I. Introduction.

     This paper encourages  a conversation  between Buddhist
and  feminist  philosophers  by  drawing  out  a  previously
unrecognized  point of contact between them: both traditions
highlight  the  practice  of mothering  as a model  for  the
cultivation  of an ethic of compassion or care.  One form of
Buddhist meditation  -  notably expressed  in Tsong kha pa's
Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path (Lam rim chen mo)
-  cultivates  compassion  for all sentient  beings  through
meditation  on the practice  of mothering.  The goal of this
process is to cultivate the same kind of compassion  for all
sentient  beings that a mother exhibits toward her children.
In  Maternal  Thinking: Toward  a  Politics  of  Peace, Sara
Ruddick's  goal  is to give  voice  to, and consequently  to
learn how to value, the practice of mothering as a model for
other  moral  relationships,  including  what  she  calls  a
"politics  of  peace."  We  do  not  suggest  that  Maternal
Thinking ought to be adopted for the Buddhist canon, or that
the Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path should become
a feminist classic. Nor by focusing on these two texts do we
mean  to imply  that  they  represent  all  voices  in their
respective  traditions.  Tsong kha pa's text represents only
one of the four major schools of Tibetan Buddhism, and there
are other  Tibetan  scholars  who would  disagree  with  his
exposition of the practice of viewing all sentient beings as
being  like  one's  own  mother.  Similarly,  the  issue  of
mothering in feminist philosophy  is relatively  new;  there
are  feminist  philosophers   who  would  strongly   dispute
Ruddick's  orientation.  However, a  limited  comparison  of
these two texts reveals several provocative connections that
could potentially inform each tradition.

     In  the  two  sections  that  immediately   follow,  we
describe a Buddhist ethicof compassion  and a feminist ethic
of care.  We then draw out some  of the connections  between
these  traditions.  In the  final  section  we anticipate  a
possible objection to the comparison.
ˇ@
II. Ideas of Mothering in Tibetan Buddhism
ˇ@
     In the tantra system of Buddhism as practiced in Tibet,
ideas of mothering are central to spiritual practice, and in
order  to progress  in meditation  one must  gain  a direct,
intuitive  understanding  of the practices  of mothering  on
both personal and universal  levels.  An important  text for
this practice  is Tsong  kha pa's  Great  Exposition  of the
Stages  of the Path, an extensive  work  that  lays  out the
stages  of  the  path  to  enlightenment  from  a Mahaayaana
perspective.(1)  In  order  for  one  to  be  considered   a
Mahaayaanist, according  to  Tsong  kha  pa, one  must  have
generated  the mind of enlightenment  (byang  chub gyi sems,
bodhicitta), the existential  transformation  that marks the
beginning  of  thepath  of the  Bodhisattva, a compassionate
being who seeks the state of Buddhahood  in order to benefit
others.2   The  mind   of  enlightenment   is  a  resolution
personally  to undertake  to free all sentient  beings  from
suffering  through  one's  own efforts, and  its  generation
marks the beginning of the Bodhisattva path.

     The Bodhisattva is distinguished from "ordinary beings"
(so  so'i  skye  bo, p.rthagjana), those  who are  primarily
concerned  with their  own welfare  and happiness.  Ordinary
beings   are   those   whose   actions   are  motivated   by
self-interest and self-cherishing and who, although they may
occasionally  perform altruistic  actions, mainly seek their
own   happiness.   Bodhisattvas,  by  contrast,  are  mainly
concerned  with  others, and  their  religious  practice  is
motivated  by an intense  desire  to help them overcome  the
suffering to which all living beings are subject.

     The initial problem is that self-centered attitudes are
deeply  ingrained  in each of us, and in order to break them
we  must  cultivate  unfamiliar   attitudes  and  practices.
According  to Buddhism, all beings who are caught  up in the
continuous round of birth, death, and rebirth are subject to
suffering,  and  this  suffering  is  rooted  in  primordial
ignorance, an ignorance  that causes  beings to value things
that lead to suffering  and to devalue  things that can help
one to overcome  suffering.  Due  to misperceiving  reality,
beings come to view things like material  possessions, fame,
power, etc. as being conducive to happiness, and as a result
they generate  desire  for them.  This desire  in turn leads
them to commit  actions  that harm  and oppress  others  and
which inevitably rebound on those who commit them.

     According  to Tsong  kha  pa, beings  harm  and oppress
others in this way because of misperceptions that cause them
to see others as less valuable than themselves.  In order to
end the vicious  cycle of desire, oppression, and suffering,
it is necessary to reorient one's mind through developing an
understanding of the value of the other.

The primary  meditative  practice  through  which one brings
about  the  necessary  reorientation  is referred  to as the
"seven-point  cause and effect method."  This constitutes  a
training program through which one learns to value others as
much  as oneself.  The main focus  of this  practice  is the
kindness of one's own mother: one considers the various ways
in which  one's  mother  cared  for and  protected  one  and
develops a profound sense of love and gratitude  toward her.
The next phase of the meditation  involves  extending  these
feelings to include all other beings. The seven stages are:

1. Understanding  that all sentient  beings  have been
   one's mothers;
2. Remembering their kindness;
3. Wishing to repay their kindness;
4. Love: wishing that all beings have happiness and the
   causes of happiness;
5. Compassion: wishing  that all beings  be free  from
   suffering and the causes of suffering;
6.The  unusual   attitude   (lhag   pa'i   bsam  pa,
   adhyaa`saya):  vowing  to  work  to  free  all  beings  from
   suffering and establish them in Buddhahood;

