.


                     INTRODUCTION

    The Chao Lun(a) (Book  of Chao) was written  in the early
fifth  century, c.e., by the Buddho-Taoist  monk Seng-chao(b)
(378-414)(1).  The book itself contains four essays, the most
purely philosophical one is entitled "On Time."(2) This paper
will focus  on this  essay  in order  to explain  Seng-chao's
conception  of time and its relation  to Buddhist  emptiness.
Before this critical analysis can begin, it will be necessary
to explain some of the structural aspects of the Chao Lun.
    Seng-chao   often  quotes   directly   from  the  ancient
classics, the Tao-te-ching(c) and the  Chuang  Tzu.(d) Taoist
technical  terms are often cited  and used as euphemisms  for
Buddhist concepts.(3) There are two important  terms of which
we should  be  aware: one, "emptiness"  or sunyata  is  often
equated  with  pen-wu(e) or  "original  non-being"  (this  is
further associated  with Lao Tzu's "Void filled to the brim,"
that is, the Void that carries  all existence  within it) and
two, the Way or the tao(f) can stand  for marga  or path.This
latter term is extremely important to Seng-chao.
    Seng-chao's  book  can  be understood  as his attempt  to
explain  how he views  the  Buddha's  doctrine  of the Middle
Path.  We can further  say  that  Seng-chao  is definitely  a
Madhyamika  Buddhist because he understood  some of the basic
Buddhist  concepts, such  as, sunyata, the  Middle  Path, and
Nagarjuna's tetralemma (of which his understanding progressed
throughout the period of his writings). The Middle Path which
is  classic  to  all  Buddhism  explains  how  to  avoid  the
extremist positions of eternalism  and nihilism.  Seng-chao's
writings were not intended  to argue the truth or validity of
the Middle Path; rather much of the Chao Lun was


p.44

written  to explain  how an Enlightened  Being (the Sage, the
Holy Man,or the Buddha) experiences  reality.  Seng-chao  was
not  necessarily  attempting  to  prove  any  ontological  or
epistemological claims about reality.
    The structure  of the Chao Lun which itself  was compiled
after  Seng-chao's  death  by his disciples, is in a reversed
chronological   order,  with  the  exception  of  the  fourth
chapter.  In other  words, the first  chapter, "On Time," was
written  after chapter two, "On Sunyata," and chapter  three,
"On Prajna Not Cognizant."  The latter  was the first written
essay of the Chao Lun. An interesting aspect of chapter three
is  that  it  includes  a  set  of  correspondences   between
Seng-chao  and a fellow monk, Liu I-Min.  These letters  shed
much light on what Seng-chao  thought prajna or enlightenment
meant  for the Sage.  The last  chapter  which  is of dubious
authorship(4) is entitled  "Nirvana  Is Unnameable."  Another
aspect of the Chao Lun is that Seng-chao attempted to use the
logic   of  the   tetralemma,  though   he  was   not  always
successful.(5) There is also a heavy reliance on the language
of paradoxes.  This latter  will  be discussed  below  for it
plays a role in Seng-chao's conception of time.
    The goal  here will be to explicate  the argument  in the
first chapter regarding  the nature of time by paying special
attention  to  the  implications   of  the  second  chapter's
discussion   of  sunyata.   In  order  to  proceed  properly,
Seng-chao's  understanding  of the limitations  of language's
ability  to express  his docttine  on time will be discussed.
Our overall treatment  of his project will be concerned  with
the content  rather than the actual  logical  (tetralemmical)
structure of Seng-chao's ideas.

            LANGUAGE and LIMITS

    Seng-chao  understood  that language has certain inherent
limitations.  He  considered  language  to  be  an artificial
application of names to things. "Normal language is unable to
describe [Seng-chao's or the Sage's] vision of the cosmos and
that therefore  contradictions  are unavoidable."(6) Absolute
Existence   or  "Reality   belongs   to  an  order   that  is
fundamentally  incommensurable  with symbolic systems such as
language. Nevertheless,



p.45

language  performs  a  function  in  establishing  this  very
truth."(7) Seng-chao knew that he had to use language to make
himself  understood, but at the same  time  he realized  that
language could only establish conventional  truths which are,
at best, the complementary  aspects to the Absolute  Truth of
the  Middle  Path.  He was  therefore  aware  of the  limited
conventional  means he had access  to in describing  Absolute
Truth.  He also " seems to have been aware that even an ideal
language(8)  would   correspond   only   to   a  conventional
interpretation of reality, and not [absolute reality]
itself."(9)  The  "ideal"   language   which  most  concerned
Seng-chao was the "doctrine of names."

