CHINESE BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY
pp.75-106
Copyright @1997 by Diologue Publishing Company.
Honolulu, Hawaii. U.S.A
p.75
I. INTRODUCTION
In the early 1960s when I was engaged in doctoral thesis
research, I came to know a work of Hu Shih, eminent historian
and philosopher, on the subject of ancient Chinese logic.(l)
For the first time, I became aware that the Mohist school of
logic, founded by Mo-tzu,(a) a contemporary of Confucius
(K'ung-tzu(b) ), prospered in ancient China for a few
centuries prior to the Ch'in and Han dynasties. While
perusing the text, I was struck by the fact that ancient
China already developed a logical system comparable to that
of ancient India as well as ancient Greece, and that the
Chinese actively applied the logical method not only to
advance scientific knowledge but also to resolve social and
political problems.
In the same work, Hu Shih pointed out that from the
logical point of view, the Confucians and Mohists, though
rivals, nevertheless complemented each other by their
respective contributions to the development of logical
thought. Where Confucian thinkers set forth the principle of
"names" and "predicables," the Mohist thinkers discovered the
principle of "subject terms." Thus, despite their adversarial
positions, their theories precisely contributed to the
advancement of Chinese logical thought in terms of the
logical structure of propositions.
Although Buddhism appeared in China several centuries
after these pre-Han philosophical schools, its philosophical
insights further contributed to the Chinese logical and
linguistic understanding. It is important
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for students of Chinese philosophy to focus more attention on
the Buddhist philosophical insights in Medieval China in the
area of pre-linguistic and pre-logical phases(2) which
underly the ordinary mental, logical, and linguistic
functions as a way to evaluate the moral and religious ideas
of the Chinese.
The purpose of this paper is threefold: (1) to examine
briefly the Confucian and Mohist ideas about logic and
language, (2) to present the Classical Chinese Buddhist
thought on logic and language as an important complement to
ancient Chinese logical thought, and (3) to evaluate the
contemporary relevance and significance of Chinese Buddhist
thought and insight.
II. CONFUCIAN AND MOHIST THOUGHT ON MORAL AND
CULTURAL PROBLEMS
As is known among historians, during the period of the
6th century B.C, the central power of the Chou(c) dynasty was
steadily declining and the feudal state was rapidly
disintegrating. The Chou aristocracy and culture, the revival
of which Confucius dreamed, were no longer cohesive. There
developed many independent states equipped with their own
bureaucratic systems, so that each one fought against the
others throughout this period of social and political
upheavals. This chaotic state of affairs eventually ended in
the rise of Ch'in,(a) a centralized and bureaucratic empire
just preceding the great Han(e) dynasty. Facing the ills of
the times, Confucius and Mo-tsu were equally engaged in the
task of restoring the order of society and reforming its
system by advocating two widely different philosophical and
practical orientations.
Confucius (ca. 450 B.C.), a teacher of young nobles in
the state of Lu,(f) devoted his life to defining and refining
the values embodied in the proprieties and culture of the
Chou aristocracy. Behind these norms of conduct and culture
he perceived an ideal "true gentleman" (chun-tzu(g) )guided
by such inherent principles as benevolence ("Love others" and
"Do not do to others what you would not wish them to do to
you").
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He reasoned that the ills of the society derived from a
prevailing humane negligence on the part of the aristocratic
members of society, their failure to adhere to the norms of
proprieties and maintain cultural forms of harmony such as
music (le(h)) Thus, his major effort was directed toward the
restoration of the codes of honor (positive rules of
propriety) to be practiced by the true "gentlemen." Confucius
was convinced that as soon as the ruling class of landed
gentlemen mutually support each other through normative
proprieties, the masses would spontaneously follow these same
rules of life and culture.
Chou society was divided into the classes of landed
aristocrats and the masses. The members of aristocracy
regulated their own conduct based on a body of positive rules
of propriety, i.e., a "code of honor" (li(i)), while the
masses had imposed upon themselves,legal codes which provided
for the "five kinds of penalties with their 'three thousand'
classified degrees" Under this dual system of morality,along
with the division of the society into "superior men" and
"little men," the former were governed only by a code of
honor while the latter were controlled by the fear of
punishment. If the people are governed by laws and their
conduct regulated by punishment, Confucius reasoned that the
idea of "government by law" will become highly undesirable.
To him it seemed evident that the masses would try to evade
any legal penalties without undergoing any paper sense of
shame. In any case, he did not think of the law as an
effective instrument. Thus, he concluded that the best way to
lead the masses is by example of virtue and the rules of
propriety, enabling them to feel shame and so to try to be
good.(3)
Standing on the other side of the aisle, Mo-tzu and his
followers neither shared the culture of Chou as understood by
the Confucians nor desired to complicate their lives with
elaborate etiquette, such as the duty to mourn one's father
for three years. Their guiding principle was always practical
utility combined with pragmatic concern, so that the meaning
of every institution lies in what is good for itself, and the
meaning of every conception or belief or policy Lies in what
kind of conduct or character it is best suited lies to
produce. Mo-tzu said. "Any principle which can
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elevate conduct should be perpetuated. That which cannot
elevate conduct should not be perpetuated. To perpetuate
anything that cannot elevate conduct is nothing but a waste
of speech."(4) The Mohists felt a deep objection not only to
the class division between aristocrats and the masses, but
also to the aristocratic moral code because it was divisive,
requiring any gentleman to put his duties to his family and
his lord before the interests of anyone else. Accordingly,
each family as well as each state was obliged to prefer
itself over others and to be drawn into conflict with others,
a conflict where the common people always suffered.
In contrast to the Confucian principle of the gradations
of love, decreasing according to the remoteness of the
relationship, the Mohists introduced the idea of a universal
concern or love, loving others just as one's self. Chien-ai
(j) means to "to love others just as one's self," having as
much regard for others-say, father, elder brother, lord,
vassar, and so forth-as for one's self, and having as much
regard for other families as for one's own.(5) The term
signifies a principle that applies to all, so it is
translatable as "universal love." But it was also on this
same principle of "universal concern" that aggression
(kung(k)), namely one state attacking another state simply in
order to benefit at its expense, was condemned by the Mohists
as a crime no different from the private robberies and
murders and punishable by the state. Although Mo-tzu and his
followers were not people with warm sympathies towards
everyone, their personal affection was disciplined by a stern
sense of justice and equality. In theory, they did not
tolerate the idea of a state or government which did not
benefit all of its citizens.
