A belated response to Hu Shih and D.T. Suzuki. (debate on Ch'a
and Zen Buddhism in Philosophy East and West, vol. 3, p. 3 an
p. 25, April 1953)
By James D. Sellmann
Philosophy East and West
Vol. 45, no. 1
January 1995
p. 97-104
by University of Hawaii Press
p. 97
COMMENT AND DISCUSSION
A Belated Response to Hu Shih and D. T. Suzuki
In the April 1953 edition of Philosophy East and
West, Hu Shih and D. T. Suzuki published their debate
on the history and method of Ch'an (Zen) Buddhism.(1) A
year later, Van Meter Ames presented his response to
their debate by arguing that Zen is like pragmatism;
he did this to defend Hu Shih's approach and to "tone
down" what he referred to as Suzuki's
"transcendentalism."(2) Van Meter Ames analyzed their
debate on two points. First, he saw it as a split
between schools or worldviews when he typified Suzuki
as a Buddhist who finds transcendentalism in the Zen
masters, as opposed to Hu, the pragmatist, who finds
naturalism in them. Second, Ames said that their
debate was a matter of "emotional tone" concerning
"that subtle aspect of truth which is not so much a
matter of fact as of taste."(3) He devoted most of
his article to an attack on Suzuki's work for
explicit and implicit contradictions.
In 1955, Arthur Waley presented his short
response to the debate.(4) Ames had imposed
"pragmatism" on Hu; Waley had imposed "religion" on
Suzuki. Ames tried to resolve the debate; Waley saw
the two positions as necessary polarities: "If there
were no Hus there would be no Suzukis."(5)
In this review, I renew the discussion to show
that both Hu's and Suzuki's respective positions have
their shortcomings, especially in their criticisms of
each other. I will not recapitulate their articles. I
focus my arguments on four topics: (1) Ch'an versus
Zen, (2) the irrational and arational, (3) history
and historiography, and (4) knowledge versus
praj~naa-intuition.
I. Ch'an versus Zen-A Case of Equivocation
It is clear that Hu and Suzuki are in
disagreement, and it is also clear what they are
disagreeing about. What Ames, Waley, and I have
trouble grasping is: why are they disagreeing when
many of their positions overlap or depend on each
other? Sometimes in a debate one discovers
contradictions that, upon careful study and
clarification, turn out not to be real
contradictions, or the debate is groundless. Often
these misunderstandings arise because of a shift in
the meaning of a word or phrase. In this case the
equivocation concerns the meaning of the term
"meditation" (Skt dhyaana) or rather the Chinese
"character" ch'an (Jpn zen).
When Hu uses the term "Ch'an" (especially with a
capital "C"), he means the Ch'an Buddhist sect of
China, usually that of the T'ang dynasty. But Hu also
uses the term "ch'an" to mean dhyaana or meditation.
p. 98
With this distinction in mind, Hu's statement that
Shen-hui started "a new Ch'an which renounces ch'an
itself and is therefore no ch'an at all" (p. 7) is
made clear. This is no Ch'an paradox or
contradiction. Hu simply means that the Ch'an school
of Shen-hui rejected sitting meditation (Chin
tso-ch'an, Jpn zazen), and this is not meditation
(ch'an, dhyaana).
Suzuki's use of the term "Zen" is not as
consistent as Hu's. Depending on the context, Suzuki
means various things by "Zen." Van Meter Ames points
out that for Suzuki: "Zen is life, " that is,
"everything that goes into the make-up of life" (p.
20). And Waley has shown Suzuki's Zen to be "like...
religious experience" (p. 75). Suzuki does use the
term "Zen" to refer to the school of Buddhism that
developed in T'ang China, but he often uses it to
mean other things as well. Sometimes the term "Zen"
functions as Suzuki's mantra or as his "one word" (yi
chu tzu), which neither affirms nor denies. In his
response to Hu, Suzuki clearly states that he is not
talking about the historical Zen school. Suzuki wants
to discuss "Zen as Len apart from its historical
settings.... Zen in itself, or Zen as each of us
lives it in his innermost."
