.


Introduction

Current studies on the ethical thought of Sung neo-Confucians
generally focus on issues concerning  the cultivation  of the
mind and the investigation of principles.  Both are essential
to the  realization  of sagehood.  The strong  interest  that
neo-Confucianism   has  received   in  American   scholarship
notwithstanding, ritual, a  major  concern  in  neo-Confucian
ethics, remains understudied.[1]  One of the consequences has
been  the  inflation  of  the  importance  of metaphysics  in
neo-Confucian discourse on morality.

From the perspective  of Chu Hsi (1130-1200), however, modern
students  make the same  mistake  as the Buddhists, that  is,
they  one-sidedly  stress  the rectification  of the internal
self with reverence (ching i chih nei) without also employing
propriety or duty to regulate the external self (the body) (i
i fang  wai).[2]  For  Chu  Hsi, both  jen (humanity) and  li
(principle)  could   be  defined   in  terms  of  li  (ritual
rules).[3] In Confucian  discourse, li in the sense of ritual
rules are the major means that defines  the proper  level  of
the public display of emotions, feelings, and actions  in the
fulfillment   of  duty.[4]   Li  are  indispensable   to  the
cultivation of proper conduct--the  particular realization of
universal  virtues.  Like  Confucians  before  them,  leading
neo-Confucian  thinkers  such as Ch'eng  I (1033-1107), Chang
Tsai  (1020-1077), and Chu Hsi were no less  concerned  about
ritual.   They  had  written  on  a  wide  range  of  rituals
pertaining   to  funerals,  burial,  mourning,  and  ancestor
worship.[5]

This essay seeks to redress this balance by demonstrating the
importance   of  ritual   in  the  moral  theories   of  Sung
neo-Confucians  by focusing  on Chang Tsai's  thought.  Chang
Tsai  was  of  one  of  the  most  consistent   and  renowned
neo-Confucians  in the Northern Sung.  He formulated a theory
of moral  cultivation  that  put  a premium  on ritual, which
informed his much-studied cosmology and ontology. In order to
assess the cen-trality  of ritual  within the fabric of Chang
Tsai's  thought, I shall  first  show  how it is inextricably
related  to his cosmology, theory  of human  nature, view  of
history, and system  of ethics.  I shall  then  try  to place
Chang's thought within the broader  context of his agenda for
reforming Northern Sung society.

Studies  on Chang's thought in general  stress the importance
of his contribution to the formulation of a monistic ontology
and a materialist  notion of the cosmos  based on the concept
of ch'i (matter).[6] The attention  that Chang's metaphysical
ideas have received  in current scholarship  has overshadowed
his theory of moral cultivation.  As I will demonstrate, this
situation results from a one-sided approach to Chang's notion
of ch'i that stresses its significance  in his cosmology  and
ontology without also considering  the inherently  disruptive
quality of ch'i for humanity.

Discussions  of Chang Tsai's thought generally make little or
no mention of his view of ritual? By contrast, the importance
of ritual in Chang Tsai's thought  had long been pointed  out
by his  contemporaries  and  his students.  In a biographical
essay he wrote to commemorate  his mentor, Lu Ta-lin  related
that Chang  often  encouraged  scholars  to start  practicing
ritual  as the proper  method  of moral  cultivation.[8]  The
emphasis on ritual in Chang's teachings  was also known among
officials,  including   the  famed  statesman   Ssuma   Kuang
(1033-1107).[9] Even the author of Chang's  biography  in the
Sung  shih (A Dynastic  History  of the Sung) did not fail to
note his interest in ritual.[10]

Apart from his ch'i cosmology, what distinguished  Chang Tsai
from   other   Sung   neo-Confucians--such   as  Chou   Tun-i
(1017-1077), Ch'eng  Hao (1032-1077), and Ch'eng  I--was  his
strong emphasis  on moral education  through ritual practice.
His  view  is  epitomized  in  his  pedagogical  method--i-li
weichiao (teaching by ritual). Similiar phrases conveying the
same idea abound in Chang's writings.

To  understand  why  the  learning  and  practice  of  ritual
constituted  the  central  part  of Chang's  theory  of moral
education,  we  need  first  to  take  note  of  the  by  now
well-recognized  fact that there  was a strong  anti-Buddhist
impulse  in the Tao-hsueh  strain  of neo-Confucianism.  This
anti-Buddhist  sentiment  appeared  faintly  in neo-Confucian
cosmology   but   was   expressed   most   pronouncedly    in
neo-Confucian  ethics.  In order  to understand  Chang Tsai's
ethical  thought, we need  to examine  the  connection  Chang
himself  made between  the cosmos  and human nature, for they
form an inseparable and coherent system.

The Cosmos of Matter (Ch'i)

In traditional societies, ethics have often been rationalized
as founded  in the  cosmic  order, be it the  creator  of the
universe or the very structure of the universe itself.  Views
of the natural order provide  the paradigm  and justification
for  the  sociopolitical   order  of  the  human   world.   A
cosmological  pattern  provides  a "permanent  and unchanging
order of things," against which the flux of human conduct can
be explained, measured, and valorized.[11] The need to ground
a particular  ethical system in the cosmos becomes acute when
there is more than one ethical system.  Their differences may
result in an awareness of the arbitrariness and relativity of
the order of social relations  and hence the rules of conduct
as they are prescribed  by the competing systems.  The battle
of  ethical  doctrines  thus  often  involves  a cosmological
debate.   The  Sung  neo-Confucians'   profound  interest  in
cosmological  and metaphysical  questions  can be regarded as
evidence  for  their  determination  to  counteract  Buddhist
ethics at the cosmological level.

Setting  aside the question  of the accuracy  of Chang Tsai's
understanding  of Buddhism, his notion  of a cosmos of matter
was meant as an explicit  rebuttal  of what he took to be the
Buddhist  negation  of the phenomenal  world.[12]  Chang Tsai
believed    in    a   self-generating,   self-renewing,   and
self-sustaining   cosmos.   The  cosmos  is  a  "great  void"
(t'ai-hsu) of formless  matter  (ch'i), which  is its essence
(t'i).[13]  There  is no great  void  independent  of matter.
Ontologically  speaking,  they  are  inseparable, but, viewed
from the vantage  point  of the human  senses, they represent
the two general modes of existence--form and formlessness. It
is due  to the principle  (li) of the cosmos  that  essential
matter  condensed  to form physical  existence  of all sorts,
which will eventually disintegrate  back into formless matter
again.   The  cyclical   process  of  the  condensation   and
dispersion  of matter  are but  two different  states  of the
transformation  of the Way.  This dynamism  of the cosmos  is
what Chang called  ch'i-hua  (transformation  of matter), and
the great  void  (hsu) refers  to the formless  state  of the
cosmos.  These  two aspects  taken  together  constitute  the
"nature"  (hsing) of all beings.  Therefore, there  is always
matter regardless of its modality.

The Cosmic Hierarchy

According  to Chang Tsai, all things are the same in terms of
the constituent ch'i and are without exception subject to the
universal process of condensation and dispersion.  But things
in the universe do not flow freely in a chaotic manner;  they
all  have  their  proper   positions.   Far  from  being   an
undifferentiated mass, nature is hierarchical.  Things in the
universe  are ordered by several cardinal  principles.  Chang
said:

    There  is a chronological  order  in birth;  this is what
    constitutes  the temporal  order  of Heaven  (t'ien-hsu).
    Small and big, high and low, all appear in juxtaposition;
    this is what is called  the hierarchical  order of Heaven
    (t'ien-chih). Heaven creates things in an orderly manner,
    and,  after   taking   shape,  things   come  to  have  a
    hierarchical order.[14]

Thus,  in  the  world  of  forms   or  existence,  there  are
principles  regulating  the relationship  between  individual
things.  Human society also reflects these natural principles
of order.  Any attempt  to understand  Chang  Tsai's  view of
human nature must take into consideration  Chang's  idea of a
cosmic hierarchy.

Cosmic Nature and Human Nature

According  to the neo-Confucians  themselves, one  of Chang's
major contributions  consisted in his conception of "physical
nature"  (ch'i-chih  chih  hsing).  Ch'eng  I argued  that no
discussion  of human  nature  would  be complete  without  an
explanation  of man's physical nature? Indeed, the concept of
"physical  nature" is essential to bridging Chang's seemingly
egalitarian  view  of the  cosmos  and his defense  of social
hierarchy, a tension  which  Chang  himself  did not seem  to
recognize. Chang's main concern was how to explain the myriad
differences  of the human species  in terms of their  varying
physical  constitution, and  hence  the social  hierarchy  in
terms  of the  variations  in human  intelligence  and innate
abilities.  It  is no coincidence  that  Chang's  concept  of
"physical  nature"  was  highly  valued  by  Chu  Hsi  as  an
important contribution  to Confucian-ism.  This notion is, in
fact, crucial  to the neo-Confucians'  response  to Buddhism.
They  were  compelled  to  accommodate  the  universalism  of
Buddhist cosmology while rejecting its altruistic implication
for social ethics.  It is this notion of physical nature that
made  it  possible   for  the  neo-Confucians   to  reconcile
ontological universalism and the Confucian doctrine of social
hierarchy based on the family.