The Mohists believed that government originated from the
need to unify the "different moralities" (i-i(1) ) of
individuals competing in the primitive war of all against
all. Its function is to "unify and assimilate morality
throughout the empire" (i-t'ung-hsia-chih-i(m) ) .(6) He
treated anarchy as a conflict not just of interests but also
of "moralities." by which he meant not moral codes but the
conflicting family or state loyalties existing within the
"traditional love" which the Confucians advo-
cated.(7)
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III. CONFUCIAN AND MOHIST CONTRIBUTIONS TO LOGIC AND LANGUAGE
Philosophically, both Confucius and Mo-tzu contributed to
logical and linguistic reflections in their Chinese cultural
traditions. Confucius sought to "rectify names," a task which
he considered necessary in order to realize moral and
political reform. So, as Hu Shih puts it, "Confucius sought
to make the language an exact means and an integral part of a
logical philosophy."(8) He used written words and judgments
(i.e.,propositions) so judiciously and so juridically to
imply moral judgment, to approve and condemn as the laws of a
State ought to approve and condemn.(9) The events in the
Ch'un-ch'iu(n) (Spring and Autumn Annals) are not merely
recorded with linguistic exactitude, but also at the same
time with ethical judgments. The judgments are implied in the
wording itself. He registered his disapproval and
condemnation of wars carried on by one state against another
as "invasions and aggressions." Only those wars led by
princes who had received at least nominal sanction from the
Emperor were recorded as "punitive expeditions.'' In short,
the Ch 'unch iu is said to have been intended by Confucius to
embody his doctrine of "rectifying names and judgments" and
"to reform a corrupt age and restore it to rightness." The
underlying methods are (1) to apply exact use of language,
(2) to give implicit ethical judgments, and (3) to lay out
ideal relationship.
Evidently, Confucius' goal was an intellectual
reorganization of society by means of "names" and "judgments"
which he truly believed to be the key to the solution,
namely, "to reform a corrupt age and restore it to
rightness." He and his followers attempted to discover
through the study of names what things ought to be in order
to reform the social and political order of the day. They
furnished the society with an elaborate and rigid system of
ideal relationships (li(o))(10) These two tasks were carried
out by Confucian scholars in the following centuries in terms
of (1) teaching the judicious use of the written word as
exemplified in the Ch'un-ch'iu, and (2) editing and codifying
elaborate customs,moral
80
precepts, rituals, and ceremonies into a system of
propriety(li(i)).Their motto was: "Set up what is righteous,
and consider not its beneficial result."(11)
Mo-tzu was quite dissatisfied with this Confucian method
and approach. He sought instead for a criterion by which
truth and falsity as well as the right and wrong of beliefs,
theories, institutions, and policies could be tested either
to be so or not to be so. Accordingly, Mo-tzu's motto, as
quoted before, was: "Any principle which can elevate conduct
should be perpetuated. That which cannot elevate conduct
should not be perpetuated. To perpetuate anything that cannot
elevate conduct is nothing but waste of speech." Unlike the
Confucians, they always considered this pragmatic principle
and kept their eyes on the end results or beneficial results
which might come by choosing the proper course of action.
Obviously, the practical consequence was the sole criterion
of value and worth of principles and institutions.
Consequently,Mo-tzu and his followers were always aware of
the importance of the motives of action as "foreseen ends
which call for the endeavor." This was Mo-tzu's distinct
contribution, a philosophical insight into moral action which
transcended that of Confucius.
From the logical point of view, the Confucian contribution
was the discovery of the significance of "names" or
"predicables" which become the indices to classify things and
actions. But the Confucians failed to see that the
predicables detached from their practical bearing upon the
"predicated" are empty and meaningless. It was left to Mo-tzu
and his followers to introduce the term "subject" or the
"predicated" (shih(p)) into their logic. Quoting from Hu
Shih's translation, Mo-tzu defined the subject term and the
predicate term in the following ways. "That by which
something is said (about something) is the predicate (name),
that by which something is said (about something) is the
predicate (name) that about which something is said, is the
subject or the predicated (real) "(12) For students of
philosophy, it is evident that the Confucian attempt to
discover the original meaning of a word is a futile task.
Even if it is found, the original meaning can have very
little more than
81
mere etymological interest. If we abandon the strictly
etymological approach, we are compelled to resort to
arbitrary meanings by attributing them to conceptual
references as ideals.
According to Hu Shih, therefore, Mo-tzu's contribution was
to check this irresponsibly one-sided emphasis on the empty
predicables by discovering "subject terms to which names or
predicates are to be predicated. A predicate must be taken
with reference to the predicated, and a judgment must be
taken with reference to its practical consequences. Knowledge
ought to consist not in learning predicables and universals,
but in the ability to use these things in real life, namely,
"to elevate conduct." A man is said to "know" things "not
because of his ability to name them, but because of his
ability to choose them."(13)
The ancient Confucians will say to those who, stand by
powerless, watching moral chaos, violent bloodshed, and
meaningless destruction, "Educate yourselves about the
meaning of human rights, freedom and justice." Ultimately,
people by this means will come to understand the underlying
universal law through the study of these conceptual names and
predicates. By this means people today may, according to
their view, seek to reform the global social and political
order with an elaborate and rigid system of ideal
relationship, and so try to bring new structure to
multi-racial, multi-cultural, multi-religious and
multi-national encounters. The Mohists, however, would
respond: This is not enough. You ought to be able to
distinguish the right from the wrong by enquiring into the
causes of good or bad government. By examining the relations
between names (predicables) and substances (subjects), one
ought to be able to determine the good and evil in reference
to actual agents, things or events and deal more practically
with difficult and doubtful situations.(l4)
But how can we do these things? The Mohists then provided
us with their logical method, through which we may be able to
discover ways to deal with these multiple tasks. Mo-tzu
developed a system of logic, the only logic developed in the
early history of Chinese thought. Rephrasing Hu Shih's
translation of the crispy textual statement, the Mohist
definition of interential logic appears as follows:
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The reasoner ought to note and observe the happenings
(literally "becoming so") of all things, to seek the
order or relation between various judgments, to define
the subject with the predicate in order to express his
meaning in a proposition by giving the reason (i.e., by
the statement beginning with "because"("ku"(q)) in a
premise, and support the reasonconclusion relation by
selecting instances on the principles of agreement
(t'ung(r) ') and difference (i(s) ) [Italics not in
original.].(15)
This constitutes the essential element of Mohist logic.
The surprise is that this Mohist method of inference is
indeed comparable to the Buddhist method of inference
(anumana) developed in India.
IV. A COMPARISON BETWEEN CHINESE AND INDIAN LOGIC
The Indian logic of inference in general was theorized on
the dual principles of anvaya and vyatireka. The terms,
anvaya and vyatireka, originally belonged to the vocabulary
of the science of grammar in ancient India and signify
respectively "connection" and "separation."(16) As
philosophical reflection developed, these terms were used by
Buddhist as well as Hindu logicians to mean the dual
procedures of similar and dissimilar instantiations for
logically valid reasoning. As referred to before, these two
operations correspond exactly to the Mohist principles of
agreement (t'ung) and difference(i). As will be made clear
below, irrespective of Indian or Chinese language, these
operations are fundamental to the mental process of
classifying referential objects by means of naming and hence
indispensable to the practical use of language (vyavahara).
In the Indian logical context, the positive and negative
instantiations represent not only inductive but deductive
reasoning as well. For instance, in an inference drawn from
rising smoke perceived over the slope of a distant hill, one
may infer an outbreak of fire there. First, the reasoner
83
seeks to determine whether it is valid to assert the two
related predications (i.e., "something has smoke" (The
reason) and "Something has fire" (The conclusion) in
reference to an particular location outside of previse visual
range in for side of a distant hill)). So one tests the
causal concomitance of "smoke-and-fire" (i.e., "Wherever
there is smoke, there is fire") by referring it to similar
instances, such as, a kitchen where the two always concur. In
addition, one is also obliged to test the contraposition. "If
no fire, then no smoke" by referring to dissimilar instances,
such as a water tank, where the two concomitants never occur
separately or jointly. Having done so, only then, in
reference to a given subject term (i.e. here 'a hill'), the
reasoner can safely assert the reason (hetu): "Because of
rising smoke on the other side of the hill," and the
conclusion (sadhya): "an outbreak of fire on the other side
of the hill." In Indian syllogism, this combined procedure of
inductive and deductive reasoning, i.e., citing similar and
dissimilar examples, was required at all times.
