Apophatic and kataphatic discourse in Mahaayaana: A Chinese view

By Robert M. Gimello
Philosophy East and West
volumn. 26, no. 2.(April 1976)
P117-135
(C) bye The University Press of Hawaii.


P117 It is a widely held view, among modern scholars of Mahaayaana as well as within certain of the Mahaayaana traditions themselves, that Praasa^ngika-Maadhyamika of the sort one finds in such works as Naagaarjuna's Muulamadhya-makaarika and Vigrahavyaavartanii(1) is the definitive rendition of the Greater Vehicle's ultimate purport. T. R. V. Murti, in his classic study, has called Maadhyamika the "Central Philosophy of Buddhism."(2) Kenneth Inada has called Naagaarjuna "the giant among giants" of all Buddhist thinkers.(3) Bimal K. Matilal has recently argued that "there is a sense in which the Maadhyamika position may be considered logically unassailable," thereby raising it to a status of universal rather than just Buddhist preeminence.(4) Such judgments abound in the literature of Buddhist scholarship. Nor is it surprising that they should, for they only echo the centuries-old conviction of many eminent Buddhist that Naagaarjuna's thought is the most perfect expression of the Buddha's own middle path. The pride of place accorded to it by Tso^n kha pa and his dGe lugs pa school is only one of the relatively more recent traditional examples of this tendency. There is no doubt excellent reason for such acclaim as this. The clarity, force, and elegance of Naagaarjuna's arguments are undeniable. They can easily over-whelm, and often have. However, the lavish traditional and modern appreciations of Naagaarjuna's thought have not been without untoward consequences for our understanding of other varieties of Mahaayaana. The Mahaayaana is a far more various thing than a reading of the Kaarikaas. or even of their antecedent Praj~naapaaramitaa scriptures, would indicate; and the Maadhyamika position has hardly gone unchallenged in Buddhist intellectual history. Indeed, much of the subsequent history of Mahaayaana thought may be read as a cumulative qualification of the `Suunyavaada that one finds in the Perfection of Insight Literature and in Naagaarjuna. Such at least was the case with the Yogaacaara and Tathaagatagarbha traditions: and when Buddhism found its way to China Chinese Buddhist thinkers often expressed a clear preference for the later qualifications or modulations of Maadhyamika rather than for the severity of an unadulterated Naagaarjunism. It may well be that our enthusiasm for Naagaarjuna along with the comparative complexity and inacessibility of other traditions have predisposed us to give less attention than deserved to the alternative forms of Mahaayaana.(5) Should this be so, the remarks that follow may be taken as an effort at compensation. The criticisms, explicit or implicit, that have been leveled against classical `Suunyavaada are many and diverse. One might undertake to examine the question of whether Maadhyamika is normative for the whole of Mahaayaana by investigating, for example,the claim of the Madhyaantavibhaaga that an understanding of emptiness is crude and incomplete unless tempered by an understanding of the reality and potency of constructive imagination. For the Yogaacaara authors of this text, emptiness is always and ever coincident with the imagination of P118 the unreal (abhuutaparikalpa: hsu-wang fen-pieh(a)) and it is only the coefficiency of the two principles that can wholly account for the way things really are.(6) It is in recognition of this--the essential duplexity of reality--that the Madhyaantavibhaaga may say, as one would not expect Naagaarjuna to say: na `suunya^m napi ca`suunyam tasmat sarvvam vidhiiyate satvad asatvaat satvaac ca madhyama pratipac ca saa ku shuo i-ch'ieh fa fei k'ung fei pu-k'ung yu wu chi yu ku shih ming chung-tao i(b) Therefore it is said that all dharmas Are neither empty nor nonempty, Because they exist, do not exist, and yet again exist. This is the meaning of the "middle-path."(7) One might choose also to consider the theory of the "three revolutions of the wheel of the law" found in the Sa^mdhinirmocanasuutra: Formerly, in the second period and for the sake only of those aspiring to practice of the Mahaayaana--reckoning on the fact that all dharmas lack own-being, neither arise nor perish, and are originally calm and essentially of nirvaa.na--the Lord turned the Wheel of the Law which is characterized by a hidden intent (i yin-mi hsiang(c)). [But] this too (i.e., like the first turning) had [other teachings] superior to it to which it deferred. It was of a sense still to be interpreted (yu wei liao-i(d) ; neyaartha). and [thus] the subject of much dispute. In the present third period and for the sake of aspirants to all vehicles-reckoning [again] on the fact that all dharmas lack own-being, neither arise nor perish, are originally calm and essentially of nirvaa.na and have the lack of own-being as their nature--the Lord has turned the wheel of the Law which is characterized [this time] by a manifest meaning (i hsien-liao hsiang(e)). This is the most rare and precious [of teachings]. There is nothing superior to this Turning of the Wheel of Law by the Lord and nothing to which it defers. It is of truly explicit meaning (chen liao-i(f); niithaartha) and not the subject of disputes.(8) The third revolution of the dharmacakra here described is, of course, the annunciation of what was to become Yogaacaara Buddhism. The second Corresponds to the `Suunyavaada of the Praj~naapaaramitaa canon and, proleptically, to its Maadhyamika systematization. The implication of this passage is that although both dispensations of the law teach emptiness (here called "lack of own-being, " "nonarising, " etc.), the Praj~naapaaramitaa and Maadhyamika versions of the doctrine are inchoate, eliptical, imprecise and a source of controversy, whereas the Yogaacaara version is definitive, explicit and not liable to conflicting interpretations. A third approach might be to follow the masterful lead of Ruegg, (9) Takasaki, (10) and Wayman(11) in considering the claims of the Tathaagatagarbha tradition to superiority over classical `Suunyavaada. The Tathaagatagarbha, after all, is a tradition which argues forcefully that the reality of all things is as much P119 "nonempty" (a`suunya; pu-k'ung(g)) as it is "empty" (`suunya; k'ung(h) (12) and which employs such un-Maadhyamika terminology in its locutions about reality as "permanence" (niitya; chang(i)). "purity" (`subha; ching(j) ) , and even "self" (aatman; wo(k).(13) A fourth option, and the one we take here, is to look at the differences among Maadhyamika and the other varieties of Mahaayaana through the eyes of those Chinese Buddhist who, in devising their own systems of thought, were given the opportunity to compare and choose. I refer here to the numerous sixth-and-seventh-century Chinese thinkers who formulated "division of the doctrine" (p'an-chiao(l)) and similar schemes in the course of fashioning new and uniquely sinic schools of Buddhism. Almost without exception these thinkers chose to subordinate `Suunyavaada of the sort one finds in the Perfection of Insight literature and the Kaarikaas to other kinds of Mahayana, often to doctrines and texts of Tathaagatagarbha provenance or association. The Hua-yen p'an-chiao system, for example, relegated `Suunyavaada to the category of "incipient'' or "elementary" (shih(m)) Mahaayaana but held the Tathaagatagarbha tradition to be representative of an "advanced" or "final" (chung(n)) Mahaayaana, both of which fell short of the perfection of its own "rounded" or "comprehensive" (yuan(o)) teaching.