Early Saa.mkhya in the Buddhacarita

Kent, Stephen A.
Philosophy East and West
Vol.32:3(July 1982)
The University of Hawaii Press
(C) by University of Hawaii Press

P.259 INTRODUCTION In the twelth canto of the Buddhacarita (B)(1) A'svagho.sa describes the sage Araa.da's metaphysical system, (2) and provides statements concerning the liberating knowledge that people achieve by working through it. Araa.da's metaphysical system consists of twenty-five principles, the highest of which is distinct from the others. Liberating knowledge involves the highest principle "knowing" its separation from the other consituents, and the technique by which the highest principle realizes this knowledge is the cultivation of the powers of discrimination. Araa.da's metaphysical system bears striking resemblances to systems that appear in other texts from roughly the same era. For instance, it has such close affinities with metaphysical systems in Book Twelve of the Mahaabhaarata(Mbh) , the Mok.sadharma, (3) that the translator of the Buddhacarita, E.H. Johnston, suspects both works have a common authority, possibly a text of the little-known Var.saga.nya school.(4)Additional similarities exist in certain passages of the Bhagavadgiitaa(Bvg),(5) but the difficulties over dating the latter text make the question of influence between the two impossible to answer with certainty.(6) Another similar metaphysical description is elaborated in the Indian medical text from the first century c.e., the Caraka Sa.mhitaa(CS) , (7) and various resem- blances between Araa.da's reputed system, as well as several differences, readily can be identified. (8) Finally, several Upani.sads(U), especially the Katha Upani.sad and the 'Svetaa'svatara Upani.sad, contain descriptions of metaphysical systems that resemble Araa.da's.(9) Araa.da's system, along with the systems that resemble it, often are referred to as forms of "early Saa.mkhya," (10) and therefore a prelude to II'svarak.r.s.na's classical Saa.mkhya(11) system of about the fifth century C.E.(12) Johnston, for instance, speaks in this manner. Franklin Edgerton, in contrast, argues that these so-called early Saa.mkhya systems within the Bhagavadgiitaa and the Mahaabhaarata are but aspects of "Upani.sadic Brahmanism," and do not represent doctrines of a distinctive school of thought.(13) His view, however, cannot explain all relevant passages in the Mahaabhaarata, and therefore we must assume that an independent tradition of nontheism was developing during this era, and that it occasionally reveals itself in the texts.(14) Nonetheless, Edgerton's argument has merit when we apply it to the Buddhacarita ów the metaphysics of the twelfth canto "are set in a framework which espouses the old Upani.sadic notions of aatman and brahman." (15) So it is in the Buddhacarita that Araa.da follows his description of the path of knowledge (saa.mkhya, although he does not use the term itself) with a description of "another P.260 method [of] the same dharma, " that is, yogic trances. The two descriptions do not disagree over metaphysic, just method.(16) to refer, therefore, to the metaphysics of the twelfth canto of the Buddhacarita as "early Saa.mkhya" is not to imply that Araa.da's reputed system was among those that were beginning to distinguish themselves from orthodoxy. Our use of the term will be a heuristic one,(17) used to facilitate our efforts in examining the metaphysics of the tewlfth canto by both comparing them to the later classical Saa.mkhya system, and by contrasting them with the Buddhist criticisms that A'svagho.sa levels throgh Gautama (as the Bodhisattva and the Buddha). When helpful, references will be made to appropriate sections of A'svagho.sa's story of Nanda's conversion, the Saundarananda (S),(18) as well as to passages from the Mahaabhaarata, the Bhagavadgiitaa, the Yoga-Suutras (YS) (19) and the Upani.sads. A'SVAGHO.SA'S RENDITION OF ARAA.DA'S SAA.MKHYA SYSTEM Within verses 17-42 of the twelfth canto of the Buddhacarita, A'svagho.sa presents Araa.da's early Saa.mkhya system, and in verses 69-82 offers the bodhisattva's subsequent rejection of it.(Verses 43-63 present a means to salvation through trances [dhyaana-s] that actually have a closer affinity with Buddhist yogic states than with orthodox Indian ones, and verses 66-67 state the names of the previous great sages of what Araa.da considers to be the joint Saa.mkhya-yoga tradition.)(20) Araa.da's system consists of twenty-five principles (tattva-s) in which a distinction exists between one tattva, aatman(21) or knower of the field (k.setrajnna),(22)and the other twenty-four. The twenty-four are further divided into two groups: one group of eight called prak.rti(primary matter) and another group of sixteen derived from the former, called vikaara (secondary matter or "production" or "derivative" [B xii 17-20]). Prak.rti consists of avyakta (unseen power) , buddhi (intellect) , aha.mkaara (ego), and the five bhuuta-s (elements). Vikaara consists of the five objects of the senses, the five senses, the hands and feet, the voice, the organs of generation and excretion, and manas (mind). The exact process by which either the eightfold prak.rti generates itself or prak.rti generates the sixteen secondary evolutes is never explained in this text.(23) Together these twenty-four tattva-s comprise the field (k.setra). Matter, both primary and secondary, is called"the seen" and is "that which is born, grows old, suffers from disease and dies." AAtman, in contrast, is described as possessing the opposite of these attributes (B xii, 22).(24) The aatman continues to transmigrate until it discriminates between itself (the unseen, intelligent, and unmanifest) and "the seen" (the unintelligent and the manifest [B xii, 29, 40-41]). A dualism is present here between the knower of the field and the field itself, and this dualism is to become more clearly pronounced in the classical school(SK XIX). SVABHAAVAów(INHERENT) NATURE UNDERLYING THE EIGHTFOLD PRAK.RTI A multifeatured unity known as svabhaava underlies the eightfold prak.rti and serves as its motive force for creation. Its features are identified in B xviii, 29-41 P.261 as part of a series of arguments in which the Buddha is refuting the theory that Nature (svabhaava)(25) is the Creator of the universe. In these verses svabhaava is described as single essence (31), all pervading (32) , without attribute (34) or characteristics (35), a perpetual cause (that is, eternal [35]), productive (36), not perceptible, unmanifest (39) and inanimate,and without conscious- ness (ace-tana?[40]).(26) The crucial arguments offered to refute svabhaava center around "the rule that attributes of an effect must also be in the cause". A'svagho.sa (via the Buddha) objects to the early Saa.mkhya svabhaava on the grounds that since it is without attribute (gu.na[34]) or characteristics (vi'se.sa) it cannot be the cause of the world (or universe) whose physical constructions are pervaded by both.(27) We find the same features used to describe svabh- aava in the Buddhacarita also being assigned to avy- akta, the ummanifest, in SKX ów XI.(28) of the classical school, with but one important difference. The avyakta of the classical scheme contains the three gu.na-s and through them it possesses both attributes and characteristics. It thereby differs from the early svabhaava, which has neither. Because of the gu.na-s, A'svagho.sa's criticism of an (inherent) nature in Saa.mkhya as being without attribute(s) or characteristics and therefore unable to be the cause of a material world full of both, is effectively countered in the classical system (SK XII ów XIII).