The Mohist principles of agreement and difference likewise
constitute a form of inductive reasoning. In distruction from
Indian logic, however, the Mohists did not include the dual
instantiations in the syllogistic formula, instead, they
theorized that a valid inference is to be based on a
hsiao,(bu)(17) i.e., an inductively well proven causal or
logical relation based on the method of agreement and
difference. In this respect, Indian and Chinese forms of
syllogistic inference are fundamentally the same reflecting
the universal nature of logic and language.(18) With this
understanding, the meaning of the Mohist's criticism against
the Confucian doctrine of names can be more clearly grasped
by consulting a Hindu-Buddhist dispute that occurred in
Medieval India. There is an instructive parallel between the
difference of Mohist and Confucian logical thought on the one
hand, and that of Buddhist and Hindu logical thought on the
other.
One of the heated disputes between Buddhist and Hindu
logicians in Medieval india was focused on the question: "is
the Buddhist threemembered syllogism innovated from the
traditional Indian five-membered
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logic valid." The traditional Indian syllogism consisted of
five statements.
(1) Thesis(pratijna): "There is fire on the hill,"
(2) Reason(hetu): "smoke is on the hill,"
(3) Examples (udhaharana). "Wherever there is smoke,
there is fire, like in a kitchen," and "Wherever
there is no fire, there is no smoke,like near a water
tank.
(4) Application (upanaya): "There is smoke on the hill,"
(5) Conclusion (nigamana): 'Therefore, there is fire on
the hill."(19)
Critically examining this formula, the Buddhist logician,
Dignaga (ca. 5th century) , introduced a three-membered
formula as follows.
(1) Examples similar instantiation(anvaya) and dissimilar
instantiation (vyatireka),
(2) Reason which implies its conclusion as applicable to
a substratum,
(3) Conclusion.
The dispute in question arose between Hindu logicians who
upheld that what is to be proven (thesis) must be initially
proposed and the Buddhist logicians who countered that it is
not necessary. The reason that this difference became a
heated dispute is that it was correlative to another
difference concerning the object of inferential knowledge.
In reply to Hindu logicians' criticism, Dignaga and
Buddhist logicians in subsequent periods defended their
theory by stating that real and necessary members of a
syllogism or inference are only of two types, namely, (1) the
general rule expressed in the statement of similar and
dissimilar instances (drstant) and (2) its application to an
individual substratum by stating a reason (hetu). When a
universal relation of smoke and fire is known to a community
of people,in order to let them know a conclusion that "a
distant hill is on fire," it suffices to inform them that 'a
distant hill has a billow of smoke (hetu)." For, in this very
reason (hetu), its conclusion (sadhya) that "the hill is on
fire" is already implied.(20)
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In opposition to this Buddhist logicians' view in
assigning class determination of a given substratum to the
anvaya and vyatireka procedures as the primary task of
inference, the Hindu logicians (Naiyayika) assigned to them
the verification of the universal relation (vyapti) between
smoke and fire. Further, in opposition to Buddhist logicians'
view in regards to the laying down of a reason (hetu: "a hill
having smoke") as the main body of an inference, Hindu
logicians interpreted it as a verification of a given reason
(smoke on a hill) by means of its conclusion (sadhya: fire on
a hill) determined by the previous (anvaya-vyatireka)
procedure. Dignaga refuted this Hindu logicians' view by
stating: The object of inferential reasoning is neither the
property of a given substratum (e.g., "smoke-then-fire" of a
hill) nor the connection (sambandha) between "smoke-fire" and
a hill, but the substratum itself characterized by the
conclusion(sadhya. "a hill having fire'').
The reason is threefold. (1)When the concomitance of
smoke and fire is known universally, the conclusion should be
implied in the statement of a reason, i.e., "(a)P then (a)Q";
(2) When "Q" is known universally to be found in a similar
instance, say, a kitchen as "b)Q" [here 'b' is a kitchen],
the substratum'a', which is one of the class members similar
to 'b' should be the object to be cognized by inference;and
(3) If the object of an inference is the hill-fire relation,
there is no element capable of making an inference possible,
nor is there anything to be inferred. It follows that the
connection need not be expressed as a thesis (pratijna), and
should not be accompanied by a reason (hetu).(21)
The point intended here is that for Medieval Indian
Buddhist logicians it is not the purpose of an inference to
know a given universal relation (If smoke, then fire) as
valid, because such a universal ought to be already known by
a community of people through induction. Hence, it is the
purpose of the inference to let them known whether a given
substratum, say, a yonder hill, is a member of the similar
class of things like a kitchen and not a member of the
dissimilar class like a water tank. Hence, the main element
of an inference is the laying down of a reason on the basis
of the class determination of a given substratum, and not the
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verification of a reason (hetu) in relation to a conclusion
(sadhya) as held by Hindu logicians. This difference exactly
parallels the difference found between the Confucian and
Mohist views of logic.
Recapitulating the foregoing points, the Confucians
discovered the significance of "names" or "predicables" or
"universals" which are the indices to classify things and
actions. But they failed to see why cultural and ethical
universals, which guide human conduct, become empty and
meaningless statements when detached from their practical
context of an agent or substratum. The Mohists criticism
precisely pointed to this by introducing the idea of subject
term as object of inferential knowledge and defining the
logic of inference as follows. It is the task of inference to
express one's meaning in a proposition by giving the reason
in a premise [i.e. by the statement to begin with 'because,'
i.e., "ku(9)..."],and support the reason-conclusion relation
by selecting instances on the principles of agreement (t'ung)
and difference (i).''(22) Here too, the essential business of
the Mo-tzu s theory of inference is twofold: (1)
class-determination of a given subject term, and (2) laying
down of an inferential reason. It follows that the Mohist
criticism was justified against the Confucian theory of the
primacy of naming or universal relation, precisely because a
name or a relation without its substratum has no reality or
efficacy.
V. CHINESE BUDDHIST CONTRIBUTIONS TO LOGIC AND LINGUISTICS
The religion of the Buddha was officially recorded to
have been introduced to China in AD. 156 in the reign of the
Han emperor Ming (ming-ti(t)). Yet it would take a few
centuries for Chinese Buddhism to acquire its generic
features. During the period of the two centuries from the end
of the 4th to the 6th, the period of the so-called "Six
Dynasties," multifarious forms of Buddhism, Hinayana as well
as Mahayana, along with their scriptures and cultures, were
introduced piece-meal to the divided regions of North and
South. They arrival offering no clear refer-
p.87
ence to scriptural origins, developmental history or their
sectarian affiliations. Thus, it became the major task of
scholar monks and intellectual Buddhists to sort out the
translated texts into textual groups and to correlate them
into a certain order for the developmental history of the
scriptures relative to the teachings purported in them The
more comprehensive the system was, the more superior it was
held by Buddhist scholars who classified them, in the attempt
to portray the richness of religion and culture in Buddhism.