In Chang's view, human existence derived its bodily form from
cosmic  matter.  Man's  physical  form  embodies  the  cosmic
principle   of  the  endless   cycle   of  condensation   and
dispersion.   Individual   human  beings  are  no  more  than
particular instantiations of the coalescence of the essential
matter  of  the  cosmos.  In  this  sense, human  beings  are
identical  with other things  in the cosmos, and human nature
is  identical  with  the  nature  of  the  cosmos.  "Nature,"
therefore, is universal and is not peculiar to humankind.[16]
While  human  beings  are identical  with everything  else in
terms  of  their  cosmic   origin   and  the  material   that
constitutes   their  bodily   form,  upon  taking   shape  as
individual  persons, they still differ  as a result  of their
inevitable "imbalance" of physical constitution.  Chang gives
us no clue to why this is so.  We can perhaps  infer from his
other  ideas  that such an imbalanced  human constitution  is
inevitably  a result of the natural  process  of condensation
and dispersion.

Chang distinguished this corporeal nature of human existence,
ch'i-chih  chih hsing (physical  nature), from its origin  in
the cosmic  being t'ien-ti  chih hsing(nature  of heaven  and
earth).  Distinctions  appear as the cosmic ch'i condenses to
form different  kinds of existence  (wu), of which humans are
the most  intelligent? When  things  acquire  their  specific
forms, they  break  away  from  the undifferentiated--and, in
this  sense,  pure--cosmic   being.   Humans   assume   their
uniqueness  only  when  they  come  into  existence  both  as
individuals and as a particular order of being.  This rupture
marks  the  very  constitution  of human  existence  that  is
different  from other  forms  of beings  and from  the cosmic
substance.  To stress the rupture  of beings is to call for a
differentiated   treatment   of  the  cosmos,  humanity,  and
nonhuman beings. As we shall see, this rupture provides Chang
Tsai and the neo-Confucians  with the logical and ontological
ground for reaffirming  the centrality of the human world and
its hierarchical social structure.

It  should  be  noted, however, that  Chang  did  not  regard
"physical  nature"  and "nature  of heaven and earth"  as two
differentiable  aspects  of the nature of an individual.  The
ch'i  of a person  is at the same  time  both  universal  and
particular, since  the body  continues  to be subject  to the
cosmic principle of condensation and dispersion. The rupture,
therefore, is  never  complete.  It is this  linkage, however
slim it may be, that  provides  the possibility  of achieving
full reunion  with the cosmos  through  the comprehension  of
principles and moral cultivation.

This  partial  rupture  between  humanity  and the cosmos  is
central to Chang's moral and social philosophy.  There can be
no humanity, no individual  life, without separation from the
undifferentiated   cosmic  substance.   In  Chang's  thought,
appetites,  such  as  the  desire   for  food  and  sex,  are
indispensable to human existence? The affirmation of physical
needs was necessary for repudiating  the Buddhist suppression
of  desires,  especially  sex,  which  served  the  important
function of reproducing  humanity and thereby constituted  an
indispensable  element  in  the  social  institution  of  the
family.[19]

The point of departure for moral cultivation is therefore not
the universal nature of human beings as cosmic beings but the
human reality of living persons in society. The validation of
life  was  thus  only  the  first   metaphysical   task  that
neo-Confucians  had to tackle before they could advance their
ethics.   While  insisting  on  the  distinctiveness  of  the
particular  form  of cosmic  ch'i as instantiated  in humans,
Chang Tsai regarded physical nature as the determining  force
in a given human, seeking  to fulfill  that human's  personal
needs  and appetites.  To this  extent  the instantiation  of
universal ch'i is potentially  disruptive at the social level
as individual  humans seek to gratify their appetites  and to
preserve and extend their own lives.

The stress  on the human break from the cosmos  was important
for Chang's criticism of the Buddhist universal treatment  of
individuals as members of the human species, on the one hand,
and of humankind  as but one species of living creatures  and
things among many, on the other.  The "pernicious"  effect of
Buddhist teaching, Chang explained, was that they "regard the
nature  of all things  (t'ien-hsia  wan-wu) as being  without
distinction."[20]  By attacking  the  Buddhists'  mistake  of
treating  human  individuals  as just another  kind of living
thing, Chang  was  implicitly  attacking  the  Buddhists  for
extending  their cosmic view to the human world.  In accusing
Buddhists  of  taking  a  "materialist"   and  universalistic
approach to humanity, he was defending the Confucian position
that places  humanity  at the center  of things and affirming
the hierarchical  character  of social relations--a  point to
which we shall return.  In brief, Chang took exception to the
Buddhists'  elimination  of social distinctions  by virtue of
their ontological universalism. Thus, according to Chang, the
Buddhists  failed  to realize  that humans should  be treated
differently    because    their   physical    nature   varied
considerably. Differences in physical nature justified social
distinctions, which were embedded in ritual rules.

Chang  believed  that the universal  of human nature, what he
also called t'ien-ti chih hsing (nature of heaven and earth),
was good in terms of its completeness and balance. But when a
human  is  born,  the  cosmic  ch'i  is  instantiated   in  a
particular   form.[21]   Hence  physical   endowment   varies
according  to the  individual, as  is evident  in the  myriad
variations of human temperament and talent.

The myriad differences  among real human beings, however, was
for Chang precisely  the source of the ethical  problem faced
by  humanity.  Variations  in  temperament,  disposition, and
intelligence   were,  in  his  words,  the  result   of  "the
inharmonious"  constitution  of human beings.[22] Even though
Chang did not consider  physical nature to be evil in itself,
the physical constitution of each individual person was bound
to be either  deficient  or excessive  in one  way or another
(p'ien) compared  to that person's  cosmic  nature  prior  to
birth.[23]  Chang saw in humanity's  "imperfect"  endowment a
common proclivity  to seek gratification  of bodily appetites
(yu), which  was  evil  in  the  sense  of being  selfish  or
self-centered.  A person's  earthly  existence, and hence the
propensity toward seeking satisfaction of desires, inevitably
rendered that person prone to all sorts of indulgences. Human
nature  in the empirical  world, as Chang  often found, was a
far cry from its cosmic perfection.

In order  to "return"  (fan) to the harmonious  and  balanced
state  of  the  cosmic  nature, one  thus  had  to  cultivate
oneself.[24] It should be noted that Chang used "return" as a
metaphor, meaning that, having transformed one's character by
developing  good habits, one would always  behave as properly
and naturally as heaven.  Put differently, morality has to be
"acquired"  through  cultivation.   But  if  morality  always
involves a choice, the question of morality does not arise at
the cosmic or onto-logical level. Morality only exists at the
intellectual, psychological, and social  level, and  morality
is possible  because  a human  being  has a mind  (hsin).[25]
Morality   is  peculiarly   relevant   to  human   existence.
Therefore,  morality   needs  to  be  created   rather   than
discovered.

The premium  that Chang  Tsai placed  on personal  effort  in
acquiring  morality  is to some  degree  a response  to Ch'an
Buddhism, which  had  become  a prominent  form  of  Buddhist
discourse in the Northern Sung.  According to Ch'an Buddhism,
since  human  essence  and  cosmic  essence   are  identical,
personal  effort in cultivation  is not necessary  insofar as
one comprehends  this truth.  This Buddhist position that had
been embraced  by some Confucians  was the target  of Chang's
attack.[26] It is no surprise that although Chang argued that
humankind  had its origin in the cosmos, he did not entertain
the Taoist  notion  of the harmony  between  human being  and
nature.  For him, human nature is not to be left "un-carved,"
as  Lao  Tzu  insisted,  but   controlled,  transformed,  and
disciplined.

The Malleability of Human Nature

Confucians  since the classical  period  had believed  in the
malleability  of human nature.[27]  Chang averred  that one's
nature, which  is the condensation  of matter, was  malleable
and hence capable  of transformation.  Except  for one's life
span, birth, and  death, there  was nothing  in one's  nature
that  one  could   not  change.[28]   When  Chang   spoke  of
"transformation   of  nature, "  he  was  without   exception
referring  to "physical  nature."  But why  is transformation
necessary? If morality  is something  to be acquired, why not
concentrate on learning good conduct? To understand why Chang
stressed  "transformation  of  nature," we  have  to  examine
closely his view of physical nature.

When Chang spoke of "physical  nature," he seldom referred to
human presocial  or biological  nature;  in most cases he was
referring to internalized  patterns of social behavior, which
in the aggregate  amounts  to an individual's  character  and
psychological makeup? While every human has natural abilities
and emotions, the way these abilities  are developed  and put
to use, and the manner in which humans  are taught to express
their  emotions, are shaped  by social  practices.  Therefore
"physical  nature"  in Chang's  usage  has two  meanings: the
natural  endowments  of  the  individual,  and  the  socially
conditioned  patterns  of these natural  endowments, which in
the  aggregate   constitute   the  character   of  a  person.
"Transformation  of nature"  in Chang's  mind  in most  cases
means the changing of the social character of individuals. In
brief, Chang's  use of the term "physical  nature" has strong
sociological and psychological connotations.

