Motion and Rest in the Middle Treatise

Ever since the beginning of philosophical speculation, the concept of motion has played an important role in Western philosophy. Heraclitus is well known to many for the famous statement, "All things are in a state of flux."[1] For him motion is the cosmological principle underlying all physical reality. In contrast with this philosophy, Zeno and other Eleatics deny the reality of motion. Zeno's famous antinomies of the Arrow and of Achilles aim at a refutation of the possibility of motion.[2] The concept of motion has also been an important issue in Eastern thought. Most Chinese people believe that things in the universe are ever in a state of flux and change. The I Ching[a] (the Book of Changes), according to its Appendices, was composed to represent this fact: "the lines (of the hexagrams) serve to imitate all the movements taking place beneath the sky."[3] Kung-sun Lung,[b] a Chinese philosopher in the fourth century B.C., holds that the particular is ever changing but the universal is unchanging.[4] Other Chinese logicians argue that "The shadow of a flying bird never moves."[5] According to the realistic school of the Indian Vai`se.sikas, motion is a reality. It is one of the three things in which the genus Existence inheres, the other two being Substance and Quality.[6] Motion is something different from the thing moving. This consists in the fact that the conjunction of the thing with its place has been destroyed and a new conjunction of it with a new place has been produced. The Vai`se.sikas accept motion as duration, lasting till the cessation of motion. Early Buddhists, generally speaking, hold that everything is in perpetual flow - reality is pure flux. They deny the existence of any mental substance or a mover behind the movement, but they assert that all created things are changing and have characteristics of origination, duration and cessation. However, some early Buddhists such as the Saammitiiya and the Vaatsiputriiya accept not only the reality of motion but also that of a mover or some kind of mental substance behind the movement.

For the Maadhyamikas (San-lun[c] Buddhists),[7] motion and rest are empty: their natures cannot be explained rationally. Like Zeno, Naagaarjuna, the

founder of Maadhyamika Buddhism, critically examines the possibility of motion and denies its reality. He uses his dialectical analysis to show that the terms "going", "goer" and "the path of going" do not refer to actual realities which have their own specific characteristics or natures. But while Zeno affirms the reality of rest, Naagaarjuna again critically questions the possibility of rest and even denies its reality.

Maadhyamika philosophy is considered to be "the central philosophy of Buddhism."[8] The essential of Maadhyamika teachings is the doctrine of "the Middle Way of the Eightfold Negation" (pa-pu-chung-tao[g]).[9] According to the Maadhyamikas, this doctrine is the original teaching of the Buddha. After he gets enlightenment, the Buddha preaches to the five mendicants the doctrine of the Middle Way.[10] It is primarily concerned with the way of life that one ought to live. He advises the five mendicants not to live the pessimistic ascetic life nor to live the hedonistic worldly life, but to go above the two extremes and then they can attain peace. Naagaarjuna accepts the Buddha's doctrine of the Middle Way, and extends it to deal not only with the problem of the way of life but also with all philosophical and religious issues. He seems to find that people usually describe an event as "appears or disappears," "permanent or impermanent," "similar or dissimilar to itself," and "moves hither or thither." For him, those attempts to describe and explain the reality of an event are extreme views. The Buddha's doctrine of the Middle Way is to tell us to avoid all those extremes and to become free from the concepts of "is'' and "is not".. Naagaarjuna opens the Middle Treatise with these words: [11]

The eightfold negation is not just eight negations but a wholesale negation of all attempts to characterize things. Naagaarjuna's critical analysis of the concepts of motion and rest is one of the most important parts of his campaign against all metaphysical views. As we know, philosophers have often con-

sidered their main business or task as the description and explanation of the essence (whatness) or the existence (thatness) of reality. Philosophy is often defined as the study of the true nature of things. The so-called idealism, materialism, pluralism, monism, nihilism, absolutism, theism, atheism, etc., are various theories and views about what reality is. Some philosophers may emphasize the permanent and abiding aspect of experience and hold that the true nature of things is something permanent, unchanging and abiding. Other philosophers may emphasize the impermanent and momentary aspect of experience and hold that true reality is not something permanent and abiding, but is pure flux. Generally speaking, in the Western tradition the former "static" view of the universe can be seen in Parmenides' philosophy and the latter ''dynamic" view, in Heraclitus'. In the Eastern tradition the former can be represented by Braahmanism and is known as the Aatman view; and the latter, by Hiinayaana Buddhism and is known as the Anaatman view. But philosophy, for the Maadhyamikas, is not the description and explanation of the true nature of things. Naagaarjuna critically analyses both the Aatman and Anaatman views of the universe and claims to reveal their absurdities and declares that all metaphysical systems are dogmatic. For the Maadhyamikas, a conceptual speculation of any thing does not give us knowledge, but only illusion. True wisdom is the abandonment of all views. Naagaarjuna says,

