type of language use to the use of the "fish-trap" (ch'uan) (af)or "rabbitsnare" t'i)(ag) which are useful for fish catching or rabbit-snaring but which ought to be forgotten as soon as the fish or rabbit is caught. He said, The fish trap exists because of the fish; once you've gotten the fish, you can forget the trap. The rabbit snare exists because of the rabbit; once you've gotten the rabbit, you can forget the snare. Words exist because of meaning; once you've gotten the meaning, you can forget the words. When can I find a man who has forgotten words so I can have a word with him?(34) The metaphors of the "fish-trap" and "rabbit-snare" affirm the use of language for its instrumental value. It is, however, an affirmation which entails its own negation. Though somewhat different from Lao Tzu's speaking which does not speak of the Tao as the ultimate reality'in and of itself, Chuang Tzu's speaking is also an expression and articulation of a myrtical/skeptical vision in which the Tao as dialectical transformation insures its ineffability and permits the use of language only as a self-erasing activity. The principle of alterity also prevails in Vimalakirti's use of language. It is, however, an alterity which differs from Chuang Tzu's in structure and which expresses and articulates a Buddhist form of mysticism/skepticism. While Chuang Tzu's alterity entails a doubleness in which Chuang Tzu's self and the self of others are not only inter-dependent in their coexistence but also mutually producing and exchangeable as speaking subjects, the P.385 doubleness in Vimalakirti's alterity postulates Vimalakirti as a speaking subject who is produced by and for the sake of, but does not reciprocally produce, the self of others as speaking subjects. Not surprisingly, therefore, the statements by Vimalakirti are more often than not occasioned by requests, sayings or thoughts of others as speaking subjects. In this regard, Vimalakirti as an enlightened layman is very much like the Buddha who does not usually preach unless asked. This difference between Chuang Tzu on the one hand and Vimalakirti and the Buddha on the other does not mean that Vimalakirti or the Buddha never took the initiative to speak. They both in fact did; the Buddha's instruction to Maitreya in the last chapter of the Virnalakirti-nirdesn Surta and Vimalakirti's invitation to the thirty-three Bodhisattvas to speak out on the Dharma-Gate of Non-Duality are examples of their initiative as active speakers. However, in taking the initiative as active speakers, the Buddha and Vimalakirti do not exist as speaking subjects in their own right, but on the condition of an audience of deluded beings as the speaking other. As enlightened beings, neither the Buddha nor Vimalakirti has a self to speak and to speak of; they come to be possessed of a self in response to the selves of others as deluded speaking subjects who, being deluded, still have selves to speak and to speak of. For this reason, what the Buddha and Vimalakirti say does not have a determinate subjectivity which is contingent upon the subjectivity of what the audience in their delusion may have to say. It is only provisional saying which makes no ontic reference either to themselves as embodiments of the ultimate reality or to the ultimate reality that they embody and which automatically disappears with the disappearance of the saying of the deluded other. Therefore, instead of being self-erasing like Chuang Tzu's saying, the saying of the Buddha and Vimalakirti is intended to be other-erasing. It is saying for the sake of the deluded other whose saying needs be erased so that he can be saved from the delusion of himself both as a saying subject and as the subjectibity of his saying. As such, their saying is an exercise of "skilful means" (upaya or fang-pien)(ah) (35) and is no different from their use of magic. In fact, their saying is often accompanied by their use of magic and may be regarded as the verbal counterpart of their magical demonstration which is visual. Just as their magic produces nothing but conjured up maya and