While  the development  of character  is closely  related  to
one's  temperament  and  dispostions, there  is no reason  to
assume  that  everyone's  character  is bad  and  in need  of
transformation.   Chang  Tsai's  idea  of  the  imbalance  in
physical  endowment  only makes improper conduct possible but
not inevitable or permanent. An "unbalanced" constitution has
yet to produce  thoughts  or actions  whose effect  will then
constitute  a  moral  problem.  But,  for  Chang  Tsai, human
character as a rule is in need of transformation.  Why did he
insist on transformation  of physical nature as the main task
of moral  cultivation? This explanation  has to be sought  in
Chang's  view of history, which, as will be explained  later,
is inseparable  from his perception  of Northern Sung society
in the eleventh century.

The Historical  and Social Origins  of Immoral  Conduct  n of
nature presupposes  a belief in the presence  of patterns  of
improper  conduct, or evil (o), in a given individual.  Where
does  evil  arise?  According   to  Chang,  one's  unbalanced
constitution  is a necessary but not the sufficient condition
for  the  generation   of  evil  because   different   social
environments can prevent or facilitate its development.  When
the individual  with an unbalanced constitution  is taught li
(ritual rules), which involves  bringing  one's emotions  and
actions into line with standard rules (as occurred during the
Three Dynasties in high antiquity), that individual  will not
have the opportunity  to develop  bad habits, and hence a bad
character.  Under the proper tutelage  and government  of the
sages, deviations from the mean were rare.  Therefore, it was
much easier for people living in the Three Dynasties to learn
propriety, since their social environment  was virtually free
of incidents  of impropriety.  In contrast, it was only when,
being  unbalanced  in  one's  endowment, one  grew  up in  an
environment  pervaded  with  immoral  examples  that  one was
prompted  to  seek  the  excessive  gratification   of  one's
appetites.

In Chang's  view, therefore, the  process  by which  a person
acquired  a bad character  was originally  a historical  one.
With the disappearance of sage-kings, human society since the
Golden Age had suffered from the loss of their teachings, and
hence  people   failed   to  conduct   themselves   properly,
succumbing  to all sorts of "vices." Since those who violated
propriety  and broke  laws were too numerous  to be executed,
people born thereafter could not but be influenced by immoral
conduct, giving them free rein to their selfish  desires.[30]
It was more  difficult  to learn  to be moral  even if one so
wished.[31]  The relevance of Chang's historical  explanation
of what he regarded  as the social  "vices"  of human society
will become apparent when social practices  in the early Sung
are considered.

Buddhism and Society in the Northern Sung

In Chang's  times, scholar-officials  and official  aspirants
grew up in a society pervaded by Buddhism.  Most had not only
taken  Buddhism  to be true but had also  grown  up accepting
many Buddhist practices  as natural and indispensable  facets
of their daily life.[32]

Buddhism might have suffered  a brief period of decline after
the suppression  by Wu-tsung in 845.  But it bounced back and
rapidly  grew in strength  when  the successor  to the throne
rescinded  the policy.  The number of Buddhists  in the early
Sung exceeded that of the T'ang, and there was evidence  that
Buddhism  had become a much more powerful  religion affecting
the social  life  of all  classes.[33]  It was customary  for
emperors   to  visit  Buddhist   temples   during   important
festivals.  Students of the imperial university  would gather
in Buddhist temples to mourn the death of high officials.[34]
Buddhist  monasteries  continued  to serve as rendezvous  for
informal  meetings  and feasts  for the literati.  Successful
candidates  of the palace  examination  were  entertained  in
monasteries  by order of the emperor.[35]  Public  bathhouses
owned and operated by Buddhist monasteries were frequented by
urban  dwellers   in  cities  like  K'ai-feng,  Lo-yang,  and
Hang-chou.[36]  Most Buddhist monasteries  provided travelers
with  accommodation  and food.[37]  Merchants, craftsmen, and
peddlers chose to convene at Buddhist temples. The Hsiang-kuo
temple in K'ai-feng  was a notable  example.[38]  Ironically,
despite their anti-Buddhist  stance, the Ch'eng brothers  and
Chang Tsai, like other literati, frequented monasteries.[39]

Buddhism  in the early Sung was more than a physical presence
in society;  it was also firmly  entrenched  in the realm  of
cultural  symbolism  --the  realm where social  actions  were
given their meaning.  The importance of many ceremonies  that
define  the meaning  of the major  events  of the human  life
cycle--such  as birth and death--were  perceived  in Buddhist
terms.  In the  early  Sung, it was common  for  families  in
K'ai-feng  prefecture  to hire Buddhists  to perform rituals,
and  "barbarian  music"  was  used  in the ceremony.  Despite
injunctions  issued by the imperial government in 970 and 981
against the use of the service  of Buddhists  and Taoists  in
funeral   processions,  most   families   in  the  prefecture
continued   to  violate  the  regulations   as  late  as  the
1220s.[40]

Ou-yang  Hsiu's idea of using ritual  and music to occupy the
peasants  so that  they  would  not have  time  for  Buddhist
practices  is well  known.[41]  Ssu-ma  Kuang, Ch'eng  I, and
other  neo-Confucians  were  very  critical  of  the  use  of
Buddhist services in funerals.[42]  The Buddhists  provided a
wide range  of services  pertaining  to funeral  and mourning
rites: experts  leading funeral processions  and the offering
of vegetarian meals, sermons, and the postmortem seven weekly
services   or  "seven  sevens."[43]   Buddhist  temples  also
provided  storage  for  unburied  dead.[44]  The widely  held
belief in geomancy that often resulted in the delay of burial
made it necessary to employ the service of Buddhists.[45] For
those  who  chose  cremation  to  dispose  of  the  dead, the
Buddhist not only provided a cheaper alternative to expensive
ground  burial  but  a justification  for  such  a choice  as
well.[46] The use of these Buddhist services perpetuated  and
reinforced  the Buddhist teachings about the meaning of life,
death, and spirits. The performance of "seven sevens," music,
and cremation could only be justified  in Buddhist terms that
denied physical  life absolute  value and which held that the
ultimate goal was the speedy delivery of the dead.

The pervasive presence of Buddhism in the Northern Sung was a
major  source  of what Chang called  the "bad" habits  of his
contemporaries.  Their  physical  nature,  or  character, was
"bad"   because   they   had   internalized    Buddhist   and
non-Confucian   patterns   of  conduct.   They  confused  the
Confucian way of life with that of the Buddhist.  Worse still
was their ignorance of the impropriety  of their conduct.  To
create a Confucian  society--a  common goal of neo-Confucians
of the Northern Sung --Chang Tsai did not and could not start
from scratch.  The only  way to realize  such  a goal  was to
transform  social  customs  so that  they  would  be free  of
Buddhist influence.

The Process of Acquiring Morality

In the light of the pervasive  influence of Buddhism in Chang
Tsai's   times,  the  connection   between   the  stress   on
transforming improper conduct and the anti-Buddhist thrust of
his ethical thought becomes clear. It should be noted that in
Chang's  explanation,  evil,  or  improper  conduct  such  as
Buddhist  practice, arose  as a result  neither  of the  mere
"unbalanced  constitution"  nor  of the exclusive  impact  of
environment  but of the combined  effects  of both.  While  a
human  being's  unbalanced  constitution  was  the  necessary
precondition, the social  environment  was the  precipitating
cause.  Immoral conduct was a result of a person's own making
in the absence of a moral environment. Therefore, anyone born
after the Three Dynasties would almost without exception have
developed a bad character by virtue of his or her "unbalanced
constitution"  and  the  immoral  environment  in which  that
person lived.

According  to Chang, improper conduct began in childhood, and
even in the womb prior  to birth.  With  the advance  of age,
having   continuously   given  free  rein  to  one's  natural
inclinations, one came to develop a "bad nature"  in the form
of  bad  habits.[47]  Before  coming  to  realize  one's  own
improper  behavior  and  resolving  to become  good, one  had
already  developed  a personality  with a mixture of good and
bad patterns of conduct.

Just  as  a person's  bad  character  is  the  product  of  a
developmental  process, so, too, is the  acquisition  of  the
good.  The work of moral  cultivation, therefore, calls for a
continuation  of the good behavior  one has already  acquired
along with the uprooting  of improper behavior.[48]  The work
of transformation  thus consists of two parts: the persistent
performance  of good deeds (chi-shan) and the extirpation  of
evil thoughts  and acts (ch'u-o).  These two types  of effort
were necessary  because in any given individual  were present
both good  and evil.[49]  And these  two different  kinds  of
effort  were  to  be  undertaken   simultaneously,  since  an
individual was constantly pulled in both directions.  Chang's
view of the initially indeterminate quality of one's physical
nature was clearly expressed  in the following  remark: "When
[one's] nature is not yet fully developed (ch'eng), both good
and evil tendencies coexist. Hence, one's nature is good only
if one practices  good conduct assiduously.  The good will be
accomplished when every bit of evil is eliminated."[50]

Only when one is committed to eradicating evil and performing
good  deeds  will  one be able  to "establish  one's  nature"
(ch'eng-hsing)  and  thereby   bring   it  to  resemble   the
undifferentiated  state of cosmic essence.  This human effort
in  cultivating  a moral  personality  is  what  Chang  calls
"transforming  physical  nature"  (pien-hua  ch'i-chih).  But
where exactly was the line between good and evil, or good and
bad habits? Who set the criteria? How did an individual  know
about them?