(29) In fact SK XIV specifically says "the unmanifest (avyakta) is likewise established because of the gu.na-nature in the cause of the effect (or because the effect has the same qualities as the cause)." This theory of gu.na production in classical Saa.mkhya may have been influenced by the early notions of the inherent productivity of svabhaava (as we are about to explain). (30) In addition, the eightfold prak.rti in early Saa.mkhya may have evolved into the classical system's verti- cal emanation pattern, involving the karmendriya-s (five organs of action), the buddhiindriya-s (five senses), manas (mind), and the tanmaatra-s (the five subtle elements). (31) In any case, before we can reconstruct the process by which the features of the early Saa.mkhya svabhaava become attributed to the avyakta of classical Saa.mkhya, we must unravel the complicated development of the gu.na-s. It is to this task that we now turn. THE EARLY AVYAKTA (UNSEEN FORCE) AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GU.NA-S Nowhere in A'svagho.sa's description of Araa.da's Saa.mkhya system are the three gu.na-s mentioned, despite the fact that A'svagho.sa knows of them (B vii 53, and n.) and even refutes them at B xxvi 10-14. There seem to be several reasons for their omission. To begin, the variety of descriptions attached to the term gu.na-s within the Mahaabhaarata verses of early Saa.mkhya indicates that their meaning is in a state of flux. (32) A'svagho.sa, however, seems to use them in a form different still from those of the epic, since to him they seem to signify " the three bhaava-s" (states of being) closely identified with moral attributes. (33) It was these three bhaava-s in the capacity as moral attributes within avyakta, the unseen force, that determine for the latter the means or mechanism by which the individual is p.262 bound to sa.msaara. Because the gu.na-s only are a facilitationg force to avyakta, E. H.Johnston believes that A'svagho.sa feels no need to mention them in Araa.da's Saa.mkhya description. (34) THE THREE EARLY SAA.MKHYA GU.NA-S AND THE BUDDHIST ROOTS OF GOOD AND EVIL The gu.na development within Brahmanism closely parallels the development of the Buddhist notions of the three roots of goods (ku'salamuula) (35) and the roots of evil (aku'salamuula), (36) and A'svagho.sa may take advantage of this correspondence. We see their parallelism, as does A'svagho.sa, by associating the three roots of good with the gu.na sattva and the three roots of evil with the gu.na-s rajas and tamas. (37) Through this association we can understand more fully the processes of salvation in the appropriate developmental stages of both Buddhism and early Saa.mkhya thought. (38) The three roots of evil are raaga (passion),dve.sa (hatred, enmity), and moha (ignorance, as delusion of mind) , (39) but, in addition, A'svagho.sa occasionally uses the gu.na term rajas to cover the two Buddhist terms raaga and dve.sa (B vii, 53 and n.). These three roots of evil, along with the three roots of good, are the cause (hetu) by which karman is perpetuated. Interestingly, in the Pali Nikaayas, nirvaa.na is achieved with the disappearance of the three roots of evil, (40) a feat achieved in the Saundarananda by yoga techniques. (41) Similarly, in this early stage of Saa.mkhya, liberation occurs when the gu.na-s rajas and tamas are destroyed by the increase of sattva (B xxvi 10-11) . The des- truction of ignorance (and the acquisition of knowledge) is complemented by an increase in good deeds and moral merit, and this destruction of ignorance is brought about "through learning, intelligence and effort" (B xxvi 11). Certainly 'effort' involves a meditational process (as it does in the Saundarananda text and Yoga).42 Worth noting, however, are the differences between the Buddhsit hetu and the gu.na-s, since A'svagho.sa criticizes the early Saa.mkhya salvational model as self-contradictory. Essentially he argues (B xxvi 10-14) that sattva can never destroy rajas and tamas because, by definition, all three are permanent. (43) A'svago.sa, in contrast, accepts the standard notion of the skandha-s, which are impermanent by definition, and whose karmic causes can therefore be destroyed. (44) THE FIVE SKANDHA-S AND THE SAA.MKHYA TATTVA-S OF MATTER Interestingly, the content of these skandha-s corresponds closely to the early Saa.mkhya analysis of the corporeal individual, omitting the avyakta. (45) The skandha rupa (physical form, body) is analogous to the elements and their evolutes,the objects of the senses; vedanaa (sensation) equates with the senses; samj~naa (ideation, perception, the naming faculty) with the Saa.mkhya manas (mind); vij~naana (consciousness) with the early buddhi; and sa.mskaara (dispositions, formative forces, mental phenomena), insofar as it was thought to relate to the "integrating action of the personality, with aha.mkaara" (46) An additional p.263 ucomparative point involves the influence of "the power of the act" in both systems, it being one of the three causes of transmigration in early Saa.mkhya (B xii 23) and also serving as the means by which the skandha-s are perpetuated (S xvii 19). THE SAA.MKHYA CAUSES OF SA.MSAARA AND THE FACTORS THROUGH WHICH THEY WORK Returning again to Araa.da's Saa.mkhya description, the sage first first gives the three causes of sa.msaara as being wrong knowledge (aj~naana), the power of the act (karman), and desire or craving (t.r.s.naa [B xii 23]). These three causes are comparable to the Buddhist cause (hetu) of transmigration: moha (ignorance, delusion), raaga (passion), and dve.sa (hatred, enmity). Within early Saa.mkhya, the three causes seem to function by eight factors (B xii 23-24) in a manner as follows: (47) Sa.msaara ózówówówówówówówówówósówówówówówówówówówówówówówówówówó{ óxThree causes of óx Factors by which the three óx óxsa.msaara óx causes work óx óuówówówówówówówówówóqówówówówówówówówówówówówówówówówót óxwrong knowledge óx1.misunderstanding (vipratyaya óx óx (aj~naana) óx [see B xii 25]) óx óx óx2.wrong attribution of person- óx óx óx ality (aha.mkaara [see B xii óx óx óx 26]) óx óx óx3.confusion of thought(sa.mdeha óx óx óx [see B xii 27]) óx óx óx4.wrong conjunction (abhisamp- óx óx óx lava [see B xii 28]) óx óx óx5.lack of discrimination óx óx óx (avi'se.sa [see B xii 29]) óx óuówówówówówówówówówóqówówówówówówówówówówówówówówówówót óxpower of the act óx6.wrong means (anupaaya óx óx (karman) óx [see B xii 30]) óx óuówówówówówówówówówóqówówówówówówówówówówówówówówówówót óxdesire or craving óx7.attachment (sa^nga óx óx (t.r.s.naa) óx [see B xii 31]) óx óx óx8.falling away (abhyavapaata óx óx óx [see B xii 32]) óx ó|ówówówówówówówówówórówówówówówówówówówówówówówówówówó} Araa.da continues by explaining what he means by each of the eight factors by which the three causes of sa.msaara function (B xii 25-32).After having done so, however, he also attributes transmigration to a fivefold ignorance (B xii 33-37),(48) as well as to a person's unjusted identification with corporeal individuality (B xii 38). It is unclear how these descriptions of the causes and the perpetuataion of sa.msaara are related.(49)Interest- ing to note, however, is that the fivefold ignorance Araa.da identifiessówtorpor (tamas),delusion (moha), great delusion (mahaamoha), darkness (taamisra) and blind darkness (andhataamisra)ówbecome,in Saa.mkhy- akaarikaa XLVIII,the five viparyaya-s(errors or mis- apprehensions).(50) P.264 To summarize the complicated development of the gu.na-s discussed earlier: the three gu.na-s in the early Saa.mkhya of Araada are but bhaava-s, "states of being," each having moral qualities through which the unseen avyakta attaches a person to sa.msaara. The moral actions associated with the three gu.na-s are divided into two kinds: those moral actions containing the sattva gu.na, propelling a person into higher rebirth (and eventual release); and those containing the rajas or tamas gu.na, perpetuating the cycle of existence.These moral qualities within sa.msaara have three causes, and these causes themselves seem to work by eight factors that variously relate to each of them. This twofold division of the three gu.na-s parallels the division and functions of the three Buddhist roots of good and evil. Liberation is achieved with the increase of sattva (51) and the concomitant extin- guishment of rajas and tamas, a process similarly described in parts of the Mahaabhaarata and Yoga Suutras iii 55. A'svagho.sa choses not to mention the gu.na-s in Araa.da's early Saa.mkhya description apparently because he considers them to be merely the 'mechanism' through which avyakta attaches sa.msaara to the individual, and their description is not considered necessary once avyakta itself is mentioned. Apparently the gu.na-s attain their classical,cos- mological and psychological significance only when the term prak.rti begins to mean but the first of twenty-four material tattva-s, and loses its meaning as the inclusive title of the eight tattva-s ound in the earlier speculation.