By the time of the mid-sixth century, two clear features
characteristic of Chinese Buddhism emerged. The first was the
so called Chioa-pan(u) (or in full Chiao-hsiang-pan-shih(r),
namely, the systematic and critical classification of
Buddhist doctrines. The second was the primacy of Mahayana
Buddhism over Hinayana, although in practice the latter
tradition was also given due importance. From the doctrinal
point of view, Chinese Buddhists adopted Mahayana Buddhism as
superior to that of Hinayana for two basic reasons: (1) the
Mahayana insight of dharmasunyata (k'ung-hsing(w) ) is
superior to the Hinayana insight of dharmasvabhava
(yu-tzu-hsing(x) ) and (2) the Bodhisattva-yana path of
practice (p'u-sa ch'eng(y)) is superior to the Sravaka-yana
path of practice (shen- men-ch'eng).
The term sunyara, compounded of sunyn ("empty," "void,"
"hollow") and an abstract suffix ta (equivalent to ness), was
almost invariably translated into Chinese as kung-hsing
("emptiness," "voidness," or "vacuity"). The conceptal range
of this term included logical and dialectical referents The
difficulty in understanding this concept is due to its
transcendental meaning (paramartha) in relation to the
logico-linguistic meaning (vyavahara), especially because the
etymological tracing of its meaning [i.e. sunya meaning
"vacuous or hollow within a shape of things"] provides no
theoretical or practical addition to one's understanding of
the concept.
The normative set of practices of the Bodhisattva-yana
[("-vehicle" or --marga ("-path," p 'u-sa-tao(aa) or -carya
("-practice," p 'u-sa-hsing(ab)] consisted of six standard
forms committed by "One who seeks to realize
p.88
ultimate insight." The six forms of practice (sat-paramitas,
liu-tu(ac) or liu-po-lo-mi (ad) )which represent the broadest
categories of virtues enumerated in the
Prajnnaparamita-sutras and other Mahayana scriptures are
charity (dana, pu-shih|(ae) )morality (sila, ch'ih-chieh(af)
) , perseverance (ksanti, jen(ag) ) , endeavor (virya,
ching-chin(ah)), meditation (dhyana-samadhi, ch an-ting(ai)),
and wisdom (prajna, chih-hui(aj)), to later on four more
virtues were added later on resulting in the Ten Paramitas
(shihpo-lo-mi(ak)): expediency (upaya, fang pien(al)), vow
(pranidhana, yuan(am)), might (bala, li(an) ), and insight
(jnana, chih(ao)). The body of normative practices, however,
prescribes no specific set of prefered conduct. Whatever
specific action a bodhisattva takes to apply within a given
situation is left to his insight into sunyata. The special
faculty to be acquired through this insight is defined as
"skillfulness in "expedient means, " or "skilfulness in the
choice and adoption of the means," or "expedients for
converting others or helping them" (upaya-kausarya,
shan-ch'iao-fang-pien(ap) )(23) The concept of "expedient
means" does not simply mean ordinary conduct based on reason
and rational calculation. Because it is anchored in one's
insight into sunyata, the "skillfulness in means" is a
special faculty imbued with the nature of transcendence.
Moreover, this faculty is also pragmatic, because whatever
specific action it is to be taken, a bodhisattva adopts it as
the best means for a given situation as well as for a
specific foreseen goal. The concept is dual natured,
empirical and trans-empirical.
In the history of Chinese Buddhism, The full
comprehension of the Mahayana insight into `sunyata was
attained only though two stages of development. First, toward
the end of the 4th century, Kumarajiva,(aq) foremost exponent
and translator of the Madhyamika treatises, arrived in
Western China and completed the translation of the
dialectical treatises in A.D. 409, while raising a group of
excellent scholar monks under his guidance. Among these
disciples, Seng Chao(ar) (383-413), whom the teacher
praised as foremost in the understanding of the doctrine,
left a treatise called Chao-lun(as) on the Madhyamika
philosophy of sunyata.(24) In this text, he innovated a
unique method of paradoxical argument, which I believe
operates best in utilizing the Chinese linguistic system to
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demonstrate the dialectical meaning of sunyata.
Toward the end of the 6th century, then Chih-i(at)
(531-597), the third patriarch of the T'ien-t'ai school(au)
and a contemporary of the Sanlun(av) master Chi-tsang(aw)
(549-623) wrote a series of texts on the T'ient'ai doctrines,
establishing an elaborate system of teachings endowed with
the classification of "five periods and eight teachings"
(wu-shih-pachiao(ax)). The system classifies the five periods
of doctrinal development, the four methodical teachings of
religious practice (hua-i-ssu-chiao(ay) , and the four
doctrinal teachings of religious conversion
(hun,fa-ssuchiao(az)) Philosophically, the T'ien-t'ai system
is understood to be a type of Buddhist phenomenology, such
that a moment of thought or human consciousness was analyzed
into three thousand phenomenal dimensions (I-nien-san-ch
ien(ba)), and that all these multiple phenomena are theorized
to interact in perfect permeation (Yuan-jung-san-ti(bb)),
embodying the threefold truth of "dependent origination"
(pratityasamutpada, yuanch'i (bc)), namely, the three aspects
of "emptiness"(`sunyata or k'ung(bd) , "linguistic
practicality" (prajnapti, chia(be)) and the "middle path"
(mad. hyama-pratipad, chung-tao(bf)). Chih-i adopted these
definitions of "dehyama-pratipad, chung-tau(bf)).
bhz(bh)(25) pendent origination'' from Nagarjuna's(bg) Chung-lun
Although insights into sunyata, prajnapti, and madhyama
(chung(bi)), were taken from Nagarjuna's Chung-lun, the
system of I-nien-san-ch ien and Yuan-jung-san-ti ought to be
regarded as a genuinely original Chinese theory, in the same
Manner that the Hua-yen(bj) ten-fold theory of dependent
origination (shih-hsuan-yuan-ch'i(bk)) with regard to both
the transcendent (hsing(bl) or li(bm)) and the phenomenal
(hsiang(bn) or shih(bo)) is originally Chinese. During the
lifetime of Chih-i the Hua-yen system was in the process of
being established by Tu-shun(bp) (557-640). It was then
further developed by Chih-yen(bq) (602-668) and completed by
Fa-tsang(br) (643-712) in the middle of the T'ang dynasty.
The system consists of a classification of Buddhism into five
teachings and ten schools (wu-chiashih-tsung(bs)). Though it
was not as broad as that of T'ien-t'ai, it con- centrated
philosophically on the analysis of the perfect
interdependence of dharmas (dharma-dhatu-pratityasamutpada,
fa-chieh-yuan-chi(bt').
p.90
Where the T'ien-t'ai system constitutes a grand combination
of philosophical and religious elements, it represents a
pioneering analysis of the causality of "dependent
origination." I believe it is a uniquely Chinese formulation,
just as that of T'ien-t'ai. In this paper, however, I shall
confine myself to the question: How and why did Seng Chao's
method of dialectic and Chil-i's understanding of sunyata
contribute to the contemporary world's philosophical
enrichment?
V. LOGICAL AND DIALECTICAL STRUCTURES
The Nagarjunian method of dialectic shares the same
structural foundation as that of logic and language. At the
time of Nagarjuna Indian logic (Nyaya) nearly reached its
full maturation, equipped with a unique theory of syllogistic
inference. It was unique in comparison with the Aristotelian
syllogism, but, as some contemporary logicians hold,(26)
Indian logic of inference was essentially not different from
that of the Chinese logic developed by Mo-tzu, precisely
because of two identical procedures in their inferences.