Experiential Knowledge and Moral Knowledge

Indeed, in Chang Tsai's view, the individual's  ignorance  of
right  and  wrong  prevented  him  or  her  from  doing  good
consciously and consistently. The common people had no notion
of  right  and  wrong  because   they  only  lived  by  their
experience.  They  were  molded  by the customs  and commonly
accepted practices of society.

Chang therefore  cautioned  against  learning  through  one's
senses  and  personal   knowledge   of  others'   experience.
Knowledge  acquired  through one's "eyes and ears" (wen-chien
chih  chih) is not  to be  depended  on  as a guide  to moral
conduct.[51]  There are several inherent defects in this type
of knowledge.  First, experiential  knowledge  was mostly  no
more  than  an  extremely  small  accumulation  of unexamined
records  of social practices.  The limited  experience  of an
individual tended to reinforce the impression that there were
no morals beyond  the social  customs  with which people were
familiar.  Such  parochialism, in fact, more often  than not,
led  to  the  mistaken  notion  that  conformity   to  social
practices  constituted  propriety.  As Chang  lamented, those
"mean  people"  (hsiao-jen) of wit, who have developed  a bad
character, may  even  use experiential  knowledge  to justify
their improper conduct. Others might do it in good faith. The
knowledge  that other members  of society  were doing exactly
the same thing would even strengthen  their conviction in the
rectitude   of  their  conduct.[52]   Moreover,  experiential
knowledge, being  an  amalgam  of  fragmentary  knowledge  of
customary  conduct, provided  no clear guidelines  for proper
conduct. The common people, including the literati, would not
be able to distinguish  good from bad.  It was harmful if one
mistook bad conduct for good deeds, which in Chang's view was
what most people  did in his times.  Without  a firm grasp of
knowledge  of proper conduct, the scholar  should not hastily
begin  changing  his habits.[53]  Chang knew that habits  die
hard.  For these reasons--limited experience and inability to
distinguish good from evil --experiential knowledge could not
be trusted  as a guide  to moral  development.  It is in this
sense  that Chang rejected  experiential  knowledge  acquired
through one's senses. Nonetheless, Chang did not fall back on
intuition  exclusively  for  a  knowledge  of  morality.   He
admitted that there were moral lessons to be learned from the
experience of exemplars of moral excellence.[54]

In Chang's  view, to learn  to  be  good  always  began  with
learning to do virtuous things or, in Aristotle's  term, "the
that."[55]  The quest for knowledge of virtue (te-hsing  chih
chih) was therefore  the first  task of those who aspired  to
become worthies and sages. If moral knowledge was external to
the individual, it followed that moral cultivation called for
"extensive  learning"  (po-wen)  in  order  to  accumulate  a
knowledge of virtue--propriety and duty (po-wen i chi-i).[56]
For Chang, "extensive  learning" essentially  meant the study
of books  (tu-shu), which  was  an integral  part  of Chang's
program for moral transformation.  "Extensive  learning"  did
not mean indiscriminate  pursuit of knowledge.  The relevance
of knowledge was defined in terms of the purpose of learning.
In Chang's case, to be a sage was the goal of learning; hence
all knowledge  required  for achieving  that  goal  had to be
acquired.

Chang designated  the Classics, the Analects, and the Mencius
as-core readings  and dismissed  Buddhist and Taoist writings
as dispensable.[57]  Reading  the right  books was important,
for it was through  learning  that moral  knowledge  could be
accumulated.  The broader  the learner's  knowledge, the more
profound the learner's moral knowledge would become.[58]  And
more  important, the better  that  person  would  be able  to
comprehend moral principles (i-lj).

Chang clearly believed  that most individuals  could learn to
be good.  But there were very few scholars  who could do good
persistently, regardless  of the  circumstances.  The  common
scholar  might  do good under duress  or as the state  of his
emotions and mind dictated. The common scholar did not always
do the same thing  whenever  the situation  demanded  such an
action.  Put differently, morality  remained  in an unsettled
state.  It was  not  the character  of the scholar  to behave
consistently   in  response   to  the  same  situation.   The
discrepancy  between  knowledge  and action always  generates
tension, conflict, and displeasure in those individuals whose
performance  of the good depends  on whether  they succeed in
overcoming   the  tendency  of  their  character  to  respond
improperly.  As Chang  had noted, one major  obstacle  to the
development  of moral conduct  was psychological.  Chang  was
perhaps  the only neo-Confucian  to stress the reluctance  of
ordinary people, including scholars, to shed their bad habits
because  of their fear of being ridiculed.  He therefore  did
not recommend  drastic change in reforming  rituals.[59]  The
lack  of consistency  among  scholars  could  not  be changed
without re-aligning their actions with moral rules.

Learning to Be a "Great Man"

As  Alasdair  Maclntyre  has  aptly  stated: "moral  concepts
change  as social  life changes."[60]  In any given  society,
learning  to be good  is  always  defined  by culturally  and
socially  sanctioned  models of virtuous conduct.  To develop
moral conduct requires a clearly defined model or goal. To be
a sage  was  the  highest  goal  in all  neo-Confucian  moral
discourses. In Chang Tsai's thought, the sage represented the
highest stage of moral cultivation. Chang, however, preferred
to use the term "great  man"  (ta-jen) to denote  the highest
stage of moral achievement.  Ta-jen was a term Chang borrowed
from  the Book of Changes.  In his exposition  on the Book of
Changes, Chang  distinguished  the sheng-jen  (sage) from the
ta-jen  (great  man).  The sage naturally  followed  heavenly
principles  without the help of external learning or the need
for self-discipline.[61] Such perfection and effortless moral
conduct were almost beyond human capacity.

For Chang, sages were not ordinary people. Sages could not be
completely  understood  by ordinary human beings.  Sages were
born, not made, and humans  could therefore  never completely
become sages.  Chang said: "sagehood  cannot be known;  it is
the natural endowment of heavenly virtue."[62]  Elsewhere  he
said: "Sagehood, like heaven, has no stairs  whereby  one can
ascend."[63]  What Chang is saying is that the sages' conduct
was  perfect  without  exertion, a feat  that  could  not  be
emulated  by ordinary scholars.  Chang's teachings  therefore
focused  entirely  on how an ordinary  scholar could learn to
become  a "great man." Nonetheless, according  to Chang, when
scholars   resolved   to  make   progress   in  their   moral
development, they could eventually  reach a stage  comparable
to the moral qualities of the sages.  When a scholar became a
"great man," his morality was so firmly established  that his
nature was perfectly  in accord with the heavenly  virtues of
natural sages.  At that stage it was difficult to distinguish
between  sages and great men.  Although  great men were still
aware of the differences  between  themselves  and Confucius,
others might have difficulty making such a distinction.[64]

Sages and "great  men" differed  in that the moral perfection
the  latter  attained  was  a result  of  great  resolve  and
persistent effort of cultivation. In brief, human resolve and
unfailing  effort  could elevate  one to the level of a sage.
Chang  therefore  rejected  the view that sagehood  could  be
attained  without  "moral cultivation"  (hsiu) and "learning"
(hsueh).[65] Chang's stress on moral cultivation  can be seen
as a refutation of those scholars who, under the influence of
Ch'an Buddhism, argued that sage-hood was attainable  without
studying and cultivation.[66]

Learning Ritual and Good Habits

For Chang  Tsai, to become  moral, one  had  to learn  proper
conduct.  In  his  times, to learn  proper  conduct  entailed
changing most of one's current patterns of behavior. To learn
morality, one had to undo the immorality  that had taken form
in  the  individual  as character  traits.  In Chang's  view,
learning  to practice  ritual  was the most effective  way to
transform  one's deep-rooted  habits by gradually eradicating
the settled state of bad character traits and by consistently
molding  one's  conduct  in accord  with  clearly  prescribed
rules.  Chang's idea of learning to be a moral person through
habituation  in some ways resembles  Aristotle's  approach to
moral development.[67]  The morals of a given individual  are
the result of the development  of good habits rather than the
mere acquisition of knowledge of propriety.

The centrality  of rituals in Chang's ethical thought is well
epitomized in several expressions he often used. First, Chang
understood morality in terms of ritual practice. "Rituals are
the established  rules of sages;  there is no morality  (tao)
without  rituals."[68]  In  his  commentary  on the  Book  of
Changes, Chang explained his teaching of chih-li ch'eng hsing
(fashioning   one's  nature  or  character  through  learning
rituals).  He insisted  that rituals were the ground on which
one stood and that only through  learning  rituals  could one
settle one's character.  With the firm establishment  of good
character, moral  conduct  would  emanate  unfailingly.  Then
one's actions would always correspond  to moral principles as
naturally  as the transformation  of things operates with the
fixity of the positions of heaven.[69]

Chang knew extremely  well that a person with moral knowledge
has yet to become  moral.  One's  physical  nature  with  its
deep-rooted  habits prevented  one from acting in accord with
one's  understanding.  There is a gap between  knowledge  and
behavior.  One may break any rule with full knowledge  of its
impropriety  because of the settled state of one's character.
To bring  one's  emotions  and actions  into line  with one's
knowledge  of proper conduct calls for extreme  self-control.
Any exclusive  appeal to the intellect  for generating  moral
conduct   will  not  always   work  since  most  people   are
weak-willed.

