Chi-Tsang's Treatment of Metaphysical Issues
By Hsueh-Li Cheng

Journal of Chinese Philosophy
V. 8 (1981)
pp. 371-389

Copyright 1981 by Dialogue Publishing Company


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I

The purpose of this paper is to show how Chi-tsang [a] (549-623 A.D.), the most eminent Chinese San-lun master, [1] treats the problem of Being and Nothingness, and why he rules out all metaphysical assertions as conceptual confusions. Both Eastern and Western philosophers often engage in the dispute of whether Being or Nothingness is the true reality of the universe. What is real or what "is" is often considered by metaphysicians as belonging to the realm of Being, and what is unreal or what "is not," the realm of Nothingness. [2] However, when philosophers become involved in metaphysical speculation, they may make an ontic commitment to Nothingness as well as Being. The so-called "Nothingness," "nothing" or "non-being" may be regarded as the name of something. [3]

    According to Chi-tsang, all metaphysical views are dogmatic. The so-called "Being" and "Nothingness" are unintelligible concepts. To say that Being is the true reality of the universe and has priority over Nothingness is an extreme view. To say that Nothingness is the true reality of the universe and has priority over Being is also an extreme view. [4] Buddha's Dharma is given to "empty" the concepts of "is" and "is not." This teaching of the Middle Way (Chung-tao) [c] [5] does not imply that Reality must be something beyond Being and Nothingness, but that any metaphysical speculation of the true state of things should be eliminated. True wisdom (praj~naa) is the abandonment of all views. Chi-tsang argues that metaphysical speculation of Being and Nothingness is a disease (ping). [f] [6] It is the root of all erroneous or perverted views. [7] The cure of the disease lies not so much in developing a new metaphysical theory as in understanding the proper nature and function of human conceptualization and language. Chi-tsang, following

 

 

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Naagaarjuna, claims that the very language men create and use plays a trick on them and destroys their "eyes of wisdom." [8] Enlightened men should discard conceptualization so as to avoid being taken in by this trick. [9] Emptiness, for Chi-tsang, is a medicine (yao) [l] for curing the "philosophical disease." [10]

    It seems that the metaphysical problem of Being and Nothingness is related to the epistemological issue of truth and falsity, for metaphysical speculation is concerned with whether ontological assertions about the world are true or false. When Chi-tsang critically examines Being and Nothingness, he has an interesting analysis of the nature of truth and the concepts of "right" and "wrong." He contends that all things, including Being and Nothingness or "right" and "wrong," are empty. Since all truths and falsities are empty, it makes no sense to dispute whether a certain metaphysical assertion "is" or "is not" "true." This refutation of metaphysics is different from the refutation of metaphysics by contemporary Western positivists, for it neither makes a "true" statement about the world nor finds a "meaningful" assertion about sense experience or anything.

    In the following, I will first investigate how Chi-tsang repudiates the concepts of Being and Nothingness and why he argues that all metaphysical theories should be eliminated. Then, I will present Chi-tsang's analysis of truth and his arguments for the emptiness of "true" and "false" and examine his teaching of the refutation of erroneous views as the illumination of right views (p'o-hsieh hsien-Cheng) [m]. Finally, Chi-tsang's refutation of all views will be compared with critiques of metaphysics by certain contemporary Western philosophers. His doctrine of emptiness will be expounded to show how he uses "Emptiness" to clear away the problem of Being and Nothingness.

 

II

What is the true state of the universe? Is there anything real in the world? What is it? Is it Being or Nothingness? Is Being more essential than Nothingness? Philosophers have often considered these questions as genuine questions and have provided various answers. Unlike most philosophers, Chi-tsang does not try to find any definite answer; instead, he examines the meaning and significance of the questions and rule them out as nonsensical issues. He analyzes basic concepts, especially concepts such as "Being"

 

 

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and "Nothingness" through which man may construct experience, and argues that the concepts are unintelligible. Hence it makes no sense to dispute whether Being or Nothingness is the true reality of the universe and whether Being is ontologically more essential than Nothingness.

    So-called Being is supposed to be something real. But a thing, Chi-tsang points out, cannot be defined or described as real. For that which is real must have a determinate nature, i.e., its own essential nature, and cannot be dependent upon other things or come from causal conditions. To claim that something x is real, would contradict the fact that all phenomena in the world are bound by the relations of cause and effect, unity and diversity, and duration and destruction. Whatever we can know through experience is conditioned by something else, so it cannot be real. [11] For Chi-tsang, the perceived object, the perceiving subject, and knowledge are mutually interdependent. The reality of one is dependent upon the others. If one is false, the others must be false. When a rope is perceived as a snake, the perceived object, the snake, is false. The perceiving subject and the knowledge of the external object must also be false. So what one perceives within, or without, is all illusory. Therefore nothing, neither mental nor non-mental, can be real.

    Since things cannot be defined or described as real, it makes no sense to assert the reality of Being. So Being cannot be established.