First, both were theorized to bear the dual principles of
similar and dissimilar instantiations (anvaya and vyatireka)
in Indian logic or the dual methods of agreement (t'ung) and
difference (i) in Chinese logic as essential criteria of
valid reasoning. Secondly,both understood that the function
of inference is to cognize a given substratum or a subject
term by determining its class as being in parallel with
similar examples that belong to the same class in terms of a
reason-to-conclusion relation. The only minor difference
between the two is that the Indian syllogisim requires
similar as well as dissimilar examples at all times for
deduction, whereas the Mohist formula calls for an
established model form (hsiao(bu)) for valid deduction, upon
which a given reason ought to be in agreement.
Hsiao means "to imitate, " to be "similar to, "
"efficacious, " "to yield the expected result," or "to
verify." Hu Shih translated this important Neo-Mohist logical
term as "deduction" or "deductive reasoning;" i.e., "an
inference to be deduced from a hsiao or a mold." He
translated the
91
passage of the definition of hsiao as follows:(27)
The hsiao or reasoning from a mold consists of setting up
the form (fa(by)). That which is modeled after is that
which is to be set up as the form. When the cause or reason
conforms (t'ung) to the hsiao or mold, it is right [i.e.,
the method of agreement]. When it does not conform (i) to
the hsiao, it is false" [the method of difference] .
Although the Mohist deductive reasoning requires no dual
instantiation, since the reasoner ought to parallel a given
object of deduction with a model form, it is evident that
whatever model form to which the reasoner refers for his
inference must be one that has already been well established
in convention through the method of induction, i.e., on the
basis of the methods of agreement and difference.
The fact that the dual principles of similarity and
dissimilarity or that of agreement and difference are
commonly found in Indian and Chinese logic suggests that the
inferential process of the mind is universal despite the
difference of cultural and linguistic forms, and that they
are essential to the symbolic process of the mind. For
instance, in order for a child to be able to call an animal a
cow, he or she must know the convention according to which a
certain group of animals with a set of similar properties,
like a dewlap, is called a "cow." The process that underlies
the child's mind ought to be the process of affirming similar
objects and denying dissimilar objects such as, horses, and
while doing so, he classifies "cows" in contrast to what he
has denied. So, it is clear that the logical context in which
a child correctly calls an object a "cow"is based on (l) the
dual rules of similar (anvaya) and dissimilar instantiations
(vyatireka) or agreement (t'ung) and difference (i) and on
(2) the clear distinction of the class boundary between the
two contrary groups of things (e.g., a cow" and a 'horse or
non-cow" in the case of naming; and "a kitchen having smoke
and fire'' and "a water tank neither having fire nor smoke"
in the case of inference). This is what I call the logical
context of syllo-
92
gistic inference
Hu Shih pointed out that the Confucian contribution to
logic was the discovery of "name" or "predicables" (ming(bw))
whiletheMohist contribution to logic was the discovery of
"subject" or the "predicated" (shih(p)) .Asbrieflymentioned
before, Mo-tzu defined the subject term as "that by which
something is said (aboutsomething) andthepredicate term "that
about which something is said." When two universals are
linked in proper sequence in reference to this subject term,
there arises a meaningful statement or proposition. The
process, which links these two parts of a sentence, is
structurally tile logical context in which the dual processes
are clearly separated.
Language is a system of symbols, semantically agreed upon
for their denotation and for their syntactical stringing into
a sentence, and stands in the middle between the spheres of
nature and mind. From times immemorial the human race has
evolved the use of language as the primary tool to depict the
world of experiences in abstraction and to communicate them
with fellow humans. Irrespective of whether a person is
Japanese, Chinese, Indian, or English, every word of
language, every common name, expresses the recognition of a
class. In fact, the process of classifying things and that of
linking words, phrases, or sentences in the use of language
is so common that it is performed in most cases unconsciously
and spontaneously. Then, what is the role of Buddhist
dialectic? How is it related to this structural foundation of
logic?
Analyzing Nagajuna`s dialectical treatises over and over
again, I am increasingly convinced that one primary principle
that underlies all of his reducrio ad absurdum arguments
rasonga-vakyn)is the dialectical contrxr in which the dual
instantiations (anvaynandvyarireka) aresimultaneouslyapplied
to one and the same spatio-temporal sphere in reference. The
following is the gist of his argument that appears in the
Vigrahavyavartani (karika36-39).'"
Since an illumining light (a candle light) and the state
of darkness are two opposite agents, wherever there is
light, there
93
cannot be the state of darkness, and vice versa. It
follows that although conventional knowledge leads us to
believe that these two may have contact somewhere, there
is no possibility at all for their contact.
The argument conveys to the reader two things: (I)It is
impossible for two different things to be a referent at one
and the same place and time, likewise for two contrary or
contradictory concepts to be applied to one and the same
referent. This is correct from the point of view of the
logical context. (2) Despite this convention, Nagarjuna
reminds the reader of the fact that convention itself
violates this rule, so that the process of naming (i.e.,
denoting an object by name) as well as the process of
syntactical linkage of a subject with its predicate) is found
to be ultimately based on the dialectical context.
His dialectical argument gradually compels the reader to
become aware that our conventions-"light illumines darkness,"
"wisdom dispels ignorance," and so forth-though apparently
meaningful, are based on the juxtaposition of two
conceptually contrary or exclusive statements, namely, "light
illumines darkness," and "darkness obstructs illumination."
This means that convention is invariably anchored in the
dialectical context where similar and dissimilar
instantiations (anvaya and vyotireka) are simultaneously
referred to at one and the same spatio-temporal sphere. Here,
two logically distinct classes of entities are no longer held
separate in thought but coalesced into one, though
empirically impossible and logically meaningless. As a
result, there comes into being a dual natured referent, e.g.,
something that is both "simultaneously existent and
nonexistent"
In other words, the dialectical procedure compels us to
realize that every symbolic usage (i.e., naming an entity or
classifying a similar instance) is concurred with its
contrary (i.e., naming an opposite or classifying a
dissimilar instance) in itself. It is because of this reason
that in order to explain the insight of sunyata, Nagarjuna
and Mahayana Buddhists in general used a class of metaphors
that exemplify dual natured
94
entities such as magic, sky-newer, sand dreams.
Just suppose that we are listening to an on-going speech,
in which phonemes, words, and sentences are incessantly
coming and going. Catching a series of rapid sounds our mind
instantaneously configurates them into a word, a series of
words into a sentence, and a series of sentences into a
unified understanding. It is within this dynamic flow of
speech or thought also that we cannot deny the on-going dual
operations of positive and negative instantiations at every
moment of consciousness, which vigorous logical reflection
alone can abstract a-posteriori. Now we can define the
dialectical context in terms of two conditions. The first
condition is (1) that the dual operations of anvaya and
vyatireka are intuited to be present at every moment of
consciousness in terms of linguistic symbols; this is called
the juxtaposition of the contraries secondly, (2) that these
two operations in turn refer the two contrary meanings to a
given moment within the spatio-temporal sphere, forcing the
respective referents to coalesce,this is called the dual
natured referent. So, a stream of consciousness, a series of
moments linked one to another, is understood to be
accomplished within the dialectical context.