(52) THE DEVELOPMENT OF SVABHAAVA IN RELATION TO THE CLASSICAL SAA.MKHYA CONCEPTS OF PRAK.RTI, AVYAKTA, AND THE GU.NA-S Having described in part the evolution of prak.rti, avyakta, and the gu.na-s we now can connect the development of these three entities with that of svabhaava, described earlier. What occurs between the time of A'svagho.sa and II'svarak.r.s.na's classical work is that the features of svabhaava as the motive force behind the eightfold prak.rti become posited as the features within the classical avyakta. In the process, the latter acquires a new meaning, different from the (older) notion of it being the 'unseen force'of the morallaw. In classical Saa.mkhya it now means the "unmanifest force" in which lie at rest the manifold creative power (as gu.napari.naama) of the three gu.na-s. The moral qualities through which Araada's early avyakta worked are transferred from the gu.na-s of the earlier thought to the eightfold bhaava-s within the buddhi of classical thought.(53) While II'svarak.r.s.na rejects the idea that sva- bhaava is a creative principle, the concept may have influenced classical notion in two other areas. First, svabhaava as" the inherent nature of things' becomes the term used in relation with suffering as the (apparent) linkage between puru.sa and manifest creation in Saa.mkhya-kaarikaa LV.(54) if there is a connection, thought, between svabhhava in this later P.265 sense and the earlier notion of nature underlying all prak.rit, it is simply that now suffering is what underlies all creation. Second, there is a quite early notion of svabhaava described by A'svagho.sa in Buddhacarita ix 59-62 that may have influenced the classical notion of gu.n-apari.naama, the ever-varying proportions of the interacting gu.na-s causing the manifestations of prak.rti. In this descriptions, 'Suddhodana's counsellor is stating to the Boddhisattva various philosophical, disputes of the day in a vain attempt to convince the latter to return to his home. One of the materialistic or naturalistic philosophies described contains a doctrine in which the four elements (space being omitted from the usual list of five),(55) usually in mutual opposition, now "group themselves together" according to their own inherent nature (or according to natural development) and from the world. One is reminded of the classical notion of the gu.na-s, whose natures are dissimilar if not antagonistic, but that also interact to from the mainfest universe. While indeed there is a similarity between these two ideas, no precise connection between the older syabhaava notion and the classical gu.napari.naama theory can be drawn with certainty.(56) BUDDHI Comparatively little is known about buddhi prior to the classical period. One of the few things the texts allow us to say is that the eithtfold buddhi of classical Saa.mkhya is not known in Araa.da's system. Furthermore, it also seems true that in some earlier Saa.mkhya systems buddhi should be translated as "consciousness" (cetanaa)or "intellect" (vij~naana), and these meanings contrast to its characterization within the classical school as simply "ascertainment" or "determination"(adyavas- aaya[SK XXIII]). This devaluation of buddhi probably occurs concomitant with the developing idea of the transcendence fo puru.sa, the latter itself being considered conscious as opposed to those emanations within material creation (prak.rti in her vyakta or generating form) which are unconscious. To fit within this classical dualism, the conception of buddhi has to be appropriately modified, and its adyavasaaya designation resulted. However, while this general outline of the modification of buddhi concept holds true for the Mahaabhaarata, Araa.da's references to buddhi are too vague to allow placing Araa.da's use within this scheme.(57) AHA.MKAARA AND AATMAN While the function of aha.mkaara in Araa.da's Saa.mkhya is difficult to determine, its very appearance within it is important to note with regard to the development of classical Saa.mkhya thought. It translates as 'ego' or 'I' and is the cause of the corporeal individual's activity. In part its purpose in early Saa.mkhya is to subsume the functions of two other principles, mahat aatman (Great Self) and jiiva aatman (individualized self or soul), both of which, in various texts, had animated the body and connected it with the transmigrating soul.(58) In the Buddhacarita, an P.266 association involving transmigration seems to exist between the aatman and aha.mkaara, as seen in one of the Bodhisattva's objections to Araa.da's Saa.mkhya: "and as for this imagined abandonment of the ego principle (aha.mkaara), as long as the soul (aatman) persists, there is no abandonment of that principle" (B xii, 76).(59) By the time of II'svarak.r.s.na's classical system, the aatman has disappeared and its transmigrating function is assumed by the subtle body (li^nga, li^nga'sariira). In addition, aha.mkaara assumes the individual aspects of aatman,(60) already having been associated previously with it (as in the Buddhacarita). Buddhi, Aha.mkaara, and Cosmological Speculation Although early Saa.mkhya (as well as early Buddhism) emphasizes the investigation of the individual more than the cosmos, when the cosmos is considered it is usually done through mythological means.(61) So we find in Buddhacarita xii 21 that Kapila (a famous Indian sage reputed to be the founder of Saa.mkhya) and his pupil (probably AAsuri) are symbolic of buddhi,(62) Prajaapati symbolizes aha.mkaara(63) and Prajaapati's sons represent the five elements.(64) Unrelated to this particular set of mythological figures is another set of cosmological speculations, also in the twelfth canto. In Araa.da's description of the trances(dhyaana-s), each aruupya (attainment) is associated with certain divine spheres, and such associations probably are indicative of Yoga practices of this time.(65) It is worth noting that, in a similar view,there are cosmological associations between the three worlds and the three gu.na-s in Saa.mkhyaakarikaa LIV. The modest conclusion that we can deduce from this material is that in early Saa.mkhya, early Yoga, classical Saa.mkhya, and later Yoga there is the notion that liberation includes a journey through the cosmos, probably to reach a location beyond the control of cosmological fate. ELEMENTS, GROSS ELEMENTS, SUBTLE ELEMENTS, AND OBJECTS OF THE SENSES Two categories of principles (tattva-s) exist within Araa.da's Saa.mkhya that are not found in the later Saa.mkhya scheme of the Saa.mkhyaakarikaa. II'svarak.r.s.na's system has not accepted either the five objects of the senses (B xii 19) or the five elements (B xii 18) within its list of twenty-four material evolutes, although both groups are easily mistaken for being in the classical system. Notions underlying Araa.da's five elements (bhuuta-s) ów space (aakaa'sa), wind (vaayu), fire (tejas), water (ap) and earth (p.rthivii) ów are less philosophically discriminative than those upon which the classical five gross elements ów also space, wind, fire, water, earth ów are based, but the agreement of the names themselves often obscures this fact. Nor do the gross elements have generative potential as do the earlier elements. Similarly, the five objects of the senses within Araa.da's description ów 'sabda (sound) , ruupa (form) , spar'sa (touch), gandha (smell) , rasa (taste) ów appear to be the same as the five classical subtle elements (tanmaatra-s), but this appearance P.267 falls away with the realization that the latter five of the Saa.mkhyakaarikaa are both subtle potentials above the plane of gross corporeality, and also productive entities themselves. The early objects of the senses, in contrast, are not productive (that is, nothing further is emanated from them) and they exist within the material, perceptible creations of the world. It is true, however, that these four categories ów the elements, the gross elements, the subtle elements, and the senseobjects ów undergo a complicated transformation as the early Saa.mkhya is evolving toward II'svarak.r.s.na's work. THE ELEMENTS Beginning with the five elements found within the primary matter (prak.rti) of early Saa.mkhya, their productive capacity can be explained by the state of philosophical speculations during an era which made "no hard and fast distinction between animate and inanimate, between material and spiritual, or between substance and quality."