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To begin with I am quite aware that any attempt to deal with a topic such as "Ch'an (Zen), Taoism, and Wittgenstein" would have to face certain problems, risks, and criticisms, Some, for instance, would object on a priori grounds that the attempt made here is not scholarly nor fruitful, that it is a waste of time, and that it is philosophically unjustifiable to discourse on this type of topic. This is because involved in this type of topic are conceptual systems, philosophies, cultures, values, goals, and methodologies that are so different that they cannot be accurately understood in their own terms due to misinterpretation and distortion. Perhaps in cases in which careful and painstaking scholarly work is lacking or is not consistently carried out, this objection would be valid and it should be taken seriously as a healthy reminder.
However, it is fair and necessary to point out that my attempt to deal with this type of topic does constitute a philosophically legitimate, though not an entirely new venture. For, recent studies, discussions, and publications have shown that there are some significant parallels or resemblances not only between Western and Eastern philosophies in general as Archie J. Baum,[1] Frederick C. Copleston,[2] Kwee Swan Liat,[3] Paul Masson-Oursel,[4] Hajime Nakamura,[5] Troy Wilson Organ,[6] John C. Plott,[7] P. T. Raju,[8] and Ben-Ami Scharfstein,[9] to name a few, have admirably demonstrated. But there are also some interesting parallels between Chinese philosophy, particularly between the Ch'an School of Chinese Buddhism and the philosophy of Taoism espoused by Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu, and the philosophy of the early and later Wittgenstein as Dennis Ahern,[10] Arthur Danto,[11] Russell Goodman,[12] Ben-Ami Scharfstein,[13] and Lik Kuen Tong,[14] to name a few, have ably shown.
I hope that I have conveyed the impression that what I want to say on this topic is an outgrowth of and elaboration upon the relevant contributions of these and other scholars. Accordingly, I would like to make it my aim to
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discuss how we can interrelate the Ch'an School, philosophic Taoism, and Wittgenstein in terms of their major tenets so that the question of their compatibility or incompatibility can be addressed and resolved.
In order to achieve this aim, I will attempt to first discuss some connecting links between the Ch'an School (recognized by some to have been originated by Bodhidharma and developed more significantly by Hui-neng, Shen-hsiu, and others) and philosophic Taoism (derived from Lao Tzu and developed by Chuang Tzu). Then I will present a similar discussion of some connecting links between Ch'an and Taoism combined, and Wittgenstein- especially the early and later Wittgenstein. I will conclude by using the discussion on connecting links to deal with the question as to whether or not Ch'an and Taoism can be philosophically compatible with Wittgenstein and to what extent.
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In trying to discuss some connecting links between Ch'an and Taoism, I wish to make clear that it is not my purpose to make into an issue the question as to whether the Ch'an School of Chinese Buddhism was originated by the Indian Buddhist Bodhidharma or by somebody else such as Tao-seng (as the distinguished scholar Hu Shih had argued in 1932 in his informative and thorough article entitled "Development of Zen Buddhism in China."[15]) Nor do I intend to make into an issue the question as to whether the Taoist philosophy that stems from Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu did have any decisive impact on the development of Ch'an, though there is some evidence that "the philosophy of Ch'an (or Zen) Buddhism is remarkably similar to philosophic Taoism, and that at least some of its founders were quite familiar with the Chuang Tzu."[16] Rather I want to acknowledge the various contributions made by numerous Taoist philosophers and Ch'an masters to the development of Ch'an. And, for the sake of discussion, I want to concentrate on some positive factors shared by philosophic Taoism and the Ch'an School. Among some of the most significant of these are the following: (1) recognition of a reality immanent in everybody and in everything including the world of Nature, (2) acceptance and practice of the wordless doctrine according to which enlightenment or liberation is not founded on words, letters, rituals, and traditions, (3) emphasis on naturalness and spontaneity, and (4) maintenance of the harmony of opposites.[17]
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Let us make these factors more explicit. From Lao Tzu's point of view, the immanent reality is no other than Tao, which can be understood in two important senses. In the absolute sense Tao is not a reality with describable features due to its simplicity, emptiness, and indeterminateness, which is somewhat analogous to an uncarved block. In the relative sense Tao is a describable reality by virtue of its creative and dynamic function considered as the source and sustainer of the universe.[18] In the absolute sense the intrinsic reality of Tao is necessarily beyond description, in which case we are compelled to exercise silence, or even better, to express our knowledge of Tao by refraining from using language to talk about Tao when we may happen to know Tao. As Lao Tzu paradoxically but tersely remarks, "He who knows [the Tao] does not [care to] speak [about it];he who is [ever ready to speak about it does not know it."[19]
From the Ch'an standpoint, what is called the immanent reality is part and parcel of everyone and everything[20] and is disclosed through personal awakening, which is referred to as the experience of enlightenment (wu). However, without limiting itself to Taoism, the Ch'an School recognizes that such an immanent reality is no other than the realization of Buddha nature or having no mind of one's own,[21] which is an undifferentiated continuum due to forgetting of all distinctions[22] but not an underlying substance with a Cartesian center of its own.