is in thi sense non-producing, their saying also does not say anything real and is a fictitious non-saying comparable to P.386 silence. Therefore, both the Buddha and Vimalakirti can say a great deal without violating the injunction against saying. Theoretically speaking, their saying will have to go on so long as there is still a deluded being to be saved. All deluded beings must be exposed through the saying as non-saying so that they can all be erased as saying subjects. For this reason, Indian Buddhist literature is often characterized by an enumerative repetitiousness. It is noteworthy that Vimalakirti's silence was preceded by an itemized listing of the views of the thirty-three Bodhisattvas who attempted one after another to speak of the Dharma-Gate of Non-Duality. This enumerative repetitiousness may tax the patience of a modern reader, but is theoretically meaningful. It exemplifies both the Mahayanic ideal of universal salvation and the Buddhist mystical/skeptical affirmation of a legitimate mode of saying as non-saying. The legitimate mode of saying which is affirmed in Indian Buddhism and which the saying of the Buddha and Vimalakirti exemplify prevailed among Chinese Buddhists as a model. However, in its actual use by Chinese Buddhists, the model changed somewhat in both conception and execution. In the hands of a monk like Seng-chao(ai) (384-414), the model became a simplified performance which is no longer encumbered by enumerative repetitiousness. In his three essays on "the Immutability of Things," "the Emptiness of the Unreal" and "the Non-Cognition of Prajna" in the Book of Chao (Chao Lun) (aj) , Seng-chao proceeded according to the Madhyamika theory of twofold truth and the logic of negation embodied therein. Therefore, he maintained the distinction between chen(ak) and su(al) which Liebenthal has rendered as "truth" and "public view"(36) and which are Seng-chao's terms for paramartha-satya and samvriti-satya. He also followed the Madhyamika logic of negation by arguing for the exact opposite of the "public view" from the same premise. Therefore, he said, "From the fact that things past do not reach up to things present, [ the common people] infer that things change and do not remain still while I infer the opposite from the same fact."(37) He also said, "[The common people believe that] things change and do not remain still because they do not come [to the present]....[But I believe that] things remain still and do not change because they do not leave [where they were in the past and come to the present]."(38) P.387 Nevertheless, notwithstanding his subscription to the Madhyamika theory of twofold truth and its logic of negation, Seng-chao's style of argumentation is notably different from that of Nagarjuna and Aryadeva. Nagarjuna and Aryadeva did not use the theory of twofold truth in isolation. Rather, they used it in connection with the "four points of argumentation" to form the so-called "eight-fold negation" which is a dialectical process of progressive negation. The ideas of "four points of argumentation" and "eightfold negation" are conspicuously absent from Seng-chao's three essays which followed the Madhyamika logic of dialectical negation without, however, becoming entangled in the seriality of progressive negation. The ideas of "four points of argumentation" and "eightfold negation" and the practice of progressive negation are all characteristically Madhyamikan. But the style of argumentation that they constitute is not peculiar to the Madhyamika school. It is an instance of what I have referred to above as "enumerative repetitiousness" which is common in Indian Buddhist literature. Indeed, both Nagajuna and Aryadeva were engaged in the ongoing task of erasing the sayings of the deluded other. The so-called Three Treatises of the Madhyamika school(39) are all preoccupied with refutation of what Nagarjuna and Aryadeva regarded as erroneous views, whether the views involved be Hinayanic, Mahayanic or Brahmanical. In this regard, Seng-chao is again different. He did not itemize the "public views" of "change," "reality," or "cognition" in their variety. Instead, he spoke of them together categorically as "public views" and then proceeded to argue for their opposites by turning them around or standing them on their head to establish the thesis of what in Liebenthal's rendition is the "coincidence" of opposites.