(66) These elements were "cosmic forces inhering in the substances from which they took their name," and it was accepted that from them composition of the secondary evolutes, (68) but the Buddhacarita says nothing about the evolutionary process from the primary to the secondary groupings. OBJECTS OF THE SENSES Five of the evloutes within Araa.da's nonproductive secondary matter are the objects of the senses, traditionally known as sound, form, touch, smell, and taste. These were the five basic qualities or attributes perceived by the senses. The lack of philosophical clarity, however, between substance and quality meant that the material objects of the world are classified according to the qualities (of sound,taste,and so on) that the senses perceive.(69) Each sense object may have been "the special and sole object of one of the organs of sense," and also may have had an association with a particular element.(70) Refinements of thought in the Vai'se.sika school could have stimulated Saa.mkhya into modifying several of its components. Vai'se.sika established the relationship between the elements (earth, water, fire, air, and space) and their respective qualities (smell, taste, form, touch, and sound), and the latter group serves as the objects of sense perception.(71) These qualities existed only insofar as they inhered in the elements themselves, and this fact probably presented a problem for early Saa.mkhya thought. In the Buddhacarita's Saa.mkhya system, the objects of the senses have a separate identity from the elements (bhuuta-s) , and Vai'se.sika critics could have argued that individual elements exist only insofar as they were particularized by their inherent qualities. While early Saa.mkhya would not have accepted the premises of the Vai'se.sika argument, it nonetheless could have been clear that Vai'se.sika had made a philosophical advance by distinguishing between substances and their qualities. If the elements produced the objects P.268 of the senses,(72) then early Saa.mkhya would have been hard-pressed to explain how the generative elements produce nongenerative entities (the objects of the senses) that are nothing but their own qualities.(73) These Vai'se.sika developments could have influenc- ed classical Saa.mkhya's interpretations of both the elements and their sense objects.(74) In any case, the objects of the senses are removed from its cosmological scheme of twenty-four material entities, and the Saa.mkhyakaarikaa only makes passing reference to them as the objects of the organs of action (SK XXVIII and XXXIV) . The elements, previously thought to have been productive, are reduced to unregenerative tattva-s found at the last stage of the emanation process. By eliminating the five sense objects, however, a vacancy of five tattva-s is created,and this vacancy is subsequently filled with a new fivefold designation, the tanmaatra-s (subtle elements) . Within Saa.mkhya speculation this new group appears for the first time in the Saa.mkhyakaarikaa and not gonly fills the numerical vacancy created by the expulsion of the five objects of sense, but also now has a creative potency that had been assigned previously to the elements. Its five individual members bear a resemblance to the names of the five sense objects, but no correspondence exists in the functioning of the two. The tanmaatra-s are conceived as "extremely fine or subtle potentials" that combine to produce the corporeal world (For example,the mahaabhuuta-s). (75) While Vai'se.sika distinguishes between substances and (among other things) the qualities and specificities(vi'se.sa-s) which inhere in them, classical Saa.mkhya distinguishes between the nonspecific (avi'se.sa) subtle elements and the specific (vi'se.sa) gross elements which are generated out of them. SUMMARY: ELEMENTS OBJECTS OF THE SENSES, SUBTLE ELEMENTS, AND GROSS ELEMENTS Having thus suggested a possible explanation for the appearance of the classical Saa.mkhya tanmaatra-s, we can now understand the complex relationship between Araa.da's elements and the objects of the senses and II'svarak.r.s.na's subtle elements and gross elements. The early Saa.mkhya elements are found within the eightfold creative prak.rti, the latter generating the sixteen constituents of secondary matter through its underlying inherent nature of svabhaava. At this stage of philosophical thought, no difference is made between substance and quality, so no scrutiny of the substantive nature or corporeality of the elemental concept has yet occurred, as will happen within the Vai'se.sika school, In a manner which is not entirely clear, the five sense objcets (along with the other eleven tattva-s of secondary matter) are generated from prak.rti, and each of the five seems to have particular relationships not only with the senses but also with individual elements. This early Saa.mkhya scheme may have been affected by the Vai'se.sika analysis of substance and quality. As a logical consequence of this analysis, the general acceptance of the elements as corporeal substances may have stimulated P.269 Saa.mkhya to remove from them not only their status as primary tattva-s but also their previously assigned generative capacities. At the same time the five objects of the senses are no longer considered substantive entities but rather qualities or attributes of substantive entities that give them their specific characteristics. The necessary adjustments are made within the classical system by eliminating the five sense objects and relegating the elements to the lowest position in the evolutionary process ów a position indicative of their corporeal and gross substance. The five vacancies created by the exclusion of the sense objects are filled by the subtle elements, a new group within Saa.mkhya speculation that necessarily assumes the creative capabilities previously held by the elements and that allows them to serve as the generative source for the gross elements. THE KNOWER OF THE FIELD (K.SETRAJ~NA), PURUSA,AND AATMAN The soul or Soul is regarded both as aatman (B xii 20 and 81), and the knower of the field (k.setraj~na [B xii 20 and 80]), an association also common in the Mahaabhaarata.(76) In Araa.da's system both terms have individual and cosmic significance,(77) but their exact meaning is unclear. One way to explain thdir difference is to regard aatman usually as the "cosmic soul" and k.setraj~na as "that portion of the cosmic soul that is attached to the individual."(78) The difficulty becomes, of course, understanding exactly what the relationship is between the individual and cosmic soul. The best clue regarding the difference is given in Buddhacarita xii 80-81, in which the aatman (as soul) is understood to be unknowing (aj~na) and the knower of the field (k.setraj~na) to be knowing (j~na). Presumably this knowing is in regard to the field of primary and secondary evolutes, and the soul's true separation from it. Earlier, in Buddhacarita xii 65, there exists a description of the liberated knower of the field (k.setraj~na) as "that supreme Absolute (parama.m brahma) , without attribute, everlasting, and immutable". Two verses earlier, the term "self" (aatman) is used enigmatically: "But another, skilled in regard to the inner self, causes his self to cease by his self and since he sees there is nothing, he is declared to be one for whom nothing exists" (B xii 63). In this passage, the last of the 'selves' seems to be equated with the knower of the field in xii 64, and it is the latter who achieves liberation. Several things need to be said about these three enigmatic verses (B xii 63-65) in an attempt to clarify Araa.da's use of aatman and k.setraj~na in the early Saa.mkhya sections. To begin, it seems that the term k.setraj~na is the name given to aatman, when, as it gains liberation, it 'knows the field' of creation. Prior to liberation, aatman is aj~na, unknowing (B xii 80-81).(79) Next,I take the three references to "self" in Bud- dhacarita xii 63 to mean that the cosmic, 'knowing' self associated with Brahman causes the individual's inmost psychological nature or essence, 'the inner self', to cease its notion of a P.270 'personality' self. Finally, the supreme Absolute is not to be taken as a cosmic being but rather as a cosmic condition of mok.sa. Sen Gupta points out that had this term been understood as indicating a supreme God, the Bodhisattva certainly would have criticized the theory on these grounds.