7. The  mind  of  enlightenment: resolving  to  attain
   enlightenment for the sake of all sentient beings.3

     The practice is based on the Buddhist understanding  of
karma and rebirth, according  to which each person  has been
reborn an infinite  number  of times, and each lifetime  has
been  determined  and conditioned  by past actions.  Because
past rebirths  are numberless, and because  future  rebirths
are also numberless, a Buddhist  can conclude  that  she has
been  in  every  possible  relationship   with  every  other
sentient  being, and that every sentient  being has been her
motheˇFfather, best friend, etc.4

     The meditator  first  contemplates  the many  types  of
relationships  she has had with every other sentient  being,
and then realizes that she has done great harm to many other
beings  in the past: she has been  an executioner, murderer,
torturer, etc., and so there  is a great  debt owed to every
other sentient  being.  In addition, she also realizes  that
every other being  has been her own mother  and that just as
her own mother was almost unimaginably  kind, so every other
being  has been just as kind and has given  birth, cared for
and  nurtured   her,  loved   her  selflessly   and  without
qualification, and has forgone her own happiness for that of
her children.5

     At this point the meditator  focuses  on the specific
kindnesses  of her  own  mother: Imagine  your  mother  very
clearly in front of you.  Consider several times how she has
been  your mother  numberless  times, not only now, but from
beginningless  cyclic  existence.  When she was your mother,
she protected  you from all danger  and brought  about  your
benefit and happiness.  In particular, in this life she held
you for a long time  in her womb.  Once you were born, while
you still  had new hair, she held  you to the warmth  of her
flesh  and rocked  you on the tips  of her ten fingers.  She
nursed  you at her breast, gave  you  food  with  her mouth,
cleaned  your snot with her mouth, and wiped away your filth
with  her  hand.6
     In various ways she nourished you tirelessly.  When you
were  hungry  and thirsty, she gave  you drink, and when you
were cold, clothes, and when poor, money. She gave you those
things that were precious to her. Moreover, she did not find
these  easily? When  you  suffered  with  a fever  she would
rather have died herself than have her child die; and if her
child  became  sick, from the depths  of her heart she would
rather have suffered herself than have her child suffer.7

     The love  of a mother  for her  child  and the  child's
gratitude and love are the primary paradigms for cultivating
an attitude  of cherishing  all other beings.  Tsong  kha pa
assumes that the meditator  has a close bond with her mother
and that  when she contemplates  her mother's  kindness  she
will  wish to repay  it.
     The seven-point  cause and effect method is based on an
assumption  that  a mother's  love  for  her  child  is  the
strongest  love  of ordinary  beings, and this  becomes  the
model  for  Buddhist  practitioners.  The  purpose  of  this
practice is to make the meditator aware of the specific ways
in which her mother cared for and protected her. The passage
above graphically  describes  the various  types of kindness
that mothers  show to their  children, and the meditator  is
supposed  to understand  this in terms  of specific  acts of
extreme kindness. In other words, it is not enough merely to
grasp on an abstract level that mothers care for and nurture
their  children: one must also  understand  the depths  of a
mother's  love and the lengths  to which she will go to help
her children.

     After  becoming  aware  of the  kindness  of one's  own
mother, one then extends  to all other sentient  beings  the
feelings   of  love  and  gratitude   that   this  awareness
generates.  Then one considers  the fact that one's  present
life is contingent on various causes and conditions and that
one's present  relationships  are merely  accidental: in the
past, the person  who is now  one's  worst  enemy  was one's
mother  or dearest  friend, and one's friends  and relatives
were  one's  most  bitter  enemies.  Moreover, there  is  no
certainty  even with respect to present relationships: one's
enemy  can become  a friend, and one's  friends  can  become
enemies.  From  one's  own viewpoint, since  one has  cycled
beginninglessly, there are no sentient  beings  who have not
been one's friends hundreds of times.  Therefore, one should
think, 'Whom should I value?' 'Whom should I hate?(8)

     Contemplating in this way, one comes to understand that
there is no necessity for a particular person's being either
cherished or despised. Our relationships are accidental, and
there  is no  compelling  reason  to value  some  more  than
others. This is a crucial point, since Tsong kha pa contends
that  most  of the problems  of human  society  result  from
mistakenly  valuing some people more than others and viewing
some as worthy of either neglect or hatred. When one sees an
enemy suffering, not only is it not unbearable, but one also
likes  it.  When one sees the suffering  of someone  who has
neither  helped  nor harmed  one, one usually  just forsakes
that person.
     This  is  because  the  person  is  not  attractive  to
oneself.   When  one  sees  the  suffering   of  a  relative
[however], one cannot bear it. To the extent that another is
attractive  [to oneself], one experiences  the force  of not
being able to bear his/her  suffering.  One must generate  a
sense of the attractive  qualities  [of others]  and greatly
cherish and hold them dear. This is very important.(9)

     As he elaborates  on this  idea, the  reason  why it is
important  is that we create  and reify ideas  about others:
some are beloved, some  are hated, and some are neutral, and
these  latter  we view  with  indifference.  We all see such
neutral  people  every day: these are people  toward whom we
feel no particular  obligation  and whose sufferings are not
percieved  as having any connection  to us.  We pass them by
and quickly forget their sufferings.


