Candrakiirti's refutation of Buddhist idealism

By Peter G. Fenner
Philosophy East and West
Volume 33, no.3 (July 1983)
P.251-261
(C) by the University of Hawaii Press


P.251 In the seventh-century Buddhist tract Madhymakaavataara(1) (Introduction to the Middle Way; hereafter cited as MA) Candrakiirti establishes the Maadhyamika system of thought by refuting the tenets of various Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophies. In the course of these refutations he criticizes the Vij~naanavaada or Idealist school of Buddhism.(2) This article reconstructs the critique and is offered as an Asian contribution to the philosophy of perception. The style of argumentation in the critique differs from the contemporary discussion in the theory of perception, mainly because of the nonexistence of a scientific world-view in ancient India and a general deprecation of naive realism. The points, for example, that idealism contravenes the physiological basis for perception as argued for by causal theorists and the implausibility of physical objects being erratically discontinuous through time, are raised obliquely rather than as central foci of discussion. For the most part the arguments draw on consequences that hold for an idealism (even more rank than Berkeley's) in which the mind is upheld as the sole reality to the point where sets of appearances are intrinsic to the existence of consciousness. Though the arguments may have no immediate relevance to the contemporary discussion of perception, they do evidence a different approach to idealism and give us some insight into a centuries-old Indian preoccupation with the philosophy of perception. Though the style of argumentation differs from contemporary Western discourse it shows a philosophical rigor in its own way, nonetheless, and on this count alone should be of some interest. The central issue in the critique is the Vij~naanavaada thesis that dependent (paratantra) phenomena (really) exist.(3) The Vij~naanavaada support that thesis with the doctrines of the (real) existence of consciousness, the nonexternality of sense objects, the heuristic device of potentials (`sakti) as the cause of sense experience; and apperception. It is these doctrines that Candrakiirti criticizes. According to Vij~naanavaadins all objects of knowledge have three natures: an imaginary (parikalpita), dependent (paratantra), and perfected or fully established (parini.spanna) nature.(4) The imaginary nature arises through the force of mental imputation, the principal one being a mental construction which bifurcates subjects from objects. People are thought to fabricate a division between themselves and the world, such that the two appear to be really distinct. As mere imputations, though, the Vij~naanavaadins hold that the imaginary or dualistic nature of experience is quite unreal. Dependent natures form the bases on which or within which occurs the bifurcation of experience. They are defined intensionally as that which arises in dependence on others, that is, literally "other-powered" (paratantra; gzan-dba^n). The absence of bifurcation or duality in P.252 experience is the perfected nature of phenomena. According to Vij~naanavaadins, yogins achieve liberation by ceasing to impute imaginary qualities, especially that of duality. In so doing they realize that the perceiver and its objects of perception are not different entities or substances (dravya). That realization knows the perfected nature. Dependent and perfected natures have a true existence (satyasiddha), the latter because they are known independently of mental constructions and hence veridically, and the former because they both arise dependently and form the basis for perfected natures. That is to say, dependent natures are what may be known either dualistically or nondualistically. As the basis of perception, their non-existence would preclude the possibility of the existence of perfected natures. For Maadhyamikas, on the other hand, the (intrinsic) existence of dependent natures precludes the possibility of liberation as it runs counter to their idea of emptiness (`suunyataa) in which all phenomena lack an intrinsic existence (svabhaava) . The Vij~naanavaada then, is concerned to establish the existence of dependent phenomena where the Maadhyamikas wish to refute their true existence. In his critique Candrakiirti focuses particularly on refuting the (true) existence of consciousness, for all dependent phenomena on the Vij~naanavaada account are essentially the same entity as consciousness. Hence the refutation of the (true) existence of consciousness is a refutation of the true existence of dependent phenomena. The procedure in the MA is to refute, in serial order, the nonexternality of sense objects, the explanatory device of seeds or potentials of experience, and apperception. REFUTING THE NONEXTERNALITY OF SENSE OBJECTS The MA begins its critique with a summary statement (6.45-47) of the Vij~naanavaada world-view according to which the yogin who has