(14) A theme that unites all of these challenges to Maadhyamika primacy--the Yogaacaara, the Tathaagatagarbha. and the Chinese--is a profound dissatisfaction with the seemingly relentless apophasis of Naagaarjuna and, to a lesser extent, of his sources. All are able to acknowledge Naagaarjuna's caution--that uncritical use of the constructive language of philosophical views is a species of intellectual bondage--but they acknowledge it only as a caution, a corrective to false views. They insist, however, that the way of denial and negation, the unremitting distrust of positive language, is necessary but not sufficient unto enlightenment. It allows one to fend off error but does not actively advance one toward the truth and may even impede the practical religious life by generating more subtle forms of error and by inhibiting compassion. Therefore, the various alternatives to Maadhyamika that we have mentioned took it upon themselves to reassert the salvific value of kataphasis, the spiritual utility of positive and affirmative language. They chose, in short, eloquence over silence. In what follows we offer for consideration one example of the rejection of an exclusive apophasis in favor of a disciplined kataphasis. We will examine the argument of a brief but important text entitled Discernments of thec Dharma-Element of the Avata^msaka (Hua-yen fa-chieh kuan-men(p) (15) attributed to Tushun(q) (557-640),(16) the reputed "first patriarch" of China's Hua-yen (Avatam saka) school of Buddhism. This very influential text has been put to many uses in the history of East Asian Buddhism, both within and without the Hua-yen tradition. It is, of course, not simply a text "about Buddhist theories of language." But without denying the broader range of its meanings we do suggest that it does serve our particular purpose well; it offers a significant vision of P120 the place of language in the religious life. The Kuan-men is composed of three general discernments or kuan, (r) each one of which is subdivided into several more specific discernments. The first of the three, entitled "Discernments of True Emptiness" (chen-k'ung kuan-fa(s) ), is a straightforward and expert rendering of standard Mahaayaana teachings on emptiness (`suunyataa; k'ung) and the relation of emptiness to material forms (ruupaani; se(t)). Emptiness is shown to mean first that all constituents of reality, even material forms, are dependently originated. They depend entirely on a plurality of causes and conditions for their ephemeral coming to be and they are utterly devoid of own-being (svabhaava-`suunya; tzu-hsing k'ung(u)). In short, all dharmas and all combinations of dharmas lack substance. Thus, there are simply no entities anywhere which exist in and of themselves. It follows from their insubstantiality that all dharmas are also indeterminable, since to deter-mine them would be to assign them fixed substantive identities which, in turn, would violate the doctrine of dependent origination, No thing born of causes and conditions possesses such an identity. This we may call the transitive import of emptiness. By it we are informed, even if only negatively, about the nature of reality. We are told what it is not. But this negative import does not exhaust the doctrine's meaning; it has also an intransitive significance. As dharmas are indeterminable, so emptiness itself is indeterminative. It is especically emphasized in the Kuan-men and most other Mahaayaana interpretations of emptiness not only that all dharmas are devoid of determinate identity but also that the statement that they are so is itself not a determinating predicate. In the technical language of Buddhism, emptiness is not an ascriptive view (d.r.s..ti; chien(v)) about dharmas. Rather it is an expression of the resolute refusal to predicate or ascribe, indeed, of the impossibility of such operations. Emptiness, in other words, is the very principle of denial of determinancy within this system of Mahaayaana discourse, the cognitive equivalent of the words "no" or "not" within the system of discourse known as ordinary English usage. Admittedly this reflexive function of emptiness--by which it eludes classification as a determinating predicate, denies itself ('suunyataa-'suunyataa; k'ung-k'ung(w)), and so avoids hypostatization--is puzzling, but it is puzzling in a peculiarly deep sense. Like the well-known paradox, "everything I say is a lie." its difficulty may well derive from some quirk in the structure of language or thought, perhaps from some problem inherent in the notion of reflexive negation itself.(17) In any case, it follows from this understanding of emptiness that all attempts to formulate determinate views of forms and emptiness must fail. Just as particular Material forms lack ontological own-being, so all predications lack the linguistic equivalent of own-being--to wit, referential meaning. The Buddhist ultimate truth of emptiness is ineffable, then, but in a special sense--not because our words fall short of describing some transcendent absolute reality called "emptiness," but because all words are such that they lack referential content or are "empty" of substantive meaning (artha-`suunya-`sabda) . This holds despite appearances and P121 the common usage of words. As there are really no determinate entities to be referred to, so words do not actually refer. Their indexical function is illusory, indeed it is one of the major fabricators of illusion. What is, and the emptiness thereof, will simply not submit to the language of determinateness. On the other hand, what other kind of language is there? This problem no doubt accounts for the intractable character of the emptiness teaching and for its frequent misinterpretation. It is to this problem that our text gives initial attention in its first major discernment. Using terminology and concepts which are derived entirely from Indian Buddhism and which were well known, if not always well understood by earlier Chinese Buddhists, Tu-shun proceeds to explain "true emptiness'' by refuting the three most common deviant "views" of emptiness, all of which err in falsely distinguishing between material forms and emptiness: (1) forms and true emptiness are identical, he maintains, precisely because forms are not to be identified with the false emptiness of annihilation (pu-chi tuan-k'ung(x)): (2) forms and true emptiness are identical also because, although surely there is no determinate form possessed of a "mark" (hsiang(y)) which is the equivalent of the principle of emptiness (k'ung chih li(z)), each form is "devoid of substance" (wu-t'i(aa)), thus there is no particular existent nor mark thereof which may be called emptiness; and finally, (3) forms are identical with true emptiness because when forms are properly discerned they all "coalesce" (hui(ab)) and "revert to emptiness" (kuei k'ung(ac) ) , and therefore emptiness is not an entity apart from forms. The "views'' or predications here treated--that emptiness is annihilation, that it exists as a quality of things, and that it is a transcendent entity--are thus all averred to be themselves empty. Such views are devoid, to be precise, of reference. The "emptinesses" that they adduce, so to speak, are what Naagaarjuna had called "misconceived" (durd.r.s.ta) .(18) From these observations Tu-shun draws the conclusion, again in essentially Indian terms, that emptiness and forms are mutually "non-obstructive" (wu-ai(ad)). Since they are coextensive, since the limit of one is the limit of the other, forms and true emptiness together constitute a "dharma of one taste" (i-wei fa(ae)). Tu-shun ends his treatment of the first general discernment by eloquently insisting that finally it eludes even his own attempts to verbalize it (tzu yu i pu-shou(af)) and by cautioning that the correct explanation of the identity of forms and true emptiness may be achieved only while striving toward the "realm of practice" (hsing-ching(ag)), at the entrance to which, paradoxically, it must be relinquished (jo shou chieh pu-she wu i ju tzu cheng-hsing(ah)). Up to this point Tu-shun's exposition, though a model of accurate brevity, contains nothing new. It is a recapitulation of certain fundamental insights of Mahaayaana drawn largely, it would seem, from the Perfection of Insight (Praj~naapaaramitaa) tradition as refined in the alembic of Maadhyamika analysis. To be sure, this in itself represents a considerable advance over the obscured vision of `Suunyavaada achieved, for example, by most of those Chinese Buddhists of the fourth and early fifth centuries who concerned themselves with the P122 problem. In Tu-shun's work the lineaments of a correct `Suunyavaada are lucidly "discerned,'' and his understanding of it would hardly deserve an epithet such as "hybrid Buddhism," which has, with some justice. been applied to those earlier efforts.