(80) Keeping all of this in mind, I reinterpret Buddhacarita xii 63 to mean, "But another, skilled in regard to the cosmic aatman, causes his unknowing self to cease by his k.setraj~na...." Of significance for the later doctrine of the classical puru.sa is that the difference between k.setra and k.setraj~na explicitly foreshadows the classical dualism. Furthermore, the unknowing aatman and the knowing k.setraj~na are reflected in the classical doctrines of the deluded puru.sa 'apparently' entangled in matter and the witnessing puru.sa conscious of its separate nature from it. The descriptions of the supreme Absolute in Buddhacarita xii 65 ("without attribute, everlasting and immutable") resemble those of puru.sa in Saa.mkhyakaarikaa XIX (possessed of isolation or freedom, inactive, and indifferent). Finally, the similarity between the individual k.setraj~na and the individual puru.sa-s is striking. Of course there are significant differences between Araa.da's and II'svarak.r.s.na's school.The classical scheme is much more insistent on the ontological separation of puru.sa and prak.rti than is the early separation between k.setraj~na and k.setra. One suspects that, to an adherent of classical Saa.mkhya, even the statement in Buddhacarita xii 64 that liberation occurs when the "knower of the field...escape[s] the body" would be considered to have unjustly compromised the absolute separation between the material and the nonmaterial principles. (81) Furthermore, the term aatman does not appear in the Saa.mkhya-kaaikaa,its transmigrating and indiv- idualizing functions having been assumed by the subtle body and aha.mkaara, respectively. THE BODHISATTVA'S REJECTION OF ARAA.DA'S SAA.MKHYA SYSTEM All of the Bodhisattva's refutations of Araa.da's Saa.mkhya doctrines challenge, in some way, the existence of the soul (aatman). Within this overall framework, the Bodhisattva's arguments can be divided into two categories: those describing the necessary continuation of samsar-ic potencies within an aatman; and those which criticize Araa.da's notion of knowledge. Regarding the continuation of samsar-ic potencies within an aatman, the Bodhisattva begins his refutation by saying that when the k.setraj~na achieves his separation "from the primary and secondary constituents" (B xii, 70), the inactivity of the mind, and the longevity of the state itself create the "imagination" of it being an eternal condition (B xii, 74). However, the three causes (hetu-s) of karman and transmigration ów the power of the act, ignorance, and desire ów still "remain in a subtle state" within the soul (B xii, 74) , since the latter contains the "causal conditions" in which they grow. Consequently, the soul itself is described as "a seed" for both further transmigration and further karman (B xii 70-71). Inevitably the soul will find " that it will again become bound from the continued existence of causal conditions" (B xii 71). Furthermore, the Bodhisattva asserts that the ego-principle (aha.mkaara, P.271 probably used in its animating and transmigrating sense described earlier) persists as long as does the soul (B xii, 76).(82) The next set of three arguments are those which are directed at the Saa.mkhya notion of knowledge, each of the three addressing a different meaning related to the word "knowledge" itself. The first argument located "knowledge" as "reason" and criticizes the Saa.mkhya liberation by saying that since the "activity of reason" is an attribute, a soul that possesses such an attribute necessarily becomes identified with it, just as a fire is identified with its attributes of outward appearance and heat. Liberation, therefore, has not been achieved (B xii 77-78).(83) What is at issue here is whether the knower of the field ever can separate permanently from its field, and the Bodhisattva is claiming that the k.setraj~na cannot. The Bodhisattva continues along these lines by stating that the very nature of a k.setraj~na, a knower of the field, necessitates that there be a k.setra, a field for it ot know, and this necessity of an orientation to a field precludes the knower of the field from ever being released permanently from it (B. xii 79-80). The Bodhisattva has not accepted the claim Araa.da made that the knower of the field obtains freedom from " the rushing torrent of birth and death" (B. xii 41) by "properly" discriminating the "mind, voice, intellect, and action" (B, xii 31) ów that is, "that which lacks intelligence, the seen" ów from "the intelligent....the unseen" (B. xii 40) . The Bodhisattva responds that discrimina- tion is not enough for a soul to gain permanent liberation, since its necessary orientation to the field of existence invariably draws it into the cycle of transmigration.(84) The final argument against Araa.da's liberation scheme is directed against the soul in its aatman or unknowing state. The Bodhisattva charges that the existence of the quality of unknowing need not be established through the existence of an aatman that lacks knowledge. As is the case with common things, like logs or walls, "the quality of not-knowing is well established" without them having an aatman (B. xii 81). When combined with the previous argument about the impossibility of a k.setraj~na ever gaining complete release from its field, the Bodhisattva seems to be saying that, if Araa.da's liberation system involves a change occurring from an unknowing to a knowing state, then neither state requires that an aatman exist for the change to occur. Nonetheless, the conclusion reached through each of these arguments is that everything resembling a doctrine of a soul has to be abandoned before there will be assurance that liberation from matter will be permanent. Beyond knowledge of the field is the complete "abandonment of everything" (B. xii 82). SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS A'svagho.sa, through the character of Araa.da, describes an early Saa.mkhya that on certain points has basic affinities with various other Saa.mkhya descriptions dating around the first centuries C.E. It is a Saa.mkhya of twenty-five principles, one principle standing rather separate from the twenty-four material tattva-s(prin- P.272 ciples.) This material group of twenty-four tattva-s is divided into primary and secondary forms. Primary matter, called prak.rti, is thought to be eightfold, and consists of avyakta, buddhi, aba.mkaara, and the five bhuta-s (elements). From these eight principles are produced the sixteen tattva-s of secondary matter, called vikaara (a production or derivative). (Unfortunately the text does not describe the specifics as to how this generation takes place.) These sixteen tattva-s include the usual five senses plus a sixth, manas (mind) (as was typical for this period of Indian thought), the five sense objects, and the hands and feet, the voice, and the organs of generation and excretion (elsewhere known as the karmendriya-s, the organs of action). All sixteen are considered to be uncreative and ungenerative. Underlying the eightfold prak.rti is a principle called svabhaava, which is thought to be the (inherent) nature by which the eightfold prak.rti is creative and generative.By the time of the classical scheme, the notion of a nature (or an inherent nature) causing the creation of the universe has become posited in the avyakta, which as "unmanifest force" carried a different meaning than does the first tattva of early Saa.mkhya, avyakta as "unseen force." This inherent nature that motivates generativity within classical Saa.mkhya does so through the three gu.na-s, and by having these three exist within avyakta, the latter obtains both attributes and characteristics, making it more plausible as the source of all creation. The basic scheme, however, of a horizontal emanation that exists in early Saa.mkhya's eightfold prak.rti reappears in the classical system's emanations from aha.mkaara of the karmendriya-s, the buddhiindriya-s, manas, and the tanmatra-s. While A'svagho.sa does not mention the three gu.na-s in canto xii, his omission simply may indicate that at this early stage they are not considered to be significant in the process of creation. The gu.na-s are conceived to be the three bhaava-s, states of being, having the moral qualities through which avyakta (unseen force) attaches a person to sa.msaara. The gu.na-s, as moral qualities in this text, are divided into two groups: those qualities and actions of the sattva gu.na that lead to higher rebirths (and eventual release); and those qualities and actions of the rajas and tamas gu.na-s that lead to lower births. In this twofold division one can see concepts similar to the Buddhist roots of good (=sattva) and evil (=rajas and tamas) which also determine a person's condition of rebirth. The cause or causes of sa.msaara are unclear,since Araa.da gives three different causal schemes, and the schemes themselves