In refuting all dynamic and static views of the universe, Naagaarjuna examines the concepts of motion and rest and argues that motion and rest are empty. For him, to say that something is moving is wrong; and to say that something is not moving is also wrong. This is the true meaning of the Buddha's teaching of the Middle Way.

Naagaarjuna's discussion of motion and rest is mainly stated in Chapter II of the Middle Treatise, which exists only in Chinese.[15] It was once well accepted by Chinese people and exercised an enormous influence upon later Mahaayaana Buddhists' view of the universe. For instance, it inspires Seng-chao[j] to argue for "the immobility of things" (wu-pu-ch'ien-lun)[k] in the first chapter of the Chao-lun.[l] [16] But this has never been well explicated by Western scholars. The purpose of this paper is, first, to expound Naagaajuna's treatisement of motion and rest from Chinese sources. Second, it is to examine critically whether he

has successfully shown that motion and rest cannot be real and to see whether he has conclusively refuted all metaphysical views.

When Naagaarjuna discusses motion and rest,[17] he deals with four main issues and problems: (i) Motion cannot be established. (ii) The mover or moving entity cannot be established. (iii) The path of motion cannot be established. (iv) Rest cannot be established. Each of these four issues is explicated by Naagaarjuna as follows.

(i) Motion is not possible or cannot be established.[18] Naagaarjuna points out that without motion the divisions of space as the traversed, yet to be traversed, etc., cannot be made; and on the other hand without these divisions motion itself cannot be understood. When we examine the path of motion, we see that it consists of (a) the part which is already passed (i-ch'u;[m] gata) and (b) the part which is yet to be passed (wei-ch'u;[n] aagata). And when we examine the part which is already passed we do not find the act of passing in it. For it has already been passed, Nor do we find the act of passing in the part which is yet to be passed. For it is not yet. So the act of passing is impossible.[19]

It may be argued that the existence of a path which has neither been passed nor is yet to be passed is not beyond comprehension. For there is "the path which is being passed" (ch'u-shih;[o] gamyamaana). And motion happens in this path.[20] But Naagaarjuna contends that one can say there is "the path which is being passed" if and only if there is the act of passing. But we are still examining whether there is the act of passing. How can we use ''the path which is being passed" to establish the act of passing?[21]

It might also be argued that we do see that something "begins'' to move. Hence we cannot deny the reality of motion. But Naagaarjuna contends that the "beginning" of motion is not possible. He asks, "Where or when does motion begin or start?" Does it begin at the place which is already passed, or at the place which is yet to be passed, or at the place which is being passed? There cannot be "beginning to pass" at "the place or moment which is already passed". For the latter is the effect of the former. But the latter is over. How can there be the former? Nor can there be "beginning to pass" at "the place which is yet to be passed". For the former is the starting point of change from rest to movement. But the latter has no change yet and hence there cannot be "beginning to pass" in it. The so-called "place which is being

passed" is possible only if there is the act of passing. But the so-called act of passing is possible only if there is the beginning of passing. So we cannot use "the place which is being passed" to justify the reality of the beginning of passing.[22] His argument can be summarized as follows:

(ii) The mover cannot move. People believe that there is the mover or moving entity. Since the moving agent exists, motion is possible. But Naagaarjuna denies that the mover could move.[23] If someone moves, Naagaarjuna asks, does "the one who has already moved" move or "the one who has not yet moved" move? We cannot say that "the one who has not yet moved" moves; for it involves contradiction. Neither can we say that "the one who has already moved" moves. For his action is over. How can we say that he moves?[24]