The enlightenment experience referred to can come about in one of two ways. According to the Northern School of Ch'an led by Shen-hsiu (600-706),[23] the personal realization is a matter of gradual enlightenment because one has to distinguish the unenlightened part from the enlightened part of the mind and it takes time for the mind to be enlightened. But according to the Southern School led by Hui-neng (638-713),[24] personal awakening is a type of transforming and revolutionary experience that can occur suddenly with unexpected intensity. For the Southern School of Hui-neng, it is misleading to speak of the unenlightened and enlightened parts of the mind as if they were separated out from moment to moment. Instead all of these belong to one mind and are indistinguishable when the moment of direct intuition and personal enlightenment comes.
With respect to the second factor, we can see that both the Ch'an School and Taoism do reject the descriptive and explanatory uses of language to deal with the truth of personal enlightenment.[25] In general this rejection
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represents a denial of the applicability and validity of what is called the theory of names, which calls for a one-to-one correspondence between names and referents. In the case of the Ch'an School, any effort to express or describe the content of the enlightenment experience of wu is rejected because the direct realization of wu is not readily distinguishable from the emptiness or suchness of things as they are. That the realization and attainment of wu is not amenable to semantic and syntactical manipulations is reflected in the Ch'an conviction that the truth of enlightenment is "not expressed in words or written in letters"[26] but is directly intuited and experienced.
From the Taoist perspective, any attempt to use written or spoken words to talk about Tao, especially in the absolute sense, is also rejected on the grounds of indescribability or unnameability and ignorance of the nature of Tao. As Lao Tzu observes,
The Tao that can be expressed (named)
Is not the Absolute Tao.
The names that can be spoken
Are not Absolute Names.[27]
Here the Taoist rejection or caution is predicated on two supporting arguments. The first argument proceeds from the premise that the absolute Tao is such that its simplicity, emptiness, and indeterminateness would logically preclude the possibility of assigning to the absolute Tao any describable attributes or nameable features. Accordingly, since Tao, absolutely considered, is simple and devoid, like a vacuum, of any determinate qualities, the absolute Tao is not a nameable or describable referent. This implies that the absolute Tao by its very nature can only be properly understood by overcoming or transcending the conventions of language and the tendency to resort to silence as a form of nonverbal communication. To this effect, Chuang Tzu cautions as follow:
Were language adequate, it would take but a day fully to set forth Tao.
Not being adequate, it takes that time to explain material existences.
Tao is something beyond material existences.
It cannot be conveyed either by words or by silence.[28]
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The other supporting argument is that "knowing" the absolute Tao is neither a matter of having knowledge in the conventional sense nor a matter of having no-knowledge.[29] This is because the state of knowledge in the conventional sense presupposes a subject-object distinction, which is extrinsic to the absolute Tao. And because the state of having no knowledge is indicative of blind ignorance or illusory consciousness, which hampers any attempt to know the absolute Tao and to capitalize on its creative efficacy (te). Rather knowing the absolute Tao involves the discarding of knowledge by forgetting all distinctions.[30] This move results in the non-epistemological state of having no-knowledge, which comes after the stage of having knowledge.
Implicit in this rejection of language and knowledge in the conventional sense are two outstanding pragmatic strategies characteristic of the practice of the Ch'an School and Taoism. One of these is the tactical application of the iconoclastic attitude to challenge and loosen the grip of. conventions in society. The other is the catalytic use of silence to break up the dichotomizing and restrictive tendency of conventional knowledge and language. The iconoclastic attitude stems from the conviction that written and spoken words, because they are an integral part of the rules and conventions of language, tend to reify and obscure the immediate quality of the enlightenment experience. The catalytic use of silence is not so much to communicate non-verbally as it is to overcome or transcend spontaneously and unconditionally the conceptual constraints[31] imposed by language, knowledge, and thinking in the conventional sense, whether or not we are made aware of the limitations and inadequacies of our language, knowledge, and thinking.