     When our enemies suffer, however, a typical reaction is
pleasure, and we wish to see them suffer more.  Tsong kha pa
suggests that such attitudes are mistaken on several counts:
firstly, one's present  relationships  are merely the result
of causes  and conditions, and there is no necessary  reason
for them  to be as they  are.  In the past  we have been  in
every possible relationship  with every other person, and in
the future  best  friends  will become  bitter  enemies  and
enemies  will be our mothers  who will care  for and protect
us, with their livesif need be. Secondly, the attitudes that
are generated  by indifference  and hatred  lead  to further
conflict, fighting, and oppression.  We tend to oppress  and
devalue people toward whom we feel no particular attachment,
and rather  than valuing  them we treat them as means  to be
used for our own purposes.  When one fully  understands  the
kindness of one's own mother and understands  that all other
sentient  beings  have been equally  kind, however, then one
comes  to feel a pervasive  love that  extends  to all other
living  beings, even those toward  whom one previously  felt
animosity.

     The next step is to realize that one owes each sentient
being  a great  debt of gratitude  for past kindnesses  and,
thinking in this way, one resolves to repay each one.  After
considering  how best to accomplish  this, it becomes  clear
that at present one's resources are limited. Since Tsong kha
pa  is a Buddhist  thinker, it is  not  surprising  that  he
concludes  that the person  best able  to help  others  is a
Buddha, and so he suggests  that  at this  point  one should
decide  to become a Buddha  in order to benefit  others most
effectively.

     A  Buddha,  according   to  Mahaayaana   understandings
prevalent  in Tibet, is a fully  enlightened  being  who has
perfected  wisdom and compassion  to the highest  degree and
who then uses his/her wisdom and supernatural powers to help
others.

     But what relevance  do Tsong  kha pa's  ideas  have for
people  who do not accept  Buddhist  ideas  about  karma and
rebirth?  Does   this   text   have   anything   to  say  to
non-Buddhists? We would like to suggest that these questions
can be answered positively, and that Tsong kha pa's analysis
pinpoints  some of the root causes  of current  problems  in
interpersonal, interracial, intrasexual,  and  international
relationships.

     As he suggests, it seems increasingly  clear that large
and small battles are fought between people who have come to
view  each  other  as objects  and  as merely  members  of a
particular  group  of "others."  Each  person  constructs  a
reality   in  which  his/her  own  friends,  relatives,  and
companions   are  valued,  while  others  are  viewed   with
indifference  or even hatred  because  of fixed conceptions.
Such  conceptions  in turn  lead  to  acts  of  callousness,
cruelty, oppression, murder, and war, but if we could  learn
to cultivate  a sense of the value of other  people  and the
precariousness  of present relationships, perhaps this could
form the basis for a greater appreciation  of others.  Every
other person  is potentially  lovable, and everyone  has the
potential to love, care, and nurture, although in many these
potentials may be deeply submerged.

     Tsong kha pa's model provides a way to envision  others
as loving and lovable, even if at the present time it may be
difficult  to see  this.  These  ideas  will  be more  fully
developed in Section Five. ˇ@

III.  Feminist Moral Theory and the Practice of Mothering ˇ@

     As feminists  seek ways to express  what is distinctive
in women's  moral experience, there  has been a tendency  to
move  away from traditional  teleological  and deontological
theories   toward   contextualist   accounts   in  terms  of
friendship, appropriate trust, and caring.10

     One way to approach feminist  ideas about mothering  is
through the feminist literature on an ethic of care. Much of
this literature  begins with Carol Gilligan's  psychological
research on gender differences  in moral development.11  Her
work, in  turn, was  a response  to  the  work  of  Lawrence
Kohlberg.   Kohlberg  had  argued  for  a  theory  of  moral
development   in  several  stages,  moving  from  stages  of
interdependence - where moral judgments are made in response
to a particular  context  -  to a final stage in which moral
personhood  becomes  autonomous.  A mature  moral person for
Kohlberg  makes moral  judgments  that issue  from universal
rules.

     Echoing  Kant's  distinction   between  properly  moral
universal  imperatives  and non-moral, prudential  maxims or
customs, the distinction  for Kohlberg between the moral and
the prudential is that the properly moral is universalizable
. Such judgments require autonomous agents, agents who judge
by  reference   to  rules,  not  by  reference  to  personal
relationships.

     Generally, this rights-based approach to moral thinking
tends to emphasize  formalistic  decision procedures  and an
adversarial   understanding   of  moral   discourse.   Moral
deliberation  is detached  from  the body  and the emotions.
Gilligan's  research  indicates  that  Kohlberg's  hierarchy
distorts   patterns   of   moral   development    that   are
characteristic  of women.  Whereas Kohlberg's  hierarchy  is
represented  as depicting  the  ascending  stages  of  moral
development  per  se, they  are, in  fact, the  stages  of a
typical  man's  moral  development.  Those  stages  that are
characteristic   of  women  are  placed  at  the  bottom  of
Kohlberg's hierarchy.

     Women's experiences are more sympathetically understood
in  terms  of  the  recognition  of  a  plurality  of  moral
interests, contextual  decision  making, and  nonadversarial
accommodation of diverse interests. Women tend to understand
moral  personhood  as  relational  and  contextual,  not  as
autonomous.  The  body  is  understood  as moral  agent, and
emotions  are  not  cut out of the  moral  domain.  Gilligan
summarizes, " the  morality  of  rights  differs  from  the
morality  of responsibility  in its  emphasis  on separation
rather   than  connection,  in  its  consideration   of  the
individual rather than the relationship as primary.? "(12)

     In turn, the literature on an alternative ethic of care
itself  derives  from feminist  standpoint  theory: feminism
questions  the  "universality   imperative"  of  traditional
philosophy.13   Sara  Ruddick  quotes  Catherine  MacKinnon,
saying, Feminism  not only challenges  masculine  partiality
but   questions   the   universality    imperative   itself.
Aperspectivity  is revealed as a strategy of male hegemony.?
Nor  is feminism  objective, abstract, or universal.  Eminsm
does not begin  with the premise  that it is unpremised.  It
does not desire to persuade  an unpremised  audience because
there is no such audience.(14)