(19) Certainly it is free of such mitigating conceptual preoccupations as those drawn by the earlier Chinese dispensation from Arcane Learning (hsuan-hsueh(ai)) or Taoism. In short. the content of the Kuan-men's first set of discernments is imitative but authoritative. The second major division of the work, entitled "Discernment of the Mutual Nonobstruction of Principle and Phenomena'' (li shih wu-ai kuan(aj)) is quite different. It initiates in the text a significant departure from traditionally Indian forms of conceptualization and expression and provides us with the first instance of the phenomenon which is our underlying theoretical concern--transition to a more kataphatic mode of discourse. The first thing one notices about this section of the Kuan-men is its introduction of a new nomenclature. Rather than continue to dwell on emptiness, forms. and their ineffable identity, Tu-shun here treats of principle (li(ak) ) and phenomena (shih(al)) and of the variety of relations that may obtain between them--their fusion (yung-yung(am) ), their coincidence versus their reciprocal effacement (ts'un-wang(an)), and their discord versus their concord (ni-shun(ao) ). He specified ten such relations: 1. Principle pervades phenomena (li pien-yu shih(ap)) 2. Each phenomenon pervades principle (shih pien-yu li(aq)) 3. Phenomena are formed by principle (i li ch'eng shih(ar)) 4. Phenomena can reveal principle (shih neng hsien li(as)) 5. Phenomena are sublated by principle (i li tuo shih(at)) 6. Phenomena can conceal principle (shih neng yin li(au)) 7. True principle is identical with phenomena (chen-li chi shih(av)) 8. Each phenomenon is identical with principle (shih-fa chi li(aw)) 9. True princi is not a phenomenon (chen li fei shih(ax)) 10. Phenomena are not principle (shih-fa fei li(ay)) We should note that Tu-shun has made the second of these ten subsections longer than the other nine put together. thereby indicating that it is the crux of this major discernment. What is the significance of this change in nomenclature? What is gained in choosing to speak of principle rather than emptiness, of phenomena rather than forms, and of fusion, pervasion, et cetera rather than only identity and nonidentity? If principle is simply a synonym of emptiness and if phenomena are simply dharmas by another name, then little indeed would seem to have been gained. Of course, it is to be noted that the terms li and shih are free of the sort of technical, Indian Buddhist associations that bind words like k'ung, se, and fa. To this extent their introduction into the text may be partially an attempt at freer translation into a more idiomatic Chinese. However, the terms li and shih are not mere idioms; they bear their own burden of accumulated meaning. P123 Their use would suggest. therefore, that the transition from the first to the second discernment is not merely formal. It involves not only substitution of terminology but also a deeper conceptual change, a new level, and manner of discourse. The terms li and shih, especially the former, have a history of reflective use in earlier Chinese thought far too long and intricate for us to summarize here.(20) Even if a summary were feasible, it would still be left to us to guess how much of their complex semantic history Tu-shun had in mind when he chose to adopt these terms. Our only reasonable recourse, then, is to look to the text itself with the aid of its commentaries. The earliest commentator and fourth patriarch of Hua-yen. Ch'eng-kuan(az) (738-839? ) . provides several possible reasons for the substitution of li and shih for k'ung and se. First, because the whole of the first discernment--that of the identity of k'ung and se--serves to do no more than clarify an abstract proposition or principle (li(ak)), namely, that the "true emptiness consists in the nonobstruction of emptiness and forms" (se k'ung wu-ai wei chen-k'ung(ba)). Second, although the statement of this principle in the older terminology does succeed in clarifying the truth of emptiness. it also has the disadvantage of tending to neglect or diminish the concretely real. In the words of Ch'eng-kuan, "it does not manifest the marvelous actuality of suchness" (wei-hsien chen-ju chih miao-yu(bb)). Third, the insistence on the identity of k'ung and se is seen as making too much of an ineffability which our commentator fears would ultimately "extinguish both principle and phenomena" (wang li shih(bc)). Finally, the older concepts are held to be inadequate to the breadth of their own vision because they "will not broadly display the marks of nonobstruction" (pu-kuang-hsien wu-ai chih hsiang(bd)).(21) Tsung-mi(be) (780-841), the fifth patriarch, offers essentially the same reasons.(22) A still later commentator. the Sung monk Pen-sung, (bf) adds that the first discernment "merely inveighs against delusion and discloses a principle" (tan-shih chien ch'ing hsien li(bg)): it is pure but useless. "like refined gold which is yet to be fashioned into an instrument and used" (ju chin-k'ung wei-wei ch'i yung(bh)).(23) Each of these three commentators makes essentially the same point--that the principle of true emptiness, even when it is properly discerned as "the coalescence of forms and their reversion to emptiness" (hui se kuei k'ung(bi)), offers a rather barren spiritual prospect. However carefully it may be distinguished from annihilationism (ucchedavaada, tuan(bj)), discourse in terms of emptiness and forms seems still to dissolve the world of practical experience and to derogate its variety. In the strong light of emptiness, the world of forms seems pallid and featureless; its particularities evanesce. In other words, while the cognitive import of true emptiness is certainly not nihilistic, Tu-shun and his commentators think that its conative and practical force, just as certainly, is. The consequences of this for the Mahaayaana Buddhist might well be dire. Emptiness can easily become a dispiriting intellectual barrier (j~neyaavarana, chih-chang(bk) to his further progress on the bodhisattva path. Of course, classical P124 Indian Mahaayaana also recognizes this danger and, in its own terms, compensates for it. The fourth of the six perfections, forbearance (k.saanti; jen(bl)), has to do especially with enabling the bodhisattva to cope with the daunting prospect of emptiness and with its corollary, the fact of "unarisen dharmas'' (anutpattika-dharma) ; wu-sheng-fa(bm)).(24) Only if he is able, so to speak, to "tolerate" its emptiness, can a bodhisattva hope to act successfully in the world, for the weal of sentient beings? Tu-shun's own preliminary recognition of this same problem is found at the end of the Kuan-men's first section, where it is urged that the understanding of emptiness and the explanation of its relation to forms should not inhibit or replace practice. In fact, as we have seen, practice is declared the only possible context for correct understanding of emptiness. However, even when one takes into account all of the corrective devices already built into `Suunyavaada. it appears that Tu-shun is still concerned that it might remain "like a badly grasped snake or a flawed incantation which can ruin a slow-witted person." He is intent upon removing even the conceptual and verbal "near occasions" of its misuse.