The problem lies in Hu using Ch'an (Zen) to mean
the T'ang school of Buddhism, and Suzuki using Zen
(Ch'an) to mean the enlightenment experience or the
emptiness from which life swells. Hu is discussing
the history of Ch'an; Suzuki is discussing the
religiophilosophic significance of the Zen
experience. They are discussing two different
matters. Thus, I contend that because of their
different usages of "Ch'an," they are not debating or
talking with each other; rather they are talking in
opposite directions. Because of their disparity, they
do not actually rebut each other.
They accuse each other of holding positions which
they do not actually hold. For example, Hu accuses
Suzuki of saying that one cannot understand the
history of Ch'an--when in fact Suzuki is not talking
about history but about the Zen experience. Suzuki
accuses Hu of not being qualified to discuss Zen
in-itself, but this is not Hu's project. Hu wants to
discuss the history of the Ch'an school, not the Zen
experience. Suzuki appears to be saying that if he
were Hu's Zen master, then he would not give Hu the
Mind-seal.
Suzuki's proposal that Hu is unqualified to
discuss Zen in-itself is based on his distinction
between two different types of mentality: one that
understands Zen and one that does not. Van Meter Ames
holds that this distinction "is an
intellectualistic-conceptual dichotomy foreign to
Zen" (p. 20). From the perspective of the Zen
experience, Ames would be correct, for the Zen
experience would not hold such a distinction-- we all
have Buddha-nature within us. But are not the Zen
tradition and its many schools based on the
distinction between the enlightened and the
nonenlightened, between the one who "understands,"
has praj~naa-in-tuition, or lives Zen and the one who
does not? Suzuki has not com-
p. 99
mitted an error in holding this distinction. But does
he have the right to rebut Hu this way? Isn't Suzuki
committing the fallacy of arguing against the man ad
hominem? Hu does not have to be enlightened to
discuss the history of Ch'an (Zen). One can discuss
the history of a number of religious traditions
without being a member of them, let alone a
consummate member. Hu's and Suzuki's original
misunderstanding of what the other means by Ch'an
(Zen) generates other confusions.
II. The Irrational and the Arational
Hu begins his article by expressing
disappointment with Suzuki and his disciples for
stressing the idea that Zen is illogical, irrational,
and beyond our intellectual understanding. Hu claims
that since one can discuss and understand the history
of Ch'an in China, it is therefore understandable.
There are two problems here. First, Hu is
committing a category error in that he confuses what
is said about Zen with what Zen is. In other words,
just because one can have a rational discussion of
something and come to have an understanding of it, it
does not follow that the thing discussed and
understood is itself rational. One can discuss mob
behavior and come to an understanding of it, but this
does not make such behavior rational. Second, Hu
criticizes Suzuki for the wrong reason; that is, his
attack on Suzuki does not get at the root of the
problem of describing Zen as illogical or irrational.
It seems to me that describing Zen as illogical or
irrational is a misunderstanding not of Zen, but of
the nature of the illogical and the irrational.
The problem as I see it is "What sense does it
make to speak of the logic of the illogical," just as
in ethics it does not make sense to speak of the
morality of immorality? The immoral, like the
illogical, is everything opposed to the moral, or
logical. However, Suzuki and others do speak of
Buddhist philosophy and logic, Zen philosophy and
logic, or praj~naa logic. if Zen is "illogical," it
would make no sense to speak of "Zen logic" because
that would be a logic of the illogical, which would
not be a logic in any sense. Although Zen is opposed
to conventional modes of thought or is antilogical,
this does not make it illogical or irrational.
Following Toshihiko Izutsu, I would describe Zen as
alogical.(6) In this sense one could have a metalevel
discussion of the "logic" of the alogical. The
"logic" of the alogical would be a metalogic. This is
the case with Zen. Zen is definitely
antiphilosophical and antilogical; however, one can
discuss the metaphilosophy or metalogic of the
aphilosophical or alogical approach of Zen. Both Hu
and Suzuki have misrepresented "Zen," for it is
neither logical nor illogical, but alogical.