One advantage  of ritual  as a method  of cultivating  proper
conduct  is its  efficacy, derived  from  the fact  that  the
participants  do not  analyze  the  pattern  of relationships
prescribed  by  the  ritual.[70]  Whether  strong-willed   or
weak-willed, the  participants  are  required  to follow  the
rules in ensemble.  Chang argued  that ritual  practice  as a
vehicle   for  moral  cultivation   was  most  effective   in
transforming   one's   "improper   habits"   (hsi-ch'i)   and
internalizing patterns of proper behavior.[71] He wrote:

    [One  may] know them [the moral  imperatives  of heaven],
    but, if one does  not internalize  them  as one's  nature
    through  ritual  practice, they  are not yet  an integral
    part  of one's  self  (pu  i li hsing  chih).  Therefore,
    learning ritual to realize one's [essential] nature (chih
    li ch'eng hsing) will result in the manifestation  of the
    Way (tao-i).[72]

Ritual and the Stages of Learning

Chang recommended the learning and practice of ritual to all,
including  children  and scholars  aspiring  to become sages.
Chang stressed  that learning  ritual  was the most important
task  for scholars.[73]  There  were  several  advantages  to
learning   rituals.   Rituals   helped  to  cultivate   moral
character.  Furthermore, they provided  a constant pattern of
rules  for  action.  Rituals  helped  to develop  spontaneous
responses  to  specific  situations   without  reasoning  and
without  the internal  conflict  between  reason  and action.
Finally,  studying   rituals   would  increase   one's  moral
knowledge.[74]

Chang distinguished  two stages  of learning, using Confucius
and his disciples as the scale: the first began with learning
for a scholar and ended with achievements equal to Yen Hui's.
Among the disciples  of Confucius, Yen was most venerated  by
the Sung  neo-Confucians.  The second  stage  began  with the
level of Yen's learning  and ended with the perfect character
of Confucius.[75]  But  these  two  stages  of learning  only
applied to scholars who were already educated.

In fact, in  addition  to these  two  stages, there  was  the
period from childhood  through  the "first stage." Therefore,
there were actually three stages in Chang's learning program.
According  to Chang, the learning  process  began even in the
mother's  womb.  [76]  After  a  child's  birth,  the  family
provided  the most important  learning environment.  Children
developed  a character  as they learned from other members of
the family, who, more often  than  not, conducted  themselves
improperly. Before children were old enough to receive formal
education, they had already acquired  improper  habits, which
had  become  fixed  as  character  traits.  It was  therefore
important  that children should be taught to do sweeping  and
to conduct  themselves  properly  toward  elders before  they
developed "bad" habits in these respects?

Though aware of the importance of education during childhood,
the focus  of Chang's  teachings  about  learning  was on the
scholar.  After committing himself to the goal of learning to
be a sage or a "great man," the initial  difficulty  involved
in learning  for the  scholar  was  the  question  of how  to
"transform"   his   physical   nature   or   character.   The
transformation  was  difficult, for  it demanded  "overcoming
oneself"  (k'o-chi), which involved undoing one's conditioned
state of improper conduct?

The  need  to learn  ritual  practice  was not the  exclusive
concern   of  beginning   scholars.   Although   Chang   Tsai
distinguished  between  two  stages  of learning, he did  not
relegate  ritual practice  to only the second stage [79] Even
Yen  Tzu had to learn  and practice  rituals  throughout  his
life.  How  much  more  important, then, was  it for ordinary
scholars   to  learn  ritual  practice?  Literati   would  be
indistinguishable  from mean people  if the former  concerned
themselves    with   nothing   but   sensual   and   material
satisfaction, paying no heed to the importance  of ritual and
duties, [50] Here it is clear that Chang Tsai's  main concern
was how to establish the distinctive  patterns of behavior of
the elite.  The function  of ritual  as a "class"  marker  is
unmistakable--a point to which we shall return.

Rituals and PRINCIPLES

It is now clear that by moral knowledge, Chang Tsai primarily
meant rules of proper conduct befitting the social status and
role of the individual. It is the knowledge of how to conduct
oneself  in relation  with  others  in all conceivable  daily
situations. He was not concerned with the question of how one
can  reach  a moral  judgment  about  action  in  an  unusual
situation, especially  one that involved a conflict of values
and duties.  Chang's program of learning  morality  consisted
essentially  of learning what, not learning  why, because the
reason was not a particular  reason for a specific  action in
an  unexpected  situation.  It was  a general  reason  for  a
prescribed   action  for  the  same  occasion   under  normal
circumstances. Chang Tsai's view of moral education therefore
called for the learning of both the concrete  rules of proper
conduct  and  the  general  reasons  for those  rules.  These
reasons, for Chang Tsai, were based  on moral principles.  In
his  writings  he  sometimes  speaks  of ritual  in terms  of
concrete  ceremonies,  decorum,  etiquette, or  institutions.
Sometimes  he refers  to ritual  in the sense  of the general
reason or principle of proper conduct.

It is therefore  no surprise that a casual reading of Chang's
writings  seems  to suggest  that  there  were  two kinds  of
rituals: those  that changed  with  time and those  that were
absolute (pupien). In fact, what he was referring to were two
aspects, rather than two categories, of rituals.  Rituals had
their form--the  outward, public act--and  their meaning--the
reason for the need to perform these formalized  acts.  While
the form might and often  should  change  with circumstances,
the  meaning,  or,  in  his  terminology, the  principle, was
permanent.  It is  in this  sense  that  Chang  spoke  of the
identity of ritual with principle [31]

A formalized  act  can  lose  its  symbolism  but retain  its
pattern of behavior as social custom. Customary practices can
be observed  without comprehension  of their meanings  on the
part of the participants.  The alienation  of symbolism  from
ritual act makes it possible for the performance of ritual in
a totally  different  context  of meaning.  Social  practices
often contained  "improper"  rituals  and duties.  [62] These
were often the result of the "erroneous"  matching of meaning
and ritual forms.  A simple example was the performance  of a
Buddhist rite to fulfill a Confucian obligation--such  as the
use of a Buddhist service in funerals  and burials to express
the grief and filial emotions of the bereaved. [63] According
to Chang, these were the kinds of improper  ritual  practices
that needed to be abandoned. There were others that should be
changed  under new circumstances.  [64] What kinds of rituals
were  correct? How could  scholars  know these  rituals? More
fundamental  questions  were how the general criteria were to
be obtained whereby specific  rituals could be evaluated, and
how the criteria  were constituted.  These criteria  were, in
fact, the types of rituals  that Chang regarded  as absolute,
permanent rules of human society.

In  Chang's  thinking,  "absolute  rituals"  were  more  than
customs and social practices.  They had a cosmological  basis
[85]  "Rituals  are  principles,"  Chang  explained? Although
rituals  were mostly  created  by humans, Chang claimed  that
"the rituals of heaven and earth exist of themselves." One of
these absolute  rituals  or principles  was hierarchy.  Chang
said:

    There  are rituals  that need no change.  [They are] like
    the order and laws of heaven, how can they be changed?...
    Heaven begets things with differential images of superior
    and inferior, big  and  small.  All  man should  do is to
    observe  these [principles];  this is what rituals should
    be.  There are scholars  who think that all rituals  were
    created by man;  they are not cognizant  of the fact that
    rituals are rooted in the nature of heaven? [87]

Chang is, in fact, claiming that social distinctions  are not
artificial  but an extension of the natural order.  Hierarchy
is a basic principle  of the universe.  It is inevitable  and
natural  that things occupy different  positions  within  the
universe.  As demonstrated  above, Chang's ontology  may lend
itself to a radical interpretation of egalitarianism; but his
view  of  the  "unbalanced"   endowment  of  human  existence
provided  the needed justification  for his stress  on social
distinction, which only becomes apparent  in his writings  on
moral cultivation and ritual.

The function  of rituals  was twofold: to distinguish  and to
integrate.  [88]  As Hsun  Tzu had pointed  out long  before,
individual  human  beings  can  only  survive  by  forming  a
society, which provides a set of common rules regulating  the
conduct   of   its   members.    These   common   rules   and
institutions--li    (ritual)  --are   essential    means   of
integration. But the pattern of integration takes the form of
hierarchy, and ritual serves to define, institutionalize, and
reinforce the structure of social differentiation.  For Chang
Tsai, ritual  was essential  to defining  mankind  both  as a
group having a common bond in their origins in the cosmos and
as individual  members  of a social  hierarchy  with specific
roles and stations (fen).

