Tsung-mi's questions regarding the Confucian absolute

By Yun-hua Jan
Philosophy East and West
vol. 30, no.4(October, 1980)
P495-504


P495 When one studies the interaction of Chinese religions, the problems can be approached from two different angles: One angle may be called positive, that means one looks for similar concepts, terminology, and precepts from the different but related religions, hence to determine the possible influence of one to the other. The other may be called negative in which one looks, not for similar concepts or terminology, but searches for the criticisms and counter-criticisms, to see the actions and counter-actions of the traditions. The search for similar concepts and terminology often clarifies the points of continuity in a tradition in spite of differences. The continuity of philosophical concepts and practical precepts takes different forms, whether it is a straightforward borrowing or a modified takeover, a transformation through assimilation or a new formulation from its own context but under a degree of influence from the other. The approach also has its limitations. This is so because when the relation between two hostile religions becomes too antagonistic and emotional, or when there is a great risk, some of the principal thinkers or leaders cannot recognize the influence of the opponents, but rather try their best to deny it. A negative approach does not look for similarities between different religions, but tries to see their differences. It is aimed at the questions that had been raised by one school and the reactions to questions by the other. Sometimes, such reactions are explicit and direct and sometimes they are not. Whatever the situation might be, a reaction is a reaction whether or not the reactor(s) acknowledged it. By examining the past experiences of many inter-religious relationships, one would find that the influence from antagonistic debates are often stronger than friendly dialogues. The approach of this article is from a negative angle. It attempts to enquire into a Buddhist's questions and criticisms regarding the Confucian concept of absolute, and Neo-Confucian reactions to the questions during the centuries after the issue was raised by the Buddhist. Some researches have pointed out that while most Neo-Confucian thinkers have strongly attacked Buddhism, these thinkers had an inadequate or unsystematic knowledge of Buddhism.(1) Under the circumstances, a contextual study becomes necessary, because the participants could not acknowledge what had actually happened in their lifetime because of the hostile relationship. One important Buddhist critic of Confucianism was Tsung-mi(a) (780-841) , a systematic thinker of Ch'an(b) and Hua-yen(c) Buddhism. As we now have quite a few studies on this monk's life, works, and thought,(2) there is no need to repeat them. What is necessary is to point out Tsung-mi's knowledge of Confucianism and some other classical Chinese philosophies. As far as the Confucian ======================== Jan Yun-hua is Professor in the Department of Religious Studies at McMaster University, Ontario, Chanada. P496 tradition is concerned, Tsung-mi studied it for a period of years and his works reflect his knowledge of the tradition quite well. However, Confucianism in his day was not as we know it during a later period, and Tsung-mi found the tradition highly unsatisfactory. What was the reason for his unhappiness? Tsung-mi explained it in his autobiographical statements. In one place he says, "although I studied Confucian Classics as my texts, yet I often lamented that I had no place to return to." In another place he declared that once he had some knowledge of Buddhism, he "knows that worldly affairs and skills from the beginning were irrelevant to [spiritual life and destiny],"(3) so he renounced the household life. Years later, Tsung-mi had critical comments on the Classical tradition of China. As for Confucianism, Tsung-mi questioned its concept of the absolute from two points of view, its cosmological concept of Tao and its moralistic ontology of Heaven or the 'Mandate of Heaven'. Tsung-mi relies heavily and correctly on the Book of Change for the cosmological absolute of Confuci- anism. He first quoted from the Appendix III/11: Therefore in the I(d) there is the Great Ultimate (t'ai-chi(e)), which produced the two Forms (i(f)). The two Forms produced the four Emblems (hsiang(g)). The four Emblems produced the eight Trigrams. And, the eight Trigrams determining good or bad luck, and from this determination the great businesses were produced.