These two pragmatic strategies give rise to the third and fourth factors characteristic of the practice of Ch'an and Taoism. Both regard the quest for enlightenment as not requiring the performance of any special or super-mundane activities in addition to the daily activities or tasks that people perform naturally and spontaneously. This means that the Ch'an and Taoist aspirants do not opt for enlightenment as if it were a state external to, or separate from all other activities of everyday life or the mundane world including the world of Nature. Rather they try to attain enlightenment through a tactical, undistracted, and alert performance of diversified but harmonized activities of everyday life familiar to everybody, This also means that the Ch'an and Taoist aspirants are able to perform their usual tasks
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with strategic advantage because they are conceptually liberated from external constraints and the yoke of conventions. Consequently, as conceptually liberated individuals, they are able to effectively work their way through the conventions of society instead of being used by them.[32] From the Ch'an perspective such a manner of operating is indicative of an individual who is capable of going through moments of enlightened living while he is actively involved in activities such as eating, washing dishes, cutting grass, painting a house, chopping wood, etc. But from the Taoist perspective such a mode of living is characteristic of an individual who operates through the superior Way of non-action (wu-wei),[33] which must be regarded as the path of least interference, but not as the static state of' mere passiveness or inactivity. Moreover, such an individual, when he learns to let himself go or leave his mind alone, is capable of following the superior Way of non-interfering action because he acts through and with the creative and virtuous power of te[34] whose practical efficacy[35] is exemplified by his natural and spontaneous action. That superior and effective performance can be attributed to the practical efficacy or agency of te is attested to by Lao Tzu when he observes as follows:
Superior te is not te,
and thus has te.
Inferior te does not let go of te,
and thus is not te.
Superior te is non-active [wu wei] and aimless.
Inferior te is active and has an aim.[36]¡@
Given these factors considered as possible links that connect Ch'an and Taoism, let us determine and discuss whether and how any of these and other possible links can relate Ch'an and Taoism to Wittgenstein.
Before we do this, it is necessary to have a clear overview of the entire philosophy of Wittgenstein so that we can see clearly which aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophy can be connected with Ch'an and Taoism. As it is customarily done, the entire philosophy of Wittgenstein is divided into four main periods, which are referred to as (1) the early Wittgenstein, (2) the middle Wittgenstein, (3) the later Wittgenstein, and (4) the mature Wittgenstein .
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In the philosophy of the early Wittgenstein set forth in the Tractatus, the main concern is the development of a logic of description that governs the describable states of affairs. The fundamental underpinnings of the logic of description are the doctrine of logical atomism and the doctrine of logical independence of elementary propositions. According to the first doctrine, factual descriptions of particular states of affairs or atomic facts in the world are possible by means of elementary propositions in such a way that the latter are logical pictures of the former. According to the second doctrine, in order for these elementary propositions to be descriptive of corresponding unique factual states of affairs, these elementary propositions must have definite or determinate propositional sense. Otherwise, they would be so unavoidably ambiguous that they would be descriptive of no particular state of affairs-actual or possible. And in order for these elementary propositions to have determinate sense, their constituents must be simple names that stand for simple objects whose configurations can give rise to the structure of depictable states of affairs. On the basis of the logic of description, the Tractatus recommends that when we are dealing with states of affairs that are not describable or that are not susceptible to linguistic articulation, we are better off if we exercise silence. As Wittgenstein says in the concluding proposition of his Tractatus: "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence."[37]
In the philosophy of the middle Wittgenstein set forth in Philosophical Remarks and Philosophical Grammar, the main concern is to preserve the contextual setting for the proper understanding of propositions that are already accepted or held to be true. This is done by placing propositions within a particular conceptual system in which they first arise and make sense. Consequently we cannot indiscriminately confuse propositions that may be true within a particular conceptual system with those that may be true in another conceptual system. This implies that the truth or falsity of propositions is relative to the conceptual system to which they belong and is contingent on the categories and forms of life operative within such conceptual systems.
In the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein set forth in Philosophical Investigations and Blue and Brown Books, the main concern is to remind us of, and make us take seriously the many different but legitimate uses of language in its natural every day setting. Here language is no longer restricted
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to the way we describe the world. Rather the focus of attention is on the actual and possible uses in which people employ language in connection with their accepted and practiced forms of life. This means that uses of language do encompass people's values, lifestyles, natural histories, and traditions in which they live, work, study, worship, communicate, and perform many other activities. The upshot of all this is that whatever we mean or intend to say is disclosed by the particular context in which we use language analogous to the way we play games.