The question of the criteria for evaluating  the propriety of
ritual  rules was not a concern  for either the common people
or  the  beginning  scholar,  for  they  did  not  understand
heavenly  principles,  and, therefore, they  only  needed  to
learn  from the sages.  The institutions  and rules  of human
conduct  prescribed  by  the  sages  of the  Three  Dynasties
without doubt were the sources  of proper rituals.  Since for
the Sung neo-Confucians  the teachings  of the sages had been
lost for over one thousand years since Confucius and Mencius,
the   revival   of   ancient   rituals   posed   considerable
difficulties.  But  Chang, like  other  Sung  neo-Confucians,
believed  that  the tao had been  rediscovered  in his times.
Those who comprehended the tao would be able to create "moral
principles" (i-li).  [89] This was only possible when one had
"learned extensively"  (powen) the moral principles contained
in  the  Classics?  Chang   at  one  point   summarized   the
relationship between learning, principles, and rituals:

    What  are  called  ritual  rules  are  principles.  It is
    necessary to learn principles  exhaustively;  rituals are
    principles  put  into  practice.  When  [one]  knows  the
    principles, [one] can create rituals;  therefore, rituals
    come out of principles. [91]

Although  Chang  had the modesty  not to claim  sagehood  for
himself, he did regard himself a "great man" (tajen).  He had
already  argued  that there was little difference  between  a
natural  sage and a great man who strove  to learn the sagely
principles? The fact that he called his study on the Classics
"The  Repository   of  Principles   of  Classical   Learning"
(Ching-hsueh li-k'u) is strong evidence for his belief in his
ability  to  understand  the  principles   contained  in  the
Classics? It is therefore  no surprise  that  he had  already
written  extensively  on  rituals.  Firmly  believing  in his
comprehension  of moral  principles, Chang  took  liberty  in
creating  rituals, so much  so  that  he incurred  Chu  Hsi's
criticism. [94]

Ritual, Aristocracy, and Social Hierarchy

The  transformation  of  society  could  be  made  with  less
difficulty  if  the  emperor  supported  such  a  cause.  But
unfortunately  for the neo-Confucians, most  emperors  of the
Nothern Sung--T'ai-tsu (r. 960-975), T'ai-tsung (r. 976-997),
Chen-tsung  (r.  999-1022) ,  Jen-tsung  (r.  10231063),  and
Ying-tsung  (r.  1064-1067)--were great patrons  of Buddhism.
Sung emperors also erected buildings  for the translation  of
Buddhist scriptures, from 982 through 1082.  [95] Without the
support  of the emperors, the neo-Confucians  could only hope
to win  over  the literati.  To create  a class  of Confucian
literati entailed initially  overcoming  the Buddhist beliefs
and practices  that  had been  internalized  by them.  It was
therefore  necessary  to  establish  the  goal  of  attaining
Confucian   sage-hood  for  the  literati,  thereby  refuting
competing definitions  of good and bad conduct offered by the
Buddhists.   To  "transform"  their  character,  or  physical
nature, entailed  replacing  Buddhist  rituals with Confucian
rituals.

It is time to take up the question  of the "class"  dimension
in Chang Tsai's thought.  Although  barely noticeable  in his
ontological   and  cosmo-logical   thinking,  this  dimension
figured prominently in his writings on ethics and rituals. In
fact, Chang's  class interest  is so obscure  in his ontology
that it deceptively savors of egalitarianism. When Yang Shih,
a student  of Ch'eng I, pointed out that Chang's  ontological
egalitarianism  might  be  compared  to  Mo Tzu's  notion  of
universal  love, Ch'eng I denied the comparison  and stressed
that  the  main  idea  of Chang's  treatise  was li i fen shu
(unity of principle and differentiation  in social stations).
[96] As Donald Munro has pointed  out, the Ch'eng-Chu  school
of cosmology  drew heavily on the attributes  of a clan-based
society.   Hierarchically   arranged  position  is  one  such
attribute.  [97] Chang Tsai's  cosmology  is no exception  to
this mode of thinking that analogized the social hierarchy to
nature.  For if Chang's contribution  had to do only with the
universalism   of  his  ontology   without   also  explaining
"differentiation"   or  different   stations,  he  would   be
endorsing  what  he took to be the Buddhist  position.  It is
therefore  appropriate  in  this  connection  to discuss  the
social vision underlying Chang's view on rituals.

The society that Chang Tsai envisioned was one dominated by a
small  number  of  hereditary  families  with  an independent
economic  basis? They were also to serve as the guardians  of
the  common  people, providing  them  with  instructions  for
proper  life-style  and norms of conduct.  Ritual rules would
serve to institutionalize  the elite's  privileges  and would
make an effective  instrument  for the uprooting  of Buddhist
influence in society.

We have  already  seen  that Chang  projected  a hierarchical
structure  onto the cosmos, which included the order in which
things  come into existence.  The hierarchical  nature of the
cosmos  was used  to explain  and sustain  a parallel  social
hierarchy.  Chang  explicitly  said  that  distinctions  were
natural.  The basic function of ritual was to "distinguish'.'
(pieh-i). [99] Indeed, individuals differed in their physical
endowment.  Humans  were more intelligent  as a species  than
animals and things despite their common origins in the cosmic
ch'i.  But  within  the  human  species,  individuals  varied
considerably in terms of their intellectual capacities. [100]
Therefore, some were more intelligent  than others.  Some had
natures so "clear" (po) that they could easily be enlightened
and  attain  sagehood.  On the  other  extreme, however, were
those whose nature was so "thickly obscured"  (hou) that they
could never be enlightened.  [101] This natural difference in
human endowment  justified  a social  hierarchy, and the main
function  of ritual was to define and reinforce  distinctions
between individuals.  On one occasion, Chang clearly revealed
the audience he was addressing  when he noted that the ritual
practice  of the common people was simple.  He did not demand
observance  of rituals  from them for they  did not have  the
resources  for expensive  rituals.  Besides, they  could  not
comprehend  the  meanings  behind  the rituals.  [102]  Chang
believed  that the common  people  were the least endowed  in
intelligence. [103]

Much  of  Chang's  teachings  about  the  stages  of learning
discussed   earlier,  and  in  fact  his  entire  program  of
learning, were  not  meant  to  apply  to  all  classes.  The
"scholar"  or "learner"  to whom Chang always referred  could
not possibly  include  the common people of the lower classes
(hsia-min) .  Chang  at  times  made  this  explicit  in  his
writings.  [104]  He believed  that there  were human  beings
whose "physical  nature"  had so thoroughly  settled into bad
habits  that  they had become  "impenetrable  and closed"  to
transformation.  [105] But the educated class could transform
their character by ritual practice.

Neo-Confucian Sages and Ritual Reforms

Strong interest  in rituals was by no means idiosyncratic  in
Chang  Tsai's  thought, nor was it confined  to the Tao-hsueh
neo-Confucians such as Ch'eng I.  Eminent politicians such as
Ssu-ma  Kuang and other Confucians, including  Shih Chieh and
Li K'ou (1009-1059), also expressed  strong concern about the
need to "revive" Confucian rituals.  [106] It should be noted
that even though  Sung neo-Confucians  had great interest  in
rituals,  they,  unlike  scholars  in  the  T'ang, were  more
interested in the role of ritual in moral cultivation  and in
preserving  the family.  They  did  not look  to the imperial
state as the center through which Confucian  rituals could be
promulgated. [107]

When  Chang  Tsai  called  for  the  forming   of  habits  in
accordance  with proper rituals, he was not simply  demanding
the determination  and endeavor to practice some well-defined
and clearly prescribed rituals authorized  by the government.
He was making a plea for reforming or reinventing rituals for
the scholar-official class.  It should be noted at this point
that Chang, like  most Confucians  in the Northern  Sung, was
not anachronistic  when it came to details of specific rites.
They  recognized  the need  to change  the specific  form  of
ancient  rites so that the material  conditions  of the times
could be taken into consideration.  [108] Chang justified his
recommendations  for rituals in terms of the lack of interest
in  the  investigation  of  principles  on  the  part  of the
Sheng-tsung  emperor.  [109] And as the discussion  above has
shown,  Chang  believed  that  there  was  little  difference
between  a "great  man"  and a sage.  When  a great  man  had
investigated  the  principles  of  humanity, he  was  equally
qualified  to authorize rituals.  Chang was confident that he
had comprehended enough moral principles to reform and create
rituals  on  his  own  authority.  [110]  Chang  had  written
prescriptions  on  funerals,  burial, mourning, and  ancestor
worship. [111]

Perhaps for Confucians  no individual rite was more important
than paying homage to the ancestors to whom the entire family
and kinship  group owed their  existence.  Tu Yen (978-1057),
Han  Ch'i  (1008-1075),  Fan  Tsu-yu  (1041-1098), Ch'eng  I,
Ssu-ma  Kuang, Chang  Tsai, Lu Ta-fang  (1027-1097), and Shih
Chieh all had expressed  different  opinions about the proper
ceremony for ancestor worship.[112] Han Ch'i wrote an account
of instructions for sacrifice to ancestors at the grave.[113]
Although  they  strove  to  reform  popular  practice,  their
flexible   approach   to  ritual   forms   resulted   in  the
accommodation of some customs. [114]

Of the various  rituals  Chang  wrote  about, none were  more
important  than those designed  to strengthen  kinship  ties.
Like  many  neo-Confucians   in  the  Northern   Sung,  Chang
attempted  to revive  the tsung-fa  (rule of descent) system,
which  required   the  practice   of  primogeniture,  keeping
properties  and official rank in the hands of the "son of the
descent   line"  (tsung-tzu) .   [115]  Chang  regarded   the
rule-of-descent  system  as crucial  to the  preservation  of
family wealth and official status.  He lamented the fact that
the  system  had  fallen  into  disuse  and that  no official
families  could survive  two generations.  [116] But with the
revival  of tsung-fa, the heir to the descent  line would  be
able  to use  his  wealth  to  support  his  kinsmen  and  so
cultivate  kinship  solidarity.   And,  more  important,  the
kinsmen  who were qualified  for official  appointment  could
transfer their privileges to the heir.  If the heir proved to
be incompetent, the next of kin with the highest virtue would
be made the heir.