    On the other hand, Being cannot be established as something unreal either. For a thing cannot be defined or described as unreal. Chi-tsang argues that that which is unreal can never come into existence. If it exists, it must have certain characteristics through which we know its existence. But that which is unreal has no characteristics at all, so it is absurd to say that something x is unreal. Therefore Being as something unreal cannot be established.

    Thus Being cannot be defined or described as real or unreal. Hence it is unintelligible to use Being to explain the reality or unreality of all things. So the view that Being is the true nature of the universe is untenable and should be ruled out.

    Chi-tsang also examines the possibility of the ontologization of Nothingness and argues that Nothingness cannot be used to explain and describe the true nature of the universe. To say that Nothingness is the reality of the world is a contradiction in terms and hence makes no sense. For the so-called Nothingness is that which is without characteristics, while

 

 

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that which is real has certain characteristics. So to say that Nothingness is the true reality of the universe is the same as saying that that which has no characteristics has characteristics: this is contradictory. So the assertion of the reality of Nothingness is unintelligible and should be refuted. [12]

    For Chi-tsang, Nothingness cannot be defined or described as something unreal either. For that which is unreal can never come into existence and hence cannot be perceived. If it can never be perceived, it cannot be described and defined. If it is indescribable or indefinable, how can it be "described" or "defined" as Nothingness?

    According to Chi-tsang, all metaphysical speculations of Being, Nothingness or any other thing involve the svabhaavic way of thinking. When people make an ontic commitment to something (whether it is Being, Nothingness, or some other thing), they think of that thing svabhaavaly: they ascribe a "determinate or its own nature" (ting-hsing [n] or tzu-hsing [o]) to it. The thing is believed to possess an essence or quality of being itself. [13] But this concept of ontological Entity or entity is contradictory to empirical facts. Hence the Entity cannot be the true state or essential constituent of our experience, but only an objectified concept.

    The problem of metaphysical speculation, for Chi-tsang, lies in the svabhaavic way of thinking. This way of thinking is a kind of.disease, which leads people to objectify various concepts into the world and to multiply realities of ontological entities beyond necessity. Unfortunately, people, Chi-tsang argues, fail to see this and continue to make an ontic commitment to some things and become attached to them. [14] Instead of using "Being" or "Nothingness," they may use "beings" or other concepts to explain and describe the true state of the universe. Early scholastic Buddhist philosophy, according to Chi-tsang, was a good example of this.

    For the early scholastic Buddhists, it was erroneous to affirm the reality of absolute Being, aatman; but it was not erroneous to affirm the reality of monetary beings, dharmas (fa) [ab] [15].  The real, according to them, is not permanent, universal and unitary, but momentary, particular and multiple. The world is composed of an unceasing flow of particular momentary entities. Those entities are the real constituents of our experience and are the "truly real events" in the universe. Each dharma exists for only an instant, [16] and yet is self-sufficient and possesses its own mark, or characteristic, which defines its essential nature as being different from all others. For example, consciousness is the state of "being aware", and

 

 

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ignorance, that of "lack of cognition". Though they are distinct and separated from one another, the dharmas are linked together according to the principle of causation. They are not supported or attached to any substance or self. [17]

    Chi-tsang argues that although it was correct for early scholastic Buddhists to repudiate the concept of aatman, they actually had the same disease as Hindu philosophers: they both made an ontic commitment to something and become attached to it (or them). For Chi-tsang, the concept of dharmas is as unintelligible as that of aatman. He argues that the claim "Dharmas exist" is a contradictory or absurd statement. He examines the meaning of the word "existence." In close analysis of our experience we find that whatever can be conceived to exist has a cause of its existence. All things are produced by a combination of various causal conditions. If the conditions are changed, the things also change or even disappear. "To exist" means "to be caused," "to be conditioned," "to be produced," or "to be dependent on something." [18] But a dharma, as an ontological entity, is by definition a "svabhaava thing" or something with essential or own nature. The so-called own nature is not something which is conditioned or dependent upon other things, but something which is independent and which makes an object what it is and not something else. [19] Therefore to say that a dharma exists would be the same as saying that a thing which is independent of everything else is dependent on something. This is a contradiction in terms and hence makes no sense. [20]

    According to Chi-tsang, all other "ontological entities" can be refuted in a similar way. They are only human concepts and one should not be attached to them. However, philosophers continue to manufacture "ontological entities" and objectify them into the world. For Chi-tsang, the source of this type of philosophical confusion is that philosophers fail to see the emptiness of conceptualization and language. People often think of words and concepts svabhaavaly: they suppose that our words, names and concepts are attached to objects and belong to them inherently. They believe that words name or denote objects, and that sentences are combinations of such names. Meaning is the thing for which a word stands. If the word does not denote an ordinary object, it must stand for a transcendental or non-empirical entity, and if one knows something, there must be "something" which one knows. Men tend to look for a "real object" for a word, a "real distinction" behind a linguistic distinction, a "real essence" for a linguistic class, a "true

 

 

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reality" for a knowledge, etc. Thus they are led unsuspectingly into metaphysical dilemmas of their own making. Philosophers indulge in metaphysical disputes about such questions as the following: What is the true state of the universe? Is it Being or Nothingness? Is Being one or many? What is it (or are they)? Is it (or are they) permanent or impermanent? Does "Nothingness" stand for something? Does it have priority over Being? For those philosophers, these metaphysical questions are genuine questions and the chief task of philosophy is to answer them.