(25) In contrast then with the first discernment, the second--of the nonobstruction of principle and phenomena--offers a quite abundant and heartening spiritual prospect. In its conative as well as its cognitive significance it avoids the negativism suggested by the terms ''emptiness" and "forms," and thereby permits a more affirmative comprehension of the diversity of experience. The ''phenomena" of this second discernment are things and events themselves. They are to be distinguished from "forms" precisely because a form (ruupa) is not so much a thing or an event in itself as it is one of the finite number of constituents of things and events. Ruupa, in other words, is a dharma; a shih need not be only a dharma.(26) One might describe the transition from ruupa to shih as follows: Ruupa are dharmas. Dharmas--like the five skandha, the twelve aayatana, or the eighteen dhaatu--are the subpersonal components of all that exists or is dependently originated. Because they are subpersonal certain early traditions of Buddhism, in respect of the anaatman doctrine, regarded dharmas as somehow more real than the things and events they comprise. Dharmas were judged by some to be ultimately real (paramaartha) ; the things they comprise only conventionally (sa^mv.rti) so. Mahaayaana Buddhism showed, however, that such dharmic components are as empty of own-being as is anything else; dharmas too "lack selves" (dharma-nairatmya) and thus do not exist as discrete entities. The classical dharma-theory had been developed, primarily in the Abhidharma traditions, as an explanation of the fundamental doctrines of dependent origination, impermanence, and no-self. However, if dharmas themselves may be shown to be empty, then the dharma-theory loses any exclusive claim it may once have had to definitive explanatory or illustrative power. The way is then clear for the formulation of new explanatory models of those doctrines, new theories or conceptual expressions of the teaching of no-self and its corollaries. The concept of phenomenal emptiness, as opposed to dharmic P125 emptinless, is one such alternative to the earlier dharma-theory, What, after all, is the advantage of continuing to be mindful of dharmas rather than of the things and events which dharmas had been thought to comprise? What advantage is there in discriminating subtle instances of svabhaava-`suunyataa instead of crude and more obvious instances of that same truth? Both kinds are equally empty. On the other hand, the Kuan-men and its commentaries do suggest that there may be some positive advantages found in reversing the priority that is in focusing on the more obvious rather than the subtler embodiments of emptiness. Consider the difference between a world composed of dharmas like form, feeling (vedanaa), idea (sa^mj~naa), contact (spar`sa). et cetera and a world composed of objects and activities of everyday experience that have deliberately not been shattered or reduced to their component dharmas. Surely the latter is more readily at hand, equally "empty, " and--most significantly--better suited to the task, emphasized by Ch'eng-kuan, of "manifesting the marvelous actuality of suchness." This last, as we shall see, was a task most appealing to Chinese Buddhists. As shih is not the exact equivalent of dharma or ruupa, so li is not the exact equivalent of `suunyataa Neither, however, is it a denial of `suunyataa. Emptiness, as it was described in the first discernment, is one member of a propositional relation between forms and itself. This holds true regardless of the nature of that relation, even if it be the ineffable or indeterminable one of neither identity nor nonidentity. Li, by contrast, subsumes that relation, and with it, both of its members. Li is not so much the principle of emptiness as it is the principle that all particulars are empty. This distinction, between a nominative and a propositional function, is difficult to clarify. It is a modal, not an essential, difference. Admittedly, great care was taken in the first discernment to show that emptiness too is not of the same order as particulars, that it is not a "thing;" to see it otherwise would be to adopt one of the "misconceived views" of emptiness which were there refuted. Nonetheless, for Tu-shun the term li still marks an advance over the term `suunyataa precisely because it makes that difference of order or mode all the more clear. Principles have noetic, not ontic, significance. They suggest regularity and truth but do not imply either substantive existence or its opposite, nonexistence. They seem proof, therefore, against the common ontological misinterpretations to which an abstract, nominative locution like emptiness is subject because their primary function is not so much to designate or to advert as it is to establish rules by which such activities as designation, and any number of others, may proceed. Justice, for example. is admitted to be a "principle" governing many political endeavors, yet in our attempts to understand or effect justice we are not normally led to seek a particular "thing" called justice, unless it be a "thing" in a suppositional "third world."(27) Nor are we moved to deny justice simply because no such "entity" is to be found. So too with the principle that all is empty or indeterminable. It clearly does not prompt a search for an ontological something (even an ineffable something) P126 called "emptiness" or "the indeterminate." The "principle that all particulars are empty" is not the designation of one or the only member of a class of real things that exist in some supersensible realm beyond the realm of particulars. If we may counterfeit a phrase, "principle." in Hua-yen usage, is always "principle-that" rather than "principle-of." Such a principle establishes the rules for successful engagement with particulars: it is certainly not an alternative to particulars. As another of Tu-shun's progeny, Fa-tsang(bn) (643-712), was to say of the Buddhist notion of "substance (t'i(bo) ) . so we might say of principle-that "it is not something produced by productive cause; rather it is something illuminated by illuminative causes" (fei sheng-yin chih suo-sheng wei liao-yin chih suo-liao(bp)).(28) Like the new concepts themselves, the variety of nonobstructive interrelations between li and shih also offers a contrast to the first discernment. Whereas the mutual nonobstruction of emptiness and forms amounts to but the one relation of identity (chi(bq) ) Or nondifference (pu-i(br) ) , the nonobstruction of principle and phenomena assumes no less than ten specific forms. In addition to being identical with each other. the two also simultaneously pervade, constitute. reveal. conceal, and cancel each other. Further, these relations occur not only between principle and the totality of phenomena but also between principle and each phenomenon. Herein lies the comparative abundance of the second discernment. In its new conceptual expression, the truth of indeterminability has become multifaceted and may now be appreciated from a liberal variety of perspectives, each complementing the others. This has fruitful consequences as well for the practice of Buddhism because the practitioner now has a more diverse repetoireof themes for contemplation than the first discernment had offered him. However, before we can fully understand the second discernment we have still to determine what it really means to say. for example, that "each phenomenon pervades principle." If phenomena are not the dharmas of traditional Buddhism but are instead the empirically available things and events of this world, and if principle is simply the principle that these things and events are indeterminable, then what possible sense can it make to say that the one pervades the other? Tu-shun was obviously aware of this problem since he included in his exposition several questions like: "If principle in its totality pervades a single mote of dust, why is it not small?" (li chi ch'uan-t'i pien i-ch'en ho-ku fei hsiao(bs)) and "If a single mote of dust completely encloses the nature of principle, why is it not large?" (i-ch'en ch'uan-yu li-hsing ho-ku fei ta(bt)). In other words, one is initially puzzled to know if and how qualities like size, which are perfectly suited to physical particulars like motes of dust, can be ascribed to principle. How can a principle be either large or small, except in the most figurative sense? And yet how can it not be one or the other if it is said to be pervaded by phenomena? The assertion that phenomena pervade principle would seem then to involve what certain modern Western philosophers P127 have called a category mistake.