For Chang the tsung-fa  system was a heavenly principle.  But
no doubt the system was designed to centralize  the resources
of a kingroup  so that the best person would receive official
appointment  and at the same time manage the lineage property
in  support  of  the  entire  kin-group.   [117]  This  hoary
institution, Chang  hoped, would  keep officials  from losing
their  privileges   and  wealth,  which  was  the  inevitable
consequence  of the civil service examination  system.  [118]
Chang Tsai strongly  opposed  the civil service  examination,
and he always taught his students  to focus on learning to be
sages rather than on success in the examinations? [119]

Chang's advocacy  of the revival of the tsung-fa  system is a
clear indication  of his vision of a new Confucian society--a
society  governed  by  a small  number  of  hereditary  elite
families.  The institutional bases of these families were the
tsungofa  and the "well-field"  system.  The tsung-fa  system
would  guarantee   a  small  number  of  elite  families  the
perpetual  ownership  of land and an uninterrupted  access to
official   appointment.   While  the  tsung-fa  system  would
concentrate  land and political resources  in the heir of the
descent  line,  the  "well-field"  system  would  ensure  the
economic independence  of the elite families.  Chang believed
that if the emperor  was "benevolent"  enough  to revive  the
"well-field"  system  by parceling  out land to officials  as
permanent  holdings, it could be easily done without the need
to punish one dissident.  The ultimate  goal, however, should
be the full installation  of the feudal  system (feng-chien).
[120]

To conclude, against  the social background  of Buddhism  and
the effort of neo-Confucians  to rebuild a Confucian society,
it can easily be understood why Chang Tsai's program of moral
cultivation stressed the transformation of character or human
physical  nature.   Even  the  scholars  who  served  in  the
government  took  Buddhism  as a higher  truth  and practiced
Buddhist  rites  as much  in earnest  as did  the  commoners.
Buddhism had come to constitute  so essential a part of their
character  that any attempt to challenge and undermine  it by
disputations  and criticism would have been to no avail.  The
recreation  of  a  hierarchical   society  dominated  by  the
scholar-official  class involved nothing less than a thorough
undoing of behavioral  habits promoted  by Buddhist teachings
and  rituals.   Confucian  rituals  had  to  be  created  and
propagated  in  order  to  remold  social  conduct.   Chang's
profound  insight into the process of behavioral  development
led him to emphasize  the role  of ritual  in the cultivation
and  changing  of  character.  It also  explains  why  ritual
occupies a central place in Chang's moral philosophy.

NOTES

1 -  There  are two  essays  in Neo-Confucian  Education: The
Formative Stage that focus specifically on Sung neo-Confucian
teachings  about properly  ritualized  conduct in the family.
But neither  is concerned  with an explicit  analysis  of the
role of ritual at a higher  level of neo-Confucian  education
such as the cultivation of the mind. See M. Theresa Kelleher,
"Back to Basics: Chu Hsi's Elementary Learning (Hsiao-hsueh),
" and Patricia  Ebrey, "Education  Through Ritual: Efforts to
Formulate  Family  Rituals  During  the Sung Period," in Neo-
Confucian Education: The Formative Stage, ed. Wm. Theodore de
Bary  and John  Chaffee  (Berkeley: University  of California
Press, 1989), pp.  219-251, 277-306.  With  a few exceptions,
the importance of ritual in neo-Confucian ethics has received
no greater attention among Chinese and Japanese scholars. See
Ch'ien  Mu's  comprehensive  study  of Chu Hsi, Chu  Tzu hsin
hsueh-an  (Taipei:  San-min  Shu-chu,  1971) ,  vol.  4,  pp.
112-179. Ueyama Shunpei has treated Chu Hsi's theory of human
nature in relation  to ritual in "Shushi no 'karei' to 'girei
kybden tsukai,'" Toho gakuh6 54 (1981): 173-256.

2  -  Chu  Hsi, Chu-tzu  yyulei(Classified  conversations  of
Master  Chu) (Peking:  Chung-hua  Shu-chu,  1986),  126:3019,
126:3027.

3 -  Ibid., 6:101, 6:109.  The  term//will  be translated  as
ritual  rules  in  this  article, a rendering  I borrow  from
Donald  Munro.  See his Images  of Human  Nature  (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1988), p.  8.  Li in its broadest
sense includes  formal aspects of ritualized  conduct, social
and political  institutions, and the principles  and meanings
in whose terms they are justified.

4 - For an interpretation of Confucius' thought that stresses
the centrality  of ritual and its magical  power, see Herbert
Fingarette,  Conlucius--The  Secular  as  Sacred  (New  York:
Harper & Row, 1972).  For a discussion that grants ritual the
power of cultivating  the inner qualities of the participants
in  addition  to shaping  behavior  by ceremonial  rules, see
Benjamin  I.  Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard  University  Press, 1985),
pp. 67-75.

5 -  For a discussion of the interest and significance of the
ancient  institution  of kinship--the  tsung system, ancestor
worship, the compilation  of genealogy, and the setting up of
sacrificial fields--see Patricia B.  Ebrey, "The Early Stages
in the Development of Descent Group Organization," in Kinship
Organization in Late Imperial China, 1000-1940, ed.  Patricia
B.  Ebrey  and  James  L.  Watson  (Berkeley:  University  of
California Press, 1986), pp.  35-50.  For a discussion of the
use of family  ritual to mold behavior  by neo-Confucians  in
the  Sung,  see  Ebrey's  "Education  through  Ritual, "  pp.
277-306.

6 -  Ira  Kassoff, The  Thought  of  Chang  Tsai  (New  York:
Cambridge  University  Press,  1984);  T'ang  Chin-i,  "Chang
Tsai's Theory of Mind and Its Metaphysical Basis," Philosophy
East and West 6, no.  2 (July 1956): 113-136;  Huang Siu-chi,
"Chang Tsai's Concept  of Ch'i' Philosophy  East and West 18,
no. 4 (October 1968): 247-260.

7 -  To give just a few examples: Fung  Yu-lan, A History  of
Chinese Philosophy  (Princeton: Princeton  University  Press,
1952) ,  pp.  477-498;  Car-sun  Chang,  The  Development  of
Neo-Confucian Thought, vol.  1 (New York: Bookman Associates,
1957;  reprint, New  Haven: The  New College  and  University
Press, 1963), pp.  159-182;  Hou Wai-lu, Chung-kuo ssu-hsiang
t'ung-shih  (A general  history of Chinese  thought) (Peking:
en-min Ch'u-pan She, 1957), vol.  4, pt.  1, pp.  545570; Wm.
Theodore  de Bary, Sources  of Chinese  Tradition  (New York:
Columbia  University  Press,  1960), pp.  466-470;  Wing-tsit
Chan,  A  Source  Book  in  Chinese  Philosophy   (Princeton:
Princeton  University  Press,  1963) ,  pp.   495-517;  Huang
Siu-chi, "The Moral Point  of View of Chang Tsai," Philosophy
East and West 21, no.  2 (April 1971): 154155. Ira Kasoff has
begun  to take  note of this understudied  aspect  of Chang's
thought even though his treatment does not do full justice to
the  centrality   of  ritual  in  Chang's   theory  of  moral
cultivation  (Ira E.  Kasoff, The Thought  of Chang Tsai, pp.
81-82, 128).

8 -  Chang Tsai, Chang  Tsai chi (Peking: Chung-hua  Shu-chu,
1978), p. 383 (hereafter CTC).

9 - CTC, pp. 387-388.

10 -  T'o T'o, Sung Shih  (Peking, Chung-hua  Shu-chu, 1977),
427:12724.

11 -  For a general discussion of the importance of cosmogony
to ethics, see Cosmogony  and the Ethical  Order: New Studies
in Comparative  Ethics, ed.  Robin  W.  Lovin  and  Frank  E.
Reynolds  (Chicago:  University  of  Chicago  Press,  1985) ,
"Introduction."

12 - CTC, pp. 7-9.

13 - Ibid., pp. 7-8, 66.

14 - Ibid., p. 19.

15 -  Carsun Chang, The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought,
vol. 1, p. 178.

16 - CTC, p. 21.

17 - Ibid., p. 341.

18 - Ibid., p. 63.

19 - Ibid., p. 63.

20 - Ibid., p. 324.

21 - Ibid., p. 23.

22 - Ibid., p. 324.

23 - Ibid., p. 23.

24- Ibid.

25 - Chang Tsai said, "Heaven does not have mind; the mind is
in the mind of man" (C/C, p. 256; see also pp. 185-189).

26 -  Chang  Tsai, however, did not give  the names  of these
Confucians (C/C, pp. 64, 267).

27 -  See  Donald  Munro, The  Concept  of Man in Earl;/China
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), pp. 15-16.

28 - CTC,, p. 23.

29  -  Most  studies  of  Chang's  thought  do  not  identify
"physical nature" with character.

30 - CTC, p. 355.

31 - Ibid., p. 274.

32 - Ibid., pp. 64, 350.