(40) This thesis is unexceptional in terms of the Indian Buddhist insight into the identity of nirvana and samsara. But the style in which Seng-chao argued for its establishment is simple and direct. It does not involve the use of enumerative refutation or progressive negation as a mediating procedure. In being simple and direct in his style of argu- mentation, Seng-chao practised a type of language use which later became characteristic of Ch'an. Ch'an is known for its doctrine of "direct pointing to the mind of man" (chih-chih jen-hsin)(am). This doctrine is part of the contention that Ch'an is a silent "transmission from mind to mind" (i-hsin ch'uan-hsin)(an) and that it "does not institute words and literature" (pu-li wen-tzu)(ao).(41) As such, P.388 "direct pointing" expresses Ch'an's radical rejection of language use including the kind of language use entailed by sutrareading as unnecessary for attaining enlightenment. Nevertheless, Ch'an masters did not stop talking. The Sixth Patriarch, in spite of his iconoclastic image as an illiterate woodcutter who tore up the sutras, not only preached and quoted from the sutras in his preaching but, as part of his last instruction to a chosen group of "ten disciples, " told them to "hand down the teaching of the one roll of the Platform Sutra" so that they would "not lose the basic teaching."(42) Even Lin-chi(ap) (d. 867) who is known for the use of beating and shouting as teaching methods and who condemned those who studied the scriptural literature as "blind idiots" who looked for "juice" in the "dry bones" of "some old fellow, long dead"(43) did not refrain from preaching or quoting from what in his terms were the "old masters" (ku-jen(aq)).(44) That the Sixth Patriarch and Lin-chi could have done so with no sense of contradiction is understandabie in terms of the Indian Buddhist conception of the saying of non-saying as legitimate saying, which both the Sixth Patriarch and Lin-chi continued to affirm as a model. As was the case with the Buddha and Vimalakirti, neither the Sixth Patriarch nor Lin-chi rejected the use of language unconditionally, but only as other than an othergenerated and other-erasing activity. For the Sixth Patriarch, therefore, "all the sutras and written words, Hinayana, Mahayana and the twelve divisions of the canon have been established because of men." He said,...all the sutras exist because they are spoken by man. Among men there are the stupid and the wise. The stupid are insignificant, the wise, great men. Should deluded people ask the wise, the wise will expound the Dharma for the stupid and enable them to understand and gain a deep awakening."(45) Similarly, for Lin-chi, "names and phrases are not names and phrases in and of themselves: " but are constructions for the "accomodation and guidance" (chie-yin) (ar) of "little children" so that they can be cured of their "illness" of delusion.(46) As such, they are devoid of a determinate self and are unreal like "the moon reflected on water." He said, 'The Buddha-realm cannot say of itself'I am the Buddha-realm.' It is only the unattached man of the Way who comes forth by riding on circumstances. If a person asks me where to look for the Buddha, I will respond by coming forth in a state of purity. If a person asks me about the Bodhisattvas, I will resp ond by coming forth in a state of compassion. If a person asks me about Bodhi, I will respond by P.389 coming forth in a state of pure mystery. If a person asks me about Nirvana, I will respond by coming forth in a state of tranquillity. Circumstances differ in ten thousand ways, but I as a person do not discriminate. Therefore, I appear in forms in response to things as the moon is reflected on water."