Because of their misunderstanding, Hu is claiming
that one can understand the history of the Zen
school; Suzuki is claiming that the Zen experience is
beyond the ken of human understanding. As Waley
pointed out, both of them take their positions to
unnecessary extremes.
p. 100
Hu goes too far with his rationalism in claiming that
the kung-an (Jpn koan) has a rational meaning (p.
77). On this point, Suzuki's criticism of Hu is well
taken; Hu, like a Zen novice, attempts a rational
explanation of the koan and misses the point. Suzuki
goes too far in considering himself a "sinner" for
making historical sense out of Zen, "for apart from
the mundane (the world of history) there is no
transcendental (Zen-experience)" (Waley, p. 78).
III. History and Historiography
Following Suzuki's own testimony, both Ames and
Waley discuss his problem with history. However, they
do not attempt to reconcile it. Ames would agree with
Suzuki that he and Hu are "sinners" if they use
history to dispel misunderstanding when history
cannot have the final word. Ames only attempts to
solve the problem for Hu by claiming that Hu, like
any pragmatist, can have the "pure experience" of Zen
(p. 20). Waley points out Suzuki's shortcomings as a
historian, and he goes on to claim that Suzuki's
"attitude that Zen is `above historical facts' (is
not) really a Zen attitude" (p. 76). Waley wants to
reconcile the problem by showing that it is Suzuki's
personal bias against history that leads him to make
this distinction, such that Suzuki and Hu become
necessary polar opposites like the mundane and the
transcendent, the infinite and the finite, the
historical and the transhistorical.
I think that I can resolve the problem for Suzuki
by drawing a distinction between "history" and
"historiography." Commonly when one speaks of
history, one usually means historiography, that is,
the art and science of writing history. It is
important to keep in the mind the philosophical
concept of history as a cultural tradition by which a
people understand and interpret themselves. "History"
in this sense is a rich concept; it is not the mere
objective study of events in the past; it is the
living tradition of a people. History is alive, and
in this sense the "historian" is anyone who
contributes to the living understanding or
self-realization of a people. Historiography, on the
other hand, contributes to history, but the negative
qualities are ascribed to it. For example, the simple
objectivity or objectification, a concern only for
the past and the dead and so on, which Suzuki
ascribes to "history," can be seen as characterizing
the narrow interpretation of "historiography," the
scientific academic discipline of history. In the
following quote from section 4, it appears that
Suzuki is not against the concept of history as the
living tradition of a people, but rather he is
opposing the sterile activity of the academic
historiographer:
I say, "Zen Lives." History shuns anything
living, for the living man does not like to be
grouped with the past, with the dead. He is
altogether too much alive for the historian, who
is used to digging up old, decayed things from
the grave. (Studies in Zen, pp. 153-154)
p. 101
Clearly Suzuki is not discussing the
philosophical concept of history, and I doubt many
historians, academic or otherwise, would agree with
Suzuki's description of history--it is an emotional
description that makes the study of history sound
like grave robbing. If we can accept the
philosophical concept of history as "living history,"
then "living Zen" could not be distinguished from the
"living history" of Zen. There can be no timeless
Zen, or if there is such an independent timeless Zen,
then it is nothing more than an empty term that has
been reified. This is similar to Waley's point that
there is no transcendent Zen without the mundane
history of it.
In his essay "Zen and Buddhism," Abe Masao
approaches the problem of the historicity and the
ahistoricity of Zen Buddhism from a different
angle.(7) First, Abe points out that Zen both is and
is not a form of Buddhism. That is, it is a form of
Buddhism in that there is a "traditional Zen sect"
that, historically speaking, developed during the
sixth century in China and spread to Japan. On the
other hand, Zen is not a form of Buddhism in that it
is the fundamental nature or basic source from which
the different forms of Buddhism arise (p. 235). In
contrasting the Buddha and the Christ, Abe points out
a fundamental paradox or form of identity through
contradiction, which clearly illustrates the
codependence of the historicity and the ahistoricity
of Zen. Abe contends that
What is essential to Buddhism is not Siddhartha's
historical existence, but the Dharma he realized.