cannot be linked together. First, he claims the causes of sa.msaara to be wrong knowledge (aj~naana), power of the act (karman), and desire or craving (t.r.s.naa), and these three causes themselves function by eight factors. Next, he attributes transmigration to a fivefold ignorance, and immediately follows by saying that a person "wanders in the cycle of transmigration" because of his false identification with corporeal individuality. Early Saa.mkhya salvation is thought of as the increase of sattva with an accompanying extinguishment of rajas and tamas. The Buddha criticizes this P.273 Saa.mkhya notion of release by saying that if all three gu.na-s were permanent entities, then sattva could not destroy the other two, which thereby makes release impossible to achieve. Buddhism avoids the difficulty of permanent but non-liberating entities by describing the individual as being composed of five impermenant skandha-s, but one notes with interest that, with the exception of avyakta, the early Saa.mkhya primary and secondary emanations can be correlated with them. Having mentioned briefly the evolution of early avyakta into the classical tattva-s of the same name but different internal forces, we can say little about two of the remaining seven tattva-s of the early period, buddhi and aha.mkaara. From the Mahaabhaarata we know that buddhi may have been thought to be consciousness (cetanaa) or intellect (vij~naana), conceptualizations that have to be modified within the classical system so as to maintain the unconscious nature of prak.rti and her evolutes. Aha.mkaara(ego) probably has some association with attaching an animating principle to an individualiz- ed transmigrating soul. In the classical period it fully subsumes the individual aspects of aatman, while the transmigrating aspects of the latter are posited within the subtle body. Finally, aha.mkaara and buddhi in Araada's system probably has applicability more to notions concerning the individual than to the cosmos, since when the cosmos is referred to it is done only through mythological figures. Within the classical system their cosmological significance is expanded. Concerning the remaining five of the eight early tattva-s of prak.rti ów the five elements ów a considerable amount can be said. In the classical system they are not creative principles, and their closest approximation is the five uncreative principles lowest in the emanation process, the mahabhuuta-s. Their demotion to ungenerative tattva-s might have occurred under the same influence that also might have caused the disappearance of the five sense objects in the Saa.mkhyakaarikaa emanation scheme: the critical examination of the difference between substance and qualities undertaken in the Vai'se.sika school. The pressures that could have been felt as a result of this examination could have affected not only the new interpretation of the elements as mere substances within II'svarak.r.s.na's system, but also the removal from the emanation scheme of the five sense objects as a consequence of their new status as nothing but qualities or attributes of the organs of action (karmendriya-s). In the numerical places of the early elements are posited the five subtle elements (tanmaatra-s), and this replacement allows classical Saa.mkhya to both maintain the tradition of twenty-five tattva-s and provide the mahabhuuta-s with a generative source. While the distinction within Araa.da's system betweem k.setraj~na and aatman is not clearly delineated, it appears that the latter is the term applied to the former when aatman is still within the influence of sa.msaara. This distinction that is made between k.setraj~na (knower of the field) and k.setra (the field of matter) is a precursor to the classical dualism between puru.sa and prak.rti. P.274 The Bodhisattva's rejection of Araa.da's Saa.mkhya notion of liberation concentrates on the difficulties with the postulation of a soul. The first set of refutations address the question of the subtle samsar-ic potencies of the three hetu-s and aha.mkaara within a k.setraj~na. The next set of refutations criticize various notions of knowledge. One attack is against the notion of a liberating knowledge that is either one of "reasoning" or of "knowing the field of matter," since both qualify the eternal nature of the liberated state due to their necessary external orientation to an entity. The other attack implies that a state of unknowing exists independently of an aatman, just as the state of salvific knowing exists independently of k.setraj~na.In the final analysis, only the complete abandonment of everything ensures complete land eternal liberation. NOTES 1. E.h. Johnston, The Buddhacarita:or, The Acts of the Buddha Part I, Sanskrit Text; Part II translation, cantos I-XIV. (1936; reprint Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1972). All English renditions of these cantos, as well as references to the introductory remarks (indicated by Roman numerals), are from Part II. Translation of cantos XV-XXVIII are from the Tibetan, Acta Orientalia, XV. 2. Araa.da (Pali, A.laara Kaalaama) was, according to tradition, one of Gautama's teachers after the Bodhisattva's renunciation. Of the various sketchy accounts of his teachings, only the Buddhacarita indicates that his doctrines resembled Saa.mkhya-yoga. Even then, the dhyaana-s to which Araa.da refers were Buddhist, not orthodox Yoga, in nature. See G.P. Malalasekara, Dictionary of Pali Proper Names, I(London: Luzac and Co.,1960), p.297; also Indumate Karunartne, "AA.laara Kaalaama, " Encyclopedia of Buddhism, ed. G.P. Malalasekera, Fascicule A-ACA (n. p.: Government of Ceylon, n.d.), p.378; Biswanath Bhattacharya, A'svagho.sa: A Critical Study (West Bengal: Santiniketan, 1976),pp.403-409. 3. The term "saa.mkhya" itself appears in Mok.sad- harma 12.228.27, 28,36:12.232.1 (in reference to 12.231.5); 12.289.4-5; and 12.290.59-60. So cites Franklin Edgerton in The Beginnings of Indian Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965),p.36,n.2.Elsewhere appear references to "the path of knowledge" and descriptions of emanation systems that are Saa.mkhya in nature. 4. B pp.lvi-lvii; 172, n.33.Gerald Larson, however, says Johnston's claim that the common source was the Vaar.saga.nya school is based upon weak evidence. For Larson's detailed discussion see his Classical Saa.mkhya (Delhi:Motilal Banarsidass, 1969), pp.109, 151-155. 5. Edgerton, ibid., indicates that the term "saa.- mkhya: appears in the Bhagavadgiitaa at ii.39, iii.3 v.4-5. References to the system, however, appear elsewhere in the text, even though the term itself is not used. See Franklin Edgerton, The Bhagavad Giitaa (1944; reprint, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), pp. 196-198;R.C.Zaehner, The Bhagavad- Giitaa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp.139-141 203. An interesting interpretation of Saa.mkhya in the Bhagavadgiitaa is David White's "Proto-Saa.mkhya and Advaita Vedaanta in the Bhagavadgiitaa, " Philosophy East and West 29, no.4(October, 1979): 501-507. 6. Johnston believes that the older parts of the Bhagavadgiitaa could have been in existence in A'svagho.sa's day, having dated the poet's works from "between 50 B.C.and 100 A.D., with a preference for the first century A.D." (B., p.xvii) . Bhattacharya, Asvagho.sa, p.19, places the poet "about 100 A.D." 7. Larson,Classical Sa.mkhya,p.242. Dasgupta dates the Caraka Sa.mhitaa at 70 A.D. S.N. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, I(1922; reprint, London: Cambridge University Press, 1955), p.213. 8. For a critique of the Saa.mkhya system within the Caraka Sa.mhitaa, see Dasgupta, History of Indian Philosophy, pp.213-217. P.275 9. For a brief but informative discussion of the most obvious instances of Saa.mkhya metaphysics in the Upani.sads, see Robert Ernest Hume, The Thirteen Principal Upanishads (2d ed. 1931; reprint, New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp.8-9. The term "saa.mkhya-yoga" appears in 'Svet. U.6.13. 10. On the meaning of the word "Saa.mkhya : Edger- ton says "it is the rationalizing, reflective, speculative philosphical method.....[the] 'reason- method'. It seems a natural term to describe the method of gaining salvation by 'knowledge'" (Beginn- ings, p.36). 11. All quotes from classical Saa.mkhya are taken from Larson's translation of the Saa.mkhya Kaarikaa (SK). 