And in the philosophy of the mature Wittgenstein set forth in On Certainty, the main concern is to show that the non-epistemological certainty of common-sense propositions lies not in philosophical justification but in following with regularity an established practice. Unlike the British philosopher G. E. Moore who attempted to offer a justification or verification for our acceptance of common-sense propositions, the mature Wittgenstein argues that such propositions are not strictly {empirical} propositions that require justification or verification. For, the certainty of common-sense propositions is not based on the elimination of doubt by appealing to some solid epistemological foundation. Rather, common-sense propositions acquire their certainty from the everyday practice carried out regularly by people when they go through their daily routines.
Given our discussion on Ch'an and Taoism and given our presentation of the entire philosophy of Wittgenstein, we can relate Ch'an and Taoism to Wittgenstein by concentrating on the following connecting links: (1) forms of life and uses of language;(2) everyday life and practical activities; (3) particularity and complementarity; (4) problems and solutions; (5) the inexpressible and resort to silence;and (6) private language and private sense.
In the first link we find that the Ch'an quest for the enlightenment experience of wu and the Taoist search for the path of active non-interfering action presuppose what the later Wittgenstein calls forms of life. For the later Wittgenstein, these forms of life must be accepted as the givens.[38] Such givens not only project new ways of living and new ways of seeing and looking at the world, but they also give rise to a new language and new uses of language. Since forms of life can become an important part of understanding the different uses into which language is put, it is consistent with the approach of the later Wittgenstein to infer that the forms of life pursued or cultivated by Ch'an and Taoism can provide the proper contexts or stage
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settings for understanding the particular uses of language made by practitioners of Ch'an and Taoism. We can now see that the significance of this first link lies in the twofold flexibility of the later Wittgenstein. On the one hand, the later Wittgenstein (as well as the middle Wittgenstein) would accept as givens the Ch'an and Taoist forms of life with their systems of communication. On the other hand, the later Wittgenstein would also recognize that there are many different uses and strategies that can be pragmatically advantageous to the goals and needs of the Ch'an and Taoist practitioners.
In the second link we find that the recognition of everyday life and practical activities is common to Ch'an, Taoism and the later and mature Wittgenstein. However, this common recognition arises from different but not mutually exclusive considerations. On the one hand, the later and mature Wittgenstein's recognition stems from the common-sense observation that in everyday life and practical activities we are provided with concrete contexts for publicly teachable and learnable uses of language that can become part of the regular practice of accepted conventions. But Ch'an and Taoist recognition arises from the conviction that while the quest for wu or Tao can be effectively conducted in a practical manner within the confines of everyday life, we should be alerted that the accepted conventions can only be followed to the extent that doing so does not hinder or jeopardize the natural and spontaneous performance of daily tasks. In other words, the later Wittgenstein holds that the consistent following of accepted conventions can display rule-governed behavior and the mature Wittgenstein holds that the regular practice of numerous daily-life activities can give ordinary certainty to common-sense propositions. But Ch'an and Taoism would require that it is no necessary to carry out either practice to the point where such practice would rule out unconventional and iconoclastic but conceivable strategies needed for the language-game of attaining the wu experience or of identifying with Tao.
What is significant about this link is that it points to two ways of dealing with scepticism. For the later and mature Wittgenstein, the nonepistemological certainty displayed by consistent following of accepted conventions shows that the sceptic's position can't be expressed and communicated without being meaningless and self-defeating, since it presupposes the common use of a public language whose rules are socially binding. But for Ch'an and Taoism, a certain degree of pragmatic iconoclasm has to be
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exercised in order not to allow such conventions and the sceptic's pronouncements on doubt to interfere with the spontaneous and creative performance of everyday-life activities that are conducive to personal enlightenment.
In the third link we find that Ch'an and Taoism are in agreement with the later Wittgenstein's injunction against the tendency to generalize and to reify universals without paying attention to particular cases with their individuating features.[39] Like the iconoclastic Ch'an and Taoist masters who would rather prefer the concrete experience of enlightenment or unverbalized identification with Tao instead of their abstract representation, the later Wittgenstein proceeds by giving reminders and by citing examples when faced with a philosophical problem. Implicit in this link is a joint effort by Ch'an, Taoism, and the later Wittgenstein to reject the Platonic view of universals or theory of forms in favor of fusing and concretizing universals with particulars depending on .the specific content of use. For Ch'an and Taoism, although the particulars of experience can become pragmatic exigencies for universals, the particulars themselves can be related to and harmonized with each other. This is because the particulars can function as complements of each other even though they may be different. However, for the later Wittgenstein, what is illuminating about the particulars of experience is that although they may possess different features, two or more of these particulars can have overlapping similarities which would give rise to family resemblances[40] without presupposing some metaphysical essence that must be common to all of them.