    Buddha's Dharma, according to Chi-tsang, is an awareness that metaphysicians have intellectual attachment. They are misled by human concepts and fail to see that those metaphysical questions appear to be intelligible but actually are not genuine questions. The so-called orthodox Buddhist philosophy is just another dogmatic view. It does not eliminate metaphysical speculation but merely shifts its position from a "monistic view" (True Being is one) to a "pluralistic view" (True Being is many). So the same kind of metaphysical concerns would occur all over again. For Chi-tsang, one cannot solve the problems by presenting a new metaphysical theory. The "complete" solution lies rather in taking all metaphysical problems as conceptual confusions without explaining the initial metaphysical mistake by another metaphysical theory. This, according to Chi-tsang, is precisely what Naagaarjuna tried to do and had done in his critique of all views. This is also what Naagaarjuna meant when he said, "I have no view." [21]

 

III

One of the main reasons why philosophers engage themselves in the examination of Being and Nothingness is that they want to find a "true" state of things and to make a "true" statement about the world. Truth is believed to be a right understanding of something. To know truth is to search for Being, Nothingness or some other things. To negate a truth-claim is to negate something real in the world. Thus for many philosophers, Being, Nothingness or other things become the "objects" of their philosophical investigation. They devote themselves to an examination of those "objects" in order to find "real truth."

    Chi-tsang contends that those philosophers really waste their time and effort, for the so-called truth cannot be a right understanding of something

 

 

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real in the world. In fact, no truth is "really true." [22]  Since no truth is really true, it makes no sense for philosophers to indulge themselves in metaphysical speculation about Being, Nothingness or some other things so as to find "real truth." The aim of Chi-tsang's discussion of the problem of Being and Nothingness is neither to find a true state of things nor to make a true statement about the world. Rather it is to show that all truths are empty, and hence to advise that one should stop all metaphysical speculation.

    In expounding this, Chi-tsang analyzes the nature of human language and claims that language is like a conceptual game (hsi-lun). [23] The meaning of a term does not lie in a certain objective or extra-linguistic entity to which that term corresponds, but lies in the context. If the context changes, the meaning of the word changes or even disappears. In the strict sense, meaning is not a real part of an object or thing itself, but a human projection. If anyone insists that there must be some extra-linguistic reality or essence to which a word refers, "this man is like a man who, perceiving the body of a woman created by magic as really existent, feels desire for her." [24] Words and names are empty in the same way that a woman created by magic who; having no essence, is empty. So to look for the meaning of a term is not the same as looking for an object, entity or essence. Right knowledge is not the right understanding of "something"; instead, it is to understand that this "something" is empty. To find truth or wisdom, Chi-tsang points out, is not the same as searching for Being, Nothingness or any other thing, but just to get rid of erroneous views, and his refutation of all metaphysical assertions is not the negation of anything real in the world, but merely the elimination of perverted views. Chi-tsang says in this regard, "To eliminate erroneous or perverted views is to illuminate true: or right views" (p'o-hsieh hsien-Cheng).

    When men have the attached way of thinking, they make an ontic commitment to "truth" and "falsity" as well as "Being" and "Nothingness." The so-called "true" is often regarded as what "is" and the so-called "false," what "is not." Right and wrong views are considered to be two completely different views. To show right views and to refute erroneous views are two separate acts; one is the affirmation of something and the other, the denial of it.

    According to Chi-tsang, one should eliminate all intellectual attachments and should not make any ontic commitment to "right" and "wrong," "true" and "false" or "affirmation" and "negation." For him, the examination of epistemological issues does not necessarily presuppose or entail a

 

 

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metaphysical or ontological essence or reality. The so-called "right" and "wrong" or "true" and "false" are equally empty; they do not stand for any essence or self-existing thing. All metaphysical theories are perverted or erroneous views and should be discarded. The "right view" is not a view in itself but merely an absence of views. The proper meaning of "having a right view" is "not to have any view." A right view is called "right" because all views are abandoned. If it were accepted as a "view," it would become a "wrong" view which ought to be rejected. [25]

    Thus in Chi-tsang's philosophy the illumination of right views and the refutation of erroneous views are not two separate things. To refute erroneous views is merely to show that all metaphysical views are erroneous and should be ruled out: this is the same as the illumination of right views. So the denial of the concept of Being does not entail the acceptance of Nothingness or any other entity, and vice versa. To find truth is not to make any "true" claim about the world, but merely to show that all metaphysical speculations about Being, Nothingness or any other thing are untenable and should be given up. This is cited as "true" because it is an absence of any metaphysical speculation.