12. Eliade dates the Saa.mkhyakaarikaa as being not later than the 5th century C.E. Dasgupta, however, dates it to about 200 C.E.Larson says that the Saa.mkhyakaarikaa was translated into Chinese between 557-569 C.E., so we can presume that the original existed before then. See Mircea Eliade, Patanjali and Yoga, trans. Charles Lam Markham (New York: Schocken Books, 1975), p.16; Dasgupta, History of Indian Philosophy, p.212; and Larson, Classical Sa.mkhya, p.4. 13. Franklin Edgerton, " The Meaning of Saankhya and Yoga, " American Journal of Philosophy 45, no.1 (1924): 32, see pp.36f; also Beginnings, pp.36-39. 14. See Larson,Classical Sa.mkhya, pp.128-139, esp. pp.133-136. 15. Larson, Classical Sa.mkhya, p.133. 16. The dhyaana-s which Araa.da describes are ones that, with a single exception, a Buddhist monk achieves. On the claim that the Saa.mkhya and the Yoga of the Buddhacarita do not represent distinc- tive schools but are two aspects of the same school, see Larson, Classical Sa.mkhya, p.130. On the relationship between orthodox Yoga and Buddhist dhyaana-s, including the ones described by Araada, see: Malalasekara, Dictionary, p.297; Louis de la Valle'e Poussin, "Le Bouddhisme et le Yoga de Patanjali, " M'elanges Chinois et Bouddhiques (1936-1937), pp.228-230. 17. Johnston divides early Saa.mkhya into three chronological periods-an atheistic stage, a theistic stage, and another atheistic stage. Larson, in contrast, prefers to avoid a chronological scheme, and instead wishes "simply to point to the various strands or traditions of speculation and to show how they come together in the later texts of the period" (p.139). For the purposes of this article, we have adopted an approach similar to Larson's. See: E.H. Johnston, Early Saa.mkhya (1937; reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1974),pp.80-87. 18. E.H.Johnston, The Saundarananda: or, Nanda the Fair (London:Oxford University Press, 1932). 19. All references to the Yoga Suutras will be taken from: James Haughton Woods, The Yoga System of Pata~njali, Harvard Oriental Series, vol.17 (1914; reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1972). 20. The sages listed by Araa.da are similarly cited in the Mahaabhaarata as being Saa.mkhya teachers. K.B.Ramakrishna Rao, "The Buddhacarita and the Saa.mkhya of Araa.da Kaalaama, " Adyar Library Bulletin 28 (1964): 232. 21. On the development of the term 'aatman' in the Upani.sads,see Hume,The Thirteen Principal Upanisads, pp.23-32. 22. For a discussion of the development of this term within the context of the Upani.sads, the Mahaabhaarata, and the Bhagavadgiitaa, see Zaehner, The Bhagavad-Giitaa, pp.333-335. The earliest use of the term is 'Svetaa'svatara Upani.sad 6.16, where it appears to be "an alternate word for the puru.sa of the Saa.mkhya system" (p.333). For its appearance in the Mahaabhaarata and the Pa~ncaraatra system, see Johnston, Early, pp.44-45. 23. In Edgerton's translation of Mbh. 12.298, the generation of a twenty-four principle material nature, similar to Araa.da's, is described. Beginning with the avyakta, each of the tattva-s of prak.rti emanate out of the previous one, and the objects of the sense emanate out of the elements. The rest of the process is jumbled. See Beginnings, pp.323-324. 24. Compare SK XIX. 25. As a consequence of the Tibetan and Chinese words used for "nature," there is some linguistic difficulty determining whether the original Sanskrit word was prak.rti or svabhaava, but the context of the argument leads Johnston to decide firmly upon the latter. See Early, pp.70-71; also Bvg. v.14. P.276 26. Johnston, B, p.lvix; Early, pp.70-71. 27. Johnston, Early, p.70. Put differently, the debate here is over the consturction of causal chains of existence within early Indian speculation. Karl H.Potter points out that these chains were areas of contention between the different schools. See his Presuppositions of India's Philosophies (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1963), pp.106-111. 28. SK X: "The manifest (vyakta) is caused,finite, nonpervasive, active supported emergent, composite, dependent. The unmanifest (avyakta) is the opposite." SK XI; (Both) the manifest and unmanifest are (characterized by the) three gu.na-s (qualities or 'strands'); undiscriminating, objective; general; nonconscious; productive; the puru.sa is the opposite of them, although similar (to the avyakta as characterized in vs.X.). 29. Johnston, Early, p.71. This is not to say, though, that the Saa.mkhyakaarikaa belief in the gu.na-s' functions is in any way a response to A'svagho.sa. 30. Johnston, Early, p.69. Compare B,p. lvii, how- 31. Larson,Classical Saa.mkhya, pp.113, 174;J.A.B. van Buitenen. "Studies in Samkhya, II," Journal of the American Oriental Society 77 (1957): 22-23; see SK XXV. 32. Johnston, B,p. lviii. He cites the meanings of gu.na in the epic verses as: (a) " 'quality' generally, " (b) "objects of the senses, " (c) "anything evolved, which is described as a gu.na of that from which it is evolved," (d)" qualities which serve to distinguish the varieties of the three gu.nas of prak.rti"; and (e) "the gu.nas themselves " [as they are known in the classical scheme]. 33. Johnston, B lvii. Johnston's interpretation of the early Saa.mkhya gu.na-s in the Mahaabhaarata as having solely moral functions is challenged by Van Buitenen, who claims instead that the gu.na-s had cosmic, evolutionary meaning. See J.A.B.van Buitenen, "Studies in Samkhya, I" Journal of the American Oriental Society 76(1956): 153, 155-156. Larson, however, correctly synthesizes van Buitenen's and Johnston's views (see pp.116-120). We can still accept, therefore, Johnston's discussion, at least as it applies to the Buddhacarita. 34. Johnston, B, p.lix. 35. Although A'svagho.sa never mentions the three roots of good per se, Johnston infers term from B ii, 56; xii, 68; and S, v. 17, where hetu works for good and not evil. See Johnston, B,p.xlii. 36. On this parallel,see Johnston,Early, pp.36-37. Edgerton, in his Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary, cites (s.v.) one of the Aku'salamuula slightly differently from Johnston; 'replacing' raaga with its synonym, lobha (desire, longing for greed) . Consequently, the three roots of good (ku'salamula) that Edgerton cites (s.v.) are alobha (non-desire) , adve.sa (non-enmity) , and amoha (non-delusion of mind, non-ignorance) . Franklin Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary, 2 vols. (1953, reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970). On the relationship between rajas and raaga see J.A. B.van Buitenen, "Studies in Saa.mkhya, III," Journal of the American Oriental Society 77(1957): 93. 37. Johnston, B, pp.101-102, n. 53. On the concept of rajas and tamas as a collective entity, see van Buitenen, "Studies in Samkhya, III," p.100. 38. Johnston, B, pp. xli-xlii. 39. Johnston points out that "within the Saa.mkhya range of ideas, " the meaning of moha "bears resemblance to the delusion of puru.sa, by which, when in contact with prak.rti, imagines, though it is really a separate entity, it is identical with it." "Some Saa.mkhya and Yoga Conceptions of the 'Svetaa'svatara Upani.sad," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland (1930): 860. 40. Johnston, B, p.xlii.He claims that this is not true in the later Abhidharma. For Nikaaya examples of the calming or suppressing of one's lower nature or passions, and the refinement of one's good nature, see Sa.myutta Nikaaya 1,5,8; xlvii, III, II, V; XLVII, III, v, vii, and so on. 41. Johnston, B, pp.xlii-xliii. For the choice of the meditational subject best designed to overcome a person's most active evil, see S, xvi, 53-67. 42. See Early,pp.35-36. On the complementary roles of Saa.mkhya and Yoga in the Mahaabhaarata and the Bhagavadgiitaa, see Edgerton, Beginnings, p.38; and "Meaning." On the opposition between sattva and raaga, see B vii 53. For a discussion on the belief that the purification of sattva is tantamount to release, see van Buitenen, "Studies in Saa.mkhya, III," pp. 98-99. 