Perhaps it may be said that the mover does not mean "the one who already moved" nor "the one who has not yet moved", but "the one who is moving". Since there is the one who is moving motion is possible. But for Naagaarjuna, this consideration does not help to solve the problem. Naagaarjuna points out that there can be a mover only if there is an act of moving, But whether there is an act of moving is the very issue we are examining. So we cannot use the mover to prove the existence of motion without begging the question.[25] If one still insists that the mover moves, he would commit two fallacies. One is that the mover could be separated from the act of moving.[26] And the other is that there are two kinds of motions, namely, "motion" in the mover and "motion" in the act of moving.[27]

For Naagaarjuna, the question whether the mover could move concerns the problem of the substance-attribute relation. Suppose both the mover and motion are real. What is the relation between them: is the mover identical with or different from the motion? If the mover is identical with motion, then the actor and action are the same. And the former would always be moving; similarly, the eater would always be eating. But this is absurd.[28] If, on the other hand, the mover is different from the motion, then the former can

exist without the latter, and vice versa. But this is also absurd.[29] So Naagaarjuna argues, "It is not justifiable to say that the motion is identical with the mover; nor is it justifiable to say that the motion is different from the mover."[30] Therefore, both the motion and the mover cannot possibly be established.[31]

(iii) The path of motion cannot be established. As we have seen that motion and the mover cannot be established, Naagaarjuna argues that the path of motion is also impossible. Since the so-called motion cannot even be started, how can we talk about the place to go to?

(iv) Rest cannot be established. One may argue that since there is no motion, mover and the path of motion there must be rest. One may also argue that since the so-called rest is the cessation of motion the reality of rest assumes the reality of motion. Therefore we cannot really deny the possibility of motion. But for Naagaarjuna, the denial of motion does not entail the affirmation of rest. Unlike ordinary people and Zeno, he denies the possibility of rest as well as that of motion. His critical analysis of the concept of rest is stated in the verses 15, 16 and 17 of Chapter II of the Middle Treatise. The first two verses concern the nature of the resting entity or person. Verse 17 concerns the nature of the resting place or time. They are all designed to show that rest cannot be explained rationally. Naagaarjuna's critical analysis runs as follows.

Suppose rest is real. There must be someone or something that rests. Now who or what rests? Does the mover (the moving thing) or the non-mover (the non-moving thing) rest? It is absurd to say that the mover (the moving thing) rests. For this involves contradiction. Perhaps it may be said that the mover rests when he stops moving. But Naagaarjuna asks, "How can this be?" When someone stops moving, he is not "the mover" anymore. So we cannot say that the mover rests. On the other hand, we cannot say that the non-mover rests either. For the rest means the cessation of motion. But the non-mover does not move. How can he "cease to move" (rest)? Besides the mover and the non-mover there is no third who rests. So rest is impossible. Naagaarjuna's argument can be stated in the following way:

Naagaarjuna states the other argument against the possibility of rest in verse 17. Suppose rest is real. It must happen at some place or at some time. Naagaarjuna asks, "Where or when can this happen?" Will it happen at that which is already passed (or the past), or at that which is yet to be passed (or the future), or at that which is being passed (or the present)? But as pointed out previously, there cannot be motion in anyone of them, hence there cannot be "the cessation of motion", i.e., rest. His argument runs as follows:

Thus rest cannot be established. So one cannot use it to establish the existence of motion as an independent entity or reality. For Naagaarjuna, motion and rest are relative to each other and hence both of them are devoid of any specific character or nature. And so neither of them is real.

III

I do not think that Naagaarjuna has successfully shown that motion and rest cannot be real. He seems to commit what we would call the fallacy of composition. The so-called fallacy of composition consists in reasoning improperly from the fact of a member of a group having a certain property to the group itself having that property. This fallacy can occur in two varieties:[32] first, it occurs when one starts with a premises which asserts that some particular property belongs to each of the individual parts or members of a whole, and then concludes that the property must therefore belong to the whole. Second, it occurs when one starts with a premise which asserts that some particular property belongs to each of the individual members of a collection (taken distributively or individually; that is one at a time), and then concludes that the property must therefore belong to them collectively; that is, as a group.[33]