In the fourth link we find that with this inheritance of the notion of "the indubitable Tao", the Ch'an School, particularly Hui-neng's Southern School which favors sudden enlightenment, can be related to the early and later Wittgenstein. This can be seen in the way problems of life and problems f philosophy are treated. From the perspective of sudden enlightenment held by the Ch'an Southern School, problems of life are solved not when the enlightened person comes up with some definitive solution for his alleged problem. Rather his alleged problem is solved in the sense that it ceases to be a problem when its problematic content suddenly disappears due to the sudden change in his way of viewing the world brought about by his sudden enlightenment.[41] This sudden disappearance of the enlightened person's alleged problem is often compared by Ch'an masters to the falling out of the bottom of a tub filled with a certain content (water).[42] The tub's
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content can suddenly disappear from one's view at the moment when the bottom of the tub suddenly falls out, resulting in a complete loss of its content, which is similar to the dissolution of the alleged problem in a way therapeutic to the enlightened person.
Like the Ch'an masters, the early and later Wittgenstein treats problems of life and philosophy by urging us to acquire a vantage point from which the alleged problems are no longer seen as problems.[43] For the early Wittgenstein, what we need to do about problems of life is not to opt for some sure-fire panacea, since none may be forthcoming. Rather what we need to do is to see clearly that a possible way out is to begin by vanishing an alleged problem for which no laboriously contrived solution would be needed once its content falls out of view as Ch'an masters would say. For the later Wittgenstein, philosophical problems are solved not by coming up with new or special information. Rather they are dissolved by having a clear understanding of the inner workings of the language used and by arranging the body of information and knowledge accessible to us in different patterns viewed from new perspectives. What is significant about this approach to problems of life and problems of philosophy is that the previously tormented mind of the philosopher or enlightened person, when the problems are dissolved, is eventually brought to a peaceful state, which seems to be psychologically equivalent to the state of mind characteristic of the enlightenment experience of wu or the identification with the Way of wu-wei.
In the fifth link we find that such advocates of Ch'an as Hui-neng and such exponents of Taoist philosophy as Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu are in agreement with the early Wittgenstein that there are realities that cannot be expressed or described in terms of written and spoken words or by language in general. The suggested strategy or advice from Ch'an, Taoism, and the early Wittgenstein can be stated in this way. If there is a linguistically inexpressible or indescribable reality, the proper course of action is to practice silence or resort to some form of "wordless faith."[44] For Ch'an such a reality is revealed through the enlightenment' experience of wu. For Taoism such a reality is manifested through the creative and dynamic agency of Tao when the Way of non-action (wu-wei) is followed. And for the early Wittgenstein, such a reality is referred to as "the mystical."[45] Three examples of the mystical are (1) the fact that the world does exist,[46] (2) feeling the world as a limited whole,[47] and (3) the things that show themselves.[48] What Ch'an and
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Taoism recognize as the inexpressible seems to be equivalent to the early Wittgenstein's third category of the mystical. This seems to be the case because in both the enlightenment experience of wu and the identification with the Way of wu-wei, the immanent reality discloses itself without the necessity for linguistic articulation or logical description.
However, when the early Wittgenstein concludes that "what we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence,[49] we have to be clear about what this silence means and why it is recommended, especially With respect to Ch'an and Taoism. How shall we interpret this silence for the early Wittgenstein and does this silence function in a way equivalent or complementary to the way silence functions for Ch'an and Taoism? We can interpret the recommended silence as a state due to a speech defect, due to an uncoerced willingness not to speak, due to a temporary physical and mental exhaustion, due to a refusal to speak while being submitted to external pressures, due to a personal decision to withhold information, or due to one's decision to exercise one's constitutional right to remain silent. Judging from his aforementioned remarks, the early Wittgenstein does not seem to have in mind any of these meanings for the recommended silence. Instead by silence the early Wittgenstein seems to mean a logically necessary curtailment of the descriptive use of language when the limits of' logical description are reached, since descriptive propositions can only have definite sense within such limits. This means that even the interpretation of silence as a non-verbal mode of communication is also ruled out.