    When the Buddha denied that a dharma is existent, he did not hold "another" view that a dharma is non-existent. If someone were to hold that a dharma is nonexistent, this view would be another extreme view to be refuted. Although the Buddha sometimes used the word "non-existence" in his dialogues, one should know that "the idea of non-existence is brought out primarily to handle the disease of the concept of existence. If that disease disappears, then useless medicine is also discarded." [26] To negate both existence and non-existence, in the strict sense, is not to affirm anything or to negate anything, for all things are empty. Chi-tsang says, "Originally there was nothing to affirm and there is not now anything to negate." [27]

    According to Chi-tsang, our language is like a game and our debate whether x is y or x is not y is like a magical creation. Suppose there are two men both created by magic. One is doing a certain thing and the other is trying to prevent him from doing it. In this case the action and the prevention of it are equally illusory. Yet it makes sense to say that one man refutes or prevents the other. Similarly, for Chi-tsang, his arguments are also empty, like everything which is created by magic or illusion, and yet they can refute the essence of all dharmas. His negation is not a negation of something real. It is only a tool for eliminating extreme views. If there is no extreme to be

 

 

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removed, there can be no such things as affirmation and negation. [28]

    For many people, truth is "absolute certainty." It is the accurate manifestation or description of Being, Nothingness or some other things. But Chi-tsang maintains that no truth is absolutely true. [29] Every true claim which is so, is so for a particular observer or is made from a particular stand-point. Its truth-value is not purely objective. In the strict sense, all truths are conventional; they are human projections. Our minds are often polluted by all sorts of illusions, prejudices and attachments. The truth-values of the statements we make, according to Chi-tsang, lie in whether they involve attachment or not. Those which involve attachment or make men clinging are called su-ti [p] (worldly, relative or low truth), and those which do not involve attachment or make men non-clinging, chen-ti [q] (ultimate, transcendent or high truth). Worldly truth is often presented as a discursive knowledge and involves certain emotional and intellectual attachments to what one perceives. When one has this type of truth, he tends to think svabhaavaly: he is committed to linguistic conventions as well as ontological entities. The meaning of a word is believed to be the object for which the word stands, and truth is considered to be an accurate statement about being, non-being or some other thing. This "attached" standpoint is su-ti. But one can remove attachments and avoid the svabhaavic way of thinking; thereby he re-examines all things in the world and sees that all things are empty. This "unattached" standpoint is chen-ti. However, if ultimate truth were regarded as something "fixed" or standing for an absolute or self-existing thing, it would become a new attachment and become worldly truth. One has to re-examine it from another higher standpoint and sees that all truths are empty. Whether a truth is high or low depends upon one's mental conditions. [30]

    Ultimately, all truths should be discarded. To realize this "empty" nature of truths is praj~naa. True wisdom is knowing nothing substantial. In a strict sense, it has no knowing or knowledge. Our ordinary knowing is a mode of thinking or reasoning with conceptualization. It assumes that there are certain definite acts of knowing, a knower and the objects to be known. It also assumes a distinction between subject and object, and "true" and "false." To know is to search for something real in the world or in the mind. For Chi-tsang, this is really an intellectual attachment; the epistemological assertion implies an ontological commitment. But praj~naa transcends this kind of knowing. It is an insight that the act of knowing, the knower, the object

 

 

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to be known, the distinction between the subject and the object, truth and falsity are all empty. This is a wisdom without attachment; it is synonymous with `Suunyataa [31]

    According to Chi-tsang, the Buddha's Dharma is given to men not to let them know anything, but to vacate their minds so that they can achieve moksha -- total liberation from evil and suffering in this world. This, for Chi-tsang, is the main message of Buddhism. Once this is realized, the problem of Being and Nothingness would disappear. [32]

 

IV

Like many contemporary Western philosophers, Chi-tsang has paid attention to the significance or meaningfulness of metaphysical statements and claims to refute metaphysics. His critique of metaphysical views appears to be similar to the viewpoint of logical positivists. They both claim that metaphysical concepts such as "Being" and "Nothingness" are unintelligible concepts and that metaphysical questions such as whether Being or Nothingness is the true Reality of the universe are not genuine questions. And they both assert that true wisdom is the abandonment of metaphysical views. But actually Chi-tsang's philosophy is quite different from the philosophy of contemporary Western philosophers.

    The main reason why certain Western philosophers, especially logical positivists, examine philosophical issues is that they want to find a "meaningful" statement about the world. For them, the only meaningful statements about the universe are those which are empirically verifiable by sense experience. Although logical positivists deny transcendental or non-empirical reality, they accept empirical phenomena as the reality or true facts of the universe and use sense experience as the ultimate criterion for judging what is meaningful and what is meaningless. [33] The reason why they repudiate such metaphysical concepts as "Being" and "Nothingness" is that these terms do not denote any empirical entity and hence are pseudo terms. They hold that metaphysical statements about Being and Nothingness are not empirically verifiable and so are nonsensical. Their critique of metaphysics aims at leading men to make an ontic commitment to empirical phenomena and to limit investigation of the universe to the sphere of sense experience.