33 -  Stanley Weinstein, Buddhism under the T'ang (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Cambridge  University  Press, 1987), pp.  134,
153, 166; Huang Min-chih, Sung-tai Fo-chiao she-hui ching-chi
lun-wen  chi (Essays  on the social and economic  history  of
Sung  Buddhism)  (Taipei:  Hsueh-sheng  Shu-chu,  1989),  pp.
349-355.

34 - Huang Min-chih, Sung-tai Fo-chiao, p. 271.

35 -  Those who succeeded  in obtaining  the chin-shih degree
were granted a feast in K'ai-pao Buddhist temple in 979.  See
Wang Yung, Yen-i  rnou lu (Peking: Chung-hua  Shu-chu, 1981),
1:4.

36 -  Fang Hao, "Sung-tai Fo-chiao tui lu-yu chih kung-hsien"
(Sung  Buddhism's  contribution  to  tourism),  in  Fang  Hao
liu-shih chih liu-shih-sze  tzu-hsuan  tai-t'ing kao (Taipei:
Hsueh-sheng  Shu-chu,  1974), pp.  124-126;  Huang  Min-chih,
"Sung-tai Fo-chiao," pp. 432-434.

37 - Fang Hao, "Sung-tai Fo-chiao," pp. 115-121.

38 - Wang Yung, Yen-i i-mou lu, 2:20.

39 -  Ch'eng  I, Erh Ch'eng  chi (Peking: Chung-hua  Shu-chu,
1981) ,  p.  26;  $ung-jen  i-shih  hui-pien  (Collection  of
anecdotes  of  Sung  personages) (Peking: Chung-hua  Shu-chu,
1981), p. 452.

40 - Wang Yung, Yen-i i-mou lu, 3:24.

41 - See James T.  C.  Liu, Ou-yang Hsiu: An Eleventh-Century
Neo-Confucianist(Stanford: Stanford University  Press, 1967),
pp. 164-165.

42 -  Han Yu and Li Ao were critics  of mixing  Buddhist  and
Confucian rituals.  See David McMullen, State and Scholars in
T'ang China (New York: Cambridge University  Press, 1988), p.
154.

43 -  Patricia  Ebrey, Confucianism  and  Family  Rituals  in
Imperial China (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991),
pp. 88-89.

44 -  Fang Hao, "Sung-tai  Fo-chiao," pp.  159-165;  Patricia
Ebrey,  Confu-cianism, pp.  94-95;  Huang  Min-chih, Sung-tai
Fo-chiao, p. 431.

45 - Patricia Ebrey, Confucianism, pp. 93-98.

46  -  Patricia  Ebrey, "Cremation  in Sung  China," American
Historical Review 95 (1990): 406-428.

47 - CTC, pp. 329-330.

48 - Ibid., pp. 187-188.

49 - Ibid., pp. 22-23.

50 - Ibid., p. 23.

51 - Ibid., pp. 24, 63, 269.

52 - Ibid., p. 269.

53 - Ibid., p. 271.

54 - Ibid., pp. 273, 313, 328.

55 -  Aristotle  argues  that morality  begins  with learning
about  virtuous  actions, or  the  "that, "  in  contrast  to
learning the "because," or the explanation  and justification
of virtuous  action.  For  discussion, see  M.  F.  Burnyear,
"Aristotle  on Learning to be Good," in Essays on Aristotle's
Ethics, ed.  Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley: University  of
California Press, 1980), pp. 71-72.

56 - CTC, p. 286.

57 - Ibid., pp. 277-278, 284.

58 - Ibid., pp. 29, 269-270, 275.

59 - Ibid., p. 312.

60 - Alasdair Maclntyre, A Short History of Ethics (New York:
Macmillan Publishing, 1966), p. 1.

61 -  Chang said: "The sage transforms himself spontaneously"
(CTC, pp. 73, 17-18, 27-28, 78).

62 - CTC, pp. 76. 17-18, 28.

63 - Ibid., p. 76.

64 - Ibid., pp. 76-77.

65 - Ibid., p. 64.

66- Ibid.

67 -  For a discussion of Aristotle's  idea about the role of
developing  good habits  in cultivating  morality, see M.  F.
8urnyeat, "Aristotle  on Learning  to Be Good"  (see note  55
above), pp. 69-88.

68 - CTC, p. 264.

69 - Ibid., p. 191.

70  -  A.  C.  Graham, Disputers  of  the  Tao: Philosophical
Argument  in Ancient  China  (Lasalle, Illinois: Open  Court,
1989), p. 25.

71 - CTC, pp. 279, 330.

72 - Ibid., p. 37.

73 - Ibid., pp.  279, 330.  His student Lu Ta-lin pointed out
that  Chang  always  told  scholars  about  the need to learn
ritual  in order to transform  their  bad character  (CTC, p.
383).

74 - Ibid., pp. 279, 330.

75 -  Kassof, The Thought  of Chang  Tsai(note  6 above), pp.
76-103, 128.

76 - CTC, p. 329.

77 - Ibid., p. 31.

78 - Ibid., pp. 281,130.

79 - Kassof thinks that ritual is important only in the first
stage, not in the second  stage  (The Thought  of Chang Tsai,
pp. 81-82, 128).  But in fact, Chang clearly said: "it is not
possible  to  attain  the state of Confucius without learning
the Book of Songs and the Records of Rites"
(CTC, p. 278).

8O - CTC, p. 31.

81 - Ibid., pp. 259, 326.

82 -Ibid., pp. 51,328.

83 - Ch'eng Hao lamented that his family was among only a few
families  in Lo-yang that did not use the Buddhist service in
a funeral (Erh Ch'eng chi, p. 114 [see note 39 above]).

84 - CTC, pp. 264, 328.

85 -  The idea that ritual had its roots in the cosmos can be
traced  back  to no  later  than  Hsun  Tzu  (A.  C.  Graham,
Disputers of the Tao, p. 259).

86 - CTC, p. 326.

87 - Ibid., p. 264.

88 - Ibid., p. 261.

89 - Ibid., p. 274.

90 - Ibid., pp. 269, 275-278.

91 - Ibid., p. 326.

92 - Ibid., pp. 77-79.

93 - Ibid., p. 288.

94 - Chu Hsi, Chu-tzu yu-lei, 84:2183.

95 -  Kuo Pang, Sung Yuan Fo-chiao (Buddhism in Sung and Yuan
times) (Foochow,  Fukien: Jen-min  Ch'u-pan  She, 1981),  pp.
1-5.

96  -  This  rendering  reads  fen  as  station, rather  than
divisions. I owe this rendering to Professor K. C. Liu. For a
similar  translation, see Peter Bol and Kidder  Smith et al.,
Sung  Dynasty  Uses  of  the  I-ching  (Princeton:  Princeton
University  Press, 1990), p.  145.  For Ch'eng  I's praise of
Chang's "Western Inscriptions," see Ch'eng I, Erh Ch'eng chi,
p. 22.

97 -  Donald Munro, "The Family Network, the Stream of Water,
and the Plant: Picturing  Persons  in Sung  Confucianism," in
Individualism  and  Holism: Studies  in Confucian  and Taoist
Values, ed.  Donald  Munro  (Ann  Arbor: Center  for  Chinese
Studies, 1985), pp. 264-269.

98 -  Chang  Tsai  wished  to resurrect  the "feudal"  system
(feng-chien), which he recognized to be impossible.  The best
alternative  was to make local government  office  hereditary
(CTC, pp. 250-251).

99 - CTC, p. 261.

100 - Ibid., pp. 341,322, 374.

101 - Ibid., p. 341.

102 - Ibid., p. 317.

103 - Ibid., p. 256.

104 - Ibid., pp. 30, 317.

105 - Ibid., pp. 23, 374.

106 -  For a discussion  of Li K'ou's advocacy  of Chou-li as
the  foundation  of "Ultimate  peace"  (t'ai-p'ing), see  Hou
Wai-lu, Chung-kuo  ssu-hsiang  t'ung-shih, pp.  408-414  (see
note 7 above).

107 -  David McMullen, State and Scholars  in T'ang China, p.
117.  For discussion  of the importance  of state rituals for
T'ang scholars, see chap. 4.

108 - See Patricia Ebrey, Confucianism, chap. 3.

109 - CTC, p. 327.

110 - Ibid., p. 288.

111 - Ibid., pp. 258-265, 289-303.  For a detailed discussion
of rituals  by Chang  Tsai and other Sung neo-Confucians, see
Ebrey, Confucianism, chaps. 3 and 4.

112 -  Ebrey, "Education  through Ritual," pp.  286, 292 (see
note  1  above).  For  Shih  Chieh, see  Tsu-lai  hsieh-sheng
wen-chi (Collected  writings of Shih Chieh)(Peking: Chung-hua
Shu-chu 1984), pp. 234-235.

113 - Ebrey, "The Early Stages," pp. 24-25 (see note 5 above).

114 - Ebrey, Confucianism, chap. 3.

115 -  Ebrey, "The Early  Stages," pp.  35-39.  See also  her
Confucianism, chap. 3.

116 - CTC, p. 259.

117 - Ibid., pp. 258-261.

118 - Ibid., pp.  267, 382.  See also Chu Hsi, Reflections on
Things  at Hand, trans.  Wing-tsit  Chan  (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1967), pp. 199-200.

119 - CTC, p. 382.

120 - Ibid., pp. 248-252.