This characteristic of Buddhism is clearly
expressed in the well-known passage, "Regardless
of the appearance of the Tathagata (Sakyamuni
Buddha) in this world, the Dharma is always
present." (P. 237).
This is the ahistorical nature of Buddhism--Dharma or
Zen in-itself. This does not mean that the historical
Buddha, Siddhartha, does not have a special position
in Buddhism. As Abe argues: "It may be said that he
is the first person who awakened to the Dharma and
who thereby became the Buddha" (p. 237). In this
sense, Dharma or Zen in-itself is historical in that
without the historical Buddha's enlightenment, or at
least some historical Buddha's enlightenment, the
Dharma would not be taught, or, more fundamentally,
it would never be experienced at all. Although the
Dharma is ahistorical, existing apart from historical
people, nevertheless it is only historical people who
can experience the Dharma. Thus, the Dharma is always
expressed in and through history. We experience the
timeless from our time-bound perspective.
The Dharma or Zen in-itself is the living history
of Buddhism -- the enlightenment or Zen experience.
This position is implicit in Suzuki's response to the
extent that he is part of the living history of Zen
which bases itself on Hui Neng's experience that
meditation (dhyaana, ch'an, zen) is one and the same
with praj~naa (enlightened wisdom). On this point
Suzuki is well aware of his historical analysis and
debt to Hu as a
p. 102
(living) historian. When Suzuki claims that Hu does
not deal with Zen in-itself or the living ahistorical
Zen, Suzuki is attacking Hu for the wrong reason. It
was never Hu's project to discuss Zen in-itself
distinct from its history.
IV. Knowledge versus Praj~naa-Intuition
A good portion of Suzuki's response to Hu is
centered on his criticism of Hu's translation of chih
as "knowledge" as opposed to Suzuki's translation as
"praj~naa-intuition." This may be Suzuki's strongest
criticism against Hu, though it is grounded
historically in his interpretation of chih in Hui
Neng and his disciple Shen-hui. It is interesting to
note that Soothill's Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist
Terms gives "knowledge" or "to know" as the basic
translation of both forms of chih, and it is taken to
be a translation of the Sanskrit vij~naana--relative
discriminatory knowledge. Praj~naa is usually
rendered into Chinese as po-ju. One must keep in mind
that Hui Neng was illiterate and not aware of the
finer aspects of the translation of Buddhist Sanskrit
terms. It is common in Chinese for one term to be
used with both positive and negative connotations,
where the difference in meaning is carried by the
context. In Hui Neng's teachings, chih should be
understood as praj~naa and not vij~naa; it is not
discriminatory knowledge, but rather it is the wisdom
of enlightenment, praj~naa-intuition. For this
reason, Suzuki is right to criticize Hu's
translation.
This difference in translation is not just a
matter of "emotional tone," as Van Meter Ames would
have it, for Hu is clearly making a translation error
and generating a misunderstanding by not clarifying
the basic vij~naana/praj~naa distinction that is so
fundamental to Buddhism. It is also the basis for the
distinction between the enlightened and the
nonenlightened. This helps to explain why Ames
misinterprets Suzuki's distinction of the two types
of mentalities. Hu's mistranslation of chih as
"knowledge" is not only evidence of his lack of
understanding of Zen in-itself, as Suzuki would have
it, but it also reflects his incomplete understanding
of the historical value and meaning of Hui Neng's
reforms because Hu misrepresents Hui Neng's teachings
on praj~naa by interpreting it to be vij~naana. It is
this misunderstanding on Hu's part which leads him to
his excessive rationalistic interpretation of Zen,
especially of the koan and the mondo.