(29) A phenomenon, in common parlance. is a "thing" or an "object of experience." Principle, as we have seen, is actually a proposition. How can one say that a thing "pervades" a proposition or vice versa? The terms of this statement seem incompatible because they inhabit different categories of use. Would not such a sentence be of the same sort as the statement that "Saturday is an amphibious biped''? Our languages do not normally permit us to link such subjects with such predicates. What special warrant then does Tu-shun have for linking them in the Kuan-men? His warrant, I would suggest, is a strong one and is derived from the earlist teachings of Buddhism. Tu-shun is justified in violating our normal categories of linguistic usage precisely because the destruction and replacement of such categories is the very purpose for which he composed the Kuan-men. To Buddhists, after all, unlike certain Wittgensteinians, our normal language categories have no inherent authority. They are not inalienable "forms of life;" they are merely part of the equipment of ignorance with which all men are endowed. Therefore. when one succeeds despite such categories in discerning that phenomenon pervades principle, one has actually revised his estimation of phenomena radically. One has done so, to be specific, by freeing himself of the constraints imposed by conventional language. Phenomena are no longer simply discrete, opaque elements of experience of the sort that fit comfortably into the categories of speech. Rather. each has become also an emblem of Buddhist truth. All particulars, Tu-shun insists, are not only indeterminable; they also exemplify the truth of indeterminability. Thus the Kuan-men can say that because a phenomenon embraces principle, "the phenomenon is emptied and principle is solidified" (shih hsu erh li shih(bu)); because the phenomenon is emptied, "the principle within the whole of it is distinctly manifest'' (ch'uan shih chung chih li t'ing-jan lu-hsien(bv)). In other words, a particular thing or event is dependently originated or empty of own-being and precisely thereby is--at least analogically--"filled" with-the principle that all particulars are empty. Phenomena, in fewer words, instantiate principle. This, of course, is by no means to be construed as a kind of monism in which all plurality and particularity is swallowed up in principle. The phenomenal world, the world of religious practice especially, is not deprived of its rich diversity because. as the Kuan-men also says, "although the totality [of phenomena] is wholely principle, yet the marks of phenomena are as distinct as ever" (chu t'i ch'uan li erh shih-hsiang yuan-jan(bw)). One might maintain, then, that the discernment that each phenomenon pervades: principle involves not a category mistake, but a category revision. Things as such may be categorially incompatible with propositions, but it is not at all clear that the same may be said of the relation between emblematic, revelatory things and propositions, Despite their differences, both perform the function of signifying or revealing. In fact, the principle that all is indeterminable must be compatible with any particular phenomenon that signifies that same truth; they actually share a common P128 identity. The principle or proposition is the "meaning" of the significant phenomenon, and the phenomenon is essentially a particular expression or vehicle of the principle. Tu-shun expressed this point in typically laconic Buddhist fashion when, in answer to the question quoted above about dust motes, he said, "principle and phenomena, when compared, are each neither identical nor different" (li shih hsiang-wang ko fei i i(bx)). This then is the primary significance of the second major discernment. Its regnant concepts, li and shih, are new and unheralded in the Indian Mahaayaana tradition, yet they do not contradict the fundamental Mahaayaana tenet of the emptiness of all dharmas. Rather, they amplify it; they render explicit certain consequences and applications of that teaching which had been left largely implicit in its classical Praj~naapaaramitaa and early Maadhyamika formulations.(30) The term li reveals the true modal status of the concept of emptiness or indeterminability more clearly than did the word `suunyataa and without its negative collative impact. The Chinese word is freer of substantive ontological con-notations and thereby is better able to show that emptiness is neither the name of a metaphysical entity nor the designation of nothingness; rather, it has the form and function of a regulative principle. The term shih, on the other hand, offers an alternative to the dharma theory which had found its way into early Mahaayaana via Abhidharma. Shih is the term designating all particular elements of the world of experience in their immediately empirical forms and is not limited in its application to the seventy-three, or however many, subpersonal dharmic constituents of those phenomena. This alternative, in turn, liberates one to discern the truth of emptiness and indeterminability "writ large," to see it as it operates in the realm of conventional experience and not only as it occurs in the rarefied dharmic realm. Finally, the assertion that li and shih are mutually nonobstructive has the culminating effect of validating and enhancing the worth of the phenomenal world. This it can do because it shows that each phenomenon is not only a thing or event but is also an emblematic instance of the most valuable of Buddhist truths. Once even these points are made, however, there remains to be treated one final step in the process of change from an apophatic to a kataphatic mode of discourse that is epitomized in the development of the Kuan-men. This last step is taken with the introduction of the third and final major division of the text---the "Discernment of Total Pervasion and Accomodation" (chou-pien han-jung kuan(by)). Like the preceding this section too is divided into ten specific discernments: 1. Principle as phenomena (li ju shih(bz)) 2. Phenomena as principle (shih ju li(ca)) 3. Each phenomenon subsumes the mutual nonobstruction of principle and phenomena (shih han li-shih-wu-ai(cb)) 4. The diffuse and the local are mutually non-obstructiveive (pien chu wu-ai(cc)) P129 5. The broad and the narrow are mutually non-obstructive (kuang hsia wu-ai(cd)) 6. Pervading and including are mutually non-obstructive (pien jung wu-ai(ce)) 7. Containing and entering are mutually non-obstructive (she ju wu-ai(cf)) 8. Interpenetration is without obstruction (chiao-she wu-ai(cg)) 9. Coexistence is without obstruction (hsiang-tsai wu-ai(ch)) 10. Universal interfusion is without obstruction (p'u-yung wu-ai(ci)) One notices immediately that, unlike the second, this third discernment introduces no fundamentally new terminology. There are, it is true, several terms that were not used earlier in the work like "broad and narrow," "containing and entering," but these are clearly just complements to the basic operative concepts of phenomena, principle, and nonobstruction. Wherein, then, lies the conceptual difference between the second and the third discernment? The text seems to provide a clue in the fact that while most of the ten specific discernments listed