    Seng-chao explicitly discusses language and the "doctrine
of names"  in part II, "On Sunyata"  (whereas  in part  I, he
treats  language  as a necessary  limitation).  In regard  to
names and reality he states,

    A thing  called  up by a name may not appear  (as what is
    expected  to appear) a name  calling  up a thing  may not
    lead  to  the  real  (thing).  Therefore  the  sphere  of
    [absolute]  Truth is beyond the noise of verbal teaching.
    How then can it be made a subject of discussion  [without
    paradox and contradiction]?(10)

An  example  of  this  type  of  paradox  is  in  Seng-chao's
discussion of permanence (rest) and impermanence (motion).

    What   people   call   permanence   I  [Seng-chao]   call
    impermanence  and vice versa.  But then impermanence  and
    permanence, though  seemingly  different, are  ultimately
    the  same.   That   is  why  it  is  said  in  a  classic
    [Tao-te-ching    chapter    78]:   'True    words    seem
    contradictory.  Who dares trust  them?' These  words  are
    fraught with meaning.(11)

We see in this  context  Seng-chao  drawing  upon  his Taoist
cultural  heritage  in  order  to  explain  the  concepts  of
Buddhism. Ordinary language is simply


p.46

unable  to describe  the  ontological  truth  of  reality, of
sunyata.   Therefore  even  an  "ideal"  language  could  not
accomplish  this, for it is only  a more  "precise"  form  of
conventional   language   insofar   that  it  describes   the
conventional world with possibly more exactness.  However, an
"ideal" language still functions in an artificial manner:

    The  'doctrine   of  names'  is  that  names  [linguistic
    entities]  match things [phenomenal  entities] and things
    match  actuals  [noumenal  entities? ].  Seng-chao,  like
    Kumarajiva  and Nagarjuna, denies this, and asserts  that
    names  are 'borrowed'  to designate  things  and actuals.
    Thus  they  are  counterfeit,  and  do  not  succeed   in
    designating  what  is  true.  Things(phenomena)  are  the
    appearances  of actuals, but like a phantom  are not what
    they seem, and are thus not real or absolute things.(12)

Language  then, no  matter  how  accurate  or  exact,  cannot
provide a description  or designate  absolute truth, for this
truth

    -is outside the sphere of the 'doctrine of names',
    -is referred  to by the statement  that  the dharmas  are
     not existent  and not  inexistent,
    -is asserted  to explain  'not inexistent',
    -is realized  without  blanking  out images of the myriad
     things from the mind,
    -and in it there is no achieving and no attaining.

    It coincides  with popular truth in the essential  nature
(emptiness) of its referents.(13) Seng-chao's  conception  of
the  Middle  Path  includes  the limits  of language, sunyata
("not  existent   and  not  inexistent") ,  prajna  ("without
blanking  out  images"  from  part  III), enlightenment  ("no
achieving and no attaining"  through sunyata and prajna), and
the TwoFold Truth(both  "conventional"  and "absolute").  The
Two-Fold Truth incorporates  the limited knowledge  (vijnana)
which is provided by language


p.47

and the penetrating  insight  of enlightened  wisdom (prajna)
that is independent of language (i.e. alinguistic).
    At this point a disclaimer  is necessary in regard to the
role that sunyata plays in Seng-chao's doctrine on time.  "It
is noteworthy  that the term does not occur  in Chao Lun part
I.  [Also] there are very few references to the Holy One, and
little  attention  is paid to the soteriological  themes that
are so prominent"(l4) in the rest  of the book.  Exactly  why
Seng-chao  neglected to include these aspects throughout  the
essay can only be a matter for conjecture.  But it is obvious
that these ideas  are his basic  presuppositions.  He did not
consider  "On Time" to present  its ideas  in an intellectual
and experiential  vacuum, that  is, without  a background  of
complementary Buddhist ideas and experiences. In other words,
the essay  is Madhyamikan, and its  tenets  are  the  essay's
philosophical   foundations,  even   though   they   are  not
explicitly presented in this way.
    So we can see how important  language's  limits  are  for
Seng-chao.  These limits have ramifications for his doctrines
and beliefs.  Language shapes his ideas and he recognizes its
effects on his thinking.  Language  forces his theory of time
into  paradoxes  and contradictions  because  of its inherent
inability to describe true reality. The truth of the world is
necessarily  hidden from language, for language  divides  and
discriminates  that  which,  when seen  from  the enlightened
point of view, is essentially interdependent  and empty.  The
limitations of language prevent it from adequately describing
time and sunyata  in their undifferentiated  and relationally
originated fullness of existence.