    But Chi-tsang's refutation of metaphysics does not aim at the

 

 

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acceptance of sense experience, but rather the avoidance of accepting any "ontic" phenomenon. From the standpoint of Chi-tsang's philosophy, logical positivism or any other empiricism is as unintelligible as traditional metaphysics. Positivists have the same "disease" as traditional metaphysicians: both have the svabhaavic way of thinking. They each make an ontic commitment to something and become attached to it (or them). The only difference between them is that traditional metaphysicians tend to make an ontic commitment to non-empirical reality, and positivists, to empirical reality. The reason why "Being" and "Nothingness" are unintelligible concepts, according to Chi-tsang, is not that they do not stand for empirical entities, but that the concepts themselves involve contradiction or absurdity. For Chi-tsang, the so-called empirical facts are as empty as transcendental reality. To make an ontic commitment to sense experience is an erroneous view and should be refuted. So contemporary positivism or empiricism judged from Chi-tsang's philosophical standpoint, is an erroneous metaphysical view and therefore should be eliminated.

    When Chi-tsang examines philosophical issues, he is not concerned with how to have a "meaningful" view of the universe, but rather how to avoid it. His philosophy of emptiness shows that the "realities," "entities" or "facts" of philosophers cannot be established and that they are really objectified concepts. Any ontic commitment to them or to anything else is an attachment and should be eradicated. Unfortunately, this philosophy is often misunderstood. The doctrine of emptiness in Maadhyamika Buddhism is often interpreted as Absolutism or nihilism; the word "empty" or "emptiness" is regarded as a descriptive name referring to Absolute Being or Absolute Nothingness.

    Actually, the San-lun Buddhist teaching of Emptiness as the Middle Way is the denial of absolutism and nihilism. According to this teaching, the views of the absolute reality and absolute unreality of things are extreme and should be refuted. The claim that all things are empty means that all things are neither absolutely existent nor absolutely inexistent. Things in the universe do not really exist, because in some respects they are inexistent; but they do not really inexist either, because in other respects they are correspondingly existent. If the existence of a thing were absolutely real, it would then be self-existent and independent of causes and conditions. But all things are dependent on causes and conditions. So the thing cannot be self-existent and absolutely real. On the other hand, if the universe were

 

 

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inexistent and absolutely nothing, it would be motionless and its phenomena would not arise. But we see that myriad things do arise from various causes and conditions, so they cannot be inexistent and absolutely unreal. [34] Thus the doctrine of emptiness in San-lun Maadhyamika thought cannot be identified with absolutism or with nihilism. [35]

    Actually, the word "empty" or "emptiness," according to Chi-tsang, is not a descriptive name, but merely "a convenient means to lead sentient beings and to enable them to be free from various attachments." [36] This tool has multiple functions and uses. It is primarily a soteriological devise. The Buddha was considered by Chi-tsang to be a soteriologist at heart and his teaching to be practical in character. His main concern was the salvation of mankind from evil and suffering and his teachings were upaaya (skillful means) to be used to achieve this goal. The Buddha was believed to be a skillful teacher. He found that the mind of ordinary people was always attached to something, and bound to some view and could not be emancipated from birth and old age, sickness and death, sorrow and grief, and suffering and distress. He intended to help them to gain enlightenment, yet he realized that they could understand only mundane things and ordinary language. In order to save them, he used common words, such as "cause" and "effect," "existence" and "nonexistence," "right" and "wrong," "affirm" and "negate," and "empty" and "nonempty," to explain his teachings. In fact, all the words used are nothing more than tools to aid in purifying the minds of the people.

    Though language may play a trick on us, Chi-tsang does not deny the practical value of language. Like Naagaarjuna, he acknowledges that language is useful and even necessary in our practical life. [37] For without language we could neither speak nor write. In order to communicate with others, we need conceptualization and predication. The mistake lies in identifying meaning with object, and concept with reality. To avoid this, one should know that our words and names are empty. When our words are not regarded as standing for any essence or self-existing objects, they can be used to expose the absurd implications of metaphysical speculations. The function of language can and should be considered as that of the raft. [38] A man intending to cross a river to get to the other bank, where it is safe and secure, makes a raft. With the help of the raft he safely reaches the other bank. But however useful the raft may have been, he will throw it aside and go his way without it. In the same way, language may be useful and with

 

 

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its help one can understand Buddha's Dharma. But we should realize that language, including the term "Dharma," is like the raft and we should discard it after salvation. Ultimately, one should give up all conceptualizations and not be bound to anything.