earlier obviously overlap in significance, one among them stands out as quite distinct in form and substance. This is the third--the discernment that each phenomenon subsumes the mutual nonobstruction of principle and phenomena. The crucial insight expressed here is both simple and profound. It is simple because it follows: necessarily, almost obviously, from premises established earlier in the work. It is profound in that it marks the ultimate point reached in the Kuan-men's conceptual developmentof the emptiness teaching. Essentially, the conceptual change undertaken at this point consists in a shift of the primary focus of meditative attention away from principle and toward phenomena. The second discernment, as we have said, had the intention of validating and enhancing the phenomenal world by showing that phenomena are not merely the mute things and events in which we are enmeshed by reason of our ignorance and craving. Rather they are all eloquently significant, charged with meaning by the liberating principle that all things are indeterminable. A particular phenomenon, after all, is above all else an instance of that truth. Up to this point, which is as far as the second discernment takes us, the enhanced status of the phenomenal appears to be a conferred status. Phenomena are endowed with value by principle and it is to principle that we must credit the "marvel" (miao(cj)) of their "existence" (yu(ck)). However, if it is discernible that phenomena are "pervaded" or "filled" with principle, then it should also be clear that one may justifiably dispense with principle-as-such as an autonomous meditative notion. This, in fact, is exactly what happens in the Kuan-men. After the third specific discernment (the third subdivision of the third major section), the term li is dropped. Phenomena are hence perceived as quite sufficient unto themselves. Their validation is no longer something conferred upon them by virtue of their relation with principle; is inherent. Phenomena. P130 then, are self-validating and what we are offered in this third general discernment of our text is actually a vision of the aseity of particular things. Once this is appreciated it will be difficult to continue to speak, as is still often done, of phenomena having their "ground" in the "absolute" or of their being "supported" by the "one reality.'' This is not even the general Mahaayaana claim, much less the claim of Hua-yen. Phenomena are seen in Hua-yen to depend on no ultimate reality but their own for the wonder of their presence. They have no noumenal base; they are their own "ground" and "support." A problem arises here, however. Is not this extraordinarily high estimation of phenomena a reversion to the ignorant view that things possess substantial own-being and are therefore independently originated? I think not. The aseity ascribed to any one phenomenon by the Kuan-men consists precisely in that phenomenon's radical interrelatedness with all other phenomena. Phenomena are not independent of each other; they possess svabhaava. They are independent only of any absolute, unitary reality conceived of as undergirding or supporting them, as somehow more real than they. A contemporary Western philosopher of religion has recently defined religion as "one's way of valuing most intensively and comprehensively."(31) In terms of this quite useful definition, the final discernment. of the Kuan-men allows the Hua-yen Buddhist to regard the phenomenal world in all of its variety, not as a place to be fled, but as the very arena of his religious practice. He need not deny or depart from the richness of "this world" in order to pursue release because each and every phenomenal element of of "this world" becomes a source and an object of intensive and comprehensive religious value.(32) There is, however, an even more profound consequence of the climactic insight that each phenomenon subsumes the mutual nonobstruction of principle and phenomena. If principle and phenomena were first seen as interfused and if each phenomenon is now seen as comprehending their very interfusion, then each phenomenon also somehow comprehends or implicates all other phenomena. We have finally a vision, not only of the aseity of particular things, but also of their total repletion. According to this vision, the emptiness of things is shown actually to entail their plenitude. The Kuan-men itself states the progression in resolutely simple terms: First "one is in one" (i chung i(cl)), then "one is in all" (i-ch'ieh chung i(cm)), then "all are in one" (i chung i-ch'ieh(cn)), and finally "ail are in all" (i-ch'ieh chung i-ch'ieh(co)). The first of these steps corresponds to the commonsense principle of identity which seems, hut is not really, in violation of the anaatman doctrine. The second expresses the Kuan-men's "reversion of forms to emptiness." The third is synonymous with its "pervasion of principle by each phenomenon." The last is obviously the culminating discernment of "total pervasion and accommodation.'' The first three of these, it should be noted, are implicit in the fourth. Other Hua-yen texts will wax more lyrical and compare the world of total pervasion and accommodation, the world of "all in all," to Indra's net, at each knot of which P131 is placed a jewel so faceted as to be able to reflect not only the whole net but also each and every other jewel in the net, each of which in turn does the same, ad infinitum. Considering that all of this begun in an appreciation of emptiness, the Kuan-men would seem indeed to bear out Naagaarjuna's dictum that "all is fitting for him to whom emptiness is fitting" (Sarva^m ca yujyate tasya `suumyataa yasya yujyate).(33) In their most general and least technically theological senses the terms apophasis and kataphasis mean, respectively, discourse which proceeds by negations and discourse which proceeds by affirmations.(34) It is the Maadhyamika's apophatic view of language, prefigured in the early Praj~napaaramitaa literature, that only negative locutions can be of definitive meaning (niitaartha) and ultimate truth (paramaartha). Any attempt to positively characterize reality --if made on the expectation that by so doing one will have verbally or conceptually "captured" the truth of things--is bound to fail and, worse, may generate new and more virulent species of error. All positive locutions therefore are, if not false, merely of conventional (sa^mv.rti) truth.(35) On such principles it would follow that the only legitimate employment of language that is: to be credited with definitive meaning is finally that of reflexive denial. We may speak only in order to command silence; we may use language only in order to disabuse ourselves and others of the error implicit in language. The kataphasis of Tu-shun and of other varieties of Mahaayaana alternative to `Suunyavaada not a simpleminded and complete rejection of Naagaarjuna's sound distrust of word and concept. Neither Tu-shun, nor the authors of the Madhyaantvibhaaga and Sa^mdhinirmocanasuutra, nor most Tathaagatagarbha thinkers believed,(36) for example, that there are positive locutions and conceptualizations which can provide accurate, descriptive purechase on the utter reality of things. None have reverted to an ignorant confidence in the referential capacity of language. However, both Tu-shun and these other Mahaayaana thinkers did hold that there are certain positive and affirmative uses of language which may perform salvifically necessary tasks that negation cannot perform, and which may even be better than denial and apophasis at those very tasks of dissolving error and destroying false views that Naagaarjuna had assigned only to denial and negation. It is this very claim that Tu-shun has made in his ascent through the three levels of discernment that comprise the Kuan-men. The emerging pattern within that work is one of the substitution of relatively kataphatic terms and propositions for