This fallacy frequently appears in Naagaarjuna's argument for the impossibility of motion. Naagaarjuna breaks motion or the path of motion into (a)

that which is already passed, (b) that which is yet to be passed and (c) that which is being passed. He examines (a), (b) and (c) "individually'' (one at a time). He claims that there is no motion or immobility in the case of (a); we do not find the act of passing in that which is already passed. Similarly, he argues that each of (b) and (c) is immobility; there is no motion in any of them. Therefore he concludes that motion or the act of passing is impossible when (a), (b) and (c) are taken together as a group or sequence. His entire argument can be summarized in the following way:

According to philosophers such as Dun Scotus and Bergson, motion is a forma fluens, a continual flow which cannot be divided into successive states. For them the premises (1)-(4) in Naagaarjuna's argument would be untenable. As for me, even if those premises are tenable the inference from the premises to the conclusion (5) is not tenable. It is fallacious reasoning that one starts with the premises which assert that some particular property belongs to each of the individual members of a collection (taken distributively or individually; that is, one at a time), and then concludes that the property must therefore belong to the collection or totality of those members (taken collectively; that is as a group or sequence). When Naagaarjuna infers the conclusion (5) from the premises he seems to argue that a motion or change cannot be composed of immobilities. His argument is as fallacious as the argument that a brotherhood cannot be made out of men, but must be made out of brotherhoods; since there cannot be a brotherhood if there is only "one man", it is impossible to have any brotherhood among "two" or "more than two" men.

The similar fallacious reasoning can be seen in Naagaarjuna's argument for the impossibility of "beginning to pass". He also breaks the path of the

"beginning" of passing into (a) that which is started, (b) that which is yet to be started and (c) that which is being started. He examines (a), (b) and (c) individually and claims that there is no "beginning" of passing in each of them. Therefore he concludes that the act of "beginning to pass" is impossible when (a), (b) and (c) are taken together as a sequence or group. This reasoning falsely assumes that what is characteristic of individuals must be characteristic of the group containing those individuals.

Seng-chao's argument for the immutability of things seems to commit the similar fallacy. He also breaks motion or the path of motion into (a) that which is in the past and (b) that which is in the present. He examines (a) and (b) individually and then argues that "each abides in its own time, and nothing departs or comes."[34] Hence motion is impossible. This argument also falsely assumes that whatever is characteristic of individuals must be characteristic of the group or sequence containing these individuals.[35]

Another main reason why Naagaarjuna argues that motion cannot be established is that one cannot give a good answer to the question whether or not motion is identical with a mover. It seems to me that this way of arguing against the reality of motion is inadequate and even odd. For the possibility and the reality of motion has nothing to do with whether or not we can give a good answer to that question. It appears silly to say that if motion cannot be rationally explained especially in terms of oneness or of difference from a mover, it cannot be established. For example, I may not be able to offer an adequate philosophical and even scientific explanation of what a relation between motion and a mover is. But from this it does not necessarily follow that motion or my coming to the United States from Taiwan cannot be established. For it is an undeniable fact that I "came" to the United States from Taiwan and that I "went" to Wisconsin. It would make no sense to say that in order to affirm the possibility and the reality of my "coming" to the United States from Taiwan I have to explain whether my "coming" is the same as or different from myself. It also seems to be funny to say that if I cannot do so my "coming" to the United States from Taiwan could not be possible or established.

In fact, "motion" and "mover" belong to two different categories: the latter refers to an object (or a person), and the former refers to the way that object appears. Therefore it is odd and funny to ask whether the one is identical with, or different from, the other as if we are comparing two things which belong to the same category. The main mistake of Naagaarjuna's reasoning

seems to lie in the fact that he fails to see that motion and a mover do not belong to the same category. Hence he inappropriately asks whether or not the one is identical with the other as if he is comparing two things which belong to the same category. Now Naagaarjuna asks such inadequate questions and forces the opponents to answer. If the opponents would not or cannot give an adequate answer, he claims the opponents' theory cannot be established. This way of refuting other people is not a genuine criticism but just a trick.

Naagaarjuna's argument against the possibility of rest is based upon his argument against the possibility of motion. For him, since motion is impossible, how can there be "the cessation of motion" (rest)? But we have just seen that Naagaarjuna has not successfully established that motion is impossible. This casts doubt upon his argument against the possibility of rest. So one can say that since motion is possible rest is not logically impossible.