                    TIME and EMPTINESS

    Seng-chao  is said to have known the Madhyamika  doctrine
on time(15) and that his Mahayana  philosophical  views  were
the first indigenous Chinese Buddhist system of its kind.(16)
We will thus proceed to explore Seng-chao's understanding  of
time.  Perhaps  it may have been an idea that be culled  from
Nagarjuna's Middle Stanzas:

p.48

    If present  and future  depend  on the past, then present
    and future  should  exist  in past  time  if present  and
    future  do not exist  in it how  can  present  and future
    exist in dependence  on it? The establishment  of the two
    does not occur without dependence on the past, therefore,
    present and future time do not exist.  By this method the
    remaining two [times] are to be treated mutatis mutandis.
    One should examine the top, bottom, and middle, etc., and
    the oneness, etc.  Non-abiding time is not perceived, and
    abiding time does not occur;  how can imperceptible  time
    be designated? If time  depends  on  an entity, where  is
    there time without  an entity? No entity exists, so where
    would time exist?(17)

Nagarjuna's  text demonstrates  that it is absurd to think of
time as three isolated self-existent  entities (svabhava) The
underlying  assumption   here  of  sunyata  or  emptiness  is
evidenced   by  the  phrase  "no  entity  exists."  The  same
assumption occurs in Seng-chao's essay, but unlike Nagarjuna,
his  temporal  terms  do not always  follow  one meaning.  He
shifts positions  sometimes, and takes extreme  positions  in
order to explicate how absolute truth appears to the Sage.
    This  shifting  of  thought  is  exemplified  in  one  of
Seng-chao's  commentaries on the  Great Perfection  of Wisdom
Treatise. He states,

    Present  dharmas flow quickly  and do not abide.  What do
    you consider  as arising? If arising  and ceasing  are at
    one time, then the two marks  [or two actions  of arising
    and ceasing]  are both destroyed.  If arising and ceasing
    are at different times, then at the time of arising there
    is no ceasing, then dharmas  do not have the three  marks
    [arising, ceasing  and  destruction].  If dharmas  do not
    have the three  marks, then they are not conditioned.  if
    they  have all three  marks, then there  is the error  of
    infinite regression. This statement of no-arising is also
    furnished in the [Middle] Treatises... The

p.49

    three times are inexistent...(18)

This commentary was Seng-chao's early explanation of time. It
was written before the first chapter of the Chao Lun.  Let us
turn then our attention to his compiled work.
    The statement, "Present  dharmas flow quickly  and do not
abide," is almost completely  at odds with his opening  tenet
in "On Time."  He begins that latter essay by declaring  that
it  is  wrong   to  say   that   things   glide   along   and
move;literally, "things  cannot alter their positions  in the
temporal  order."(19) He  continues  in  this  vein,  further
developing  what he said in his previous commentary in regard
to arising  and destruction.  "There  is rest (ching(g)) with
motion  (tung(h)) going on;  therefore, though  (things) move
they are forever  at rest.  Motion need not cease in order to
produce  rest, therefore, though (things) are at rest they do
not cease moving."(20) Motion and rest, just like arising and
destruction, are considered to be simultaneous.  These Taoist
terms  and  paradoxical  structures  exemplify  how Seng-chao
draws  upon  his  own  intellectual  background  in order  to
explain Buddhist  ideas, which in this case are the permanent
and impermanent aspects of emptiness. in other words, rest or
"stillness  is  the  mode  of  things  in essential  voidness
[emptiness, sunyata].  Since  everything  is void  [or empty]
nothing  is incompatible  with  stillness, not  even  motion.
Motion  is compatible  with stillness, and the more  profound
the stillness of essence, the more powerful the action of the
function,"(21) or  motion.  Seng-chao  is  thus  adhering  to
Taoist  "original  non-being"  or  more  precisely,  Buddhist
emptiness,  when  he  states  paradoxical   or  contradictory
postulates regarding motion and rest.
    Additionally  there is a spatial metaphor which Seng-chao
has in mind when he says  that  "things  cannot  alter  their
temporal position."  Dharmas are arranged in short sequences,
santanas;  the totality of these form the phenomenal world of
experience  (samsara).  Samsara is the realm of suffering and
self-ignorance   where   the  unenlightened   being  develops
attachments  to  the  elements  of  desire  and  passion, and
therefore cannot escape the interminable  cycles of the wheel
of life-death; it is not true