VI SENG CHAO'S PARADOXICAL ARGUMENT AND T'IEN-T'AI'S
PHILOSOPHY OF SUNYATA
Although the Mohist school abruptly disappeared from
history after the Ch'in dynasty, evidence supports the view
that the Mollist text circulated in the Neo-Taoist movement
during the 3rd and 4th centuries.(29)Accordingly, some of the
Taoist scholars may have been acquainted with the Mohist
logical theory. In another article I treated the Madhyamaka
treatise by Seng Chao (384-413),aTaoistbeforebeingconverted
to Buddhism, and demonstrated his paradoxical method of
dialectic that could have been aided by his knowledge of the
Mohist logical treatise.(30)First, his method of dialectic is
not the form of reductio ad absurdum argument on which Indian
masters mainly relied, but almost entirely a paradoxical form
of argument. Secondly, he employed the most import-
95
ant technical term of the Mohist, hsiao, in the treatise,
Chao-lun. Though his use occurred only once toward the end of
the last article, "Nirvana is No-naming"
(Nieh-p'an-wu-ming-lun(bx)), (31) there is good reason to
believe, from the view point of the textual context, that his
usage of the term exhibits his knowledge of the Mohist method
of deduction. Several examples are worth repeating here. From
childhood, we learn the use of language through listening to
others, observing their behavior, and testing out the
efficacy of its usage by ourselves. Along with these
experiences we acquire a mind ingrained with the conviction
that things exist in the way in which language depicts them.
Seng-chao s paradoxical method of argument deals with such a
fixation of our mind by forcing the reader to face a maze of
paradoxes one after another. Yet, at the end of each argument
he shows that the dual members of each paradox invariably
refer to one and the same reference.
For example, if we want to express the real (chen(by)),
we go against convention (su(bz) . If we follow convention,
we fail to express the real... When poeple say that things
are "abiding" (chu(ca) ) , I say that they are "gone"
(chu(cb))Whentheysaythat things are "gone", 1 say that they
are "abiding." Although "gone" and "abiding" are different in
expression, what they mean points to the same referent.
The fact that Seng-chao was clearly aware of the
dialectical context can perhaps be best demonstrated by
referring to the final passages that appear in his essay,
"Whatever is Unreal is Emptiness" (pu-chen-k'unglun(cc)).
The expression "existent" (yu(cd) )refers only to a
metaphorical existent (chia-yu(ce) ), sodistinguishesitfrom
"not-nothing"(fei-wu(cj)). By the expression "nothing"(wu(cg)
) wedistinguishwhatis "not-existent" (fei-yu(ch)).Thoughthe
referential fact is one, the expressions are two.
We want to say that dharmas exist, but their existence is
not a "real production" (fei-chen-sheng(ci)).Wewanttosaythat
dharmas do not exist, but phenomenal forms
(shih-hsiang(aJ) ) arealreadyconfigurated. Phenomenal forms
cannot be said to be "identical with tnothing" (pu-chiwu(ck)
),butweonlysaythatanythingunreal (fei-chen(cl))isnotareal
96
existent (fei-shih-yu(cm)). It follows that the meaning of
'emptiness of whatever is unreal' is thus revealed.
Accordingly, the large Prajnaparamita-sutra
(ta-p'in-pan-joching(ch))says: "Dharmas are metaphorically
called unreal' (chia-hao-pu-chen(cq))justasamagicallycreated
man is." For we cannot say that there is no magically created
man, but only that such is not a real man (fei-chenjen(cp)).
The Buddhist insight into sunyata does not offer any
political alternatives for either the pobitical visions of
the school of Confucian traditionalism or of Mohist
utilitarian pragmatism. Nor does it provide any additional
definitions or forms to add to the Mohist logic or logic in
general. Their insight into sunyata, however, proposes to
critically examine the use of symbols as well as, the logical
and linguistic processes of the mind, as exemplified in Seng
Chao's treatise.
A century and a half after Seng Chao, there arose a
number of Chinese Buddhist schools on both sides of the
political division of North and South, among which the
T'ien-t'ai school was foremost. As briefly mentioned before,
Chih-i constructed his system of thought ultimately on the
three Nagarjunian concepts of sunyata, prajnapti, and
modhyama (san-kuan(cq) ) .Ofthefour successive levels of
Buddhist doctrines which he classified in his system, Chih-i
placed the threefold Nagarjunian insight into the highest and
perfect teaching (yuan-chiao).(32)According to the T'ien-t'ai
master the perfect teaching is explained as follows:(33)
The term yuan-chiao is identical with yuan-miaos
("perfectand wondrous") , yian-man(ct) (uperfectand
fulfilled") , yuanchi(cu) ("perfectandcomplete") ,
'"yuan-tun(cv)" ("perfectandabrupt"),andisconsideredasthe
highe st theory in Mahayana Buddhism which exchaustively
teaches the true form of the dharma-world (dharmadhatu)
andleaves nothing hidden or untaught. Yuan-chiao explains
all phenomena with the truth of pu-tanchung(cw)or Not
mere middle, " which means
(1)Chi-k'ung(cx),
p.97
"direct identity with emptiness'. (sunyata) (2) Chi-chia
(cy)", direct identity with linguistic convention''
(prajnapti) and (3) Chi-chung(cz), "direct identity with
Middle Path (madhyama)."
This means that every and all phenomena are initially
identified directly with dependent origination secondly, they
are directly identified with emptiness; third, they are
directly identified with linguistic convention; fourth, they
are directly identified with the Middle. So the four
categories of theoretical teachings represent a system of
gradual perfection of the causal insight of dependent
origination (pratityasamutpada) andare designed to enable
practitioners to eventually attain the middle domain where
phenomenal occurrences are viewed with an entirely different
significance relative to their initial meanings. In this
regard, philosophical culmination becomes religious
salvation.
In the initial stage of teaching, innumerable phenomena
are viewed through the insight of dependent origination as
arising and perishing due to the state of human defilement
and delusion. In the last, perfected stage of teaching,
however, imbued with the insight of 'sunyata, myriads of
phenomena or human differentiations are identified with the
ultimate true state of things as they are
(chen-jo-shih-hsiang(da) , tattvasyalaksanam)perfectly free,
unobstructed, and harmonious. This is the ultimate
realization of the middle path in the system of Mahayana
Buddhism as intuited and constructed by the great T'ien-t'ai
master, Chih-i.
VII. CONCLUSION:
CHINESE BUDDHISM AND ITS CONTRIBUTION
'Sakyamuni Buddha did not express his religious doctrine
in terms of 'sunyata, but rather by (1)dependentorigination
(pratityasamutpadaoryuan-ch'i(bc) or Yin-yuan-sheng-ch'i
(db))and(2)themiddle path (madhyamarga, madhyama-pratipador
chung-tao (bf)).Severalcenturies later, a group of Mahayana
texts --the Prajnnaparamitasutras (Pan-jo-ching(dc) ) and
Buddhavatamsaka-sutras (Hua-yen-ching(dd)-introducedthe
doctrine
98
of sunyata. By the middle of the second century A.D., this
was further consolidated by Nagarjuna, the foremost Mahayana
philosopher, through his dialectical treatises, among which
is the definitive Mulamadhyamakakarika or the Middle Trearise
(Chung-lun(de)).
