.

p.249

    Existential   and  Ontological   Dimensions  of  Time  in
Heidegger and Dogen by Steven Heine is an excellent new study
which makes a significant  contribution  to our understanding
of Japanese  Buddhism  and EastWest  comparative  philosophy.
Grounded   in  the  original   German  language   edition  of
Heidegger's  Sein  und Zeit (Being  and Time) as well  as the
Japanese  language edition of Dogen's Shobogenzo(a) (Treasury
of  the  True  Dharma-Eye) ,  Heine's   work   goes   far  in
successfully  realizing  its  stated  aim  of establishing  a
"framework  for philosophical  dialogue between Heidegger and
Dogen through  an examination  of their analyses  of the true
nature,  structure   and  meaning  of  time  in  terms  of  a
convergence  of existential and ontological dimensions."  (p.
ix) The  inclusion  of  a new  annotated  translation  of the
Uji(b) or "Being-Time"  chapter of Dogen's Shobogenzo further
adds to the value of Heine's book.
    Heine argues that Heidegger and Dogen are uniquely suited
for critical  comparative  and cross-cultural  study not only
because  both attempt to overcome  the deficiencies  of their
respective  philosophical  traditions on the subject of time,
but also insofar as both thinkers "reorient our understanding
of all phases  of existence  and experience  in terms of time
and temporality,death and dying,finitude and impermanence..."
(p. ix)  In Chapter 1 of his work  entitled  "The Question of
Time" he cites Heidegger's  assertion that "our treatment  of
the meaning  of Being must enable us to show that the central
problematic of all ontology is rooted in the phenomenon of
time..." (p. 14) This fundamental inseparability of being and
time established  by Heidegger's  work  Sein and Zeit is then
related  to Dogen's  famous Zen Buddhist  doctrine  of uji or
"being-time."   In   this   context   Heine   cites   Dogen's
proclamation from the "Uji" chapter


P.250

of his Shobogenzo  which states: "time itself (ji) already is
none other than being(s) (u); and being(s) are all none other
than time." (p. 28)
    In Chapter  2 entitled  "The Origin  of Derivative  Time"
Heine analyzes the attempted overcoming of derivative time in
the  thought  of both  Heidegger  and Dogen.  Heine  develops
Heidegger's  analysis accord to which Being in its primordial
sense of "presencing" (Anwesenheit) becomes reduced to the
objectified status of a substantial entity (ousia).  (p.  36)
As  Heine  points   out,  for  Heidegger   the  "inauthentic"
(uneigentlich) mode  of  existence  is a state  of  "falling"
(Verfallen) in which Dasein is preoccupied  with the present.
(p.  61) In falling, everything primordial and mysterious  is
considered  obvious  and  self-evident, and  the dynamism  of
primordial  temporality  is reduced to mere derivate  time or
clock-time conceived as a series of static now-points.(p. 42)
According to Heidegger's  critique of Western philosophy from
Plato to Nietzsche, it is this derivative notion of time as a
succession  of  substantial  "nows"  based  on an inauthentic
preoccupation   with  the  present   which  generates   false
conceptions  of eternalism.  Heine  next relates  Heidegger's
critique  of derivative  time  to Dogen's  criticism  of what
Japanese  Buddhism terms sennigedo(c) or the "Senika heresy,"
which    refers    to   the    false    eternalization    and
substantialization of mujo-bussho(d) or "impermanence-
Buddha-nature."  Heine writes: "In 'Bussho'  Dogen exposes  a
variety  of  misconceptions   permeating   Mahayana  and  Zen
theories   and  practices   that   stem  from   fundamentally
derivative  views of being-time.  Buddha-nature, he suggests,
is frequently posited as an eternal substance which is actual
yet  transcendent  of  moral  causation  and  the  life-death
process..." (p. 58)
    In Chapter  3 entitled  "Finitude  and Impermance"  Heine
analyzes how notions of derivative  time are finally overcome
through the disclosure  of radical contingency  pervading all
existence,  revealed  in  terms  of  Heidegger's   notion  of
"finitude"   (Endlichkeit)  and  Dogen's  interpretation   of
"impermanence" (mujo(e)). Heine asserts:

    The notion of finitude  in Heidegger's  understanding  of
    Being  and  the interpretion  of impermanence  in Dogen's
    approach  to Zen have a parallel  role for each thinker's
    project in terms of overcoming  fixations  with substance
    and attachments to



p.251

    eternalism,  and  in  establishing   the  basis   for   a
    realization  of the dynamism, unity  and insubstantiality
    of primordial time. (p.71)

Heine further  argues  that although  Heidegger's  notion  of
finitude and Dogen's idea of impermanence  are quite distinct
in terms  of many of the conclusions  drawn  by each thinker,
both concepts function similarly insofar as they point to the
radical  contingency  of  existence,  ontologically  revealed
through  "nothingness"   which  pervades   man's  existential
encounters with vicissitude, anxiety, dying and loss. (p. 71)
In  the  case  of  Heidegger,  Heine  asserts  that  Dasein's
"authentic" (eigentlich) existence as a Being-in-time  is the
ontological-temporal  bails for its"existenzial disclosure of
finitude         as        Being-thrown-unto-death         or
Being-towards-the-end."  (p.  74) At this point Heine relates
Heidegger's   notion   of  authentic   finite  existence   as
Being-in-time  and  Being-towards-death  to the Zen  Buddhist
thought  of  Dogen, which  maintains  that  'the  fundamental
significance  of  impermanence  is directly  and  inseparably
related  to  an  ontological/existential  realization  of the
Buddhist  truth  of  non-self  (muga,  (f) the  thoroughgoing
insubstantiality of human and phenomenal existence)." (p. 75)
Thus  Heine   concludes:  "Heidegger   and  Dogen   share   a
concentration  on death and dying as the extreme experiential
point  for the convergence  of the dimensions  of existential
decision  and  ontological   disclosure   concerning  radical
contingency," adding that "death penetrates  every moment  of
and aspect of life, so that the ways one encounters his dying
becomes normative for his approach toward living." (p. 97)
    Finally, in Chapter  4 entitled  "Primordial  Time" Heine
describes  the dynamic existential  and ontological  unity of
non-substantive  temporality  as  developed  by Heidegger  in
terms of his notion of "primordial time" (ursprugliche  Zeit)
and  by Dogen  in terms  of  what  he  calls  the  "truth  of
being-time"  (uji no dori(g)).  At the outset of this chapter
Heine writes: The aim of the exposition of primoridal time by
Heidegger  and Dogen  is to show  that  true temporality...is
fundamentally   and   essentially   interrelated   with   and
inseparable   from  existence."  (p.   105)  Throughout  this
chapter, Heine  not  only  emphasizes  the inseparability  of
being  and  time, but  also  the  total  dynamism, unity  and
nonsubstantiality of pri-


p.252

mordial  time  for  both  Heidegger  and Dogen.  Moreover, he
emphasizes  that  by means  of their  respective  notions  of
primordial  time, both Heidegger  and Dogen attempt a radical
overcoming  of substance and eternalist ontology derived from
linear  now-time.   However,  at  this  point  Heine  sharply
distinguished  the  positions  of  these  two  thinkers.   He
repeatedly   argues   that  for  Heidegger,  primordial   and
authentic   time   is   futural,  based   on   the   resolute
"anticipation"  of  one's  projected  possibilities; Dasein's
fallenness  is always associated  with the present.  Although
Dogen refutes the "now" that has been isolated from existence
and  from  past  and  future,  he  ultimately   affirms   the
simultaneity  of all three tenses within the here-and-now  of
each dynamic and totalistic moment based on the experience of
genjokoan(h) or "the immediate and complete manifestation  of
Zen  realization."  (pp.  31, 137, 140, 143) On  this  basis,
Heine   further   argues:  "Thus   the  central   existential
difference  between Heidegger and Dogen is that Dogen insists
that  the True Man must not await, expect  or anticipate  the
arrival  of  the  presencing  of time  because  he penetrates
insubstantiality here-and-now." (p. 141)
    Although  Heine's  book  succeeds  well  in  its  aim  at
establishing  a framework for philosophical  dialogue between
Heidegger  and Dogen  on the problem  of time, many  scholars
might seriously  question  the balance and neutrality  of his
dialogue.  For  in fact, Heine  repeatedly  employs  the  Zen
Buddhist  thought  of Dogen  as a standpoint  from  which  to
criticize the limitations  of Heidegger's philosophy of time.
For instance, he writes:

    It will be shown  that whereas  Heidegger's  analysis  of
    now-time  leads to an emphasis  on the priority of future
    and past and to an inability  to disclose the temporality
    of  entities,  Dogen  overcomes  the  inauthentic  static
    now-point   through   disclosure   of  the  all-inclusive
    simultaneous  passage  (kyoryaku)  of  the  three  tenses
    encompassing all phenomena. (p. 36)

However, some would no doubt  argue that Heidegger's  account
has not failed to disclose the temporality of existence, but
has in fact brilliantly  described  the dynamic interplay  of
all three tenses in the continuity  of primordial  time while
yet carefully distinguishing the unique phenome-

p.253

nological  characteristics   of  each  tense  in  a  way  not
sufficiently articulated in Dogen's analysis.  Thus, in order
to balance  his discussion  it seems incumbent  upon Heine to
consider  how  one  might  also  criticize   Dogen  from  the
standpoint of Heidegger's analysis.
    Perhaps my most serious criticism  of Heine's analysis is
that although  it provides  an excellent  description  of the
"continuity"  central to Dogen's idea of uji or "being-time,"
it completely  fails to underscore  the radical discontinuity
which this theory  also involves.  In his account  of Dogen's
theory  of being-time  Heine  emphasizes  that  the immediate
experience of nikon(i) or "right here-and-now"  does not give
rise to the Senika heresy  of eternalizing  Buddha-nature  or
substantializing  the 'now"  since it is counter-balanced  by
the  notion  of  kyoryaku(j)  -comprehended   as  "totalistic
passage"  in  the  sense  of  "experiential  continuity."  In
Heine's  words: "Dogen further avoids any confusion  of nikon
with a newly derivative eternalism  by stressing the temporal
depth and experiential  breath  of the right-now  in terms of
the notion of experiential  continuity  or totalistic passage
(kyoryaku)." (p.  129) Elsewhere in his text, Heine refers to
this  notion  of  kyoryaku  or "experiential  continuity"  as
denoting  the  idea  of "continuous  passage"  (p.127) or the
"continuity of time" (p.181). Along with the consciousness of
nikon  or  "right  here-and-now," it  is  this  awareness  of
kyoryaku  or  "continuous   passage"  which  constitutes  the
primordial  experience  of  being-time  according  to Heine's
analysis of Dogen. Although Heine's explication of being-time
in terms of what herms of what he calls "the dual notions  of
nikon  and  kyoryaku"  (p.143) is in itself  illuminating, it
wholly neglects the radical discontinuity which many scholars
regard as primary in Dogen's  concept of mujo or impermanence
and uji or being-time.  For  instance, in his  work  entitled
Dogen  Kigen-Mystical  Realist, Hee-jin  Kim emphasizes  that
there  is  an  'ultimacy  of  discontinuity"  in Dogen's  Zen
Buddhist  theory of being-time.(1) As Kim explains, for Dogen
each discontinuous "dharma-position"  (ju-hoi(k)) constitutes
the whole of "being-time" (uji) as an "absolute now" (nikon),
comprehended as the self-actualization  of the total presence
of the Buddha-nature. Kim further elaborates:

p.254

    This is a radical  rejection  of the flow of time, or the
    stream of consciousness, or any other conception  of time
    based  on the idea of continuity  or duration.  That  is,
    time  is  absolutely  discrete  and  discontinuous.  This
    characteristic is primary in Dogen's thought.(2)