     A strategy  of masculinized  philosophy  is to disguise
itself as impartial, "objective," and nonpolitical.  It does
this through  the appeal to a universal, abstract, impartial
domain of "truths"  as foundational  for "truth."  Yet, this
disguises the fact that this very ploy to depict traditional
philosophy  as neutral and unbiased is itself political.  It
attempts  to  seize  the  domain  of  discourse,  making  it
impossible  to say within  that domain, "This  framework  is
political!  "  All  philosophies   represent  a  standpoint,
including  those  philosophies  that  have  most  vigorously
claimed not to be political.  Feminist  philosophy  does not
respond to these strategies of depoliticization  by claiming
a privileged, unbiased  foundation  for  itself.  It  seeks,
rather, to expose  the biases  of "unbiased"  philosophy  so
that they can become matters for debate.

     Western noral philosophy  has traditionally  begun from
just   such  universalistic   aspirations.15   The  standard
positions, such as Kant's deontological formalism and Mill's
utilitarianism,  have  been   presented   in  the  canonical
writings  as the alternative  moral theories.  Either duties
are to be judged by reference to categorical imperatives, or
by reference to a utilitarian  calculus.  But, in fact, both
alternatives  represent  typically universalizing  masculine
patterns  of  moral  thinking;   they  marginalize   women's
patterns of moral thinking by defining them as non-moral, as
matters of mere custom rather than morality.

     The universality  imperative  underlies the tendency of
traditional  philosophy  to dismiss typically  women's moral
thinking  as merely  personal.  The  difference  in  women's
patterns of moral thinking is evident in the fact that women
often tend to have trouble  responding  to the philosopher's
favorite  examples  of  moral  dilemmas, for  example, "What
should  one  do if stranded  at sea in a lifeboat  with  two
other people  and there  is only enough  food for two?" Such
bloodless philosopher's favorites, which assume scarcity and
conflict,16 are designed to be as noncontextual as possible.
It is not permitted to ask, for example, "Who am I, and what
are my interests?" or "Who are the other people, and what is
my relationship  to them?" The fact  that  one of the others
may be a daughter or son is irrelevant to the just decision.
These  issues  are outside  the  boundaries  of the strictly
moral.  John  Rawls'  theory  of justice  is  a contemporary
example  of just such a decontextualized  theory: he assumes
that  only if we operate  from  behind  a veil  of ignorance
which  shrouds  us  from  knowledge  of life  histories  and
context are we operating morally.


     The   transcendentalizing   character   of  traditional
philosophy  has made it difficult to grant that concrete and
embodied  practices  might  be  morally  instructive.   This
especially  includes the category "mother." Joyce Trebilcot,
in the introduction  to her anthology, Mothering: Essays  in
Feminist  Theory, neatly  spells out some of the distortions
that have resulted  from the patriarchal  demands  placed on
mothering: The mothering  typical  of patriarchies  helps to
perpetuate hierarchical  societal arrangements  in a variety
of ways: women  are required  to give birth only to children
of their  own race;  mothers  are required  to make children
conform to gender roles according to biological sex; mothers
are expected to transmit the values of the dominant culture,
whatever they may be, to their children, and more generally,
to  teach  their  children  to be obedient  participants  in
hierarchy;  and women  are expected  not  only  to reproduce
patriarchy  in children  but also  to care  for the  men who
create  and maintain  it.  No wonder  some women  refuse  to
mother, and urge us all to withdraw from mothering!(17)

     There are also issues of patriarchal control of women's
bodies  through  enforcement  of policies  concerning  birth
control and abortion. 	It is indeed not surprising, then,
that  some  feminists  reject  mothering  altogether   as  a
practice  that  inevitably  reproduces  patriarchy.  Jeffner
Allen, a radical  lesbian  feminist, has said, "I would like
to affirm the rejection  of motherhood  on the grounds  that
motherhood is dangerous to women."(18)

     Among  those  feminist  philosophers  who do choose  to
focus on mothering as a moral practice, therefore, this must
be understood  as a feminist  project.  It begins  from  the
recognition  that  mothering  as  practiced  in  patriarchal
societies  has been oppressive.  While it seeks to recognize
and affirm  the practice  of mothering  (and those  who have
been  mothers), it also  seeks  to transform  the  practice.
Furthermore, the focus  on mothering  among  feminist  moral
philosophers must be understood as an attempt to reformulate
what  counts  as an adequate  moral  theory  at a most basic
level. Taking the neglected practice of mothering as a model
makes it inevitable  that aspects of morality that have been
marginalized  -  the  body,  the  emotions, context-will  be
transfigured and given their proper places in moral theory.

     Sara Ruddick  assumes  a "practicalist"  conception  of
"truth."  By this she means that there  is no foundation  by
which all truths can be judged and that "distinctive ways of
knowing  and  criteria  of truth  arise  out  of practices."
Mothering is one such practice. "To be a 'mother' is to take
upon oneself  the responsibility  of child  care," she says,
"making  its work  a regular  and substantial  part of one's
working  life."19  Ruddick  grants that men can develop  the
practice of mothering  if they are willing to engage in such
work as a primary commitment, but she contends  that this is
comparatively rare.20

     Three  kinds of demands  are placed  on the mother: for
preservation, growth, and social acceptability. Mothers seek
to  meet  these  demands  by  works  of  preservative  love,
nurturance, and training.21 The mother seeks to preserve and
protect, to nurture  the child  physically, emotionally, and
intellectually, and to balance  the demands of society to be
acceptable   against   the  desire   for  authenticity   and
self-control.  These demands are obviously  complex, but one
aspect  that  deserves  to  be singled  out  is  the  bodily
dimension  of motherly care.  As Ruddick reminds the reader,
"[e]arly  mothering  is done  amid  feces, urine, vomit, and
milk."22  Commitment  to the work of mothering  does not end
with taking the kids to the movies on Saturday.