(4) Following the text of the Book of Change, he quoted from a commentary on the book written by Han K'ang-ph(h) (Han Po, 332-380) to explain further: That beings (yu(i) or the two Forms) most certainly begin from Non-being (wu(j) or the Great Ultimate), this is the reason for stating the Great Ultimate produced the two Forms. The Great Ultimate is the name of the unnamable. As it is unnamable it is called the Great Ultimate to refer to its ultimate nature.(5) According to the commentary by K'ung Ying-ta(k) (574-648) , the Great Ultimate is the undifferentiated One, before Heaven and Earth were differentiated. This is the reason it is called the 'Great Origin' (t'ai-ch'u(l)) or the Great One' (t'ai-i(m)), The "Tao produced the One" mentioned in the Lao-tzu means this Great Ultimate.(6) During the later period, Neo-Confucian thinkers gave a lot of ethical interpretation to Confucian cosmology; but during the period from the Wei-Chin dynasties until the end of the T'ang dynasty (that is, 220-906 A.D.) , Confucian scholars often understood their cosmology in conjunction with Taoist texts. This syncretic tendency in Chinese cosmology begins from Han Confucian thought, systematized in Neo-Taoist philosophy and predominant in the Sui-T'ang period (589-906) . Tsung-mi's understanding of Confucian cosmology exactly demonstrates and testifies to this tendency. P497 Following the aforementioned text, Tsung-mi further quoted from the I kou-ming chueh(n) to define the concept of Absolute as stated in the Book of Change: I means 'changeability (kai-i(o) ) . When the Primordial Breath' (yuan-ch'i(p) ) remains undifferentiated, it is called the 'Great Changeability' (t'ai-i(q) ) . When it starts to differentiate, it is called the 'Great Origin' (t'ai-ch'u). When the Breath begins to form signs, it is called the 'Great Beginning' (t'ai-shih(r)). When the signs of Change are with material substance (chih(s)), it is called the 'Great Simplicity' (t'ai-su(t)). When the formation of signs and the material substance are all completed, it is called the 'Great Ultimate' (t'ai-chi). Although there are insignificant similarities and differences on the subject mentioned in various texts, all of these statements agreed that the 'Primordial Breath had produced Heaven and Earth'.(7) From the quoted statement, it is clear that the concept of Ultimate in classical Chinese philosophy, both Confucian and Taoist, has been defined as eternal (ch'ang(u) ) , capable of producing (sheng(v)), universal (pien(w)), and worthy for esteem (tsun(x)). The Buddhist thinker then took up the four definitions and criticized them. He pointed out "If a thing is capable of producing, the thing itself is certainly noneternal."(8) He gives a Buddhist example that "the four great physical elements (ssu-ta(y)/catu-mahaabhuuta) of earth, water, fire, and air are capable of producing all things, but are impermanent in themselves."(9) From this conclusion a criterion is established that the great Tao is noneternal, because it is capable of producing things. The claim of Tao as eternal can also be refuted from logical points of view: First, if "Tao produced the One, and the One produced the two"(10) or "the Great Ultimate produced the two Forms,"(11) this means "the cause is one, the effects are many; hence, the theory cannot be established."(12) The failure of such a claim is obvious, it means that a peach seed could produce all kinds of fruit trees. Second, even if the capability of producing is taken for granted, the claim would lead to further difficulties, because if the eternal Tao is the cause of producing, all things would be produced everywhere and anywhere, hence capable of transcending space. This is not the case, as only certain things were produced at certain places. Third, if the Ultimate is eternal and universal, there should be no differentiation between the productive time (sheng-shih(z) ) and the nonproductive time (pu-sheng-shih(aa)). If that is the case, "all things in ten thousand categories should be born simultaneously every day and every moment."(13) In other words, time is no longer a condition for production. However, certain things are only productive at a given time. By this logical argument, Tsung-Mi pushes the classical Chinese concept of the Absolute into a logical dilemma: if they insisted on the productive power without cause and conditions, they would be unable to explain the producer and its productions, and the cosmological process that it had claimed. If they accepted cause and P498 conditions as factors to the process of production, it would lead to other difficulties: neither is it absolute as it is subject to cause and conditions: nor has it given up its original position, namely, the acceptance of the causal philosophy. Once the claim of the Tao as eternal and productive had been disproved, Tsung-mi took up the second definition made by the Confucian text. He states that "once the capability of production has disqualified [the claim of] eternality, the noneternality itself becomes the cause of the nonuniversality."