attained insight perceives all of reality to be nothing but consciousness (vij~naana) and sees that the subject (graaha) and object (graahya) are in substance the same for the object is nonmaterial. Dependent phenomena are cited as the cause (hetu) for the perception of imaginaries such as the externality of appearance yet are defined by three qualities; namely, that they (6.47 cd) "arise without external objects, exist, and (are) naturally not an object of elaboration'' (prapa~nca). The Vij~naanavaada also introduce (6.46) the idea of a source consciousness (aalaya-vij~naana) as a repository containing the seeds from which arise consciousness and appearances. In an analogical description it is said to function in the way that the movement of wind (the seeds or potentials) on the ocean (the mind base) gives rise to waves (consciousness and its objects). The Maadhyamikas begin their critique (6.48) by asking the Vij~naanavaada for supporting evidence. They undercut a Vij~naanavaada response though by raising the case of dreams themselves, and then pointing out unwanted consequences. P.253 The Vij~naanavaada hold that dreams evidence the true existence of consciousness and the merely apparent externality of objects in the so-called waking state. Taking the first point, they argue that consciousness truly exists because it can produce dream images, thoughts, and so on and hold them for subsequent recall in the waking state. The capacities for production, containment, and continuity through time would not be possible, they argue, if consciousness did not truly exist. The Maadhyamika object that if the phenomenon of recall or memory is their criterion of existence then external objects are likewise real for they also are perceived and subsequently recalled in the waking state. This, though, runs counter to the Vij~naanavaada thesis that external phenomena are merely imaginary. The Vij~naanavaada then change tack (6.50) and proffer what is a standard idealist argument for the nonexternality of objects based on phenomenological similarities between the dream and waking states. They point out especially that dream objects produce affective responses in just the same way that external objects do. The phenomenological similarities between the two states leads them to conclude that waking objects likewise have no external reality. The Maadhyamikas in response (6.51-53) offer a physiological basis for discriminating between the two states. Their Buddhist explanation is that during veridical waking perception all six consciousnesses (that is, a mental and five sensory ones) , and their corresponding powers (indriya) are active and make contact with their respective objects whereas in dreams only the mind-consciousness (manovij~naana) operates and the sense organs and other consciousnesses are inactive. Changing tack again the Vij~naanavaada leave the example of dreams and introduce (6.54) the situation in which a consciousness receives its visual impressions through an eye organ stricken by a disease (timira) such as opthalmia, which causes hairlines to appear in front of the eyes. This is functionally equivalent to the stock Western example of afterimages. They reason that the perceived reality of the hairs and consciousness of them by the person afflicted with the disease evidences the real existence of consciousness. If it were not real, the appearance of hairlines and hallucinations generally could not be presented to consciousness. Hence, the example shows the real existence of consciousness and the fictitious or illusory nature of sense objects. In responding to this example the Maadhyamikas point to a consequence of consciousness being real in the realist sense of being self-existent. Candrakiirti writes (6.55). "If the mind exists (yet) the objects of knowledge do not, then as the eye and its object, the hairs, are patently related, (people) without the disease would also have hairlines (appearing) to (their) mind. As this is not (the case), therefore (the mind) does not exist." The argument here is that if a mind perceiving objects that have no external referents truly or intrinsically exists then those illusory objects will also appear to all other minds. Hence, in the case preceding, hairlines would appear P.254 to a healthy visual sense faculty just as they do to the diseased one. The reason seated in the argument is that a consciousness perceiving hairlines must have hairlines present for it to be a real consciousness of hairlines. If the hairlines are not present there is no real "consciousness of hairlines.'' But, the Maadhyamikas reason, if the consciousness is real in your sense, the hairlines are necessarily and intrinsically related to the consciousness in which case conditions such as the mere presence or absence of a visual defect is irrelevant and so the hairlines would appear to any consciousnesses having the same focus as the one to which hairlines appear. In other words, all consciousnesses looking in the same direction, or at the same object, would perceive the visual distortion.