    Moreover, this "ultimacy of discontinuity" at the base of
Dogen's Zen Buddhist  thought further raises a question as to
the  adequacy  of  a Heideggerean  interpretation  of uji  or
being-time.   For   in  fact,  Heidegger   phenomenologically
describes  primordial  time as being purely  "ecstatic"  (ek-
static)  and  "continuous"  (kontinuierlich) .   Accordingly,
throughout   his  analysis  of  Heidegger's   thought,  Heine
repeatedly   emphasizes   this   uninterrupted   "continuity"
(Kontinuitat) or  "ecstatic-horizonal"  unity  of  primordial
time along with the undivided  "continuity  of Dasein."  (pp.
116-118) To give just one example, Heine states: "Temporality
is the ekstatikon  pure  and  simple  by whith  Dasein  views
itself   as  temporalhistorical   unity   and  individualized
continuity   of  finite  transcendence,  rather   than  as  a
collection  of isolated yet serially  connected  time units."
(pp. 116-17) Yet, neither in Heidegger nor in Heine's account
of Heidegger  can  one discover  anything  comparable  to the
"ultimacy of discontinuity" in Dogen's theory of being-time.
    In a chapter of his book Zen and Western Thought entitled
"Dogen  on Buddha-Nature," Abe  Masao  also  emphasizes  this
radical  discontinuity  of being-time  in Dogen's  theory  of
mujo-bussho  or  "impermanenceBuddha-nature," writing: "Dogen
denies continuity of time and emphasizes the independence  of
each point of time...  "(3) He adds: "Only by the realization
of the complete discontinuity of time and of the independent
moment...  does  time  become  real time."(4) Yet, in Dogen's
concept of uji or being-time, primordial  temporality  is not
merely discontinuous, since it also flows continuously  as is
denoted by the concept of kyoryaku (continuous passage).  For
this reason  Abe further  asserts: "However, in spite  of the
complete discontinuity  of time and independent  moment, time
flows. This is kyoryaku, i.e., seriatim passage..."(5) Hence,
for Dogen there is a profound  sense  in which being-time  is
both  discontinuous  and continuous.  In this context,I would
argue

p.255

that Dogen's theory of being-time  is best comprehended  from
the stand-point  of Japan's foremost 20th century speculative
philosopher  Nishida  Kitaro (1870-1945), who argues that the
unity  of  time  is itself  a "continuity  of  discontinuity"
(hirenzoku  no  renzoku) .(1)  Thus,  in  his  work  entitled
Tetsugaku  no kompon mondai.(Fundamental  Problems  of Philo-
sophy)Nishida writes:

    As I have said before, the unity of the individual cannot
    be thought  of as simply a continuity, rather, it must be
    a continuity  of discontinuity, so as to  constitute  the
    unity of independent beings with every step.  Each moment
    of time passes into the next moment  by negating  itself,
    hence establishing the unity of time.(6)

Nishida   specifically   refutes   the   position   held   by
conventional  Western substance philosophy which conceives of
time  as a series  of  discrete  now-points, i.e., as  a mere
"discontinuity"  (hirenzoku(m)),yet, he also repudiates  the
concept of time as pure duration or "continuity" (renzoku(n))
as  held  by  such  philosophers   as  Bergson,  Husserl   or
Heidegger.  Instead, the unity of time constituting  the true
self can only be described  as a "discontinuous  continuity,"
or  as it were, a "continuity  of discontinuity."  From  this
perspective  Nishida  further  argues  that the discontinuous
continuity  of temporal  experience  results  in a heightened
existential  awareness  of death  and  nothingness  at  every
moment: "For the individual  to be connected to the following
moment  as the  continuity  of discontinuity  it is necessary
that one die at this moment and enter into nothingness."(7)
    In the West, this Japanese  Buddhist  view  of primoridal
time as discontinuous  continuity  has received  its clearest
articulation by the process thought of Alfred North Whitehead.
In  his  earliest  philosophical  text  entitled  An  Enquiry
Concerning  the Principles  of Natural  Knowledge  Whitehead,
like Heidegger, rigorously protests against the standpoint of
conventional substance philosophy and scientific materialism
which  regards time  as  a series  of  discrete  now-points,
arguing  that  "we  do  not  perceive  isolated  facts,but  a
continuity of existence."(8) However,in a