(47) He also asked his followers "not to seize hold of " what he spoke because what he spoke was "without evidence and proof" (wu p'ing-chu)(as)(48) and said, "I, a simple monk of the mountain, have no Dharma to offer anyone. I merely cure disease and undo bondage."(49) However, while observing the Indian model of saying as nonsaying, neither the Sixth Patriarch nor Lin-chi indulged in the practice of enumerative refutation or progressive negation. To be sure, the above statement by Lin-chi involves the use of enumeration. But it is enumeration of a different kind which is categorical in orientation and which does not attempt to list the various inquiries about the Buddha or Bodhisattvas as itemizable specificities. In comparison with the Indian masters, both the Sixth Patriarch and Lin-chi tend to focus on the here and now and to pursue speech as an other-generated and othererasing activity in the intimacy of an immediate personal encounter. Therefore, if Ch'an dialogues are not unprecedented in Indian Buddhism for being dialogical, they are nonetheless distinct in being forthright. They embody what in Ch'an terminology is described as "trigger-fast and razor-sharp" or chi-feng.(at 50) Doctrinally, this Ch'an use of language was advocated by the Sixth Patriarch as the "law of thirty-three confrontations: which requires a person to speak in "symmetrical" terms of paired opposites so that his subjectivity will remain indeterminate and therefore unidentifiable with either affirmation or negation."(51) What was thus advocated by the Sixth Patriarch was also prescribed by Lin-chi when he stated, Followers of the Way, if you wish to attain the view that is in accord with the Dharma, just do not let yourselves be deceived. Whether you face the inside or the outside, kill whatever you encounter. If you encounter the Buddha, kill the Buddha. If you encounter a patriarch, kill the patriarch. If you encounter your parents, kill the parents. If you encounter a relative, kill the relative. Only then will you attain release....There are people who study the Way everywhere, but none come forth without P.390 delpending on things. When I, a simple monk of the mountain, face them, I beat them down at the very source. If they come forth through the hands, I beat them in the hands. If they come forth through the mouth, I beat them in the mouth. If they come forth through the eyes, I beat them in the eyes.(52) This statement by Lin-chi and the Sixth Patriarch's "law of thirty-six confrontations" are both informed by the Indian Buddhist logic of dialectical negation, but they promote a style of its use which is simple and direct like Seng-chao's and which typifies a Chinese affirmation of the Indian Buddhist saying of non-saying as a simplified performance. In contrast to Seng-chao, the Sixth Patriarch and Lin-chi who simplified the Indian model of saying as non-saying, Chih-i(au) (538-579) complicated the model by constructing an elaborate theory which no longer regarded the Buddha's preaching merely as an other-generated exercise of "skilful means" for the sake of the deluded other. Rather, according to Chih-i, what the Buddha said in his preaching embodies his "original intent in appearing in the world" (ch'u-shih pen-huai)(av) and is based upon the truth which he experientially realized under the bodhi tree as the culmination of an astronomically long process of cultivation. For this reason, the Buddha's preaching is viewed by Chih-i as consisting of both "the words which follow the minds of others" (sui-t'a-i yu")(aw) and "the words of the Buddha's own mind" (tzu-i yu)(ax).(53) The precise relationship between "the words which follow the minds of others" and "the words of the Buddha's own mind" is a main concern of Chih-i's Miao-fa lien-hua ching hsuan-i(ay) where Chih-i analyzed the problem in terms of a set of paired categories like "origin (pen) (az) and "trace" (chi) (ba) , , the "real" (shih ) (bb) and the "provisional" (ch'uan)(bc) the"subtle"(miao)(bd) and the "gross" (ts'u)(be)etc. These paired categories were then further analyzed by Chih-i in terms of a number of other paired categories such as "self-practice" (tzu-hsing)(bf) and "conversion of others" (hua-t'a)(bg) , principle" (li) (bh) and "occasion" (chi) (bi) , "following wisdom" (sui-chih) (bj) and "following situation" (sui-ch'ing)(bk), and "seven kinds of twofold truth" (ch'i chung erh-ti)(bl),ect.