43. This argument could not have been used against II'svarak.r.s.n.a's Saa.mkhya, however, since "neither sattva as an independent principle nor sattva as emancipation for the individual are doctrines held by classical Saa.mkhya. We can conjecture that, with the radical otherness of puru.sa in P.277 II'svarak.r.s.na's atheistic work, sattva could at best play only a major role in the process of emancipation, but could not be emancipation itself. The necessary adjustment is made by making the means of emancipation be an acquisition of knowledge through a bhaava composed of sattva; ie., the bhaava j~naana..., while still insisting that emancipation lie beyond anything to be found in prak.rti, where sattva and the other gu.na-s existed." Stephen A.Kent, "Valentinian Gnosticism and Classical Saa.mkhya: A Thematic and Sturctural Study" (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Microfilm service, 1978), p.43 (M.A.thesis). On the role of sattva in classical Saa.mkhya's liberation scheme, see Stephen A. Kent, "Valentinian Gnosticism and Classical Saa.mkhya: A Thematic and Sturctural Comparison," Philosophy East and West 30,no.2(April, 1980):251-252. 44. Johnston, B, pp. xli-xliii; see Potter,Presup- positions, pp.102,103,112-113. 45. Johnston, Early, p.21. 46. ibid. 47. See Johnston, B, p.170,n.24. 48. On Araada's equating the fivefold ignorance to the five do.sa-s (faults) , see Johnston, B, p.172, n.34; Johnston, "Some," pp.862,873; compare YS ii.3. 49. See Johnston, B, p.lx. 50. Larson,p.111. For a valuable discussion of the rajas-ic and tamas-ic elements within the fivefold ignorance and the relationship between the fivefold ignorance and the rajas/tamas grouping, see van Buitenen, "Studies in Saa.mkhya, III," pp.100-101. 51. See Johnston, Early, p.35. 52. Johnson,B,p.lviii.The use of the term"prak.rti" in classical Saa.mkhya can be confusing, since it often appears as the general title for 'matter'. When the creation process is in progree, however, 'prak.rti' means but the 'starting point' from which the gu.na-s activate, and it is in this sense that the term is used here. 53. Johnston, Early, pp.69,71-72. On p.72 he also states that Araa.da's Saa.mkhya is the final developmental stage before the important association of avyakta with prak.rti (for example, the classical notion) was made. Furthermore, he says that the svabhaava theory could only have been held by anii'svara (atheistic) Saa.mkhya schools that did not accept an II'svara as being the creative force of the world. In theistic, ii'svara systems, such as the 'Svet.U., "the ii'svara himself has the function of creation and the necessity for a principle of svabhaava, separate from prak.rti and setting it in motion does not arise, and accordingly the use of the term in such systems is not frequent." 54. SK LV: "the puru.sa,which is conscious,attains there the suffering made by decay and death; until deliverance of the subtle body; therefore, suffering is of the nature of things (svabhaava)." Johnston, in contrast, claims that the (apparent?)connection between puru.sa and the manifest world is explained in the Yoga Sutras as being accidental (naimittika). See Johnson, B, p.lx; and Vaacaspatimi'sra's explanation of YS. ii.17 in Woods, The Yoga System, p.142. 55. Bix. 59-62 only mentions the elements fire and water, but the process by which they coalesce is still clear. In Early, p.67, Johnston identifies the group holding this materialistic view as the bhuutacintakas of the Mahaabhaarata (12.224.50, see 12.229.2ff) and who are better known as the Kvabhaavavaadins. 56. Johnston, Early, p.67. On p.69 he also claims that the classical gu.napari.naama theory might be borrowed"from the Yoga form of Saa.mkhya, " a reference to the Bhaa.sya on YS iii.13(in Woods, The Yoga System, p.213). 57. Johnston, Early, p.60, see p.72; B, p.lix-lx. Also see van Buitenen, "Studies in Saa.mkhya, III," pp.100-102,106. 58. Johnston, Early, p.83, For a brief history of the development of the jiiva aatman concept, see Kent, Valentinian...Study, pp.34-37, 53-55. Another probable function of aha.mkaara was to generate the bhuuta-s; see van Buitenen, "Studies in Saa.mkhya, II," p.23. 59. Also see B ix., 64, which is a description of the Saa.mkhya doctrine: "there are others who assert that the coming into being and the passing away from being is solely on account of the soul." 60. See Kent, Valentinian...Study, pp.34-37. 61. Or so claims Johnston, B,p.lvii. 62. Ibid., p.169, n.21. Concerning the place of Kapila and AAsuri within the Saa.mkhya system, see Larson, Classical Saa.mkhya, p.149 and SK LXIX-LXX. 63. More precisely, Prajaapati symbolizes " the bhuutaaman, here taken as equivalent ot aha.mkaara." P.278 Johnston, B,p.169,n.21.For the five Mahaabhaarata references equating Prajaapati with aha.mkaara, see Johnston, Early, p.17. 64. Johnston, B,p.170,n.21. Although the emanation process is unclear, one wonders whether the reference to Prajaapati and his sons should be taken as an indication that the five elements generate out of aha.mkaara. Johnston, "Some," p.864 claims that this was the common emanation pattern found in the Mahaabhaarata, as mentioned above in n.23. 65. Johnston, B,p.lxi. See also YS iii.26, and the accompanying Comments and Explanations. 66. Johnston, "Some," p.869. 67. Ibid. Johnston even claims that "spiritual functions" can also evolve from them. I do not know what he means by this, since, as I see it, all of the secondary tattva-s are material in nature. In some way, however, Johnston's claim may be related to the Yoga practice of meditation on the elements. See Mircea Eliade, Yoga, Immortality, and Freedom, trans. Willard R. Trask, Bollingen Series 76 (Now York: Pantheon Books, 1964), p.195; and Johnston's reference to "yogic absorption in the elements" in "Some," p.869. 68. Johnston claims this in "Some," p.870,although admitting that the evidence is scany to support it. While never explaining fully the process by which the eightfold prak.rti, through svabhaava, creates the secondary evolutes, he does offer a few remarks concerning how secondary matter was thought to have related to the elements: " Originally each member of the ['sabda] group was considered a gu.na [attribute] of one of the elements only...but the later theory...gives one element the qualities of all five, the next four, and so on to the last of one only." Ibid.,pp. 867-868. 69. Johnston, "Some," p.870. 70. Ibid.,p.867. The relationship between the five elements, the objects of the senses and the senses is very unclear. 71. See, for instance, Karl H.Potter, ed.,Encyclo- pedia of Indian Philosophies: Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology: The Tradition of Nyaaya-Vai'se.sika up to Ga.nge'sa (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1977), pp. 86-87; 112-119; 161-162; Erich Frauwallner, History of Indian Philosophy, trans. V.M. Bedekar 2 vols., (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1973), 2:14. 73. I borrow this basic argument from Frauwallner I, pp.272-274; see also Johnston, "Some," p.871. 74. On the intermediary stage between Araa.da's system and the Saa.mkhyakaarikaa, in which the eightfold and sixteen-fold dividision falls into disfavor in the Mahaabhaarata, see Johnston, "Some," pp. 870-871. 75. Larson, Classical Saa.mkhya p. 205; see Dasgu- pta, p.251. 76. See Edgerton, Beginnings, p.41, and n.2. 77. Sen Gupta, p.121; Larson, Classical Saa.mkhya, p.122. 78. Johnston, Early, pp. 54-55, based upon Mahaab- haarata passages; accepted by Larson, Classical Saa.mkhya, p.123. This is confused, though, when Johnston (B,p.lx) says that A'svagho.sa regards the soul "as an individual, not a universal." On the one hand, he fails to specify whether he is addressing A'svagho.sa's notion of aatman or k.setraj~na. On the other hand, he fails to clarify what he means by " universal" (especially in relation to the Mahaabhaarata notions of aatman as "cosmic" soul). 79. See Edgerton, "Meaning," pp.22-29. 80. Sen Gupta, p.122. 81. SK LXII: "Nothing, therefore, is bound,nothing released, likewise not anything transmigraces. (Only) prak.rti in its various forms transmigrates, is bound, and is released." 82. For a general discussion of the Buddhist at- tempt to explain " how bondage came about and how freedom is to be gained. " see Potter, Presupposi- tions, pp.113, 131. In their causal scheme the Buddhists avoid postulating attempt to prevent the problem of subtle but lingering karm-ic seeds. 83. For a critique concerning the setting forth of Truth or "Knowledge" within the classical Saa.mkhya scheme, see Potter, Presuppositions, pp.216-217. Although it pertains to the classical school, Potter's discussion is relevant here. 84. Commenting on B xii.79 (p.180), Johnston say, "the argument apparently is that the fact that the k.setraj~na is called 'sariirin [having a body] shows that it did not exist before there was a body for it to inhabit (the bond therefore being anaadi [having no beginning, existing from eternity]).