Given this notion of` silence, we would like to know whether it functions in a way that is equivalent or complementary to the way silence functions for Ch'an and Taoism. Since, as we pointed out earlier, both Ch'an and Taoism have rejected the theory of names and description, which is consequential to the silence recommended by the early Wittgenstein, and since both Ch'an and Taoism are committed to a concrete cultivation of a direct unmediated experience through natural and spontaneous actions, we can infer that silence for the Ch'an and Taoist practitioners seems to function as a pedagogical device that does nor presuppose a descriptive language whose limits precondition the necessity for silence.[50] Whereas the practice of silence for Ch'an and Taoism can be done spontaneously without the need to overcome the limits of logical description, the practice of silence for the early Wittgenstein is an inevitable consequence of being
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made aware of the limits of logical description. Although these two ways of practicing silence are not functionally equivalent, they seem to be complementary. On the one hand, the Ch'an and Taoist use of silence is intended to transcend the dichotomy between communication by words and communication by silence. And on the other hand, the early Wittgenstein's use of silence is intended to prevent us from transgressing the limits of logical description, beyond which propositional sense is inexpressible but at which the meaning and value of the mystical can be shown though it cannot be said.
And in the sixth link we find something remarkable about the way Ch'an and Taoism are related to the early and later Wittgenstein. By virtue of the Ch'an and Taoist rejection of the theory of names and description and by virtue of the Ch'an and Taoist spontaneous and unconditional 'use of silence, the possibility of a private language is eliminated, which the later Wittgenstein also rejects but for different reasons. For the later Wittgenstein,[51] it is not logically possible to have a private language because it is difficult if not impossible to have reliable and independent criteria for the determination and verification of the sense and truth of strictly private claims. Moreover, since such criteria are lacking or cannot be obtained, there would be no significant difference between current and incorrect understanding of the use of language. Consequently, the notion of following rules privately without external checking would be contradictory and would have no intelligible sense.
What is important about the later Wittgenstein's private-language argument is that he does not deny or downgrade the existence of any private entities or mental processes as is often thought by some. What the later Wittgenstein wants to expose is the logical difficulty or practical impossibility of trying to learn privately and consistently from one's own case the sense and truth of descriptive propositions on the basis of the name-object model with the alleged private rules and private understanding. On this point Ch'an and Taoist practitioners, due to their pragmatic use of conventions, would agree with the later Wittgenstein that no intelligible and consistent sense can be given to our descriptive propositions on a strictly private basis, This implies that the only consistent and checkable way for referring to our private sensations and other mental processes is to use with regularity a publicly learnable and teachable language. However, Ch'an and Taoist practitioners wouldn't rely solely on the public use of language because their
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life activities and other preoccupations can best be executed with unconventional and iconoclastic tactics, including the strategic use of silence for overcoming the constraints imposed by the public use of language.
Here lies one significant difference between the later Wittgenstein and Ch'an and Taoist practitioners. While the former has a great respect for the ordinary or familiar uses of language based on public criteria and social conventions, the latter intend to diffuse or minimize the limiting influence of such criteria and conventions should they become barriers against spontaneous action for personal enlightenment.
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Based on the preceding discussion I would like to address and resolve the compatibility/incompatibility question. Although some of the connecting links discussed are sometimes not clear-cut and are somewhat artificial, it is fair to say that the question of the compatibility of Ch'an and Taoism with Wittgenstein can be assessed in terms of those links that have been effectively demonstrated. in looking at the six links discussed, I think that links 2, 3,4, and 5 seem to provide more defensible grounds for compatibility than links 1 and 6 would provide. It is clear from the discussion of links 2 and 3 that Ch'an and Taoism are compatible with Wittgenstein, since they all emphasize the importance of everyday life,practical activities, and particular cases. However, it is clear from the discussion of the fourth link that Ch'an, rather than Taoism, is compatible with Wittgenstein, since their approaches approaches to problems of life and philosophy are based on the view that such problems can be likened to diseases and their solutions can be regarded as possible therapies,[52] resulting in having peace of mind and experience of harmony. The importance of this link is that it shows that although problems of life are central to Ch'an and problems of philosophy are central to Wittgenstein, the result for the problem solver in both preoccupations seems to be a form of personal liberation from an inability to see the world clearly as it is without mental entanglements and conceptual confusions.