(54) Chih-i's elaborate theory of the relationship between "the words which follow the minds of others" and "the words of the Buddha's own mind" informs his p'an-chiao(bm) system, according to which the Buddha preached P.391 "Four Dharmas of Conversion" (hua-fa ssu-chiao)(bn) in five periods: (1) the Storehouse Teaching (tsang-chiao)(bo) which the Buddha preached during the second period; (2) the Pervasive Teaching (t'ung-chiao)(bp) which the Buddha preached during the third period; (3) the Separate Teaching (pieh- chiao) (bq) which the Buddha preached during the fourth period; and (4) the Round Teaching (yuan-chiao)(br) which the Buddha preached during both the first period when he taught the doctrine of the Avatamsako Sutra and the fifth period when he taught the doctrine of the Lotus Sutra.(55) With an analogy that can be traced to the "five flavors" parable in the Mahapari-nirvana Sutra,(56) Chih-i compared the Storehouse Teaching to "milk(ju)(bs), the Pervasive Teaching to "cream" (lo)(bt), the Separate Teaching to "butter" (sheng-su)(bu), the Round Teaching of the Avatamsaka to "boiled butter" (shu-su)(bv), and the Round Teaching of the Lotus to "ghee" (t'i-hu)(bw). Just as "milk, " "cream, " "butter," "boiled butter," and "ghee" form a series of progressive refinement in "flavor," so the five teachings in the "Four Dharmas of Conversion" constitute an ascending hierarchy in which "the words which follow the minds of others" gradually decrease as "the words of the Buddha's own mind" increase. The hierarchy culminates in the Lotus which is comprised of only "the words of the Buddha's own mind." As such, the Lotus contains no "grossness, " is "absolutely subtle" (chueh-tai mino)(bx) and is possessed of both the "real" and the "provisional" which are both "subtle"; it "opens up the provisional as it reveals the real" (k'ai-ch 'uan hsienshih)(by).(57) In using such paired categories as "origin"/ "trace" and "real"/"provisional" for a conceptualization of the Buddha's preaching, Chih-i sounds rather like but is actually different from Chi-tsang(bz) (549-623) who also made use of these categories for his theory of twofold truth and practice of p'an-chiao and regarded the Lotus as a text which "opens up the provisional as it reveals the real." As T'ang Chun-i has pointed out, these categories constituted for Chi-tsang a conception of the Buddha's teac hing which is notably different from Chih-i's. As the Buddha's teaching which "opens up the provisional as it reveals the real," the Lotus was considered by Chi-tsang to be produced by the Buddha through an exercise of the Buddha's twofold wisdom as both "real" and "provisional" for the purpose of converting the deluded other. For Chi-tsang, therefore, although the Buddha's twofold wisdom which "opens up the provisional" and which "reveals the real" is P.392 ultimately real, what it "opens up" and "reveals" as the teaching of the Lotus is no less a teaching for the sake of others and is for this reason still provisional.(58) Chi-tsang's conception of the Buddha's preaching is well within the Indian Buddhist mold, even though it is couched in terms of native Chinese categories of "origin" /"trace" and "real"/"provisional." For Chih-i, the matter is different; the Buddha spoke not only for the sake of others but also as an expression of"the Buddha's own mind." Chih-i thus reconceptualized the Indian model and postulated the Buddha as a speaking subject in his own right who was increasingly implicated in what he spoke until what he spoke as the Round Teaching of the Lotus consisted of nothing but "the words of the Buddha's own mind." On the other hand, however, though postulating the Buddha as a speaking subject, Chih-i denied that the subjectivity of the Buddha's speaking was ultimately speakable. Commenting on a gatha in the Lotus where the Buddha instructed Sariputra to "cease" speaking and proclaimed that his "dharma is subtle and hard to imagine: "(59) Chih-i said that the Buddha's dharma was "beyond words" (chueh-yen) (ca) and "beyond thought" (chueh-ssu)(cb) and that it was called "subtle" not because it was relative to what was "gross" but because it was "inconceivable."