p.256

later work entitled  Science  and the Modern World, Whitehead
makes a radical shift from temporal  continuity  to "temporal
atomicity," now arguing  that  the  notion  of "discontinuous
existence"(9)  introduced   by  recent  quantum   theory  has
prompted him to completely revise his description of physical
reality.  Whitehead's so-called "epochal" theory of time as a
discontinuous  continuity  finally culminates  in Process and
Reality, wherein  he argues that due to the discontinuity  or
quantum  characteristic   of  each  becoming   and  perishing
occasion, temporal  passage  involves  not  a "continuity  of
becoming,"  but  a  "becoming  of  continuity."(10) In  other
words, there is a new "creation  of continuity"  within  each
discontinuous occasion of temporal experience.  Moreover, for
Whitehead this discontinuous  continuity  of temporal passage
is the basis for an existential  awareness  of death at every
moment,  namely, a  tragic  sense  of  time  as  "perpetually
perishing."(11) For  this   reason   I  would   argue   that
Whitehead's  process cosmology  provides what is possibly the
most adequate  Western categoreal  scheme by which to cognize
the  theory  of  time  as  a  "continuity  of  discontinuity"
developed  by both Dogen and Nishida  in Japan.  Indeed, in a
footnote  Heine himself  remarks  that "Whiteheadian  process
philosophy   of  the  harmonious   and  dynamic  universe  of
prehensive  events and developing  organisms  perhaps poses a
significant challenge to Heidegger's Dasein-oriented approach
to the question  of time."  (p.  164) In this context, I have
considered  the extent to which Whitehead's  process  thought
provides a serious alternative to Heidegger's philosophy as a
Western hermeneutic capable of interpreting Dogen's theory of
uji  or being-time  in Japanese  Zen  Buddhism.  Nonetheless,
Heine's work Existential  and Ontological  Dimensions of Time
in Heidegger  and Dogen makes  an important  advance  towards
formulating  a cross-cultural  framework  aimed at overcoming
all substance  and eternalist  ontology  derived  from static
now-time,  while   also   establishing   a  basis   for   the
dynamism,unity and nonsubstantiality  of primordial time.  On
this  basis, Heine's  book  can  be strongly  recommended  to
anyone  interested   in  the  fields  of  Japanese  Buddhism,
Heidegger's existentialism or East-West comparative studies.



p.257

                     NOTES

1.  Hee-Jin   Kim,  Dogen  Kigen-Mystical   Realist  (Tucson,
    Arizona: The University of Arizona Press, 1975), p.213.
2.  Ibid, p.202.
3.  Masao  Abe,  Zen  and  Western  Thought, ed.  W.R.LaFIeur
    (Honolulu: University of Hawaii press, 1985). See Chapter
    2 entitled Dogen on Buddha Nature," p.63.
4.  Ibid., p.64.
5.  Ibid., p.65.
6. Kitaro Nishida, Tetsugaku no kompon mondai (Fundamental
    Problems  of philosophy) from Nishida  Kitaro Zenshu (The
    complete  Works  of Nishida  Kitaro), 10 vols.  (2nd ed.,
    Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1965), vol.VII, p.268.
7.  Ibid., p.295.
8.  Alfred  North  Whitehead,  An  Enquiry   Concerning   the
    Principles  of  Natural  Knowledge  (Cambridge: Cambridge
    University Press, 1919; second edition, 1924), pp.7-8.
9.  Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New
    York: Macmillan, second  edition, The Free  press, 1967),
    p.135.
10. Alfred  North Whitehead, Process  and Reality  (New York:
    Macmillan.  1929  corrected  edition, ed.  by  David  Ray
    Griffin and Donald W.  Sherburne.  The Free press, 1978),
    p. 35.
11. Ibid, p. 340.  For Whitehead, as for NIshida Kitaro, this
    "discontinuity"  of all  microcosmic-macrocosmic  quantum
    events  is crucial  not only for its radical  existential
    implications, but  also  because  it  is  the  ground  of
    creativity, novelty  and  freedom  in each  becoming  and
    perishing occasion of temporal experience.

    GLOSSARY OF JAPANESE TERMS

a 正法眼藏                    h 現成公案
b 有時                        i 而今
c 先尼外道                    j 經歷
d 無常佛性                    k 住法位
e 無常                        l 非連續ソ連續
f 無我                        m 非連續
g 有時ソ道理                  n 連續