(14) From this conclusion, another criterion is established that the great Tao is nonuniversal because it is noneternal. Similar to his criticism of Confucian cosmology, Tsung-mi's critique of the concept of Heaven or the Mandate of Heaven begins with both Taoist as well as Confucian classics. He first quoted from the Chuang-tzu which states that "Heaven and earth are the father and mother of the ten thousand things. United they become a body; parted they return to [the undifferentiated] beginning."(15) The next two quotations are from the Chuang-tzu and the Lieh-tzu on the same topic.(16) Once the relationship between the ten thousand things of Heaven and earth was established, Tsung-mi turned to the Confucianist interpretation of the relationship. He quoted from the Analects that "Life and death are the Mandate of Heaven; wealth and honor depend on Heaven."(17) The Buddhist critic then asked a number of questions: If wealth and honor depend on Heaven, why did Heaven make more people poor and fewer rich? More base and fewer noble? What is the reason for the different treatments? Does this not show that Heaven is unequitable? The critic then quotes from the Book of Change: "Rejoice in Heaven and understand destiny; therefore, there is no worry."(18) If this is the case, the critic asks, why then do those who misbehave become noble and the well-behaved remain humble? And, similarly, the virtuous poor and the unvirtuous rich? The humane die prematurely and the inhumane live long? The righteous unlucky and the unrighteous lucky? Those who were with Tao declined and those who were against Tao prospered? Doesn't this show that Heaven is unjust?(19) It has been declared in the Book of Historical Documents that "The Way of Heaven is to bless the good and to punish the bad."(20) The Book of Change states: It is the way of heaven to send down its beneficial influence below, where they are brilliantly displayed. It is the way of earth, lying low, to send its influence upwards and there to act. It is the way of heaven to diminish the full and augment the humble. It is the way of earth to overthrow the full and replenish the humble....(21) Again, if these statements are taken for granted, then problems and contradictions within the argument would arise. For example, one may ask: if all things are produced by Heaven, why then do animals and birds kill and eat each other? Does this mean that Heaven is the most inhumane and unrigh- P499 teous? Where is the blessing to the good and the punishment to the bad as the classic has claimed?(22) He further quotes from the Book of Change, that "The great characteristic of Heaven and Earth is to produce."(23) This means producing is regarded as virtuous; and this implies death is vicious. Should this be the case, why should everyone die irrespective of whether one is virtuous or unvirtuous? Another Confucian classic, the Doctrine of the Mean, states that "What Heaven imparts to man is called human nature."(24) If that is so, the critic asks, is the cruel nature of tigers and leopards also imparted from Heaven? If it comes from Heaven, it cannot be called inhumane; if it is not from Heaven, and it has not been said so, then Heaven is unvirtuous itself. This is a refutation of the other Confucian definition of their absolute, the 'worthy for esteem'. Consequently, when the root of nature is applied to man, one finds that there are deeds that are unfilial, disorderly, inhumane, and unrighteous. As the sage Confucius taught people to strive against these deeds, and as these are what Heaven imparts to man, does this not indicate that moral teaching conflicts with Heaven? This is a problem because it is well known that the Book of Historical Documents has praised the kingly way; and the Book of Odes has criticized disorderly politics. Although Tsung-mi's criticism of the Confucian concept of Heaven may be overly simple in some aspects, and some of the questions he raised do have their answers from the Confucian side, yet the basic tenets of his criticism are clear. The principal tenet is this, if Heaven is regarded as the transcendental absolute, hence the foundation of all phenomena, then it would be difficult to explain the evil and cruel actions of the world. This put the Confucian concept into another dilemma, that if these phenomena are not imparted by Heaven, Heaven would not be absolute; if they are imparted by Heaven, Heaven itself would not be moral. The former conclusion negates the claim of Heaven as ultimate; the latter would rule out Heaven as virtuous. These criticisms lead to other soteriological questions, that if the Mandate of Heaven exists, what can man do but wait, unable to attain it by his own will