(5) This analysis and subsequent ones are typically Maadhyamic. Though the Maadhyamika itself is a "middle path" their analytical procedure is to rigidly designate their objects of refutation and resolve their opponents theses into either affirmations or denials. That is, they assume there are no half measures or median positions. Their own path is a middle one in the sense that it is nonextremist for it neither affirms nor denies existences. In this preceding case, consciousness either exists or it does not. If it does not, the Vij~naanavaadins violate their tenet of the existence of consciousness. If it exists in any way other than as a nominality it truly or intrinsically exists, in which case its existence is quite independent of attendant circumstances, other conditions, causes, or objects. Hence if a particular consciousness truly exists it exists independently of, and unmodified by, factors such as the quality of sense organs. THE FAILURE OF MENTAL POTENTIALS TO ACCOUNT FOR SENSORY EXPERIENCES To give a causal account for sense experience and its vicissitudes and variations, and to avoid consequences such as the foregoing one pointed out by the Maadhyamikas, the Vij~naanavaada introduce the explanatory device of mental potentials (blo-nus, mati-`sakti? ) located in a source consciousness (aalayavij~naana). As the potentials within a source consciousness ripen serially they give rise to a continuum of consciousness and the appearance of sense objects to consciousness. The potentials account fully for the arising of sense experience, therefore, there is no need to posit external objects as a cause or necessary condition Instanciating a visual consciousness Candrakiirti states the Vij~naanavaada thesis (6.62-63) thus: The birth of a visual consciousness is produced immediately and wholly from what is its own potential. This potential which is the support of its own consciousness is perceived as the formed organ called "the eye". Knowledge which arises from a (sense-) organ, (e.g.) an appearance of blue, etc. arises from its own seed (sa-bon, biija) without an external object. From not understanding (this) people accept that the mind (sees) external objects. The differences between the experiences of individuals is explained in terms of continua of source consciousnesses containing different sets and orderings of P.255 potentials. When potentials ripen they produce differences in experience that are qualitatively commensurate with the differences between potentials. The preceding dilemma is thus resolved (6.56 a-c) by saying that the individual who has the sensation of hairlines in front of his/her eyes has potentials within his/her source consciousness that fructify as the appearance of hairlines whereas the individual without diseased eyes has no such potentials. (The very concept of diseased and healthy organs is likewise just a matter of different patterns of consistency within sets of potentials.) The Maadhyamikas are unhappy with this notion of potentials, at least when proffered as the sole cause of sensory experience. Their refutation notes first (6.56d) that instincts, on the Vij~naanavaada's account. are in need of some proof and then proceeds (6.57-61) to refute their real existence. The refutation is based on rejecting the existence of potentials as causes of past (6.59-61), present (6.57a) , or future(6.57b-8) consciousnesses.(6) The arguments are these: 1. A potential cannot be a cause for a presently existing consciousness because causes must precede their effects. If the two were simultaneous, cause and effect would be indistinguishable from each other and hence the same, in which case potentials would not be potentials for they could not act as the cause of consciousness. Hence present potentials are nonexistent and consciousness must be self-born. 2. The potential for a future consciousness is nonexistent because the potential as a cause must make contact with its effect, the consciousness. If there is no contact the two cannot function as cause and effect. The future consciousness, though, is nonexistent and therefore the potential also. (If the potential were existing then contact with its effect would require that the consciousness also existed in which case it would be a present rather than a future consciousness.) Moreover (6.57cd), a future consciousness cannot exist because distinguishables (vi`se.sa.na) (that is. a future consciousness) exist in dependence on their having characteristics or distinctions (vi`se.sya) and a future consciousness is as yet uncharacterized. Hence, the positing of potentials for an uncharacterized consciousness is on a par with talking about the children of a barren woman. A final point made by Candrakiirti (6.58cd) is that the Vij~naanavaadins have their reasoning with respect to true or self-existence quite inverted. For the Vij~naanavaada, dependent phenomena truly exist, whereas the Maadhyamikas hold that things established through dependence on each other (pan-tshun-don-la brten-pa), such as potentials and consciousness, are (ultimately) nonexistent (grub-min-~nid). Hence, from the same data. they draw a conclusion that is diametrically opposite. 