(60) Moreover, as that of which the subjectivity of speaking is ultimately unspeakable, "the Buddha's own mind" does not have a language of its own to speak or to be spoken of. "The words of the Buddha's own mind" speak in the borrowed language of "the words which follow the minds of others" and can be spoken of only in terms of the categories which relate to "the words which follow the minds of others." Thus, Chih-i said, "In opening up the traces and revealing the origin, the meaning lies in the traces" (k'ai-chi hsien-pen i-tsai yu-Chi)(cc).(61) He also said, "In opening up the provisional and revealing the real, the meaning depends on the provisional" (k'ai-ch'uan hsien-shih i-hsu yu-ch'uan(cd)).(62) Just as "the words which follow the minds of others" can be spoken of in terms of "origin"/ "trace" and "real"/ "provisional," so "the words of the Buddha's own mind" can also be spoken of in terms of "origin"/"trace" and "real"/"provisional." There are, according to Chih-i, not only "the real and the provisional for the conversion of others" (hua-t'a ch'uan-shih)(ce) which pertain to the realm of upaya but also "the real and the provisional of the Buddha's self-practice" (tru-hsing ch'uan-shih)(cf) which pertain to the Buddha's wisdom.(63) P.393 The borrowing of "the words which follow the minds of others" by "the words of the Buddha's own mind" entails the use of paradox which is necessitated by the speaking of the unspeakable. "The words of the Buddha's own mind" are implicated in but nonetheless distinguishable from "the words which follow the minds of others" because, as noted before, they are considered by Chih-i to be possessed of both the "real" and the "provisional" which are both "subtle." For this reason, the categories which relate to "the words which follow the minds of others" are both affirmed and negated by Chih-i for "the words of the Buddha's own mind." Therefore, while speaking of the Buddha's wisdom in terms of the "real" and the "provisional" as "the real and the provisional of the Buddha's self-practice, " he also maintained that the Buddha's wisdom was "without boundary" (wu-pien)(cg) and was "neither real nor provisional" (fei-ch'uan fei-shih) (ch) .(64) He said, "The Principle of Dharmata is neither past nor present, neither origin nor trace, neither real nor provisional....It comes to be possessed of past, present and future only because of [the use of] the worldly words and literature."(65) For the same reason, the "revelation of origin" required for Chih-i not only the"opening up of traces" but also the "abandoning of traces" (fei-chi)(ci).(66) The use of paradox is common among mystics.Their paradoxes however, are not always the same in use or meaning. In the case of Chih-i, his paradox differs from those of Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu and is constituted by a mode of mysticism which is distinctly Buddhist. As noted earlier, Lao Tzu's Tao moves in "reversal" whereas Chuang Tzu's Tao is the setting up of unitary opposites involving the mutual transformation of things. For both Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu, therefore, the use of paradox is entailed by the structure of the Tao as dialectical change and has in this sense a direct ontic reference. By contrast, Chih-i's paradox makes no direct ontic reference and is engendered by the speaking of the unspeakable in a borrowed language. For Chih-i, the ultimate reality is not intrinsically paradoxical and is neither paradoxical nor non-paradoxical. 'The words of the Buddha's own mind" can be affirmed in terms of the borrowed language of "the words which follow the minds of others," not because the former is determinable through the latter, but because the Buddha in his infinite wisdom can always "illuminate" (chao)(cj) and "penetrate" (tung-ta) (ck) a "situation" (ching)(cl) and what he says can therefore always "match" (hsiang-ch'eng) (cm) the "situation.''