    But men tend to be attached to some name or object. This clinging to or longing for something is likened by Chi-tsang to "disease" or "fire," which is the source of suffering, delusion and ignorance in human life. Emptiness is a soteriological device to eradicate the disease or fire so that human beings may be released from misery. It is likened to "medicine" or "water." Chi-tsang argues that one should properly understand the nature, purpose and function of this device, and not be bound to it. If one fails to do so and regards the word "empty" or "emptiness" as a descriptive name, he cannot be transformed. [39]

    If one knows the proper nature and function of the word "Emptiness" and other terms, he can use these concepts to solve philosophical confusions. In fact, Chi-tsang uses even the terms "Being" and "Nothingness" or "being" and "non-being" to clear away the problem of Being and Nothingness. This way of treating the problem of Being and Nothingness can be seen in his teaching of Twofold Truth on three levels (san-tsung-erh-ti [r] or erh-ti-san-kuan [s]) [40]. Ordinary people usually believe that the universe is real and what appear to them through the senses is considered the true state of the universe. They affirm the reality of ordinary appearances and hold that all things are real and belong to the realm of being (yu) [t]. But saints or enlightened men, Chi-tsang points out, would not accept this realism and know that all things are empty. What appears to us through the senses belongs to the realm of non-being or nothingness (wu) [u] rather than that of being. Realism is treated by Chi-tsang as worldly truth (yu-wei-su-ti) [v] and the denial of it as ultimate truth (wu-wei-chen-ti) [w]. This is the first level of spiritual growth. [41] 0n this level, one may be attached to the concept of being. This attachment can be eliminated by knowing that the true state of things is more like non-being than like being. However, men may still have a svabhaavic way of thinking. They make a distinction between being and non-being and hold that the terms "being" and "non-being" are descriptive names stand for two completely different self-existing states of affairs. The denial of being is believed to entail the affirmation of non-being as the ultimate reality of things, and vice versa. This dualistic way of reasoning is an attachment and is a kind of worldly truth (yu-wu-erh-wei-su-ti) [x]. To know that both being

 

 

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and non-being are empty is ultimate truth (fei-yu-fei-wu-p'u-erh-wei-chen-ti) [y]. This second level of spiritual growth lets people realize that the true state of the universe cannot be described as being or non-being. But men may continue to long for something. They may think that if reality is neither being nor non-being it must be "something" which is beyond being and non-being. This monistic Absolutism, for Chi-tsang, is another extreme view and should be refuted, for "that" which is beyond being and non-being is really empty. Like the previous (dualistic) ways of thinking, this metaphysical viewpoint belongs to worldly truth (erh-yu-p'u-erh-wei-su-ti) [z]. The denial of dualistic and nondualistic metaphysics is ultimate truth (fei-erh-fei-p'u- erh-wei-chen-ti) [aa] [42].

    Chi-tsang's critical examination of the problem of Being and Nothingness is a means of purifying the mind from various attachments. His critique of metaphysical speculation is employed progressively to three or more levels until all illusions and clingings are eradicated. It is purely analytic in character: Chi-tsang does not have his own metaphysics, but merely uses one metaphysical concept to refute another metaphysical concept until all metaphysical concepts are eliminated. "Thus the concept of being, representing worldly truth, is negated by that of non-being, representing ultimate truth. In turn the concept of non-being, now become the worldly truth of a new pair, is negated by the concept of neither being nor non-being, and so...forth until everything that may be predicated about truth has been negated." [43]

    "Emptiness" is used whenever extreme views occur. It has different connotations and implications on various levels. On the first level, "emptiness" means that common-sense things are illusory and unreal. It is expressed by Chi-tsang as the denial of being. "Emptiness" in this sense may be misinterpreted as "non-being" or "nothingness." People often make a distinction between being and non-being, existence and non-existence, permanence and impermanence, and sa^msaara (the cycle of life and death) and Nirvaana. But all these are svabhaavically construed and should be regarded as extremes. On the second level, "emptiness" implies that the nihilistic as well as common-sense views of the universe are unacceptable and that all discriminations or dualistic ways of thinking should be dismissed. This is expressed as the denial of both being and non-being. However, people at this stage may still be attached to conceptualization and may have the "monistic" view or description of the universe. But any conceptualization is

 

 

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an extreme. On the third level, "emptiness" displays that the monistic as well as the dualistic and pluralistic views of the universe should be rejected. It means the total negation of conceptualization and the conceptual way of thinking. This is expressed as the denial of both duality and non-duality. When all conceptualizations and other attachments are completely eliminated, "Emptiness" means "absolutely non-abiding," clinging to nothing.

    Thus the word "emptiness" or "empty" has no meaning by itself, but acquires a meaning in context. It gains its true connotation only in the process of salvation. When salvation is achieved, it loses its meaning and should be discarded. As with medicine, emptiness is of use to man only so long as he is ill, but not when he is well again. Chi-tsang says,

Originally, it was to counter the disease of [belief in] Being that we preached Nothingness. If the disease of [belief in] Being vanishes, the Medicine of Emptiness is also useless. Thus we know that the way of the sage has never held to either Being or Nothingness. What obstacle can there be, then? [44]

 

Notes

1.    San-lun Tsung [b] (Three Treatises School) is the Chinese version of Indian Maadhyamika Buddhism which was founded by Naagaarjuna in the second century A.D. The spread of the San-lun school in China began with the advent of Kumaarajiiva in the early fifth century. It is said that Kumaarajiiva had three thousand disciples. Seng-Chao (374-414 A.D.) was the most brilliant student of Kumaarajiiva. However, the most eminent San-lun Buddhist is Chi-tsang.

