.
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The appearance of this volume is not only welcomed but
adds significantly to the literature on Naagaarjuna. Although
it is yet another translation of Naagaarjuna's major work,
Muulamadhyamakakaarikaa (here-after, Kaarikaa). Kalupahana
has is setting a new direction in the study of Naagaarjuna's
philosophy. He calls for a new reading and understanding of
the text and traces the ideas back to the early Buddhist
period, indeed directly back to the historical Buddha
himself. He has come to some startling conclusions that will
most certainly cause a rippling effect through the Buddhist
scholarly world, especially in the Mahaayaana tradition. He
asserts that Naagaarjuna is thoroughly faithful to the early
Buddhist tradition, which is not especially surprising to
many in virtue of the many references to it and by
Naagaarjuna's own admission, but he goes further to assert
that Naagaarjuna's ideas are not seminal at all, contrary to
what modern interpreters have made him out to be. And,
finally, since his ideas ultimately return to the early
period and the Buddha, he cannot be considered a
Mahaayaanist.
It should be noted that Kalupahana is not the first to
question Naagaarjuna's Mahaayaana lineage. A.K. Warder raised
that question earlier on the basis of textual references and
ideas in Naagaarjuna, including the fact that he did not
refer to any existing Mahaayaana sutras. In some
respects,Warder was quite correct in denying the Mahaayaana
connection but he was not able to back up his assertion in
definitive terms because of the scarcity of literature on the
matter, plus the difficulty of probing the matter from the
Mahaayaana side.Kalupahana follows the lead and examines
closely the only text mentioned by Naagaarjuna in the
Kaarikaa,, the Kaatyaayanaavavaada Sutra, which has the same
content as the Paa1i text, Kaccaayanagottasutta.
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The suutra is quoted in full in the Introduction (pp.
10-11)because of its extreme and fundamental importance for
understanding the early Buddhist view of the Middle Way
doctrine but also for understanding the central thought of
Naagaarjuna. Indeed, there is no better place to seek a
capsuled expression of the Middle Way doctrine. In certain
respects,it is puzzling to scholars that only a single work
is referenced by Naagaarjuna, for he most certainly had at
his disposal the vast array of Buddhist literature before
him. On the other hand, that single suutra is the most
appropriate one to call on because of its direct connection
to Naagaarjuna's own thought in the Kaarikaa, in harmony with
its own namesake of the fundamental Middle Way system
(muulamadhyamaka). In any case, it seems quite trivial to
continue pushing the question of textual use or non-use,
since Naagaarjuna himself was ever so humble and reverent to
the whole Buddhist tradition and naturally sought relief and
comfort in the basic ideas. Yet, this return to the source
for an ideological foundation should not be construed to mean
that Naagaarjuna lacked ideas of his own, even seminal ones,
for his ideas did eventually catch the attention of Buddhists
living during the period and stimulated innovations for
implementing the basic ideas by adapting them to the changing
times. He thereby changed forever the course of Buddhism in
the northern regions.
The period during which Naagaarjuna lived, 2nd-3rd
Century A.D., is, historically speaking, still nebulous to
scholars, a period in which the Mahaayaana forces were
gathering momentum but where no clear cut distinction between
the Theravaada and Mahaayaana traditions could yet be made.
The Theravaada, Abhidharma, Sarvaastivaada, Sautraantika and
other lesser systems had already always been asserting their
thought in a general way. In this situation, the Theravaada
did not recede into the background, nor was it totally
eclipsed. Thus it is no wonder that Naagaarjuna should
explore the Middle Way doctrine using existing ideas that
were basic to the whole Buddhist movement. He may have been
well aware of the Praj~naapaaramitaa Suutras but, consciously
or unconsciously, he apparently had no use for their
reference. This point is debatable, to be sure, for it is
certainly difficuit to come to any definitive answer.
Futhermore, the controvery between bodhisattvayaana and
`sraavakayaanaa may have been brewing, but again it would be
difficult to gather enough
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materials to conclude that the Mahaayaana was clearly
dominant at this time. Even with the great Vasubandhu,who
comes several centuries later, it is allegedly said that he
was a Sarvaastivaadin prior to his conversion to the
Mahaayaana which was urged on him by his brother Asannga. All
in all, Naagaarjuna lived during a vibrant period of
Buddhism, challenged by new forces in social, political,
economic and monastic circles and, fortunately, he had the
intellectual powers to re-examine the whole buddhist
situation and came to a reconfirmation of old ideas coupled
with a seminal interpretation of them in a truly open way.