Another aspect of Naagaarjuna's argument for the impossibility of rest is that we cannot give an adequate answer to the question, "Who or what rests?" For Naagaarjuna, to say "A mover rests" is wrong and to say "A non-mover rests" is also wrong. The reason why it is wrong to make the latter statement, according to Naagaarjuna, is that a non-mover does not move and hence cannot "cease to move". So it is absurd to say a non-mover rests. Here Naagaarjuna seems to treat mistakenly rest as some sort of "activity". But in fact rest is not an activity at all. To say a non-moving entity rests does not necessarily mean that the entity performs or is performing any action. So it is not absurd to say a non-mover rests. Thus it is not right for Naagaarjuna to argue that rest cannot be conceived to be real because no good answer can be given to the question, "Who or what rests?"

It appears that there are certain fallacies, mistakes, inadequacies, and oddities in the Maadhyamika philosophy. Perhaps the Maadhyamikas might defend themselves by saying, "You should not say that we have committed any fallacy nor should you say that the way we handle philosophical issues is inadequate and odd, for we do not hold any view and position of our own. Our philosophical approach is merely to analyze the opponents' views and to use what they hold to expose the contradictions and absurdities of their philosophies without committing ourselves to any of them. If we hold any view, we might make certain mistakes. But, we do not hold any view at all and hence we can not make any mistake."

Twelve Gate Treatise, Naagaarjuna says that he has no theses to offer and hence he should be absolved of all mistakes and charges against him: "So your charge is not a charge against me."[36] In his Huei-cheng-lun[p] Naagaarjuna says, "If I had a thesis, then I should be wrong. But since I do not have a thesis, such a mistake is impossible."[37] Aaryadeva, an eminent disciple of Naagaarjuna, also talks about this in his Hundred Treatise. The opponent argues that "your non-acceptance of any thesis - this is the demonstration of your dharma. when you say that there is no thesis that is the thesis. And again you say, our dharma is in accordance with the belief of the men in the world, - this your own thesis."[38] But, Aaryadeva contends that "the non-thesis is not called thesis, as non-existence. We said before that all dharmas are pratityasamutpaada and that they are devoid of any characteristic. Therefore we have no thesis. To have no thesis is not called a thesis. For example when we say 'non-existence' this is real non-existence; but it is not on account of the fact that we say 'non-existence' there is then non-existence. The same (must be understood) as regard to the non-existence of thesis."[39]

Do the Maadhyamikas really have no thesis or view of their own? In spite of the fact that the Maadhyamikas repeat again and again that they have no thesis, I think they have a thesis, namely, that all things are empty and all views are erroneous. The Maadhyamikas seem to be quite convinced of this from the very beginning. They just "pretend" to say that it is only a result of their critical analysis. Strictly speaking, the only way one can claim that all possible views are erroneous is to have an actual analysis of them. But the Maadhyamikas have not actually examined all views. How can they claim that all views are erroneous? Does it not show that the claim, "all views are erroneous'', is their conviction rather than a discovery resulting from their critical examination? Perhaps the Maadhyamikas might say that the rejection of all views does not depend on the quantitative ground that it has exhausted all possible views but on the qualitative discovery of the absurdity of any view. It is not necessary for them actually to examine all views. But this can be the case only under the presupposition that all views bear the same characteristics and can be reduced or examined in the same way. Now how do the Maadhyamikas know this presupposition? Is it the result of their critical examination of all views? Is this not their thesis?

It seems to me that even if we grant that the Maadhyamikas have no position and that their philosophy is just a "pure criticism"[40] of other philosophies, it does not follow that they cannot be mistaken in any thing they say. In fact,

the essential for any such sound "pure criticism" is to understand what the opponents say and to use what they accept to refute their viewpoints. The success of this criticism lies in the fact that the arguments of the opponents really involve absurdities or contradictions as the Maadhyamikas claim. But unfortunately, the Maadhyamikas often misrepresent what other people hold and often base their criticisms on certain basic principles and assumptions which the opponents do not accept, forcing the opponents to accept the "fallacious" consequence of the entire reasoning.[41] Their criticism is unfair to the opponents.