or cultivation. Moral qualifications provide a condition for a person to receive the Mandate of Heaven, yet not every virtuous person would receive it. Should that be the case, then the relationship between morality and the mandate becomes a very tricky business in Buddhist eyes. The failure of Confucius and some of his most virtuous disciples reenforced the Buddhist view. When this problem is looked at from a philosophical angle, the lack of a causal philosophy in the Confucian theory of the absolute is a problem. Unless there is a cause, no evil can be stopped nor can the highest virtue be attainable. If an absolute remains uncertain and unattainable, the Buddhist would not only question the Confucian ontology, but also its soteriology. When the shortcomings of the Confucian tradition were questioned and criticized, Tsung-mi was, of course, fully aware that the Buddhist philosophy P500 had its own concept of the absolute. Under the circumstances, how does the Buddhist concept differ from the Confucian one, and how did the Buddhist do away with the difficulty? Tsung-mi explains: If that be the case, the Buddhist concept of True Suchness (bhuutatathataa) should also be impermanent because it is said to be capable of producing all things. The answer is that it is different, because [Buddhists regard] Ignorance (avidyaa) as the cause, from which all defilements were produced; Enlightenment-cultivation is the cause, from which all purities were produced. Ignorance like a dream, is nonexistent once the dreamer is awakened. Cultivation-realization makes one realize that all the differences he felt at the awakening are impermanent. Is not the True Suchness capable of [direct] producing; the capability of producing has to follow causal conditions, hence to manifest what should be manifested. Defilement and purity are empty from the beginning to the end, the True Suchness originally unchanging, henceforth, is permanent.(25) From this argument, Tsung-mi pointed out that "since the teaching of Tao has no such explanation, it is incomparable with this example" (that is, explanation).(26) Tsung-mi's criticism of the Confucian concept of the absolute and its lack of soteriological means for cultivation is further illustrated by his scheme of religious cultivation. The "Charter of the Unenlightened and Enlightened" has clearly shown the dialectical interactions between absolute and phenomenal aspects of Mind.(27) There he divided the spiritual scheme into four positions: the position of faith, of virtue, of the sage, and the fruit of enlightenment. These four positions are all attainable gradually through prescribed cultivations. As the scheme and its religious significance have been discussed by others in the past including me, we shall not repeat it.(28) To put Tsung-mi's critique of the Confucian absolute into a historical context, it is the contention of this article that the critic pushed the Confucianists into a tight corner, forcing them to defend their positions by making counterproposals and actions. Keeping this view in mind, it is no surprise to find that in comparison with classical Confucianism the Neo-Confucian development improved its positions from these two angles, namely a new cosmology and new formulas for cultivation. As far as Neo-Confucian cosmology is concerned, various studies have been published. Although there are fundamental differences between Neo-Confucianism and Buddhist/Taoist philosophy as these philosophies are starting from a different parameter and for a different purpose, yet there seems no doubt about Neo-Confucian borrowing and assimilation of ideas and terminologies from the two schools. Studies on Neo-Confucian methods of cultivation have been done here and there, but rarely were they connected to the Buddhist pressure on this subject. Nevertheless de Bary saw the Buddhist influence on Neo-Confucian teachings of self-cultivation when he wrote on Ming Neo-Confucianism. He says: P501 Just as Ch'an Buddhism, the dominant form among intellectuals, was a system of practice rather than a system of metaphysics, so Neo-Confucianism was, I believe, unconsciously emulating the spiritual training and character formation of the Ch'an monk at his best--but, of course, domesticating and secularizing it.