3. Finally, a consciousness cannot arise as the fructifying potential (nus-smi^n) of a potency already ceased (`gag-pa) for this view produces the consequences inhering in the situation of "birth from other."(7) The continuum of production (from a potential to a consciousness) within a mind-stream would be discontinuous and thus incapable of acting as causes and effects. In other words, the P.256 continuum's parts would be displaced from each other and so fail to be parts within the one continuum. As different moments (k.sa.na) within the stream they would be intrinsically different from each other and therefore unrelated. Because they are unrelated they could not be said to be members of the one continuum (sa^mtaana). Candrakiirti gives the example (6.61) of two of consciousness' qualities, love and agression, which, if intrinsically individuated from each other, cannot be part of one continuum. The consequences are that all would seemingly give rise to all. (A potential within any "one'' continuum, for example, would be no more likely to ripen in that continuum than in any other.) The conclusion for Candrakiirti is that these three temporal analyses disprove the Vij~naanavaada thesis that potentials are the sole cause of sense consciousnesses. COUNTEREXAMPLES After a restatement of the Vij~naanavaada theses (6.62-64) about potentials and the nonexternality of sense objects (quoted in part earlier) Candrakiirti resumes his refutation by supplying two counterexamples to their view. The Maadhyamikas contend (6.65) that if the Vij~naanavaadas are right, that objects appear to a mind-consciousness just as in a dream where there is no active sense organ, then blind people should see sense objects when they are awake just as they do while asleep and dreaming. The Vij~naanavaada are not in a position to object (6.66ab), saying that blind people are unaware of sense objects while awake because the mind consciousness is deactivated in the waking state, for on their own account potentials not sense organs are responsible for sense perception. As such there is no necessary connection between sense organs and a mental consciousness (nor even the need of organs for mental perceptions of objects) and the activation or deactivation of the sense organs (if there is such a process) is quite irrelevant to the functioning of a mental consciousness. Consequently, the activity or inactivity of a mind-consciousness is quite independent of whether a person is asleep and dreaming or awake. If the mind-consciousness of a blind person were to become inactive once he/she was perceived to wake, and similarly become active once he:she went to sleep, it would be merely coincidental. On the Vij~naanavaada thesis, then, there is nothing to stop blind people from having sensory experiences, qualitatively comparable to those had while dreaming, when they are awake. Candrakiirti concludes (6.68) that Vij~naanavaadins typically fail to respond to the Maadhyamika's analyses, being content to merely uncritically, restate their theses. The second counterexample is intended to refute the true existence of consciousness and is based on a yogic phenomenon known to the Vij~naanavaadins (6.69) in which yogins achieve a collectedness (samaadhi) or concentration on a visualized image of skeletons. The purpose of the meditation (6.70b) is to develop a mind of aversion (a`subha) to worldly affairs. For the Vij~naanavaada, the efficacy of such a meditation in producing a detached consciousness is evidence for the true existence of consciousness. The Maadhyamikas' objection is P.257 the same as that raised in the earlier example of hairlines appearing to a distorted visual consciousness. If the yogin's consciousness of skeletons truly exists it is quite independent of such causes and conditions as instructions from a guru, the development of concentration, etc.. and, therefore, will appear to any mind directed (bol-gtad) toward where the yogin is facing. This is fallacious though, and, therefore, the mind does not really exist. This series of verses concludes (6,71 ab) with the Maadhyamikas acknowledging what is the idealists "argument of variability.'' Where Berkeley used the example of a coin being perceived from various angles Candrakiirti uses a somewhat dramatic mythological image and talks of spirits (yi-dwags, preta) perceiving water as though it was pus where humans see the same as water. According to the Vij~naanavaada the fact that a variety of different perceptions can be had evidences the mental nature of sense objects, and the fact that the perceptions can satiate their respective subjects evidences the true existence of the consciousnesses produced. In reply the Maadhyamikas note the likeness of this example to that of diseased sense faculties and return the Vij~naanavaada to