relatively apophatic ones, for example, "principle" for "emptiness," "phenomena" for "material form," "universal interfusion of particulars" for "coalescence of forms and their reversion to emptiness." As Tu-shun describes the uses to which these new concepts are put, we see it claimed for them that they can do all that the terms of `Suunyavaada apophasis can do in the destruction of error as well as something that `Suunyavaada itself cannot do, namely, thwart the potentially nihilistic conative impact of the emptiness P132 teaching and encourage appreciation of the infinite value of particular things. Moreover, it can do these things without falling victim to the error of undisciplined kataphasis. These discernments of Tu-shun's, it must be recalled, are instruments of meditation. It is surely not the purpose of any form of Buddhist meditation simply to construct conceptual models of the world, nor are the kataphatic locutions of Hua-yen the components of such constructions. Quite to the contrary, their ultimate aim is to disabuse the meditator of his attachment to any and all concepts. Liberation, after all, is "inconceivable" (acintya; pu-ssu-i(cp) ) . However, it is the attachment and not the concepts that one must be rid of. That very process of conceptual disenchantment, so felicitiously described by Buddhists as a "rinsing" (hsi-ch'u(cq) ) of the mind in "the waters of insight" (chih-shui(cr) ) (37) is in fact a homeopathic therapy. Cure of conceptual illness requires precisely the expedient and disciplined use of well-chosen conceptual remedies. The "principle," "phenomena," and "nonobstruction" which comprise the Kuan-men's "discernments" are such remedial instruments. They are to be used, by collected and one-pointed minds, without attachment, and are particularly designed so as not to occasion or incite attachment. Consider how difficult it would be, even in practical terms, to focus one's tendencies toward conceptual attachment on Tu-shun's notions of "principle" or "phenomena." Their "mutual nonobstruction," by denying the mind any static point of focus, stifles the impulse to attach one's mind to them. Their "interpenetration" results in a continuous, kaleidoscopic shifting of intellectual focus--from "the diffuse" to "the local," from "the broad" to "the narrow, " from "pervading" to "including," et cetera. The mind is never given the opportunity to make hard and false discriminations, nor is it allowed to dwell in or depend upon any one perspective on any discrete object. These meditative concepts and the rather special sort of analysis they permit are to be sharply distinguished from conventional concepts--from notions like selfhood, permanence, cause and effect, and the like--wihch Buddhists are wont to call vikalpa (fen-pieh(cs) or ssu-wei(ct)) or sa^mj~naa (hsiang(cu)). Conventional concepts are regarded by Mahaayaana Buddhists as the flawed instruments of unstilled minds and they are thought to be too readily susceptible to dangerous misuse. First of all, they imply false discriminations and are therfore held simply to be in error. But, even more serious is the assumed likelihood of their becoming mental fixations, objects of a kind of intellectual craving that is far more difficult to extinguish than mere emotional craving. Such concepts as are used in meditative discernment, however, are not at all the deceptively safe harbors or lulling abodes of thought wich the Buddhists, in their "homeless" (aniketa; wu-chu(cv)) wisdom, must avoid. Tu-shun's concepts of principle and phenomena are varieties of "correct concept" (samyaksa^mkalpa, cheng-ssu-wei(cw)) or of "notion associated with insight" (praj~naasa^mprayuktasa^mj~naa; chih-hui hsiang-ying hsiang(cx) ) .(33) Their validity is a function especially of the sort of use to which they can be put. They are not used, as conventional vikalpa or sa^mj~naa are, in such spiritually P133 inexpedient activities as differentiation or dichotomous discrimination. They produce instead, as we have seen, visions of coalescence and mutual permeability. They are so defined as to actually "disarm" themselves, as they are being used, of the snares of craving and delusion with which conventional concepts are equipped. In their perpetual and total commutability li and shih offer no sedative dwelling place for the mind. They therefore do not tether the mind to ignorant views but propel it further along its liberating course. A host of problems have been left untouched in our consideration of the Kuan-men, notable among them the question of whether Tu-shun's preference for kataphasis is an expression of Chinese values, an organic development within Mahaayaana, or both. We have also not explored the relation of the Kuan-men to the Hua-yen p'an chiao system. We hope, however, that we have at least shown Tu-shun's appreciation of the value of positive and affirmative language to be a worthy and no less Mahaayaanist alternative to Naagaarjuna's unrelenting nay-saying. NOTES 1. I do not assume that these two works are typical of Naagaarjuna's thought in general. A consideration of all works validly attributable to him might yield a quite different picture of Naagaarjuna's Buddhism. See, for example. D. S. Ruegg, "Le Dharmadhaatustava de Naagaarjuna," in Etudes tibetaines dediees a la memoire de Marcelle Lalou (Paris: Adrien Maisonneuve, 1971) . pp. 448-471. 2. T. R. V. Murit, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1955). 3. Kenneth K. Inada, trans., Naagaarjuna: A translation of His Muulamadhyamakakaarikaa with an Introductory Essay (Tokyo: Hokuseido, 1970), p. 3. 4. Bimal K. Matilal, Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis. Janua Linguarum, Series Minor, III (The Hague: Mouton, 1971), p. 146. 5. One is reminded, for example, of the comment of Edward Conze, a partisan of the less complex forms of Mahaayaana, about a key doctrine of Yogaacaara He called the aalayavij~naana doctrine "a conceptual monstrosity." See Edward Conze. Buddhist Thought in In.dia (London. Allen and Unwin, 1962), p. 133. 6. Nagao Gadjin, ed., Madhyaantavibhaaga-Bhaa.sya (Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1964), p. 17 and T1599: 31.451a15-17. The Chinese is Paramaartha's version. 7. Ibid., p. 18 and T1599:31.45a25-26. 8. T675:16.697a28-b9. 9. David Seyfort Ruegg. La theorie du Tathaagatagarbha et du Gotra (Paris: EFEO, 1969); and several other publications. 10. Jikido Takasaki, A Study of the Ratnagotravibhaaga (Uttaratantra), Being a Treatise on The Tathaagatagarbha Theory (Rome: ISMEO, 1966). 11. Alex and Hideko Wayman. trans., The Lion's Roar of Queen Srimala (New York: Columbia, University Press. 1974). 12. T353:12.221c16-18 and T1666:32.576a24-26. 13. T353:12.222a4-b3. 14. T1867:45.509a24-513c18. P134 15. T1878:45.652b12-654a28. The authenticity of this text is much disputed but in an as yet unpublished study I have found reason to accept its attribution at least to Tu-shun's period, if not to him. 16. Principal biography: T2060:50.653b15-654a13. 17. Robinson's description of emptiness as "a surd within a system of constructs" seems apt here. See Richard H. Robinson, Early Maadhyamika in India and China (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967) , p. 49. See also Bimal K. Matilal, Epistemology, Logic. and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis. Janua Linguarum, Series Minor, III (The Hague: Mouton, 1971), pp. 146-167. On the logical problem of reflexive negation see Robert L. Martin, ed., The Paradox of the Liar (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1970). 18. Muulamadhyamikakaarikaa, 25: 11; T1564:30.32a. 19. Eric Zurcher, The Buddhist Conquest of China, 2d ed., Sinica Leidensia, Vol. II (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972), 1: 12. One could argue as Robinson does (Early Maadhyamika, pp. 123-144), that there were exceptions to the rule of hybridization, Seng-chao (374-414) being a most notable example. But he is notable precisely because he is so exceptional. 