Kalupahana writes as if Naagaarjuna lived outside the
shadows of the incipient Mahaayaana forces. Indeed, there is
no mention by Naagaarjuna of the Prajnaparamita Suutras, The
Lotus Suutra, Avata.msaka Suutra, Vimalakiirti-nirdesaa
Suutra,etc.,but stll it would be highly inappropriate to
assert that there is a complete gap between Naagaarjuna and
these sutras. He may not be called a Mahaayaanist as we
understand the term today but he may have been well aware of
the tension from the new forces, although he did not actively
play a key role in their eventual development. In a similar
vein, although Naagarjuna may not have directly delved into
the bodhisattva concept, its absence in his works cannot be
taken as grounds for rejecting him as a Mahaayaanist.It would
seem that no direct Mahaayaana involvement by Naagaarjuna can
now be established but, nevertheless,it would seem only
natural that he, more than any other Buddhist of the times,
was responsible for the eventual consolidation of the
Mahaayaana movement.Why this assertion? It is quite simple.
Subsequent history attests to the fact that Naagaarjuna and
his works began to take on an important role in the
development of Mahaayaana Buddhism both within and without
India-in Tibet, China, Korea and Japan. He is rightly
regarded as the Second Buddha, in many schools of
thought,such as in Ch'an (Zen) Buddhism. It is difficult to
deny the spiritual and ideological lineages that stem from
Naagaarjuna.
But why is Naagarjuna unheard of in the
Theravaada tradition? Or, granted that he had so forcefully
reconfirmed basic Buddhist thought, why is the Theravaada
tradition silent on this major thinker? Several centuries
later, we note the appearance of the great Theravaadin,
Buddhaghosa, adn his monumental Visuddhimagga, but even
Buddhaghosa
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himself is silent on Naagaarjuna, although both of them came
from the same general vicinity of South India. It would seem
highly unlikely that Buddhaghosa did not know of Naagaarjuna
and his works, and there is a suspicion that the former's
work does contain such Naagaarjunian characteristics as
interpreting dependent origination (paticca-samuppaada) ,
especially with the emphasis on the concept of emptiness
(su~n~nataa). Be that as it may, we are not attempting to
rewrite the history of Buddhism within the confines of a
limited store of literature; rather, we can only state
certain incongruous facts or events gleaned from such
literature. In the end we remain uncertain of their final
outcome.
Despite all, Kalupahana's present work merits attention
because of his boldness and assertiveness. It is something of
a tonic for those in search of an ideological continuity as
well as the development of Buddhism in general. But
Kalupahana's enthusiasm is supported by two implicitly held
premises: (1) Naagaarjuna and the Buddha are empiricists and
(2) all metaphysical discourses are denied.
These two premises run throughout his analysis of the
Kaarikaa, but to the present reviewer they do not seem to
capture the true spirit of Naagaarjuna or the Buddha. If
anything, they seem to appeal to the general reader's naive
and limited philosophical knowledge.
The term 'empricism', for example, is a special concept
in Western philosophy wrought in the British tradition of
Berkeley,Locke and Hume. It assumes a dichotomy of the
subject and object in the epistemological process, and thus
an application of it to the Buddhist nature of experience not
only distorts the process but goes against the very
foundation of Buddhist experience grounded in the five
skandhas, twelve aayatanas and eighteen dhaatus. Moreover,
the Western notion of dichotomous experience would never lead
to the Buddhist experiential goal of non-self (anaatman). In
spite of this, Kalupahana repeatedly refers to the Buddha and
Naagaarjuna as empiricists as if their doctrines fit exactly
into the Western epistemological mold. Or, he speaks casually
of the Buddha as a verificationist (ehipassika) to
accommodate modern positivistic and pragmatic principles. It
is not so much that Buddhist concepts are not amenable to
modern treatment as it is that they must be guarded against
unwarranted usage. Failing that, any concept will easily move
into
P. 375
alien territory. something Kalupahana is quite mindful of
since he denounces modern interpreters who had gone astray.
So, if Naagaarjuna and the Buddha are empiricists, then their
concepts too must be interpreted strictly within the context
of the Buddhist nature of experience.