(67) The subjectivity of "the words of the Buddha's P.394 own mind" is forever indeterminable, and its affirmation in terms of "the words which follow the minds of others" must be followed by negation. Unlike the paradoxes of Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu, Chih-i's paradox does not attempt to talk about the ultimate reality as a paradox. Rather, it is a paradoxical attempt to talk around the ultimate reality as a semantic enclosure which, ironically, is semantically unoccupied and unoccupiable and can for this reason never become semantically enclosed. Though postulated as a speaking subject, Chih-i's Buddha speaks with a subjectivity which is either indeterminate as "the words which follow the minds of others" or indeterminable as "the words of the Buddha's own mind." In this regard, Chih-i is still identifiably Indian Buddhist. Like the Monkey Wu-k'ung(cn) who, though capable of "cloud-somersaulting" a hundred and eight thousand miles in one leap, never jumped clear of the Tathagata's palm, Chih-i, in spite of all the windings and twistings in his theorizing of "the words of the Buddha's own mind" and "the words which follow the minds of others, " was never really out of the mystical/ skeptical mold of his Indian Buddhist predecessors for whom the ultimate reality is unsayable and the Buddha's saying is the indeterminate saying of non-saying. NOTES 1. Lao Tzu,Chapter l4. 2. Ibid., Chapter 32;translation modified from D.C. Lau. Lao Tzu: Tao Te Ching (hereafter cited as Lao Tzu), Baltimore: Penguin (1963), p. 91. 3. Wang Hsien-ch'ien, Chuang-tzu chi-chieh, Taipei: Shih-chieh shu-chu(co)(1962); 2/14. 4. Ibid.,25/173. 5. Wei-mo-chieh so-shuo ching ( hereafter cited as Wei-mo ching), Taisho,(cp)V. 14, No. 475, pp. 550-551;Charles Luk, trans., The Vimalakirti Nirdesa Sutra (hereafter cited as Vimalakirti), Berkeley: Shambala (1972), pp. 92- 100. 6. Wei-mo ching.p.555;Luk, Vimalakirti,p.122. 7. T'ang Chun-i, Chung-kuo che-hsueh yuan-lun: tao- lun p'ien, Hong Kong: Hsin-ya shu-yuan yen-chiu so(cg) (1974) , pp. 348-398, especially pp. 350-370. However, some of the statements cited from the Lao Tzu to exemplify each of the six types are my own selections and not provided by T'ang. P.395 8. Translation by W. T. Chan,A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (hereafter cited as Source Book), Princeton: Princeton University Press (1963), p. 174. 9. Translation adapted from ibid.,p.152 and Leu, Lao Tzu, p. 82. 10.Translation adapted from Chan,Source Book, p.146. 11. Translation adapted from ibid.,p. 150. 12. Chuang-tzu chi-chieh, 13/85. 13. Translation by Chan,Source Book. pp.168-169. 14. Translation adapted from Lau,LaoTzu, p.99. 15. Translation derived from Chan, Source Book, p.170, with minor modifications. 16. Ibid.,p.147. 17. Ibid.,pp. 154-155. 18. Ibid.,p.158. 19. 'Translation from ibid., pp.143 & 146-148, with minor modifications. 20. Chuang-tzu chi-chieh, 25/175 ; translation by Burton Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu (hereafter cited as Chuang Tzu) , New York: Columbia University Press (1968), p. 293. 21. Chuang-tzu chi-chieh, 24/159 ; translation by Watson, Chuang Tzu, p. 269. 22. Chuang-tzu chi-chieh, 2/14 : translation derived from Watson, Chuang Tzu, p.44, with minor modfications. 23. Chuang-tzu chi-chieh, 2/9. 24. Ibid., 2/11; translation by Watson, Chuang Tzu, p. 41. 25. Chuang-tzu chi-chieh, 2/12;translation by Watson, Chuang Tzu. pp. 42-43, with minor modifications. 26. Chuang-tzu chi-chieh, 2/9-10; translation by Watson, Chuang Tzu, pp. 39-40. 27. Chuang-tzu chi-chieh, 2/11;translation by Watson, Chuang Tzu, p. 41. 28. Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. by Alan Bass, Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1978), pp. 292 -293. 29. Edward M. Said, Beginnings, Baltimore:The Johns Hopkins University Press (1975), p. 342. 30. Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. by Gayatri Chakavorty Spivak, Balti-more:The Johns Hopkins University ress (1976), " Translator'r Preface," p. xix. 31. Chuang-tzu chi-chieh, 2/12-13;translation derived from Watson, Chuang Tzu, P.43, with slight modification. 32. Chuang-tzu chi-chieh. 27/182; translation by Watson, Chuang Tzu, p. 304. 33. Chuang-tzu chi-chieh, 2/13;translation by Watson, Chuang Tzu, p.43. 34. Chuang-tzu chi-chieh, 26/18l ; translation by Watson, Chuang Tzu, p. 302. 35. See Vimalakirti-Nirdesa Sutra, Chapter 2 and Lotus Sutra,Chapter 2. 36. Waiter Liebenthal, Chao Lun: the Treatise of Seng Chao (hereafter cited as Chao Lun), Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press (1968), p.47. 37. Translation adapted from ibid., p. 41. For Chao Lun in the Chinese original, see Taisho, V. 45, No. 1848, pp. 150- 161. 38. Translation adaptad from Liebenthal, Chao Lun, p.48. P.396 39. I.e., Madhyamika-sastra and Dvadasa-dvara by Nagarjuna and Sata-sastra by Aryadeva. 40. Liebenthal,Chao Lun,p.46. 41. See Junjiro Takakusu, The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy, Honolulu: Office Appliance Co., Ltd. (1956),p. 163. 42. Philip B. Yampolsky, The Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch (hereafter cited as Platform Sutra), New York: Columbia University Press (1967), p. 173. 43. Yanagida Seizan,Rinzai roku, Tokyo:Daizo shuppan kabushiki kaisha(cr) (1972), p. 158; see also Irmgard Sc -hloegl, trans., The Zen Teaching of Rinzai, Berkeley: Shambala (1976), pp. 53-54. 44. E.G., Yanagida, Rinzai roku, pp. 127, 145 & 175. 45. Translation by Yampolsky with slight modifica- tion, Platform Sutra, pp. 150-151. 46. Yanagida.Rinzai roku, p. 167. 47. Ibid.,pp. 119-120. 48. Ibid.,pp.169-170. 49. Ibid.,p.14? 50. The trigger or chi in this case is the trigger of a crossbow while feng, strictly speaking, refers to the sharpness of the edge of an arrowhead and not of a razor; cf. Chung-wen to-tr'u-tien, Taipei: Chung-kuo wen-hua ta-hsueh ch'u-pan pu (cs) (1982, popular edition), V. 5, p. 485. 51. See Yampolsky,Platform Sutra. pp.170-173. 52. Yanagida,Rinzai roku.pp. 139-140. 53. Chih-i, Miao-fa lien-hua ching hsuan-i ( here- after cited as Fa-hua hsuan-i)'(ct) Toisho, V. 39, No. 1716, p. 704. See also ihid., pp. 682, 684, 696 and 770 and Leo Hurvitz, Chih I (538-597): a Study of the Life of a Chinese Buddhist Monk (hereafter cited as Chih I), Columbia University Ph.D. dissertation (1959), p. 333. 54. Chih-i Fa-hua hsuan-i,pp.683, 685, 690, 696-697, 702-704, 712-713, 764-765, 768-770, 773 &797-800. 55. See Hurvitz, Chih I, pp. 252-301;Kenneth Chen, Buddhism in China: a Historical Survey, Princeton: Princeton University Press (1966), pp. 305-311. 56. For an English translation of this parable, see Hurvitz, Chih I, pp. 235-236. 57. Chih-i, Fa-hua hsuan-i, pp. 682, 688-689, 690, 696-697, 703-704, 705, 713, 714 & 770. For an analygis of Chih-i's view of the Lotus, see Hurvitz, Chih I, pp. 223-232. 58. T'ang chun-i.Chung-kuo che-hsueh yuan-lun: yuan- tao p'ien (III),(cu) Hong Kong: Hsin-ya shu-yuan yen-chiu so (1974), pp. 1119-1120. 59. Set Leon Hurvitz, trans.,Scripture of the Lotus Blossom of the Fine Dharma, New York: Columbia University Press (1976), p. 28. 60. Chih-i,Fa-hua hsuan-i, p.697. 61. Ibid.,p. 62. Ibid. 63. Ibid.,pp.682-683. 64. Ibid.,pp.696&715. 65 Ibid.,p.770. 66. Ibid.,p.773. 67. Ibid.,pp.693-694. P.397 CHINESE GLOSSARY a 老子 v 玄德 b 莊子 w 惠施 c 道 x 見 d 繩繩不可名 y 越 e 大道不稱 z 兩行 f 不私 aa 無 g 無名 ab 有始 h 不二法門 ac 未始有始 i 唐君毅 ad 有未始夫未始有始 j 虛理 ae 無言 k 道體 af 筌 l 正言若反 ag 蹄 m 狀 ah 方便 n 物 ai 僧肇 o 象 aj 肇論 p 有 ak 真 q 其名不去 al 俗 r 德 am 直指人心 s 放德而行 an 以心傳心 t 循德而趨 ao 不立文字 u 上德 ap 臨濟 p.398 aq 古人 bp 通教 ar 接引 bq 別教 as 無憑據 br 圓教 at 機鋒 bs 乳 au 智顗 bt 酪 av 出世本懷 bu 生蘇 aw 隨他意語 bv 熟蘇 ax 自意語 bw 醍醐 ay 妙法蓮花經玄義 bx 絕待妙 az 本 by 開權顯實 ba 述 bz 吉藏 bb 實 ca 絕言 bc 權 cb 絕思 bd 妙 cc 開述顯本,意在於述 be 鹿 cd 開權顯實,意在於權 bf 自行 ce 化他權實 bg 化他 cf 自行權實 bh 理 cg 無邊 bi 機 ch 非權非實 bj 隨智 ci 廢述 bk 隨情 cj 照 bl 七種二諦 ck 洞達 bm 判教 cl 境 bn 化法四教 cm 相稱 bo 藏教 cn 悟空 P.399 co 王先謙,莊子集解,台北 cs 中文大辭典,中國文化大學 世界書局 出版部 cp 維摩詰所說經(維摩經) ct 法華玄義 大正 cu 中國哲學原論;原道篇 cq 中國哲學原論;導論篇, 香港,新亞書院研究所 cr 柳田聖山,臨濟錄,東京, 大藏出版株式會社