p.50

reality.  In  absolute  reality  (nirvana)  nothing  happens,
nothing moves, all is empty, dharmas have no "self-existence"
and therefore  cannot  move among  the time periods.  Only an
Enlightened   Being  would  experience  this  "suchness"   of
existence  for  what  it  absolutely  is, wherein  samsra  is
nirvana.(22) Thus  reality  is motionless  and "motion-full."
However, this  is not a  completely  correct  formulation  of
Seng-chao's  Middle  Path.   Fung  Yu-Lan  states  this  more
accurately according to the Buddhist tetralemma:

    What are popularly  spoken of as movement  and quiescence
    [rest] do not basically  involve an antithesis.  The true
    aspect  of things  (dharmas) is that they are neither  in
    movement  nor quiescence.  Or, to put the matter  another
    way, they are both in movement and quiescence. To use the
    formulation of the Buddhist theory of the Middle Path: By
    saying  that there is either  movement  or quiescence, we
    fall into the two 'border'  or extremes.  By saying  that
    there is neither  movement  nor quiescence  we follow the
    Middle Path.(23)

In other words, the "positive''  affirmation  or negation  of
two opposing  extremes does not really capture the meaning of
the Middle Path. The two extremes must also be avoided.  This
is  meant  to prevent  a person,specifically  the  Sage, from
establishing  a point of view.(24) The attainment of no point
of view is one aspect of enlightenment (nirvana).
    Seng-chao next takes up what he believes to be the common
conception of time. His views here describe the nature of the
moment in time. "From the fact that what once has been cannot
join what is now, [ordinary  people]  infer that things move.
So they  say: they move  and are not at rest.  From  the same
fact, namely, that what  is past  cannot  join the present, I
[Seng-chao]  infer  they  [things]  are  at  rest"(25) in the
past.The  phrase "cannot join the present"  assumes that each
dharma  fills its moment (ksana) completely, there is no room
or  space   left   for  another   to  come   and  occupy   it
simultaneously.(26) This can be said in another way:

p.51

People  know  that  what  is past  cannot  come  back  to the
present, and they think that what is now can pass over to the
past, whereas  Seng-chao  says that what  is in the past must
occupy its position, just like what is nowfor where would the
"now" go to if it did pass over to the past that is "filled"?
"Each event pertains  to one moment of occurrence, with which
it is inalienably associated.  Seng-chao [and Nagarjuna take]
it as an unexpressed axiom that no [singular] event occurs at
two different moments."(27)
    Within the purview of Seng-chao's  view of the moment, we
shall  turn  to  his  ideas   regarding   cause  and  effect.
Liebenthal  claims that these ideas are the core teachings of
Seng-chao's  thought;  so, in order to discuss tbese ideas, a
full citation of the text will be necessary.

    Premises:
    -In the following  it is proved that causes are unable to
     produce a result and therefore  are always still able to
     produce  one.  Two  moments, the  cause-moment  and  the
     result-moment,   must   be   distinguished.   Then   two
     propositions [A and B] are possible.
    -A: The result  does not exist  simultaneously  with  the
     cause.
    -B: The result is produced by the cause (existing simul-
     taneously with it).

    Conclusions:
    -From   B: If the result  is produced  by the cause, then
     the cause has not died in the first (past) moment. (This
     means that it is present in the second and takes all the
     space which should be reserved for the result.  Thus the
     result cannot be produced.)
    -From A: If the result does not exist simultaneously with
     the cause, then the cause (must  have died in the first,
     past moment.  Thus it) cannot come forward to the second
     (present) moment  (in order  to produce  the result, and
     thus

p.52

     this cannot be produced.)
    -(The  impossibility  of causation  is  proved  for  both
     cases.)
    -Thus, because  (the cause) neither dies (in the first or
     past moment,...B), nor comes (forward  to the second  or
     present moment,...A), it is proved that it does not move
     (from   its  position   in  the  karmic   [or  temporal]
     sequence). (emphases added)(28)