As referred to before, Nagarjuna defined the original
insight of dependent origination in the Middle Treatise by
equating it with sunyata (k'ung-hsing) , prajnapti
(chia-she(df)),andmadhyama (chung-tao),thusaccomplishing the
linkage of dependent origination and madhyama. Very early on
these four concepts became the primary objects of inquiry for
Chinese Buddhists from the time of Seng Chao to that of
Chih-i of the T'ien-t'ai school and Chi-tsang of the San-lun
school. According to Seng Chao and Chih-i, through the
insights of sunyata and prajnapti every phenomenon
(vyavahara) inthe world of convention can eventually be
affirmed to pertain to the nature of transcendence
(paramartha,chen-ti(dg)orsheng-i-ti(dl)') in the middle
(chung). This middle domain, one might say, is like a locus,
without space or time, where the empirical
(laukikavyavahara-satya, su-ti(di) and the transcendent
(paramartha-satya, chen-ti) are said to interact as identical
(t'ung), while at the same time being different (i). The
question now is: What does this religious commentary mean
from the logical and linguistic point of view?
Nagarjuna as well as Seng Chao invariably introduced the
concepts of "secular" (su) and "true" (chen)respectively
referring to the conventional nature (vyavaharasatya) andthe
transcendent (paramarthasatya).They invariably juxtaposed two
contrary statements in the dialectical context, resulting in
a referent to the dual natures, i.e., "something is existent
while non-existent," "something is gone (ch'u)while being
present (chu) " "light (ming(dj) ) is identified with
darkness(an(dk))while being different from it," and so on.
Language is the medium par excellence for the formation
of culture because it depicts, prescribes, and sustains all
forms of behavioral patterns that make up and involve all
subjective and objective social institutions. Simultaneously,
cultural forms reinforce the ways language is used. Though
symbols may serve to liberate the human mind for universal
99
communication, more often than not they create bondage and
prejudice, interfering with proper communication and mutual
understanding. In this sense, even rational and logical
thinking often reflects a particular form of culture and
convention. An ideology is defined as a systematic body of
concepts about human life and culture or systematically
integrated assertions, theories, and aims that constitute a
socio-political program. As experienced by all of us, the
twentieth century has manifested a variety of ideologies.
Today, when the era of ideological confrontation has just
ended,there has begun an era of uncertainty accompanied by
amorphous, even sanguine, confrontations among different
ethnic societies and cultures, including those with different
religious beliefs. These conflicts are creating far more
formidable human problems precisely because of their
irrational nature.
The crucial point is how one should deal with the force
of a mind tied down to a particular form of ideology,
culture, religion, ethnicity or race. How could that mind,
compartmentalized within one form or another, be opened to
what lies beyond its own culture? Although Buddhist dialectic
or the insight of 'sunyata shares the same foundattion as
that of logic and language, it indeed appears to demolish the
very foundation of logic and language by juxtaposing contrary
predications and thereby inducing a dual-natured referent. As
evident in the T'ien-t'ai philosophy, however, the Buddhist
insight does not repudiate the empirical world
(shih-hsiang(dl))where the symbolic system operates, but
simultaneously accepts the workings of symbols as they are
(chia-she)from the transcendental point of view (i.e.based on
sunyata). Yet it repudiates the underlying mental force that
engenders linguistic behavior and culture formation, again in
terms of sunyata. The insight of sunyata counters the
referential force of the mind directed toward its object of
reference by its ultimately dual nature, and thus counters
the tendentious or purposive force of the mind that links one
symbol to another in terms of its ultimate
self-contradiction.
What is the characteristic of Chinese Buddhism that is
uniquely distinguishable from the Indian counterpart? There
should be no differ-
100
ence basically between Indian and Chinese Buddhism insofar as
it is concerned with those fundamental insights of dependent
origination (pratityasamutpada) emptiness ('sunyata) ,
linguistic practicality (prajnapti) , and the middle
path(madhyama). Nevertheless, there is a degree of difference
between the practical forms of the method resorted to and the
theoretical content of ultimate realization.
First, the reason that Seng Chao resorted to his own
paradoxical method of argument rather than the reducto ad
absurdum argument of Indian masters can be traced in part to
the non-inflectional mono-syllabic language and the use of
ideographic characters of Chinese language. In part it can
also be traced to the influence of the Mohist system of
logic, especially the application of hsiao and placing an
importance on subject terms.
Secondly, the T'ien-t'ai philosophical system
accomplished a total bridging between the phenomenal
(shih(bo) ) and transcendent (1i(o) )inpracticaldailylifein
terms of the Nagarjunian threefold truth
(i.e.,kungchia-chung(dm))whereas in Indian Buddhist systems,
the state of the phenomenal, mundane existence, was not
totally identified, except in theory, with ultimate
transcendence in the way Chinese Buddhists accomplished.
The practical mentality anchored in factuality (shih(p))
is an important asset of Chinese Buddhist religiosity and so
is the harmonious orientation exhibited in theorization of
facts, both of which are evidenced in the T'ien-t'ai theory
of harmonious permeation of all phenomena in terms of the
threefold transcendent truth" (yuan-jung-san-ti(dn) . The
Chinese Buddhist contribution to Chinese philosophy is that
while accepting the Confucian and Mohist logical thought,
they demonstrated why the ultimate foundation of these two
theories ought to be perceived from the standpoint of the
Buddhist insight of dependent origination and to review their
respective theories from the transcendental view of middle
path, namely, in terms of sunyata and prajnapti. As this
twofold Buddhist insight contributed to the history of
Chinese philosophy, I believe it can also contribute to the
understanding and amelioration of
101
contemporary world problems. The process is painfully slow,
but it is time for contemporary thinkers to begin to examine
insights and events that have moved and molded a culture to
supreme heights - in this case, Chinese Buddhism which peaked
during the T'ang Dynasty.
NOTES
1. Hu-shih(do), The Development of fhe Logical Methood in
Ancient China, Shang hai: The Oriental Book Co., 1928.
2. As to the meaning of "pre-linguirtic phases, , see
Ichimura's "Sunyata and Pradigrn-Shift: Dialogue between
Buddhism and Science' included in Sramana Vidya Studies
in Buddhism. Prof. Jagannafh Upadhyaya Commemoration
Volume I, Sarnath, Varanasi, India: Central Institute of
Higher Tibetan Studies 1987, pp.81-100.
3. Cf.Hu Shih, op.cit., p.47.
4. Ibid., p.65.
5. Cf. A.C Graham: The Later Mohist Logic ond Seience: Hong
kong: Chinese University Press, 1978; p.12.
6. Cf.ibid., p.13,
7. Ibid, p.8.
8. Hu Shih,op. cit., p.50.
9. Ibid., pp.48-49.
10. Ibid., p. 67 Also see Herbert Fingarette: Confucius --
the Secular as Sacred, Harper Torhbook, 1972, esp., the
concept of li in Confucius' thought.
11 Hu Shih,op.cit., p.64.
12 Ibid., p.67.
13. Ibid., p.93.
14. Ibid, and also Graham, op. cit., p.40. Graham especially
calls attention to the Mohist introduction of the tz'u
(dp) or "sentence or proposition 'for the
102
first time distinguished from the name. He states: The
distinction, grammatically less marked in Chinese than in
Indo-European languages, seems to have attracted
attention only after it was noticed that "knowing is
different from having a pictorial idea," and with this
discovery, "the Mohist's attention shifts to the
similarities and differences, not between objects or
names, but between the propositions by which we
describe."