     Critical  to  Ruddick's  argument  is  the  claim  that
mothering is inherently  as ocial practice that is committed
to making  the world  into the kind of place where  children
can be preserved, nurtured, and trained. Thus, she says that
despite the travail that mothers sometimes  experience  from
unsympathetic  societies  or uncaring  family or friends, at
its best  the practice  of mothering  is "a struggle  toward
nonviolence."23  Certainly  not all mothers  are nonviolent,
nor do all women support social structures that are peaceful
and nonoppressive. But if one takes the demands of mothering
seriously, there  is  a  moral  direction  inherent  in  the
practice  of mothering  toward  making  the world a place in
which growth can be sustained. This movement has its own set
of virtues  that  are  generated  by the work  of mothering:
"Mothers  develop  the  mental  attitudes  of  scrutiny  and
humility.  We cannot  dominate  the  world"24  The  work  of
mothering is inherently collaborative.

     In  contrast  to  conceptions   of  morality  that  are
abstract  and  rule-bound, "It is the  nonviolence  of daily
life that is itself the goal to which longer-range aims must
be   adapted."   Paraphrasing   Gandhi,   Ruddick   says   "
preservation  and  growth  of  children  is  truth,  then  a
criterion  of  its  realization   is  that  it  be  achieved
nonviolently.?" "The way is the truth." "The process  is the
project."25

     There  is, as well, an epistemic  stance  that develops
out of mothering.  It is the practice itself which generates
other categories.  Ruddick remarks, "The concrete reality of
the  child's  life  is  what  generates  other  categories."
Mothering  is a concrete activity;  as such it generates  an
appropriate   kind   of   thinking,  a  "reflectiveness   of
concreteness [that] must be developed.?"26

     "Caring   labor"   is   regarded    with   disdain   by
intellectuals  just because it is inevitably  contextual and
concerned  with  the  body.  Yet,  its  very  standpoint  as
"subjugated  knowledge," as knowledge  that  is shaped  by a
process  that  is  oppressive,  means  that  it  produces  a
"superior" version of experience.  "Caretakers  are immersed
in the  materials  of the  world," Ruddick  says.27  Without
claiming an epistemically privileged standpoint based on the
claim to have grounded  knowledge  in an unbiased  epistemic
bedrock, feminism  tends  also  to reject  relativism.  Like
Buddhism, there  is a claim  to  superior  understanding  in
feminism. It claims to have a superior version of experience
just because of the experiences through which it was shaped.

ˇ@ IV .  Buddhist-Feminist Connections

     We do not overlook the fact that Buddhist  and feminist
conceptions  of mothering  are, to  some  extent, culturally
specific.  Tibetan  society holds mothers  and their typical
practices  in extremely  high  regard.  Thus, Tsong  kha  pa
assumes  that his readers  do have  the sort of relationship
with  their  mothers  that  makes  mothering  possible  as a
meditative focus. The contexts in which feminist theories of
mothering are being developed, by contrast, vary widely, but
are typically  understood  as oppressive.  Mothering  may be
idealized in Western societies, but its actual practices are
not sufficiently appreciated. Tibetans would be shocked, for
example, by the feminization of poverty that makes mothering
a ferociously  difficult process.  While these are important
considerations, they should not prevent  us from recognizing
points  of  contact.  Specifically, both  the  Buddhist  and
feminist traditions  begin with the contention that ordinary
human  life  is pervaded  by suffering  due to delusive  and
therefore oppressive  conceptual  schemes.  These conceptual
schemes tend to be normatively  hierarchical  and dualistic.
They define the eternal as higher, more fully real, than the
temporal. In both traditions, these hierarchies are regarded
as  abstractions   that  falsify  the  concrete  reality  of
thinking, acting, and being.


     We can begin to eradicate  these oppressive  conceptual
schemes  by coming  to distrust  the  tendency  to think  of
epistemic  and  ontological  categories  as  absolute.   For
example, both traditions have criticized the metaphysics  of
stasis, whether  the Hindu  idea  of aatman  or the  Western
philosophical  idea  of  substance.  Buddhist  and  feminist
traditions  bothcan  fairly be termed, in David Kalupahana's
words,   "adventure[s]   in   non-substantialism."28
     Both  criticize  the  distinction  between  theory  and
practice  when theory  is understood  as being prior to, and
more important  than, practice.  Thinking  is understood  in
both traditions  as being intimately  connected to practice:
theory informs practice, and practice  shapes what counts as
an adequate theory.

     In each tradition, moreover, release from oppression is
not  a  matter  of  committing  to  a  new,  more  accurate,
representation  of reality, to "another  philosophy."  It is
not simply a way of thinking, but a new way of being.  It is
the commitment  to a new "way"  or form of life, a path that
can  be  cultivated  through  attending  to precisely  those
practices that are marginalized  and therefore neglected  by
hierarchical modes of thinking.