their earlier refutation. A summary point (6.71cd) is that knowables are not truly existent, and, therefore, the mind which they produce is likewise unreal. REFUTATION OF APPERCEPTION In concluding his critique Candrakiirti (6.72) questions the very knowability and hence existence of dependent things (paratantra-bhaava) by arguing that the subject-object distinction (and hence cognizer-cognized also) is dissolved when the Vij~naanavaada empty (sto^n-pa) the two of being separate (and composed of different substances). To obviate such a difficulty in their tenets the Vij~naanavaada propose (6.73ab) that consciousness can experience (anubhava) itself and cite the phenomenon of memory (sm.rti) as evidence. They say that all sense-consciousnesses are accompanied by a function or capacity of consciousness that perceives not the sense object but the sensory consciousness itself. In its own right it is neither a mind (citta), nor mental concomitant (caitta).(8) Nor is it just a conceptual (kalpanaa) recognition of perception. Without such an apperceptive faculty, the Vij~naanavaada reason that memory or recall would be impossible, for consciousness must be nonreferentially aware of itself--in other words, aware of itself independently of referents--to have memories when the referents are past and finished. If it were aware of itself only referentially then the sense consciousness generated could not be recalled in the absence of their referents (that is, sense data or objects). The Maadhvamikas reject the notion of apperception (svasa^mvedanaa) and claim that recall is quite explicable on the basis of a nonself-reflexive mind-consciousness alone. They argue (6.75ab) that the experience of objects itself is a sufficient cause for a recollection. They note (6.75d) that this also accords with the commonsense view of recollection. P.258 The Maadhyamikas' critique is two-pronged. Their first point (6.74) is that apperception cannot be considered a cause or necessary condition for the arising of memory, as both of these, according to the Vij~naanavaada, are truly existent, and, therefore, unable to be causally related in the one continuum. Moreover, (6.74d) in basing their thesis on real "birth from another" they remove (`zoms) the distinctions between raw experience and memories of it, The second consequence (6.76) is the contradiction thay in apperception the subject, object, and perception become one and so fail in fact to be subject, object, and so on. In other words, if consciousness is the object of cognition it is undistinguished from the cognizing consciousness, and therefore not an object of cognition. (Conversely, if consciousness does know or perceive it must know an object as distinct from itself, and cannot know itself.(9) ) Hence a self-conscious cognition is unknown and thus nonexistent. Consequently, the purported validation of the existence of a dependent (paratantra) consciousness via an apperceptive cognition is ungrounded. The various refutations involved in Candrakiirti's critique of the Vij~naanavaada coalesce in the common conclusion (6.77) that their naturally (^no-ho) dependent phenomena do not exist. They thereby (6.78) destroy all worldly notions and are (6.79cd) imperfect with respect to the ultimate and conventional levels of truth and so do not obtain liberation. NOTES 1. This study uses the Tibetan text with Candrakiirti's autocommentary edited by Louis de la Valle e Poussin, Madhyamakaavataara par Candrakiirti, reprint (Osnabruck: Biblio Verlag, 1970) . The relevant verses, 6.45-77 (Poussin's ed., pp. 135-173)are translated in an Appendix. Poussin's partial translation of the MA, Madhyamakaavataara Traduction d'apres la version tibertaine, Le Museon. N.S. 8 (1907): 249-317; 11 (1910): 271-358: and 12 (1911) : 235-328 includes these verses and the commentary (bhaa.sya), 11 (1910): 324-354. 2. The school also goes by the names Yogaacaara, Cittamaatra, and Vij~naapti-maatra. The adjectival qualifier-maatra, tib. tsam(-du) denotes exclusion, hence the only--or merely-mind school. There is some controversy among contemporary scholars as to whether the Vij~naanavaada is a genuine idealism. Independent of the outcome of that controversy it is clear that Candrakiirti interprets the Vij~naanavaada as "idealism." 3. The MA refutes the thesis that dependent things have existence (yod, sat). It is implicit throughout, though, that only intrinsic existence (svabhaava) is being denied of dependent phenomena for elsewhere the MA establishes the nominal existence of the commonsense world (`jig-rten). 4. See, for example, Madhyaantavibhaaga, 1.5. 5. These are presumably milder versions of the fully ramified consequences that either share all or none of their experiences. In the former case there would be just one consciousness, not many: and in the latter where, unrelated by any common percepts, each would be solipsistic with respect to the others. 