20. Attempts at such summaries have been made, for example, Wing-tsit Chan, "The Evolution of the Neo-Confucian Concept Li as Principle." Tsing Hun Journal of Chinese Studies, NS4 (1 964): 123-148, and Paul Demieville, "La penetration du bouddhisme dans la tradition philosophique chinoise," Cahiers d'histoire mondiale 3 (1956): 28--31, but neither of these treats of the word's evolution during the fifth and sixth centuries which is the time-span most pertinent to Hua-yen usage. The most useful study of this problem that I have yet seen is Kaginushi Ryokei(cy), Kegon kyogaku josetsu: shinnyo to shinri no kenkyuu(cz) (Kyoto: Bungakudo shoten, 1968), especially pp. 182-213 in which the author examines the use of the term li in the Chu Wei-mo-ching(da) , in the translations of Paraamaartha(db) (d.569), and in the writings of Hui-yuan(dc) of the Ching-ying temple(dd) (523--92). 21. Hua-yen fa-chieh hsuan-ching(de), ch. 1, T1883:45.676a13-6. 22. Chu Hua-yen fa-chieh kuan-men(df), T1884:45.687b6-8. 23. Hua-yen ch'i-tzu-ching-t'i fa-chieh kuan san-shih-men sung(dg), T1885:45.701a13-4. According to the introductory remarks to this work (T1885:45.692c12--21), It was written in K'ai-feng in 1088 at the request of a group of eminent laymen. It is regarded as an explanation from the meditative perspective (hsien-ch'u ch'an-men yen-mu(dh)). 24. Anutpattikadharmak.saanti, the tolerance of the truth that "all dharmas are originally unborn" (i-ch'ieh fa pen-lai wu-sheng(di) ) , is an accomplishment of the bodhisattba who has advanced to the eighth or "Immovable" (Acalaa; pu-tung(dj)) stage of his career. It is a faculty which allows him to avoid the mental distraction and dismay that a preoccupation with emptiness can engender. For a full account of it see chuan 10 of Vasubandhu's Da`sanhuumivyakhyaana (Shih-ti ching-lun(dk) ) (T1522: 26.179 c). That veritable encyclopedia of Mahaayaana, the Ta-chih-tu lun(dl), also offers a brief but apt explanation of the closely related concept of dharmak.saanti: "BY the power of wisdom one variously perceives that among all dharmas there is not one that can be grasped. To patiently accept this teaching. without doubt or dismay (pu-i pu-hui(dm) ) ---this is call dharmak.saanti(fu-jen(dn)." (T1509:25.171c18-20). 25. Muulamadhyamikakaarikaa, 25:11,T1564:30.33a9. 26. It is true that the Kuan-men does occasionally use the compound shih-fa(do), but this seems in most cases to be for the purpose of balanced construction. In any case the distinction between shih and fa may still be maintained by admitting that while fa may also be shih, not all shih are fa, In other words, the category of shih may be regarded as both broader than and inclusive of the category of fa. Among shih we find both commonsense things and events and dharmas, but the former farout-number the latter. The Sarvaastivaada Abhidharma, for example, lists only seventy-two sa^msk.rta dharmas; the Vij~naanavaada of Hsuan-tsang only ninety-four. The term dharma is here used in only one of its many senses. 27. I have in mind here, for example, the "third world" of Karl Popper, which he defines as "the world of intelligibles, one of ideas in the objective sense...the world of posible objects of thought, the world of theories in themselves...." See Karl Popper, Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach (London: OXford University Press, 1972), pp. 154 passim. 28. Hsiu Hua-yen ao-chih wang-chin huan-yuan kuan(dp) (T1876: 45.637b15-16). Fa-tsang is here dating the notion of the "substance of suchness" (chen-ju chih-ti(dq) from the Ta-ch'eng P135 ch'i-hsin lun(dr) (T1666:32.579a12-20). For a useful comparison of this work of Fa-tsang with the Kuan-men itself see Kamata Shigeo(ds), Chuugoku Bukkyo shisoshi kenk yu(dt) (Tokyo:Shunjusha, 1969), pp. 357-379. 29. See Gilbert Ryle, "Categories, '' in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 38 (1937):189-206. This is his initial statement of the idea. It proved very influential in modern British philosophy, and Ryle developed it further in several of his later works. 30. This, of course, is not to say that analogous developments from the emptiness teaching were not to be found in other and later traditions of Indian Mahaayaana. We do find them. for example. in Yogaacaara and Tathaagatagarbha thought, and these traditions did influence Hua-yen. But in the Kuan-men itself they play only a relatively minor role. 31. Frederick Ferre, "The Definition of Religion, " Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 38 (1970):11. 32. Recently another Western philosopher has noted elsewhere in Buddhism this same sense of the value of life in the world: "When the distinction between the sa^msaara world, the perpetual cycle of rebirth, and Nirvaa.na is collapsed, our daily life is stained with religious significance. The entirety of life is religious, rather than a restricted portion of it reserved for ritual and specific observances marked out as 'religious.' Everything we do becomes a religious act, even...eating and sleeping." Arthur C. Danto, Mysticism and Morality: Oriental Thought and Moral Philosophy (New York: Basic Books, 1972), p. 80. 33. Muulamadhyamikakaarikaa, 25:11:T1564:30.32a. 34. The two terms derive originally from the theology of Pseudo-Dionysisius. For a useful disscussion of them see Vladimir Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church (London: James Clarke & Co., 1957), pp. 25-43. 35. Frederick Streng (''The Significance of Pratiityasamutpaada for Understanding the Relationship between Sa^mv.rti and Paramaartha in Naagaarjuna," in The Problem of Two Truths. Mervyn Sprung, ed. [Dordrecht: Reidel, 1974], pp. 27-39) has recently described Naagaarjuna's view of the two truths in such a way as to suggest that my use of the word "merely" as a qualifier to sa^mv.rti is illegitimate. This, of course, is an issue worthy of separate consideration and we have not the space for it here, but suffice it to say that while it is true that Naagaarjuna does not really subordinate sa^mv.rti to paramaartha and though he deems both necessary, nevertheless he leaves much unsaid about the kind of truth sa^mv.rti is. How, for example, does it differ from conventional untruth? How does one account for its practical efficacy (upaaya). if from the ultimate perspective it is untrue? In view of these and similar problems I hesitate to agree that the notion of sa^mv.rti offers relief from the relentless apophasis of Maadhyamika. 36. Professor Ruegg has shown that there were some thinkers especially concerned with the Tathaagatagarbha-those of the Jo na^n pa tradition in Tibet--who may indeed have believed that language could be used in this way. Their kataphasis is not Tu-shun's. See D. S. Ruegg, La theorie du Tathaagatagarbha de Bu ston (Paris: EFEO, 1974). 37. Ma~nju`sriparip.rccha (Wen-shu-shih-li wen ching(du)) T468:14.503a25. 38. Ta-chih-tu lun T1509: 25.205b1-20 and 229al-17. a 虛妄分別 m 始 b 故說一切法,非空非不空 n 終 有無及有故,是名中道義 o 圓 c 以隱密相 p 華嚴法界觀鬥 d 猶未了義 q 杜順 e 以顯了相 r 觀 f 真了義 s 真空觀法 g 不空 t 色 h 空 u 自性空 i 常 v 見 j 靜 w 空空 k 我 x 不即斷空 l 判教 y 相 p136 z 空之理 bx 理事相望各非一異 aa 無體 by 周遍含空觀 ab 會 bz 理如事 ac 歸空 ca 事如理 ad 無礙 cb 事含理事無礙 ae 一味法 cc 遍局無礙 af 此語亦不受 cd 廣狹無礙 ag 行境 ce 遍容無礙 ah 若守解不捨無以入茲正行 cf 攝入無礙 ai 玄學 cg 交涉無礙 aj 理事無疑觀 ch 相在無礙 ak 理 ci 普融無礙 al 事 cj 妙 am 鎔融 ck 有 an 存亡 cl 一中一 ao 逆順 cm 一切中一 ap 理遍於事 cn 一中一切 aq 事遍於理 co 一切中一切 ar 依理成事 cp 不思議 as 事能顯理 cq 洗除 at 以理奪事 cr 智水 au 事能隱理 cs 分別 av 真理即事 ct 思惟 aw 事法即理 cu 想 ax 真理非事 cv 無住 ay 事法非理 cw 正思惟 az 澄觀 cx 智慧相應想 ba 色空無礙為真空 cy 鍵主良敬 bb 未顯真如之妙有 cz 華嚴教學序說,真如(日文) bc 亡理事 da 注維摩經 bd 不廣顯無礙之相 db 真諦 be 宗密 dc 慧遠 bf 本嵩 dd 淨影寺 bg 但是揀情顯理 de 華嚴法界玄鏡 bh 如金礦未為器用 df 注嚴法界觀門 bi 會色歸空 dg 華嚴七字經題法界觀三十門頌 bj 斷 dh 顯出禪門眼目 bk 智障 di 一切法本來無生 bl 忍 dj 不動 bm 無生法 dk 十地經論 bn 法藏 dl 大智度論 bo 體 dm 不疑不悔 bp 非生因之所生唯了因之所了 dn 法忍 bq 即 do 事法 br 不異 dp 修華嚴奧旨妄盡還源觀 bs 理即全體遍一塵何故非小 dq 真如之體 bt 一塵全於理性何故非大 dr 大乘起信論 bu 事虛而理實 ds 鎌田茂雄 bv 全事中之理挺然露現 dt 中國佛教思想史研究 bw 舉體全理而事相宛然 du 文殊師利問經