Let me cite an example to make this point clear. In refuting the aatman philosophy, Naagaarjuna presents the following argument:

Naagaarjuna assumes that all his opponents accept the premise (l). For in close examination of our experience we know that all things are produced by a combination of various causes and conditions, and hence have no definite mark, nature and own-being. They are just the products of certain conditions. When the conditions are changed, they would also change and even disappear. So there cannot be an unchanging and steadfast substratum such as the aatman or the Braahman of the Upani.sads. If anyone says that aatman exists, his view would involve contradiction; it is the same as saying that something which has self-abiding nature and is permanent is devoid of self-abiding nature and is impermanent.[42] Therefore it is unintelligible to hold that there is aatman.[43] It is obvious that the contradiction in the premise (3) would occur only if the aatman philosophers accept the premise (1). But the traditional aatman philosophers do not hold that all things, including aatman, are causally dependent co-arising and devoid of self-abiding nature. For them, the real is that which has never arisen and hence has no beginning or end, is self-abiding and permanent. So one should not say that aatman philosophy itself involves contradiction which Naagaarjuna claims it does.[44]

Thus while the Maadhyamikas insist that all views are absurd and therefore should be ruled out, they are just playing a trick on the opponents by putting something, which the latter do not accept and want, into their mouths and holding them responsible for the fallacious consequent of it. Furthermore, in using and proving those principles, the Maadhyamikas, as pointed out, commit certain fallacies. Since the opponents do not hold nor have any intention to prove the principles, the fallacies should be attributed to the Maadhyamikas, not to the opponents.

For Naagaarjuna, his critical analysis of the concepts of motion and rest is the model for refuting any dynamic and static views of the universe. "Origination", "abiding" and "destruction" can be criticized and refuted in the same manner as motion and rest. But now we have just seen that his arguments against motion and rest are untenable. So it is fair to say that he has not conclusively refuted all dynamic and static interpretations of the world.

NOTES

1. Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. I, Part 1, p. 55. Heraclitus also says, "You cannot step twice into the same river, for fresh waters are ever flowing in upon you." Ibid.

2. Ibid., PP 73-76. The Eleatics hold that true being is to be found, not by sense but by thought, and thought shows that there can be no motion and no change.

4. See the 'Discourse on the Explanation of Change' of the Kung-sun Lung-tzu[bb] (ch. 4).

5. Those logicians also argue that "The arrow is flying so fast that there are moments when it is neither in motion nor at rest" and that ''Take a stick one foot long and cut it in half every day and you will never exhaust it even after ten thousand generations." The works of the logicians have all been lost. The paradoxes are recorded in Chapter XXXIII of the Chuang-tzu. Since we don't have their original sources, it is difficult and even impossible to know exactly how they argue for these.

7. Maadhyamika Buddhism is known as San-lun-zsung[cc] (Three Treatise School) in China. For this school is considered to be based on three texts: (a) the Middle Treatise (Chung-lun:[d] Taisho No. 1564 in Vol. 30), (b) the Twelve Gate Treatise (Shih-erh-men-lun:e Taisho No. 1568 in Vol. 30), and (c) the Hundred Treatise (Pai-lun:[f] Taisho No. 1569 in Vol. 30).

8. T. R. V. Murti says, "Considering the role and the importance of the Maadhyamika, I have ventured to appraise it as the Central Philosophy of Buddhism." The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1970), p. vii

9. The name "Maadhyamika" was derived from the Sanskrit noun "madhyamaa", meaning "the middle", and suffix "ka". The Maadhyamika philosophy was so called because it

proclaimed and stressed the doctrine of the Middle Way by refuting all possible epistemological, metaphysical and religious extreme views of Braahmanism, Hiinayaana and other Mahaayaana Buddhist schools

10. See Wm. Theodore de Bary, ed., The Buddhist Tradition in India, China and Japan (New York: Modern Library, 1969), p. 71; from the Buddhacarita, Sanskrit text was ed., by E. H. Johnson (Calcutta: Baptist Mission Press, 1935), pp. 140-142.

13. This verse is the last verse of the Middle Treatise; it is the conclusion of the book. "shih-fa",[h] this doctrine, means the entire teaching of the whole treatise or what Naagaarjuna taught in the previous verses of the book.

15. The Middle Treatise was translated by Kumaarajiva in 409 A.D. from the now lost Maadhyamika-Saastra The main verses were given by Naagaarjuna, and its commentary was given by Pingala This treatise does not exist in the Sanskrit original nor in the Tibetan translation. In his preface to the treatise, Seng-jui[i] states that the treatise has 500 verses, but in fact it has only 445 verses.