With respect  to the very first  claim  about  production  of
results  by causes, both Robinson  and Liebenthal  agree that
Seng-chao  misunderstood  Nagarjuna  on this point.  Robinson
claims that Nagarjuna maintained  a consistent  point of view
that "non-abiding time is not perceived and abiding time does
not occur...  If time  depends  on an entity, where  is there
time without an entity? No entity exists, so where would time
exist?" (cited above) Whereas Seng-chao "films the same scene
with two different  cameras,"(29) insofar that causes can and
cannot produce  results  which Nagarjuna  understands  as not
existing.
    Liebenthal,  on  the  other  hand, believes  that  "while
Nagarjuna concludes from the immutability  of the causes that
they  cannot  produce  a  result,  Seng-chao   believes  that
Nagarjuna  wishes  to prove their  immutability.  He silently
infers: causes are immutable, therefore not yet exhausted [in
the result-moment], therefore  still effectability"  means to
Seng-chao,(31) for Seng-chao  denies the movement  of dharmas
from one moment (ksana) to another. Therefore, in saying that
a cause is still effective Liebenthal implies that it endures
or abides  beyond  its temporal  position  so as to exist  in
another  position.  This  is not, according  to Robinson,what
Seng-chao means. For Seng-chao,

    ordinary  causation  does not operate through  a shift of
    entity  from one point  to another.  In modern  terms, he
    considers  causation  as a relation between events rather
    than as an event. The Tathagata, the Holy One, idehtifies
    with the self-voidness  -the  nature-of  all the dharmas.
    Thus he is all-pervasive,


p.53

    all knowing, and able to exert influence  without acting,
    that is,wihtout shifting from one point to another.(32)

    In considering "causation as a relation" in modern terms,
a  comparison   between  the  conception   of  causality   of
empiricist and sceptic, David Hume, and Seng-chao's  doctines
will aptly illustrate this point. Hume comes from a different
background   than  Seng-chao,  therefore   his  premises  and
philosophical  goals  are quite  distinct  from those  of the
Buddho-Taoist   monk.At   most   points   their   views   are
oppositional, but, suprisingly  enough, they  arrive  at very
similar conclusions.
    Hume considers  causality to be only an assumed idea that
is inferred  from our experiences  of real objects  which can
either be of an internal or external nature. Cause and effect
are on this basis  seen  as products  of our understanding.He
states.

    One event follows  another;  but we never observe any tie
    between  them.  They seem conjoined, but never connected.
    And  as  we can  have  no idea  of anything, which  never
    appeared  to our outward  sense or inward  sentiment, the
    necessary conclusion seems to be, that we have no idea of
    connexion  or power  at all, and  that  these  words  are
    absolutely  without  meaning,  when  employed  either  in
    philosophical reasonings, or common life.(33)

In other words,

    Had not objects a regular conjunction with each other, we
    should  never have entertained  any notion  of cause  and
    effect;  this regular conjunction produces that inference
    of the understanding, which  is the only  connexion, that
    we can have any comprehension of.(34)

Hume  wishes  to deny that there  are any necessity, a priori
powers, or

p.54

reasons, which produce causes and effects.  Rather causes and
effects  are what we infer  through  our observations  of the
uniformity  of experiences  over  time, and  so  we establish
customs  or habits  based  on empirical  experimentation  and
evidence.  These  provide  us with  an  understanding  of how
causality  functions  in  the  world.  We can  conclude  that
because we cannot dirrectly experience  or observe the causes
that we infer between objects  or events then causality  does
not (necessarily) exist  in reality.  It is only  a customary
assumption  which our understanding  leads  us to create  and
follow.
    In  comparison   to  Seng-chao,  Hume   adheres   to  the
self-existence  (svabhava) of  entites  and  objects, whereas
Seng-chao understands them to be empty and non-self-existent.
Where Hume refers to the uniformity  of experience, Seng-chao
sees, oppositionally, the constant impermanence  of things in
experience, and only uniformity is the permanence of sunyata.
Possibly, Seng-chao  might  agree  that cause  and effect  as
inferred  by the understanding  (or cognizing  mind) would be
the  common  or ordinary  people's  conception, but  he would
maintain  that  this  is not how the Sage  or the Enlightened
Being  would experience  reality.  In sum Hume's  claim  that
there is no necessary  or a priori connection  between events
and objects would indeed agree with Seng-chao's conclusion of
the "impossibility  of causation."  However, we still need to
explicate the relation between causality and sunyata.
    Seng-chao's understanding  of the experiential  notion of
sunyata, a key concept in Buddhist  thought,(35) grounds  his
doctrine on time.  Sunyata indicates the relational nature of
the experiential world.  The Sanskrit term pratitya-samutpada
("relational     origination")    describes     the    mutual
interdependence  and interpenetration  of all the elements of
experience;  its realization  was the core  of the historical
Buddha's enlightenment.  No particular thing existed, exists,
or comes  to exist  in isolation  from the rest of the world.
Any "isolation  of a thing"  is an abstraction  which  can be
reified into an "absolute or self existence" by the cognizing
mind.  (Such  abstractions  are,  in  part,  the  product  of
language.)  The  cognizing   mind  treats  the  isolated  and
individual thing as