The discussion of the fifth link has shown that Ch'an and Taoism are compatible with the early Wittgenstein, since silence is used or recommended
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by all three to deal with the inexpressible. However, what may still be unclear is whether Ch'an, Taoism, and the early Wittgenstein would recognize that silence is not only a necessary consequence of being exposed to the limits of language, but is also a pre-logical and non-linguistic precondition for using language and seeing the world aright. From the perspective of Ch'an and Taoism, the answer is affirmative. From the perspective of the early Wittgenstein, the answer tends to be understandably negative, given the priority of the requirements (demand for simple objects and demand for independent elementary propositions composed of simple names for such objects) for the logic of description. Consequently the compatibility on this link is only partial, since the early Wittgenstein seems to assign to silence the role of a logical indicator that signals when the limits of language are reached, while for Ch'an and Taoism, silence functions as an ontological presupposition for the possibility of language, but not as the consequence dictated by the impossibility of speech or linguistic sayability at the limits of language. However, the later Wittgenstein is compatible with Ch'an and Taoism, since he would treat silence as part of the accepted forms of life discussed in the first link. For the later Wittgenstein, there is a certain degree of silence or "wordless faith" implicit in, or shown by the practice of every-day life. As Paul Engelmann observes, "What Wittgenstein's life and work shows is the possibility of a new spiritual attitude. It is 'a new way of life' which he lived... .Wittgenstein's language is the language of wordless faith."[53]
Although there is a sense in which both Ch'an and Taoism can be compatible with the later Wittgenstein as discussed in the sixth link, the compatibility based on the logical impossibility of a private language tends to be misleading and questionable. This is because what the later Wittgenstein's private-language argument does is to shift the locus of understanding and using language with consistent public sense from an exclusively private affair to an ongoing social practice of the community. There is no question that this shift to the public practice reinforces the hold of accepted conventions on practitioners. However, since the practitioners of Ch'an and Taoism would like to be conceptually liberated from such conventions even to the point of appearing tactfully unconventional, the degree of compatibility is greatly reduced. Such a situation can be prevented if the later Wittgenstein would allow the Ch'an and Taoist practitioners to make up their own rules
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as they move on in the game of attaining enlightenment or finding Tao.
From this assume we can make some concluding remarks. Although there are some points of possible incompatibility if left unclarified and unqualified, it is reasonable to conclude that he connecting links that relate Ch'an and Taoism to Wittgenstein, especially the later Wittgenstein, do provide some acceptable and significant grounds for relative or qualified compatibility. However, the extend to which Ch'an, Taoism, and Wittgenstein are philosophically compatible depends on the specific aspects in which they can be related to each other. On the one hand, the Ch'an School and philosophic Taoism are compatible with the early and later Wittgenstein, but only to a limited degree. On the other hand, since it is not entirely unreasonable to say that the Ch'an School has successfully incorporated into its philosophic heritage some outstanding characteristics of Taoism such as naturalness, spontaneity, iconoclasm, and non-action, the Ch'an School seems to be relatively more compatible with Wittgenstein, particularly the later Wittgenstein than Taoism, considered by itself, seems to be. This is because the emphasis on accepted forms of life, everyday life, practical activities, particular cases, dissolution of problems of life and philosophy, and flexibility on silence, is more characteristic of Ch'an than Taoism.
Of course the relative or qualified compatibility of Ch'an and Taoism with Wittgenstein is not an absolutely true claim but a fairly reasonable hypothesis that may be entertained for whatever merits and demerits. But since most of the connecting links discussed seem to relate to an acceptable degree Ch'an and Taoism to Wittgenstein and vice versa, it is significant to observe that the related aspects that Ch'an and Taoism share with Wittgenstein tend to show that they may not be as philosophically remote and incompatible as we may be led to believe without closer scrutiny.
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1. Archie J. Bahm, Comparative Philosophy: Western, Indian and Chinese Philosophies Compared. Albuquerque,NM: World Books, 1977.
2. Frederick C. Copleston, Philosophies and Cultures. Oxford, England: Oxford
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University Press, 1980.
3. Kwee Swan Liat, Methods of Comparative Philosophy. Leiden, Holland: Universitaire Pers Leiden, 1953.
4. Paul Masson-Oursel, Comparative Philosophy. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., and New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, Inc., 1926.
5. Hajime Nakamura, Parallel Developments: A Comparative History of Ideas. Tokyo and New York: Kodansha Ltd., 1975.
6. Troy Wilson Organ, Western Approaches to Eastern Philosophy. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1975.
7. John C. Plott, Global History of Philosophy. Delhi, Varanasi, and Patna, India: Motilal Banarsidass, 1977.
8. P. T. Raju, Introduction to Comparative Philosophy. Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press, 1962.
9. Ben-Ami Scharfstein, Philosophy East/Philosophy West: A Critical Comparison of Indian, Islamic, and European Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978.
10. Dennis M. Ahern, "Ineffability in the Lao Tzu: The Taming of a Dragon," Journal of Chinese Philosophy, Vol. 4 No. 4 (December 1977), pp. 357-382.