2.    See "Being" and "Nothing" in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy ed., by Paul Edwards, New York, Macmillan Publishing Co. & The Free Press, 1967, pp. 273-276 and 524-525.

3.    Western philosophers such as Jean-Paul Sartre state that "Nothingness lies coiled in the heart of being -- like a worm." Being and Nothingness. An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, tr. by Hazel E. Barnes, New York, Philosophical Library, 1956, p. 21. Heidegger says, "Death is the shrine of Nothing, that is,

 

 

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of that which in every respect is never something that merely exists, but which nevertheless presences, even as the mystery of Being itself. As the shrine of Nothing, death harbors within itself the presencing of Being. As the shrine of Nothing, death is the shelter of Being." Poetry, Language, Thought, tr. by Albert Hofstadter, New York, Harper & Row, 1971, pp. 178-179. Chinese Taoists such as Lao Tzu state that "being comes from non-being." Tao Te Ching, 40; The Way of Lao Tzu, tr. by Wing-tsit Chan, New York, Bobbs-Merrill, 1963, p. 173.

4.    Generally speaking, most Western philosophers hold that Being is the true reality of the world and is more essential than Nothingness, while most Eastern philosophers hold the opposite view.

5.    The name "Maadhyamika" was derived from the Sanskrit noun "madhyama," meaning "the middle," and the suffix "ka." Maadhyamika philosophy is so called because it proclaimed the doctrine of the Middle Way. The San-lun Tsung in China, Korea and Japan is known as the Chung-tao Tsung [d] (the school of the Middle Way) as well as the K'ung Tsung [e](the school of Emptiness).

6.     Chi-tsang, The profound Meaning of Three Treatises (San-lun-hsuan-i [g]; Taisho 1852), pp. 54, 6, 10c and 11a; The Meaning of Twofold Truth (Erh-ti-i [h]; Taisho 1854), pp. 82, 87a, 91a, 94, 108c and 114b; A Commentary on the Middle Treatise, Chung-kuan-lun-su [i] Taisho 1824, pp. 111-113.

7.     Chi-tsang, A Commentary on the Middle Treatise, pp. 111b and 113a.

8.    Jen-sheng hsi-lun, hsi-lun p'o hui-yen [j], pp. 139b and 141a and 144a; the Middle Treatise. XX 11:15

9.     Shang-mieh hsi-lun [k]. Chi-tsang, pp. 128 and 139.

10.     Chi-tsang, The Profound Meaning of Three Treatises, pp. 10c and 11a; The Meaning of Twofold Truth, pp. 82a,c, 108c and 114b.

11.     Chi-tsang, The Meaning of Twofold Truth, pp. 82c, 83b, 87a, 88a, 95b, 99b, 102c, 105c and 110; The Profound Meaning of Three Treatises, pp. 8a and 10a; A Commentary on the Middle Treatise, pp. 112-113.

12.     Chi-tsang, A Commentary on the Middle Treatise, p. 29.

13.    Early scholastic Buddhists such as Sarvaastivaadas held that dharmas possess their own or determinate nature (svabhaava). Naagaarjuna attacked the Sarvaastivaada for adhering to self-nature of the dharmas. Chi-tsang accepts Naagaarjuna's criticism of Abhidharma philosophy and extends the idea of svabhaava to cover all ontological entities which may be used by philosophers to explain the reality of the universe. For Chi-tsang, metaphysical speculation is an intellectual attachment. It involves a svabhaavic way of thinking, which is an attached way of reasoning.

14.    Ibid, p. 113a; The Meaning of Twofold Truth, p. 91c.

15.    The word dharma has been used in several different ways by Buddhists. Generally speaking, it has the following meanings:

    (1)    dharma, as conceived by the Buddha in meditation, means perfect enlightenment and perfect wisdom.

    (2)    dharma, as expressed in words and speech, means the Buddha's sermon,

 

 

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teaching, dialogue, doctrine, sacred text and doctrinal text.

    (3)    dharma, as set forth for his disciples, means discipline, rule, precept, regulation of conduct and morality.

    (4)    dharma, as the object of knowing, means truth, theory, principle, law and knowledge.

    (5)    dharma, as the reality of the universe, means thing, fact, element, factor, existence, constituent of our experience, and truly real event.

    (6)    dharma, as the objective data of reality, means characteristic, mark, attribute, and quality.

In the Abhidharma Philosophy Buddhists the word dharma is applied mostly in the context of (5) and (6); it is used to explain and describe the true nature of the universe.

16.     Buddhist schools such as the AAbhidharmako'sa, the Mahaasanghika, the Mahi'sasaka and the Sautraantika hold that only the present is real. But the Sarvaastivaadas maintain that the past, the present and the future are real.