p.55

if it had svabhava or "Self-existence." So the mind can grasp
after  or desire  the self-existent  entity.  Attachments  to
these  desires  are  the  sources  of suffering  (duhkha) and
ignorance. It was the nature of the Buddha's enlightenment to
pierce   this  veil   of  "absolute"   (self)  ignorance   of
existence,thereby obtaining the experiential state wherein no
thing has a self-nature (svabhava) or independent  existence.
Without self-existence, everything  must be considered  empty
and void, for artificially  isolated and abstracted  entities
(via  the cognizing  mind and language) must depend  on other
entities  for their very (own) existence.  An isolated  thing
does not exist absolutely,for things only exist relatively in
the general flux of reality.  The enlightening  experience of
pratitya-samutpada  cannot  be fully explained  in linguistic
terms  because  it  is an existential  or  (pure) ontological
truth  of the world, and can therefore  only be found  in the
truth  of  sunyata, in experience  which  is  relational  and
impermanent.
    The limits  of language, time, emptiness, and  the Middle
Path are all inextricably  bound together  for Seng-chao.  To
analyze  his  doctrine  of time  in any  other  manner  would
inevitably  lose sight of his more fundmental philosophy and
Buddhistic  understanding  of experience  reality


                          CONCLUSION
    We have seen how the idea of emptiness  is a component of
Seng-chao's  doctrine  of time.  His ideas are not completely
Buddhistic, but we can definitely see the Madhyamikan  strain
in his thought.  His doctrine  of time can also be seen as an
elaboration of Nagarjuna's idea of time.  Nagarjuna concluded
that  time  was  non-existent, but by following  some  of the
ideas of Seng-chao, a further  development  of the concept of
time  is possible.  Since  all three  periods  of time  (past
,present,and future) are dependent on each other, to consider
any isolated time period as having independent  existence  is
an erronenous position.  The interdependence  of time periods
points  to the idea that  these  aspects  of time  are empty.
Since  time  itself  iss the  source   of  change,  the  very
non-abidingness that

p.56

we experience (which cannot be explicated with language).  an
ontological  and necessary  relation  between  emptiness  and
change  is  obvious.Thus, if  we  were  to  take  the  phrase
'"sunyatam  sunyata"  which  means  to "empty  emptiness  (of
self-nature)-that is, to understand  that emptiness is not an
entity-and  apply  this  phrase  to time, we can  empty  time
itself, not only  of its existence, but its non-existence  as
well. This would expand on Nagarjuna's original conclusion by
using some of Seng-chao's  ideas.  But such an argument would
take  us too far afield  and  will  have  to be addressed  at
another time.


                     NOTES

1.  Liu, Ming-wood, "Seng-chao  and  the  Madhyamika  Way  of
    Refutation," Journal of Chinese Philosophy, (March 1987),
    97, as opposed  to  Fung  YuLan's  A History  of  Chinese
    Philosophy,    D.Bodde,  trans.,  (Princeton:   Princeton
    University  Press, 1953)which claims the dates as 384-414
    (p. 258).
2.  Robinson,  Richard  H., Early  Madhyamika  in  India  and
    China(Madison:  University   of  Wisconsin  Press,  1967)
    p.146.
3.  Fung Yu-Lan, A History of Chinese  Philosophy  p.258, and
    Conze,  Edward, A  Short  History  of  Buddhism  (London:
    George Allan and Unwin,Publishers, Ltd., 1980), p.67.
4.  Liebenthal, Walter, translator,Chao-Lun, (Book  of Chao),
    (Hong  Kong.  Hong Kong University  Press, Hong Kong 1968
    second  edition), p.39  and footnote  668 on p.126.  This
    boot will be considered  as the standard  translation  of
    the Chao-Lun.
5.  See Robinson Early Madhyamika, ch.  VI. He spends a great
    deal of his effort in analyzing the logical structures of
    Seng-chao's  arguments.  I  cannot  help  but  feel  that
    Robinson  has missed some crucial aspects  of Seng-chao's
    writings   because  to  a  great  extent  they  are  more
    qualitatively mystical than quantatively logical.
6.  Liebenthal,Chao-Lun. p.60, footnote 224.