15 Hu Shih, ibid., p.93 ; Also Cf to the above note and its
follow-up, in Graham, ibid., p.40.
16. Cf. G. Cardona, "Anvaya and Vyatireka in Indian Grammar,"
The Adyar Library Bulletin, 31-32 (1967-68), pp. 313-352.
17. Cf. Hu Shih, op. cit., p.99; also Graham, op. cit., pp.
470-473.
18. Cf. S Ichimura: "On the Paradoxical Method of the Chinese
Madhyamikas: Seng-chao and the Chao-lun Treatise" Journal
of Chinese Philosophy 19 (1992): pp. 51-71.
19. Of there five-membered statements, Dignaga eliminated
initially the Nigamana (conclusion) and Upanaya
(application of concomitance or vyapti) on the grounds
that the former is a mere repetition of the pratijna
(thesis) and that the latter is only a pedagogical
indication of the qualities of the valid hetu.
20. Dignaga's refutation of Hindu Nyaya logic on this matter
is quoted by Vacaspati Misra in his
Nyayavarttikatatparyatika., p. 169 (24) - p. 180 (10).
Cf. Vidyabhusana History of lndian Logic, pp. 281-82.
21. Ibid.
22. The italics are this writer's.
23. Cf. Har Dayal: The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist
Sanskrit Literature (originally published in London,
1932; Motilal Banarsidass, 1970) pp. 248 ff.
24. The Chao-lun or The Treatise of Seng-Chao consists of
four short essays and two epistles written on Buddhist
doctrines regarded as the earliest extant Chinese
Madhyamika text composed by the native Chinese mind. 1
fasc., Taisho Daizokyo 45,(No. 1858), p. 150 ff. Sec
Ichimura, op. cit.
25. Verse 18 in Ch. 24 reads as follows: yah
pratityasamutpadah sunyatam tam pracaksmahe/sa prajaptir
upadaya pratipat saiva madhyama // and can be translated:
"That which has arisen through dependent origination, we
call it as Emptiness; it is a linguistic convention based
on [causal] configuration, it is indeed the middle path."
Cf. alternative translations, such as, by K.Inada in his
Nagarjuna: A Translation of His Mulamadhyamikakarika
[Tokyo:
103
Hokuseido Press, 1970], or by J. Takakusu in The
EssenTinls of Buddhist Philosophy. (Honolulu, University
of Hawaii Press, 1947). p 129.
26. Cf. Janusz Chmielewski, "Notes on Early Chinese Logic"
(I-IV) , Rocznik Orientalistyczny especially,
No.III(1963).
27. Hu Shih, op. cit., p. 96. Graham, translating hsiao as
"exemplifying." quotes the Mohist definition of hsiao
from its text along with his translation in his work, op.
ci., p.470 and gives his translation as follows: 'Some'
is not all ['stone' when broken up]. The loan-named
[Ch'in horse'] is not now so. An example ['pillar'] is a
standard for being deemed such-and-such ['wood']: the
thing exemplified is the standard by which the example is
deemed suchand-such. Therefore if something coincides
with an example, it is this thing, and if it does not it
is not; this is exemplifying." (p. 471)
28. Cf.Ichimura, loc. cit., p.57.
29. Cf.A.C.Graham, op.cit., p.66.
30. See footnote 18 above.
31. Although Nieh p'an-wu-ming-lun(bx) was translated in that
article as the "Treatise that Nirvana is nameless."I am
more convinced now that the title should be translated as
"Treatise that Nirvana is No-naming" in accordance with
the foregoing analysis.
32. The perfect reading can be explained in contrast to those
ranked below it. The readings are dedescribed from lower
to higher here. (1) Tsang-chiao(dq) or the practical
teaching concerned with the three realms of existence,
comprising the teaching of the Sutra-pitaka, all
doctrines of Hinayana schools; (2) T'ung-chiao(dr) or the
theoretical teaching concerned with the three relams of
existence, comprising the teachings common to the three
vehicles and the basic Mahayana teaching; (3)
Pieh-chiao(ds) or the practical teaching concerned with
that which is beyond the three realms of existence,
comprising purely Mahayana teachings specially opened to
bodhisattvas as to the doctrine of sunyata and middle
path; (4) Yuan-chiao or the theoretical teaching
concerned with that which is beyond the three realms of
existence, comprising the Middle path as noumenon,
perfectly harmonious, theoretically and practically.
33. Cf. Bruno Petzold, The Classification of Buddhism, Bukkyo
Kyohan, comprising The Classification of Buddhist
Docfrines in India,China, and Japan; Vol. I, Pt. 4:
Tendai Doctrine, Ch.12∫3,4 [Edited by S.Ichimura,
(Wiesbaden, Germany; Otto Harrassowoitz, 1994]and J
Takakusu: op. cit., pp..
p.104
133-34. Takakusu translates "perfect permeation" as "one-in
-all all-in-one"(i.e., one element contains all
elements) .Chih-i, Ssu-chiao-i(dt) [Taisho 46
(no.1929),esp.pp.760-769].
CHINESE GLOSSARY
a 墨子 p 實 ae 布施
b 孔子 q 故 af 持戒
c 周 r 同 ag 忍
d 秦 s 異 ah 精進
e 漢 t 明帝 ai 襌定
f 魯 u 教判 aj 智慧
g 君子 v 教相判釋 ak 十波羅蜜
h 樂 w 空性 al 方便
i 禮 x 有自性 am 願
j 兼愛 y 菩薩乘 an 力
k 攻 z 聲門乘 ao 智
l 異義 aa 菩薩道 ap 善巧方便
m 一同天下之義 ab 菩薩行 aq 鳩摩羅什
n << 春秋 >> ac 六度 ar 僧肇
o 理 ad 六波羅蜜 as << 肇論 >>
p.105
at 智顗 bo 事 cj 事象
au 天台宗 bp 杜順 ck 不即無
av 三論宗 bq 智嚴 cl 非真
aw 吉藏 br 法藏 cm 非實有
ax 五時八教 bs 五教一宗 cn << 大品般若經 >>
ay 化儀四教 bt 法界緣起 co 假號不真
az 化法四教 bu 效 cp 非真人
ba 一念三千 bv 法 cq 三觀
bb 圓融三諦 bw 名 cr 圓教
bc 緣起 bx 涅槃無名論 cs 圓妙
bd 空 by 真 ct 圓滿
be 假 bz 俗 cu 圓極
bf 中道 ca 住 cv 圓頓
bg 龍樹 cb 去 cw 不單中
bh << 中論 >> cc "不真空論" cx 即空
bi 中 cd 有 cy 即假
bj 華嚴 ce 假有 cz 即中
bk 十玄緣起 cf 非 da 真如實相
bl 性 cg 無 db 因緣生起
bm 理 ch 非有 dc << 般若經 >>
bn 相 ci 非真生 dd << 華嚴經 >>
p.106
de << 中論 >>
df 假設
dg 真諦
dh 勝義諦
di 俗諦
dj 明
dk 暗
dl 事象
dm 空假中
dn 圓融三諦
do 胡適
dp 辭
dq 藏教
dr 通教
ds 別教
dt << 四教義 >>