The other term, metaphysics, is employed by Kalupahana in
the popular sense which disdains all use of it. This indeed
poses some grave problems. Certainly, such concepts as
substance, subject, object, existence, being, etc., are a11
metaphysical in nature, but so are their opposites. And so
are such important concepts as causality, condition,
contingency, necessity, permanence, change, freedom, etc.,
that are used to convey our thoughts. For example, if the
concept of the self (aatman) is metaphysical, then its
opposite, non-self(anaatman) is equally metaphysical. Yet,
all Buddhists know that non-self is not the exact logical
opposite of self. Should they be identical in the logical
sense, then both would be categorized as entifiable objects,
but that is surely not the case. We are here peeking into the
uniqueness of the non-self doctrine, one of the most
intriguing doctrines of Buddhism. The problematic here is
that, unless the true distinction or understanding between
self and non-self is ironed out, one will forever be mired in
the quicksand of linguistics or logic. Non-self may be
trans-logical, trans-rational and trans-linguistic, yet all
of these terms do not, in the final analysis, diminish or
destroy metaphysics itself or metaphysical discourse. For, to
deny the function of metaphysics is to deny all discourse on
elements that have metaphysical nature, among which the most
central for Naagaarjuna is the metaphysical self-existent
nature (svabhaava). But such a sweeping dcnial is sucidal in
terms of understanding in the sense that evcrything
experiential would be forsaken, a condition which would
prevent the shift from the metaphysical to the
non-metaphysical nature of things. Kalupahana's
interpretation of samsaara as eaualing nirvaana(Kaarikaa;XXV.
19,20) is a case in point. He is on the right track by
focussing on the continuity of the two realms of existence.
Yet, if the denial of metaphysical elements were to be
carried out completely, the nature of the continuity would
instantly melt away. The realm of samsaara, afterall, is the
realm of metaphysics (empirical orientation) or
metaphysical discourse on things that can be understood,
experientially and rationally I do not for one minute
P.376
think that Naagaarjuna and the Buddha had intended to wipe
away in one bold stroke all experiences and rational play.
What they intended to do, if I read them correctly, is to
seek an accommodation of the samsaaric elements, i.e., causes
for all suffering due to attachments (upaadaana), within the
context of a totally unique holistic and dynamically emerging
relational nature of experiential events,which is nothing but
an interpretation of the basic doctrine of
pratiitya-samutpaada. No one today or before has a monopoly
over the absolute understanding of this doctrine but it can
be said that Naagaarjuna at least came to grips with it and,
in the process, wrote the monumental Kaarikaa,which brought
into play all the principal concepts relative to Buddhism. He
was a philosopher or thinker of the highest order, to be
sure, but to claim that he had answered all the questions
raised is too generous and extravagant. To wit, Kalupahana
asserts: (p. 369)
Naagaarjuna's treatment of the metaphysical issues
that emerged in relation to all these
doctrines-doctrines pertaining to causation, change,
the human personality, survival, karma, moral
responsibility, and freedom-is so exhaustive and
complete that he can proceed to explain the Buddha's
conception of bondage and freedom without any fear of
any one raising any question. (Italics his)
Now, these remarks are too excessive to attach to a great
thinker and certainly unfitting of a true philosopher,
especially a Buddhist. What is truly great about Naagaarjuna
is that he crystallized Buddhist thought within the context
of prevailing controversies or divergent schools of thought
and came up with a bold creative interpretation of Buddhist
experience in ways that influenced subsequent developments in
Buddhism, especially the Mahaayaana tradition. The issue at
hand is not whether Naagaarjuna is a Mahaayaanist or a
Theravaadin. The issue is, how and in what way we have all
come to appreciate a novel interpretation of Buddhist
doctrines. He was the man of the hour and we, who come nearly
two millennia later, can greatly benefit by re-examining his
contributions.
It is precisely at this point that Kalupahana's work
takes on real
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meaning and significance. His work has taken up the challenge
to reexamine Naagaarjuna's thought by means of analyzing each
chapter of the Kaarikaa. He has pointed out the shortcomings
of past interpreters, such as Theodore Stcherbastsky, T.R.V.
Murti, and other lesser known figures. Insofar as his
approach is concerned, he has clearly mapped it out in the
lengthy Introduction (pp 1-98). In the main body of the work,
which is the translation and annotation of the Kaavikaa, his
interpretation of Naagaarjuna's philosophy is guided by his
understanding of empiricism, pragmatism and the
anti-metaphysical attitude. The copious annotations are
perhaps the greatest value of this work. His candid
evaluation and correction of past translations, including
those of the present reviewer, are valuable and informative.
In sum then, the work is a definite contribution to
Naagaarjuna scholarship and Buddhism in general as well. It
should attract the attention of serious scholars of Buddhism
and stimulate them to scrutinize the Kaarikaa in light of his
new approach.