Hu's misunderstanding of chih in Ch'an also leads
him to characterize the Ch'an method of teaching in
rational and intellectual (vij~naana) terms. Thus, as
Suzuki points out, Hu misinterprets pu shou p'o (do
not tell outwardly) to mean "never to tell plainly,"
as if the life experience or the enlightenment
experience could be accurately described by the
teacher who holds back for the sake of the students'
learning experience. As Suzuki criticizes: "I wish he
would remember that there is something in the nature
of praj~naa-intuition which eludes every attempt at
in-
p. 103
tellectualization and rejects all plain speaking, so
called" (Studies in Zen, p. 159). Hu compounds his
misinterpretation by citing Chu Hsi, the Sung dynasty
synthesizer of Neo-Confucianism, to back up his
interpretation of Ch'an's teaching method. Oddly
enough, Hu also seeks his Ch'an example of pu shou
p'o from the Sung Ch'an master Fa-yen (d, 1104). His
case could be strengthened if he could find examples
within the context of T'ang China--that is, if he
would stay within the historical limits of his
article. Hu, then, rationalizes the alogical nature
of Zen statements as eccentric and only seemingly
meaningless. Finally, Hu sees the period of traveling
on foot, the life of a monk, in protoscientific
terms, as illustrated by Chu Hsi. Hu overlooks the
very paradox of this "method," namely that the
disciple is traveling about looking for what cannot
be found, trying to learn from various teachers what
cannot be taught, trying to hear that one, essential
teaching or word that cannot be spoken.
At times their debate lapses into personal
attacks on integrity and scholastic ability, and it
is difficult to believe that they maintained their
friendship afterwards. In the end, they both must
accept full responsibility for the confusion they
have generated. Hu is the instigator of it by not
understanding that, for Suzuki, the term "Zen'' is in
no way confined to the coincidence that it also
refers to the "traditional Zen sect." Suzuki keeps
the fires burning by accusing Hu of misrepresenting
Zen in-itself, something Hu never proposed to do.
Although Suzuki's argument would benefit from a
philosophical understanding of "history, "
nevertheless his criticisms of Hu's overly
rationalistic interpretation of Zen are well made.
Finally, we see that neither Hu's nor Suzuki's
position can be narrowly confined to only one side of
a dualism, for example rational versus irrational,
history versus religious experience, and so on.
Standing on their shoulders, we discover that the
historicity and the ahistoricity of Zen, or the
religious experience, is a basic paradox of the
temporality and the atemporality of life and of
experience. This displays the metaontology of the
enlightenment experience: fundamentally it is
simultaneously timeless or atemporal, and yet
experientially it is only discovered by the
time-bound people who live and die. From the Zen
perspective, Hu's, Suzuki's, Ames', Waley's, and my
own respective discussions fall short in that none of
them presents that "one expression" that truly opens
the way of ZEN.
Notes
1. Hu Shih, "Ch'an (Zen) Buddhism In China, Its
History and Method," Philosophy East and West 3
(1953): 3-24; and D. T. Suzuki, "Zen: A Reply to
Hu Shih," Ibid., pp. 25-46. A summary of Hu's
article and all of Suzuki's reply are reprinted in
Studies in Zen, ed. D. T. Suzuki
p. 104
(New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1978), pp. 129-164.
My citations of Suzuki are from this reprint.
2. Van Meter Ames, "Zen and Pragmatism," Philosophy
East and West 4 (1954): 19-33.
3. lbid., p. 19.
4. Arthur Waley, "History and Religion," Philosophy
East and West 5 (1955): 75-78.
5. lbid., p. 78.
6. Toshihiko Izutsu, Toward a Philosophy of Zen
Buddhism (Tehran: Imperial Iranian Academy of
Philosophy, 1977), pp. 156 ff.
7. Abe Masao, "Zen and Buddhism," Journal of Chinese
Philosophy 3 (1976): 235 -253.