     For both  the Buddhist  and feminist  traditions, moral
values  are context-specific.  They grow  out of a sense  of
antecedent  connection  to specific others such as one finds
in the practice  of mothering.  Both oppose a conception  of
morality as universal  and rule-bound.  Both emphasize  that
compassion  or care  can be cultivated.  One must  become  a
certain  sort of person, one must experience  the world in a
certain sort of way, to be moral.  Compassion and caring are
cultivated as mental and bodily responses to the world. They
are not just ways of thinking, but ways of being in physical
touch  with the world.  Both result  in a kind of knowledge,
but  it  knowledge   that  demands   to  be  called  "bodily
knowledge." Bodily knowledge is not the kind of knowing that
is usually  characterized  as theorizing  about  a Cartesian
"external  world."  Rather, it is the kind that results from
an  embodied  practice  of  cultivation.   As  such,  it  is
validated by the experience of a cultivated person.

     We  contend  that  it  is not  simply  a cross-cultural
accident  that Buddhist  and feminist  philosophy  focus  on
mothering.  Mothering  can only become an example of a moral
practice  when the ethical domain is defined as concrete and
embodied, when  theory  and  practice  mutually  inform  one
another,  and  when  change   and  growth   are  fundamental
categories, not  stasis.  It can  only  become  an  example,
furthermore,  in  contexts  that  value  typically   women's
practices.

     The focus on mothering is, therefore, deeply reflective
of each tradition, revealing  deep assumptions.  By focusing
on precisely  those  concrete, embodied  practices, such  as
mothering, that are marginalized, left unspoken, regarded as
"sub-philosophical" by dominant traditions - traditions that
teach us to value  the transcendental  and the unchanging  -
Buddhist  and feminist  philosophy  seek  to give  voice  to
unacknowledged  aspects  of  experience  as models  for  the
transformation  of experience  from  within.  While  neither
tradition  would claim privileged  epistemic or metaphysical
status  based on access  to an absolute, unchanging  source,
both  would   claim   a  kind   of  superior   understanding
distinguished by the fact that it is indelibly marked by the
process  through  which  it overcame  oppression.  As  Sandy
Boucher  writes: Buddhism  presumes  that  most  of  us  are
blinded by a veil of ignorance of our true nature.  Feminism
presumes  that we exist within  a hoary power  structure  of
lies and misconceptions  about  the nature  of human beings.
Both systems  allow  us to tear aside  the veil, dismantling
the forms that hide from us the true beauty and potential of
human  beings.  And  the  goal  of both  is liberation  from
limiting ideas and conditions. These correspondences explain
the  attraction  of Buddhist  practice  for  women  and  its
potential usefulness.  Many women see this practice as a way
to augment or continue  their own process  of self-discovery
and activism, for it offers techniques designed to awaken us
and bring us fully present to life.29

ˇ@
V. Concluding Remarks: A Possible Objection

     It  may  appear   that   there   is  an  insurmountable
counterexample  to  the  comparison  we have  been  drawing.
Buddhist  philosophy  has traditionally  regarded  itself as
gender-neutral  and apolitical, whereas feminist  philosophy
is often regarded as inherently  political  and seeks, above
all, a gender-based understanding of oppression. However, we
would  argue  that  this  stark  contrast   at  least  needs
modification, even if it cannot be entirely eliminated. Many
feminist  philosophers  have been  working  to critique  and
undermine  the  traditional  understanding  of the political
which distinguishes  categorically  between  the public  and
private  spheres  of life.  This distinction  has helped  to
construct women as private and domestic, and it has excluded
them from participation  in business, government, and higher
education. Feminist philosophers often object to claims that
public life can be defined  by a set of "neutral"  rules for
equitable  treatment  of all (gender-neutral) "agents."  The
neutral public sphere is an abstraction; it ignores the fact
that "the personal  is the political."  Out of this feminist
critique   of  the  public/private   dualism   emerges   the
possibility of a new understanding  of the interplay between
personal cultivation and social action.

     It is possible  to see Buddhism  as moving in a similar
direction.  The mythical  mother of the Buddha, Taaraa, says
that she revealed herself as a Buddha specifically to assist
women who seek enlightenment.  This implies  that there is a
gender  distinction  recognized  by Buddhist  philosophy  at
least among those who seek enlightenment, if not among those
who have reached it.30

     Buddhism  has always been dynamic  in the ways in which
it has been adapted  to local  conditions.  As Buddhism  has
found its way into Western  societies  it has been marked by
an increased awareness of the condition  of women, including
the oppressive  ways in which  women  have been  treated  in
Buddhism.  It has also been  marked  by an increased  social
awareness  that  has  blurred  the  traditional  distinction
between personal cultivation and social action.

     Recent  books  such as The Path of Compassion: Writings
on Socially  Engaged Buddhism  and Dharma Gaia: A Harvest of
Essays in Buddhism  and Ecology, and activist  organizations
like  the Buddhist  Peace  Fellowship, are examples  of this
merger.   There  have  been  important   Buddhist  community
development  projects,  such  as  the  Sarvodaya  Shramadana
Movement  in Sri  Lanka.31  In addition, some  distinguished
contemporary  Buddhists  who were not trained in the Western
tradition  (such as the Dalai Lama and Thich Nhat Hanh) have
successfully  blended messages of personal  cultivation  and
social awareness.  Despite a tendency  to devalue  political
activity,  throughout   Buddhist  history  there  have  been
notable  examples  of people whose Buddhist  values prompted
them to engage in political  and social  activism.  Thus, we
contend  that  there  is  no  inherent  discrepancy  between
spiritual  cultivation  and  social/political  activism.  We
suggest that a Buddhist/feminist conversation could engender
fruitful  new  directions  for  a  woman-oriented  ethos  of
compassion,  love,  and  caring  in  spiritual   and  social
development.