17.    See Edward Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1967, pp. 34-36 and 92-106.

18.     Chi-tsang, The Profound Meaning of Three Treatises, p. 8a; The Meaning of Two-fold Truth, p. 95b; A Commentary on The Three Treatises, pp. 112-113.

19.    For a discussion of the world svabhaava or own nature, see Richard H. Robinson, The Buddhist Religion, Belmont, Calif., Dickenson Publishing Company, Inc., 1970, pp.5l-52.

20.     Chi-tsang, Ibid.; The Middle Treatise XV: 1-2.

21.    See the Twelve Gate Treatise VI and Hui-Cheng-lun, [ac] 63 and 64.

22.     Chi-tsang, The Meaning of Twofold Truth, p. 97.

23.    Ibid., p. 114. Chi-tsang's use of "Hsi-lun" (prapa~nca) seems to be different from ordinary Buddhist use of the term. According to the latter, the word "Hsi-lun" means provisional understanding. It is a term used with "right" intention, spirit or attitude to understand the nature of things. It is believed to be a "good" temporary or provisional devise to help people to find the "truth" of things that lay behind such temporary or provisional nature of things.

24.     Hui-cheng-lun, 27.

25.     Chi-tsang, The Profound Meaning of Three Treatises, pp. 7 and 14.

26.    Ibid., pp. 6 and 11.

27.    Ibid.

28.    Ibid, pp. 7 and 12; The Meaning of Twofold Truth, pp. 92a, 97c and 112. Naagaarjuna presented a similar point: "Just as a magically formed phantom could deny a phantom created by its own magic, so could negation and refutation" (Hui-Cheng-lun, 24).

29.     Chi-tsang, The Meaning of Twofold Truth, p. 98.

30.    This is well stated by Chi-tsang in his teaching of Twofold Truth on three levels, which will be presented later.

31.    This "no-knowing" and "empty" nature of praaj~na is well stated by Seng-chao:

 

 

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"Thus in praaj~na there is nothing that is known, and nothing that is seen... It is evident that there is a markless Knowing and unknowing illumination. . . Real praaj~na is as pure as empty space, without knowing, without seeing, without acting, and without objects. Thus knowledge is in itself without knowing, and does not depend on anything in order to be without knowing." Chao-lun, Part III in Taisho 1858, p. 153.

32.     Seng-jui also holds this viewpoint; see his preface to the Twelve Gate Treatise.

33.    See Alfred Jules Ayer, Language, truth and Logic (New York: Dover, 1946), pp. 31-45.

34.    This point was succinctly mated by Seng-chao as follows: "For what reason? If you would say that they exist, their existence arises non-absolutely. If you would say that they inexist, their forms have taken shape. Since they have forms and shapes, they cannot be the same as the inexistent. So, this explains the idea of the emptiness of the non-absolute." Chao-lun, Taisho, 1858, Part II, p. 152c.

35.    For a detailed discussion of this, see Hsueh-li Cheng, "Naagaarguna's Approach to The Problem of The Existence of God" in Religious Studies, No. 12, June, 1976, pp. 207-216

36.     Chi-tsang, The profound Meaning of Three Treatises, p. 7. This quotation was taken from Chapter One of the Lotus Scripture (Saddharmapu.n.darika suutra).

37.     Ultimate truth has to be explained by speech, and speech is conventional and conditional. Language as worldly truth is essential for the attainment of ultimate truth and nirvaana. Naagaarjuna says, "Without worldly truth, ultimate truth cannot be obtained. Without obtaining ultimate truth, Nirvaana cannot be obtained." The Middle Treatise, XXIV: 10; the Twelve Gate Treatise, VIII.

38.     Chi-tsang, The Meaning of Twofold Truth, p. 111.

39.     Chi-tsang says, "If water could extinguish fire and then again produce fire, what would we use to extinguish it? The view that things come to an end or are eternal is the fire and emptiness can extinguish it. But if one still clings to emptiness, then there is no medicine that can eliminate the disease?" Ibid.

40.    Ibid., pp. 90-91.

41.     Various levels represent the degree of one's spiritual maturity and accomplishment. The advance from one level to another is the process of salvation or removing attachments.

42.     Chi-tsang, Ibid., p. 91.

43.     Chi-tsang, The profound Meaning of Three Treatises, p. 10.

44.    Ibid, p. 11.

 

 

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CHINESE GLOSSARY

a 吉藏 p 俗諦
b 三論宗 q 真諦
c 中道 r 三種二諦
d 中道宗 s 二諦三觀
e 空宗 t
f u
g 三論玄義 v 有為俗諦
h 二諦觀 w 無為真諦
i 中觀論疏 x 有為二為俗諦
j 人生戲論,戲論破慧眼 y 非有非無不二為真諦
k 善滅戲論 z 二與不二為俗諦
l aa 非二非不二為真諦
m 破邪顯正 ab
n 定性 ac 迴諍論
o 自性