17. Chapter II of the Middle Treatise consists of twenty-five verses. According to my understanding, they can be divided into eight main paragraphs as follows:

18. Maadhyamikas do not make a clear distinction between epistemological and ontological senses of impossibility.

23. It seems that this section is given mainly to criticize the Saammitiiya and the Vaatsiiputriiya. According to these early Buddhists, motion is possible since there is the mover or moving entity.

32. See Irving M. Copi, Introduction To Logic (New York: Macmillan, 1972), pp. 96-97.

33. See Keith Emerson Ballard, Study Guide for Copi: Introduction to Logic (New York: Macmillan, 1972). pp. 45-46.

36. The Twelve Gate Treatise, II. This treatise was translated by Kumaarajiiva in 408-409 A.D. From the now lost Dvadasa-dvaara- 'saastra. Both main verses and commentary were given by Naagaarjuna. It has no Tibetan translation nor does it exist in the Sanskrit original.

37. The Huei-cheng-lun, 29. Taisho No. 1601 in Vol. 32. This text was translated into Chinese by Vimoksasena (Pi-mu-chih-hsien)[q] and Gautama (Prajna)-ruci (Ch'u-tan-liu-chih)[r] in 541 A.D. during the rule of the Eastern Wei.

38. The Hundred Treatise, Chapter III, Section 5. This treatise was translated by Kumaarajiiva in 404 A.D. from the Sata-Saastra. Its main verses were given by Aaryadeva and its commentary was given by Vasu.

40. "Pure criticism" here means that the Maadhyamikas seek only to expose absurdity or self-contradiction in their opponents' view.

41. The main principles and assumptions upon which the Maadhyamika criticism depend are these: (a) whatever is characteristic of individuals must be characteristic of the group containing those individuals; (b) an object and the way that object appears (e.g., a mover and motion) belong to the same category; (c) whatever are different cannot be related; (d) there cannot be reflexive action; (e) rest is a sort of activity; and (f) whatever can be conceived to exist is dependent co-arising and hence is devoid of self-abiding nature and cannot be permanent.

42. This argument assumes that "to exist" is "to be conditioned", "to be caused", or "to be dependent upon something else".

44. What I want to say here, contra the Maadhyamikas, is not that the aatman philosophy is right and cannot be refuted, but that the Maadhyamikas have not successfully shown that the aatman view is self-contradictory and hence untenable. It seems that if the Maadhyamikas were able to prove that whatever can be conceived to exist is causally co-arising and impermanent, they would be able to show that the concept of aatman is unintelligible. This seems to be what the early Buddhists and Hume tried to do. But the Maadhyamikas did not do so.

GLOSSARY

a	I Ching	易經
b	Kung- sun Lung	公孫龍
bb	Kung-sun Lung-tzu	公孫龍子
c	San-lun	三論
cc	San-lun-tsung	三論宗
d	Chung-lun	中論
e	Shih-erh-men-lun	十二門論
f	Pai-lun	百論
g	pa-pu-chung-tao	八不中道
h	shih-fa	是法
i	Seng- jui	僧叡
j	Seng-chao	僧肇
k	Wu-pu-ch'ien-lun	物不遷論
l	Chao-lun	肇論
m	i- ch'u	己去
n	wei-ch'u	未去
o	ch'u-shih	去時
p	Huei-cheng-lun	迴諍論
q	Pi-mu-chih-hsien	毘目智仙
r	Ch'u-tan-lun-chih	瞿曇流支

Motion and Rest in the Middle Treatise
By Hsueh-Li Cheng

Journal of Chinese Philosophy
V. 7 (1980)
pp. 229-244

Copyright 1980 by D. Reidel Publishing Co.

I

II

III

NOTES

GLOSSARY

Motion and Rest in the Middle Treatise By Hsueh-Li Cheng

Journal of Chinese Philosophy V. 7 (1980) pp. 229-244

Copyright 1980 by D. Reidel Publishing Co.

I

II

III

NOTES

GLOSSARY

Motion and Rest in the Middle Treatise
By Hsueh-Li Cheng

Journal of Chinese Philosophy
V. 7 (1980)
pp. 229-244