     From  its  earliest  beginnings,  Buddhism  has  warned
against the categories  society forces on us.  We are taught
to label ourselves and others, to reify these labels, and to
treat  them as absolutes.  As a result, we learn  to dismiss
the suffering  of others, like the "homeless"  (they brought
it on themselves, and they  chose  that life  anyway), "AIDS
patients"  (they're  mostly  gay, and so they  deserve  it),
"drug addicts"  (no one forced them to take drugs).  Through
this process of objectification  by labelling, we create the
"other."  Buddhism  suggests  that  this  is  an  inveterate
tendency   of  people  who  are  swept  up  into  oppressive
categories.  It is particularly  dangerous when this program
of objectif- ication becomes utopian and political.  Placing
one's hopes in political  activities  as if they offered the
promise  of eternal  happiness, when, in fact, the world  is
transitory, is  inevitably  followed  by  suffering, and  so
Buddhism counsels  against it (although, as we have seen, it
is still acceptable for a Buddhist to work for social change
if he/she  does  so with  the  proper  attitude  of selfless
concern for others).

     In comparison to this, the Buddhist meditative practice
we haveconsidered presents an alternative mode of being, one
based on an ethic of care and compassion, which  refuses  to
objectify  the other.  Through seeing oneself in relation to
other beings, it trains the mind and body to value the other
as much as oneself.  Moral cultivation  requires development
of a profound respect for and valuation  of virtues that are
defined by practices that are typically engaged in by women:
mothering, caring, nurturing, and love.32

     Thus, Buddhism suggests avenues for the development  of
an  explicitly   feminist   spirituality,  one  that  values
feminine  qualities  and modes  of being  and uses them as a
basis for personal and social development.

     We can see why both feminists  and Buddhists  develop a
healthy  skepticism  for  traditional  politics.  Historical
understanding  may lead  one to conclude  that the prospects
for fundamentally  changing  the world  through  "political"
activity are limited at best. Human history has been full of
wars and oppression, pogroms and genocides, cruelty, racism,
and sexism. Despite the appearance of innumerable people
with utopian models for human development, human history has
tended  to fall into predictable  and destructive  patterns.
There is little reason to hope that the present  age will be
any different, and so any political  activity  without deep,
personal  understanding  of  the  ways  in which  we project
oppressive categories onto others is unlikely to bring about
a major positive change.

    Buddhist  meditative  practices  combined  with feminist
awareness  suggest  some promising  avenues for exploration.
They suggest  that one's  present  problems  are mainly  the
result of negative, disabling  constructions  of reality and
that if one is being  oppressed, this is partially  a result
of agreeing  to a construction  of reality in which one is a
victim. Thus, the key to individual freedom lies within each
individual.  Each of us continually creates and hypostatizes
a perception of "reality," and this constitutes the world in
which we live. To the extent that this reality is oppressing
or oppressed, dysfunctional  or  self-destructive, one  will
bring harm to oneself  and others.  Through cultivating  and
extending  the  practice  of  mothering,  however,  one  can
transform one's "world," whether this is understood narrowly
or broadly.  Those  who force their  visions  of reality  on
others, who coerce and and seek to control others, generally
create  negative  effects, no matter  how noble their  goals
might be. Conversely, those who seek their ends through love
and compassion, who emphasize  the virtues of nurturing  and
care, tend to produce positive reactions  in the people they
meet.

     Both  Sara Ruddick's  discussion  of mothering  and the
meditative   practice  outlined  by  Tsong  kha  pa  provide
compelling  and thought-provoking  paradigms  through  which
human beings can transform themselves on an individual level
and, through self-development, have positive effects on
those  around  them  and on society  at large.  Our goal  in
presenting these preliminary thoughts and observations is to
initiate  a conversation  between  the two sides which could
prove mutually beneficial.