6. The analysis follows essentially the same structure as Candrakiirti employs (MA, 6.18d-19) in rejecting "birth from other" in any of the three times, past, present, and future. Cf. also Muulamadhyamakaarika, chpt. 2. 7. These are discussed through verses 6.14-97. The most trenchant criticism is that causation between dissimilars is impossible because dissimilars share no common characteristics and hence cannot be causally related. P.259 8. It is not an additional consciousness to the eight reckoned on by the Vij~naanavaada but a cognitive instrument, more particularly a mode of perception (pratyak.sa) . See Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, vol. 1, reprint (New York: Dover Publications 1962), pp. 163-169. 9. Candrakiirti gives the analogical examples of a sword's inability to cut itself, and the finger's inability to touch itself. APPENDIX 6.45 (Vijnaanavada: ) There is no seeing a subject('dzin-pa, graaha) because there is no object (bzu^n-ba, graahya) and because he/she thoroughly perceives the three worlds (srid-gsum, tri-bhava) as mere consciousness (rnam-`ses, vij~naana) that (sixth level) bodhisattva, abiding in insight (`ses-rab, praj~naa) , understands reality as merely consciousness. 6.46 As waves arise from the great ocean by the motion of the wind, so the so-called source of all (kun-gzi, aalaya) , the seed of all (things), only consciousness arises through its own potential (nus, `sakti). 6.47 Therefore the nature of dependent (gzan-gyi-dba^n, paratantra) (phenomena)--which are the cause of things existing as imaginary [kun-]btags, parikalpita)--is to arise without external objects (phyi-rol-gzu^n-ba), exist, and be naturally (ran-bzin) not an object of elaboration (spros, prapa~nca). 6.48 (Maadhyamika:) Where is an example of a mind with no external (objects)? If (you) say it is like a dream, then that must be thought (about). If whenever I have a dream the mind also does not exist then your example is not (an example). 6.49 If the mind exists because the dream is recalled (dran) when waking, then external objects will also be like that. As such your mental recall "I saw..." likewise (de' dra) (establishes that) externals have an existence too. 6.50 (Vij~naanavaada:) Because the visual faculty (mig-blo) does not exist if asleep, (externals) do not exist. Only (kho-na) the mental discernment (yid-kyi-`ses-pa) exists. Its appearances (rnam-pa) are desired (zen) like externals (phyi-rol-~nid). As with the dream so it is considered here when (in the waking state). 6.51 (Maadhyamika:) Just as your external object in the dream is unborn so the mind also is not born. 6.52 All three--the eye, visual objects, and the mind those produce--are fictitious (rdzun-pa) too. 6.52 Hearing. etc., i.e., the remaining three (senses) also are not born. As in the dream likewise here (when) awake too. Things are fictitious. That mind does not exist. There are no objects and the (sense-) powers (dba^n-po, indriya) also do not exist. 6.53 Here, for however long one is not awake, the three (i.e., eye, object, and mind) exist just as when one is awake. When (one) awakens the three parts no longer exist. Likewise (when awakening) from ignorance's sleep. 6.54 (Vij~naanavaada:) Whatever mind has diseased (rab-rib) (sense) organs, and whatever hair (etc.) it sees because of the nature (mthu) of disease, relative to that mind both (the consciousness and object) are true although for (one who) sees clearly (don-gsal) both are fictitious (rdzun-pa). 6.55 (Maadhvamika:) If the mind exists (yet) the objects of knowledge (ses-bya, j~neya) do not, then as the eye and its object, the hairs, are patently related (rjes-`brel-ba) , (people) without the disease would also have hair lines (appearing) to (their) mind. As this is not (the case) , therefore (the mind) does not exist. 6.56 (Vij~naanavaada:) The (non-diseased) perceivers (mthon-pa-dag) do not have that mind (with hairs) arising because the mental potential (blo-nus) is not ripening, not because (ze-na) it is separate from a thing (purported) to be an (external) object of knowledge. (Maadhyamika: Because that potential (nus) is not present! This is not established. 6.57 The potential (nus-pa, `sakti) for a born (consciousness) does not exist. The potential for an entity not (yet) born also does not exist. (Where) there are no distinctions (khyad-par, vi`sesya) no distinguishables exist. In consequence the son of a barren woman would also exist. 6.58 If you consider stating (bs~nad 'dod) it by what will come to arise, then without the potential its "coming to arise" cannot be. Whatever are established through dependence on each other (pantshun-don-la brten-pa), are said by the pious to be nonexistent (grub-min-~nid). P.260 6.59 If (it) comes from the fructifying potential (nus-smin) of what has (already) stopped (`gag-pa) then another will arise from another's potential. The continuum's parts (rgyan-can-rnams) there are different from each other. Therefore, everything will arise from all. 6.60 If(you) say, "The continuum's parts there are different yet the continuum on those is not different, therefore there is no fault,'' (we Maadhyamikas say) "Prove this! Because it is not right that when (skabs) a (single) continuum it is (internally) not different. 