(29) It is true that by the seventeenth century, the Buddhist pressure on Neo-Confucian cultivation likely became unconscious as the teaching of self-cultivation was already a long and accepted practice within the Confucian tradition. But when one reviews the early development, the Neo-Confucian practice seems more likely a conscious reaction to Buddhist pressure rather than an unconscious emulation. The Buddhist critique of Confucian philosophy and practice led Neo-Confucianists to search for their own identity, source, and inspiration. In the process of the search, they found some new light from their classics, especially from those which were not yet fully noted by them and their opponents. The well-known classics such as the Book of Change or the Analects are still important and influential, but a few other texts emerged into prominence from their comparatively insignificant past. The Great Learning, the Doctrine of the Mean and the Mencius are the best illustrations of this Confucian rediscovery. From the Han period to that of the T'ang dynasty, both the Great Learning and the Doctrine of the Mean were chapters of the Book of Rites. The Book of Rites had the status of ching(ab) (classic or scripture). It was important only as a manual for practical reference, and not a philosophical authority. Taking the Great Learning as an example, no independent commentary on it has been recorded in the bibliographical chapters of the Han Shu(ac), the Sui Shu(ad), nor the Old and New T'ang Shu(ae). Although there is an independent title on the Doctrine of the Mean called Chung-yung shuo(af), in two chapters mentioned in Hou Han Shu(ag), there is a note added to the title. The note states that "According to Yen Shih-ku(ah) (581-645), (30) the chapter of Chung-yung(ai) in the present version of Li Chi(aj) is not the original text of Li scripture, but belongs to the class of works under this title."(31) Two more commentaries on the Doctrine of the Mean were recorded in the bibliography of Sui Shu, namely, Chung-yung chuan(ak) and Chung-yung chiang-shu(al),(32) but their respective authors, Tai Yu(am) (378-441) and Emperor Wu of the Liang dynasty (reign 502-549) are known for their Taoist or Buddhist inclinations.(33) The Mencius was regarded by the compilers of these bibliographies as the book of a philosopher (tzu(an)), but not a scripture or a classic (ching), and hence had no authority. This situation continued even at the time when the official histories of the T'ang dynasty were compiled during the tenth and the eleventh centuries. In contrast with the pre-Sung bibliographical records on these Confucian books, the bibliography in the History of Sung Dynasty and that of the Ming dynasty has recorded abundant commentaries on these works, especially on P502 the Doctrine of the Mean and the Great Learning. The Sung Shih(ao) contains twenty-two commentaries on the Doctrine of the Mean; seven on the Great Learning, and two more as combined commentaries of both works.(34) The Ming Shih(ap) had recorded a more dramatic development on these texts as it gives a new category, the "Four Books" to the aforementioned titles along with Confucius' Analects and Mencius, and places the category under the section of 'Scripture' (ching).(35) The Ming Shih also added more titles to the commentaries. It mentions twenty commentaries on the Four Books, another seven independent commentaries on the Great Learning, eight on the Doctrine of the Mean, and another five combined commentaries on the last two titles. Although the Ming Shih is not the work bestowed the title of the Four Books, it is the first official history that gave recognition to the Four Books as 'scriptures'. It was Northern Sung Neo-Confucian thinkers, the Ch'eng(aq) brothers, who "attached so much importance to the Great Learning and the Doctrine of the Mean that they took them out of the Book of Rites, in which they are chapters."(36) It was Chu Hsi(ar) "who grouped the Great Learning and the Doctrine of the Mean, the Analects and the Book of Mencius as the Four Books."(37) The new edition and esteem of these texts has gained more ground during subsequent centuries, and was ultimately recognized by the compilers of the Ming Shih. It may be asked why the Neo-Confucian thinkers gave so much attention to these less noted works. The cultivability of sagehood as mentioned in these texts is certainly one of the central attractions. To substantiate this point, one can easily point out the 'eight steps' from the Great Learning,(38) the opening statement of the Doctrine of the Mean,(39) and the popularity of these passages among Neo-Confucianists. The attainability of sagehood as expounded by Mencius and the practical advice in the Analects have all focused on the goal which is achievable through cultivation. It should be noted that although Neo-Confucianists did give much importance to the Four Books, their sources for the revitalization of their tradition were not limited to the Four Books. Other classics also provided them with abundant statements to reinterpret the central concepts of Confucianism. Taking the concept of 'seriousness' (ching(as)) as an example, this important concept for self-cultivation originated in the Book of Change,(40) but the Neo-Confucian interpretation and emphasis