11. Arthur 'C. Danto, "Language and the Tao: Some Reflections on Ineffability," Journal of Chinese Philosophy, Vol. 1 No. 1 (March 1977), pp. 45--55.
12. Russell Goodman, "Style, Dialectic, and the Aim of Philosophy in Wittgenstein and the Taoists," Journal of Chinese Philosophy, Vol. 3 No. 2 (March 1976), pp.145-157.
13. Ben-Ami Scharfstein, "Salvation by Paradox: On Zen and Zen-Like Thought," Journal of Chinese Philosophy, Vol. 3 No. 3 (June 1976), pp. 209--234.
14. Lik Kuen Tong, 'The Meaning of Philosophical Silence: Some Reflections on the Use of Language in Chinese Thought," Journal of Chinese Philosophy, Vol. 3 No. 2 (March 1976), pp. 169--183.
15. Hu Shih, "Development of Zen Buddhism in China," Chinese Social and Political Science Review, Vol. 15 (1932), pp. 484-484.
16. Herrlee G. Creel, What Is Taoism? (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Edition, 1977), p. 23.
17. Kenneth K. S. Ch'en, Buddhism in China: A Historical Survey (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 361--362.
18. Sung-peng Hsu, "Lao Tzu's Conception of Ultimate Reality: A Comparative Study," International Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XVI, No. 2 (June 1976), p. 200.
19. The Tao Teh King in The Texts of Taoism, Part I, tr. by James Legge (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1962), Chapter 56, p. 100.
20. Kenneth K. S. Ch'en, Op. cit., p. 362. Wing-tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, tr. by Wingtsit Chan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963),p. 448.
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21. Chan, Ibid., pp. 426, 428, 435.
22. Fung Yu-lan, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, ed. by Dark Bodde (New York: The Free press, 1966), pp. 115--116.
23. Ch'en, Op. cit., p. 353. Chan, Op. cit., pp.*426-427.
24. Ch'en, Op. cit., pp. 354-356. Chan, Op. cit., pp.426-427.
25. Ch'an, Op. cit., p. 362.
26. Ibid., p. 362.
27. Edward Albertson, Understanding Zen for the Millions (Los Angeles: Sherbourne Press, Inc., 1970), p. 21.
28. Alan W. Watts, "Chapter One - The Philosophy of the Tao" in his The Way of Zen (New York: Vintage Books, 1957), p.28.
29. Fung Yu-lan, Op. cit., p. 116.
30. Albertson, Op. cit., p. 63. Watts, Op. cit., p. 98.
30. Fung Yu-lan, Op. cit., pp. 115 --116.
31. Albertson, Op. cit., pp. 13, 18, 26.
32. Watts, Op. cit., p. 11.
33. Watts, Op. cit.,pp. 136, 139. Watts, Op. cit., pp. 16, 19.
34. Watts, Op. cit., p. 25.
35. Max Kaltenmark, Lao Tzu and Taoism, tr. by Roger Greaves (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1969), p. 99.
36. Watts, Op. cit., p. 25.
37. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, tr. by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul and New York: The Humanities Press, 1966), Sec. 7, p. 151.
38. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical investigations. tr. by G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968), p. 226e.
39. Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books (New York and Evanston, IL: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1965), p. 17 and p. 18.
40. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Sec. 66, pp. 31e-32e and Sec. 67, p. 32e.
41. Fung Yu-lan, Op. cit., p. 262.
42. Ibid., p. 262.
43. Wittgenstein, Tractatus, Sec. 6. 521, p 149: "The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of the problem."
44. Paul Engelmann, Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein with a Memoir, tr. by L. Furtmuller (Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell, 1967), p. 135.
45. Wittgenstein, Tractatus. Sec. 6. 44, p. 149; Sec. 6. 45, p. 149; Sec. 6. 522,p.151.
46. Ibid., Sec. 644, p. 149.
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47. Ibid., Sec. 6. 45, p. 149.
48. Ibid., Sec. 6. 522, p. 151.
49. Ibid., Sec. 7, p. 151.
50. Lik Kuen Tong, Op, cit., P. 169 and p. 178.
51. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Sec. 265, pp. 93e-94e; Sec. 269, p. 94e;Sec. 275, p. 96e; Sec. 293, p. 100e.
52. Ibid., Sec. 133, p. 51e; Sec. 255, p. 91e. Fung Yu-lan, Op. cit., p. 262.
53. Engelmann Op.cit., p. 135.