6.61 The qualities (chos) which are dependent on love (byam-pa) and aggression (~ner-spras) , because of otherness do not belong to the one continuum (rgyud, sa^mtaana). Whatever have an individuality (so-so-ba, p.rthag tra) by (their) own character (ra^n-mtshan-~nid, svalak.sa.na), cannot rightly belong to one continuum. 6.62 (Vij~naanavada: ) The birth of a visual consciousness (mig-blo, cak.surdhii) is produced immediately (de-ma thag-tu) and wholly (kun-nas,) from what is its own potential. This potential which is the support of its own consciousness is perceived (rtogs) as the formed organ called "the eve." 6.63 Knowledge (rnam-par-rig) which arises from a (sense-) organ (dha^n-po, indriya). (e.g.) an appearance of blue, etc., arises from its own seed without an external object. From not understanding (this) people accept (len) that the mind (sees) external objects. 6.64 If you (Vij~naanavaada) says: "As in a dream where there are no separate (objective) objects of form (gzugs-don), a mind arises from its own ripened potential having their shape(rnam, aakaara), similarly here in the waking state the mind (yid, manas) exist (though) without external (objects)." 6.65 (We Maadhyamikas reply:) Just as in a dream there is no eye (Faculty operating, yet) a mind-consciousness (yid-sem) of blue appearances, etc., arises, why is it similarly not born from Its own ripened seed in a blind person who has no eye faculty (mig-dban, cak.sur-indriya)? 6.66 If in your view the potential of the sixth (consciousness only) has ripened in the dream (-state) and is not there in the waking state, then similarly why it is incorrect to say that at the time of dreaming there is no ripened potential of the sixth (consciousness). 6.67 Just as the absence of a visual faculty (mig) is not the cause (rgyu, hetu) of this (metnal-consciousness when awake), so in dreams also sleep is not the cause, Therefore, in dreams too that object (d^nos, bhaava) and eye are accepted as the cause of perceiving (rtogs-pa) a fictitious subject (rdzun pa'i yul-can). 6.68 Because whatever answer is offered (btab-pa) (by you) is seen (merely to) replicate the thesis (dam-bca', pratij~naa) . this debate (rtsod) is clarified (sel-byed). The buddhas taught that things never exist. 6.69 (Vij~naanavaada:) A yogin who from the oral instruction of a guru sees the ground of the earth (full) with skeletons, also sees that the three components (of perception--the object. organ. and consciousness) are unborn because they depend on the workings of a distorted mind (log-pa-yid. manasikaara). 6.70 (Maadhyamika:) Your objects of the (sense-) organ and mind (may be seen by another), so if the (yogin) develops a mind of repulsion (mi-sdug, a`subha) (to the skeletons) then likewise another mind directed (blo-gtad) (to them) would perceive that object. This, though, is fallacious (rdzun-pa) (for it) is not produced. 6.71 Like (a person who) has a diseased (sense-) faculty, a spirit (yi-dwags, preta) at a flowing river also experiences (blo) pus. In summary, as there are no objects of knowledge so also there is no mind. Understand this meaning thus. 6.72 If there is no (external) object (gzu^n, graahya) , and the subject (`dzin-pa~nid, graahakataa) is separate from (it), and there exists a dependent thing (gzan-dba^n d^nos, paratantra-bhaava) that is empty (sto^n-pa) of the two, then by what will its existence (yod, sat) be known? As it is not grasped (bzu^n-ba), to say "it exists Is Inappropriate. 6.73 It is not established as being experienced (myo^n-ba, anubhava) by itself. If (you Vij~naanavaadas say) it is established at a later time from recall (dran-pa, sm.rti) (then that) is not established for (the potential for recall) can be established (without apperception). It is not established by (your) statement. 6.74 Apperception (ra^n-rig, svasa^mvedanaa) is established though indeed (mod-kyi) dependent on (rag) (memory). So also the memory of memor) is not right and because the (experience and P.261 memory of it) are other so birth in a continuum is not known. This argument also defeats the distinctions. 6.75 Because for us (a memory comes) from that which will experience (myo^n, anubhava) the object (yul, vi.saya), this memory (of yours) which is other does not exist. Therefore I will remember sights and thoughts. This (understanding) is also the manner of worldly conventions. 6.76 Therefore if there is no apperception what will grasp (`dzin-pa) your dependent (paratantra) (consciousness). Because the agent, action, and acted on are not the same it is incorrect that that (consciousness) is grasped by itself. 6.77 If things exist that are naturally (^no-be) dependent, having a self that is unborn and unknown, then what harm can the son of barren women (bring) to another? Like this, it is incorrect (that your dependent things) have an existence.