on it made the idea far different from the original context. To recapitulate, this article considers Tsung-mi's criticism on Confucian concepts of the absolute as the most pointed attack on the orthodox tradition. The criticism focuses on the lack of causation in Confucian and Taoist cosmology and the disregard of soteriological means in cultivation which made Confucianism religiously meaningless. It is the contention of this article that sharp criticism forced Neo-Confucianists to respond to the critique by examining their classical sources and offering reinterpretations of them. The P503 Neo-Confucianists consequently did improve their teaching on self-cultivation and reinterpreted their tenets on cosmology. This period of criticism and reaction marks one of the most important turning points in the history of Chinese religion and philosophy. NOTES 1. G. E. Sargent, Tchou Hi contre le bouddhisme (Paris, 1955), 1-10, esp., 9-10, W. T. Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press 1963), p. 653. 2. Jan, "Tsung-mi and His Analysis of Ch'an Buddhism," T'oung Pao LVIII (1972), 1-54. The most comprehensive study is Shigeo Kamata(at), Shumitsu Kyogaku no shisoshi teki kenkyu(au) (Tokyo, 1975). 3. This is quoted from Tsung-mi's letter to his teacher, Ch'eng-kuan(av) (737-838), in Taisho shinshu daizokyo(aw) (hereafter cited as T.), no.1795, p.576c. 4. Confer I Ching: Book of Changes, trans. James legge, ed. C. Chai (New York, 1964), pp. 373. 5. From the Yuan-chueh ching Ta-shu ch'ao(ax) (hereafter, cited as TSC) in Hsu Tsang-ching(ay) (Taiwan reprint), vol. 14, p. 352c. Unless it is noted, the translations of quoted statements are all mine. 6. Ibid., the quotation from Lao Tzu is found in chapter 42, W. T. Chan, The Way of Lao Tzu (New York, 1963), p. 176. 7. From TSC, p. 352c-d. 8. Ibid., p. 352d. 9. Ibid. 10. See note 6. 11. See note 6. 12. See note 4. 13. From TSC, p. 353a. 14. Ibid. 15. Chapter XIX, the translation is from B, Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu(New York, 1968), p. 198 with minor modifications. 16. Confer ibid., p. 69 and A. C. Graham, The Book of Lieh Tzu (London, 1960), chapter 1, p. 23. 17. Analects 12: 5. Translation with slight modification is from W. T. Chan, Source Book, p. 39. 18. Chan's translation ibid., p. 265. 19. TSC, p. 415b. 20. From James Legge's The Chinese Classics (Hongkong reprint, 1960), III, p. 186. 21. From the Appendix 1, xv: 1-2, James Legge's translation, I Ching (note 4) p. 226. 22. TSC, p. 416a. 23. From Chan, Source Book, p. 268. 24. Ibid., p. 98. 25. TSC, p. 352-353a. 26. Ibid., p. 353a. 27. The charter is contained in the Ch'an-yuan chu-ch'uan-chi Tu-hsu(az), T.2015, pp. 410-413; and has been rendered into English by Alfonso Verdu, Dialectical Aspects in Buddhist Thought (Kansas, 1974), pp. 79ff. 28. Confer Jan, "The Chinese Buddhist Wheel of Existence and Deliverance, " International Congress of Orientalists, Mexico City Conference, 1976. For a more elaborate treatment on Tsung-mi's criticism, see my "A Buddhist Critique to the Classical Chinese Philosophy," XIII Congress of the International Association for the History of Religions (Lancastep, U.K.), 1975, and forthcoming in the Journal of Chinese Philosophy. P504 29. de Bary, "Neo-Confucian Cultivation and the seventeenth century Enlightenment", in his The Unfolding of Neo-Confucianism (New York, 1975), pp. 161-162. 30. Yen was respected as the most eminent and authoritative classicist of his time. See T'ang Shu, ch. 73 (Erh-shih-wu shih(ba) ed., Shanghai, 1935. Hereafter cited as ESWS), p. 3325b. Hsin T'ang-shu,(bb) ch. 198, 4090b. His opinions are still respected by modern Chinese scholarship. See Ku Chieh-kang,(bc) ed., Ku-chi k'ao-pien ts'ung-k'ai(bd) (Shanghai, 1955), p. 14. 31. Han Shu, ch. 30 (ESWS), p. 433b, line 7. 32. Sui Shu, (ESWS), ch. 32, p. 2443b. 33. For Tai, see Sung Shu(be), ch. 93, (ESWS), p. 1644a. For Emperor Wu of the Liang dynasty, see Kennth Ch'en, Buddhism in China (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 124ff. 34. Sung Shih, ch. 202 (ESWS), p. 4987b-c. 35. Ming Shih, ch. 96, (ESWS), p. 7309d. 36. From W. T. Chan, Reflections on Things at Hand (New York, 1967), p. xix. 37. Ibid., p. xxxviii. 38. The Great Learning, chs. 5-10. See W. T. Chan's Source Book, pp. 89-94. 39. Ibid., p. 98. 40. See Chan, Reflections on Things at Hand, p. xxiii; for the early reference of the term, see Chan, Source Book, pp. 264-265. a 宗密 t 太素 am 戴□ b 禪 u 常 an 子 c 華嚴 v 生 ao 宋史 d 易 w 遍 ap 明史 e 太極 x 尊 aq 程 f 儀 y 四大 ar 朱熹 g 象 z 生時 as 敬 h 韓康伯 aa 不生時 at 鐮田茂雄 i 有 ab 經 au 宗密教學ソ思想史的研究 j 無 ac 漢書 av 澄觀 k 孔穎達 ad 隋書 aw 大正新修大藏經 l 太初 ae 唐書 ax 圓覺經大疏鈔 m 太一 af 中庸說 ay 續藏經 n 易鉤命訣 ag 後漢書 az 禪源諸詮集都序 o 改易 ah 顏師古 ba 二十五史 p 元氣 ai 中庸 bb 新唐書 q 太易 aj 禮記 bc 顧頡剛 r 太始 ak 中庸傳 bd 古籍考辨叢刊 s 質 al 中庸講疏 be 宋書