p.57

7.  Robinson,Early Madhyamika,p.120.
8.  Possibly  a modern equivalent  to what might have been an
    'ideal  language'  for Seng-chao  might  be found  in the
    writings   of  Bertrand   Russell, Ludwig  Wittgenstein's
    Tractatus    Logico-Philosophicus,   or    the    logical
    positivists-like Herbert Feigl.
9.  Robinson,Early Madhyamika,p.111.
10. Liebenthal,Chao-Lun,p.56.
11. Liebenthal,Chao-Lun,p.51.
12. Robinson,Early Madhyamika,p.144.
13. Robinson,Early Madhyamika,p.143 slightly modified.
14. Robinson,Early Madhyamika,p.146.
15. Robinson,Early Madhyamika,p.138.
16. Conze,A Short History of Buddhism,p.69.
17. Robinson,Early Madhyamika,p.150.
18. Robinson,Early Madhyamika,p.138.
19. Liebenthal,Chao-Lun,p.45.and footnote 128.
20. Liebenthal,Chao-Lun,p.46.
21. Robinson,Early Madhyamika,p.129.
22. Liebenthal,Early Madhyamika,p.46.
23. Fung Yu-Lan,A History of Chinese Philosophy,p.263.
24. This  ancient  Buddhist  ideal of "no point  of view" was
    given a more structured  treatment  in Fa-tsang s Hua-Yen
    Buddhism    three    hundred    years   later.See    Cook
    Francis,  H.,  Hua-Yen   Buddhism    (University    Park:
    Pennsylvania    State   University   Press,  1977,  third
    edition),particularly  chapters  1,4,5, 6,and8.It  should
    also be noted that this ideal is also an aspect  of other
    mystic  traditions  which  attempt  to describe  similiar
    transcendental   experiences.So   Buddhist   prajna   and
    Augustine's Love will have similar characteristics.
25. Liebenthal,Chao-Lun,p.47.
26. Liebenthal,Chao-Lun,p.47, footnote 141.
27. Robinson,Early Madhyamika,p.149.
28. Liebenthal,Chao-Lun,p.52-53.I  have slightly restructured
    the argument as translated by Liebenthal in order that it
    may be more acessible for analysis.
29. Robinson,Early Madhyamika,p.150.
30. Liebenthal,Chao-Lun,p.52 and footnote 165.
31. "What  Seng-chao  calls 'immutability'(pu-ch'ien(i)) is a
    mystical concept that



p.58

    transcends   both   quiescence(ching(g) )  and   movement
    (tung(h) )  as  ordinarily  conceived.According   to  his
    theory,each  event  and  thing  is forever  fixed  in the
    particular  flash  of time  to which  it belongs.Yet  the
    succession  of these flashes creates the illusion  that a
    process   of  movement   is  taking  place, just  as  the
    successive  images on a strip of moving picture film give
    the illustration  of movement,even  though  each of these
    images is in itself static and remains  forever  distinct
    from the other images."  Fung Yu-lan,A History of Chinese
    Philosophy,p.264,footnote 1.
32. Robinson,Early Madhyamika,p.150
33. Hume, David, An Enquiry  Concerning  Human Understanding,
    Eric Seinberg, editory, (Hackett Publishing Company, Inc,
    Indianapolis 1977), p.49.
34. Hume,An Enquirly,p.64
35. Nagao, G.  M.  Madhyamika and Yogacara, L.  S.  Kawamura,
    trans.,  (State  University  of  New  York  Press, Albany
    1991),p.64 specifically,as well as other cited references
    in the book's index for more particulars

CHINESE GLOSSSARY

a << 肇論 >>
b 僧肇
c << 道德經 >>
d << 莊子 >>
e 本無
f 道
g 靜
h 動
i 不遷