1 The version  of the Lam rim chen mo to which we will refer
  in this study is entitled  Lam rim mchan  bzhi sbrags  ma,
  which  contains  Tsong  kha pa's root text and interlineal
  commentaries  by Ba so chos  kyi  rgyal  mtshan, Sde  drug
  mkhan chen Ngag dbang  rab brtan, 'Jam dbyangs  bzhad pa'i
  rdo  rje, and Bra sti dge bshes  Rin chen  don  grub  (New
  Delhi: Chos  'phel  legs  ldan, 1972).  These  interlineal
  commentaries  are extremely helpful in ascertaining  Tsong
  kha pa's thought.
2 See Lam rim chen mo, p. 560.3 and Guy Newland, Compassion:
  A Tibetan Analysis (London: Wisdom, 1984), pp. 93-102.
3 Lam  rim chen  mo, p.  559.3.  See also: Jeffrey  Hopkins,
  Compassion  in Tibetan Buddhism (London: Rider, 1980), pp.
  23-56 and Geshe Lhundup Sopa and Jeffrey  Hopkins, Cutting
  Through  Appearances  (Ithaca, NY: Snow  Lion,  1989,  pp.
  81-94.
4 Throughout  this section, we use feminine pronouns, not to
  make a political  statement  or to suggest  that this is a
  spiritual practice that is only for women; we adopted this
  convention  because in this article we are suggesting that
  there are points of congruency  between this practice  and
  some concerns of contemporary feminism. Part of our reason
  in presenting  this paper  is that  we feel  that  Tibetan
  Buddhist meditations on mothering suggest fruitful avenues
  for the development  of a feminist spirituality, and so it
  seemed   appropriate   to  use  feminine   pronouns   when
  describing the meditations, which are thought by Buddhists
  to be appropriate to both men and women.
5 At this point someone  could object  that the logic of the
  practice  could  just as easily  lead one to hate  others,
  since  they also have been murderers, torturers, etc., and
  that there  is just as much reason  to feel emnity  toward
  them  as love.  This  objection  misses  the point  of the
  exercise, which is to give powerful  reasons  for love and
  to show that in the past one has loved and cared for every
  other sentient being, and so there is no particular reason
  to value some and not others, since the relationships with
  others  whom one currently  loves and cares for are merely
  the result  of accidental  circumstances.  Thus, there are
  equally good reasons for valuing all other beings.
6 As explained  in the commentaries, the last  three  things
  refer  to  common  practices  in pre-industrial  societies
  where pre-packaged baby food, Kleenex, and Pampers are not
  available.  One commentary explains that mothers will chew
  a baby's  food first  in order  to make it easier  for the
  baby to digest.  They will use their tongues  to wipe away
  snot from a baby's  face in order to avoid irritating  its
  skin, and will  even  use  their  own hands  to clean  the
  baby's  filth.  The main import of the passage  is to make
  the meditator aware of the depth of her mother's kindness.
7 Lam rim chen mo, p. 575.1. See also Newland, pp. 35-49.
8 Lam rim chen mo, p.  572.5; see also H.H.  the Dalai Lama,
  Path to Bliss (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion, 1991), pp. 150- 160.
9 Dgongs pa rab gsal (Dbu ma la 'jug pa'i rgya cher bshad pa
  dgongs pa rab gsal; Peking #6143, vol. 154), p. 7.2.6.
10.  Two recent anthologies  provide an overview of feminist
    moral  theory: Women  and  Moral  Theory, ed.  Eva Feder
    Kittay  and Diana  T.  Meyers  (Savage, MD., Rowman  and
    Littlefield  Publishers, Inc, 1987), and Feminist Ethics
    ed.  Claudia Card (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas,
    1991).  The latter is not generally  sympathetic  to the
    care perspective. On friendship see Janice G. Raymond, A
    Passion  for  Friends: Toward  a  Philosophy  of  Female
    Affection  (Boston: Beacon Press, 1986).  On appropriate
    trust see Annette Baier's  "Trust and Antitrust," Ethics
    96 (1986) and "What  Do Women  Want in a Moral  Theory?"
    Nous 19 (March 1985):53-64. The feminist journal Hypatia
    often runs articles on these issues.
11.  But see also Dorothy Dinnerstein's  The Mermaid and the
    Minotaur  (New York: Harper  &  Row, 1976) and Nancy
    Chodorow's  The  Reproduction  of  Mothering  (Berkeley:
    University  of  California  Press,  1978) for  important
    earlier statements.
12 Carol  Gilligan,  In  a  Different  Voice:  Psychological
    Theory  and  Women's   Development   (Cambridge,  Mass.:
    Harvard University Press, 1982), p.  19. This literature
    is, by now, enormous.  For more recent developments  see
    Women and Moral Theory, ed.  Eva Feder Kittay  and Diana
    T.  Meyers  (Savage, MD.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1987),
    Feminism  and Political  Theory, ed.  Cass  R.  Sunstein
    (Chicago: The  University  of Chicago  Press, 1990), and
    Women's Ways of Knowing: The Development of Self, Voice,
    and Mind (New York: Basic  Books, 1986).  Owen  Flanagan
    and  Kathryn  Jackson  ("Justice, Care, and  Gender: The
    Kohlberg-Gilligan   Debate   Revisited",   in   Feminist
    Political   Theory)  give  a  helpful  overview  of  the
    subject.  They point out several  changes  that might be
    helpful to Gilligan's  theory.  For example, whereas she
    depicts the alternative between a rights perspective and
    a care perspective in terms of a gestalt shift, Flanagan
    and  Jackson   argue   that  this  does  not  accurately
    represent   the  shift  that  occurs  between   the  two
    perspectives.  A gestalt shift, such as the duck-rabbit,
    only allows  the image  to be seen  as either  a duck or
    arabbit.  But research suggests that most people can see
    a particular  moral  situation  from the perspective  of
    either rights or care but that one of these perspectives
    is  regarded  as  more  important.  The  distinction  in
    importance   tends  to  be  gender   based,  with  women
    emphasizing  care and men emphasizing  rights  (Flanagan
    and  Jackson,  38-40) .   This  suggests  that  the  two
    perspectives   are   psychologically,   not   logically,
    mutually exclusive.
13 Sara  Ruddick, Maternal  Thinking: Toward  A Politics  of
    Peace (New York: Ballantine Books, 1989), pp. 128ff.
14 Ibid.,  p.   128.   Quoted   from  Catherine   MacKinnon,
   "Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda  for
   Theory," Signs 7 (3 1982), p. 534.
15 There have, of course, been exceptions, such as Hume. But
   it is precisely these exceptions  that have been the most
   interesting  to feminists.  See Annette C.  Baier, "Hume,
   the Women's  Moral Theorist?" in Women  and Moral Theory,
   pp. 37-55.
16 For an analysis of the ways in which the myth of scarcity
   has made competition  seem necessary  and unavoidable  in
   masculinized   philosophy,  see  Mary  Beth  Averill  and
   Michael  Gross,  "Evolution  and  Patriarchal   Myths  of
   Scarcity  and Competition."  See also Janice  Moulton, "A
   Paradigm  of Philosophy: The  Adversary  Method"  for  an
   analysis of Western philosophy as inherently  adversarial
   rather than relational.  Both are in Discovering Reality,
   ed.  Sandra Harding and Merrill B.  Hintikka  (Dordrecht,
   Holland: D. Reidel, 1983).
17 Mothering: Essays  in Feminist  Theory, Joyce  Trebilcot,
   ed. (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1984), p. 1.
18 In  "Motherhood: The  Annihilation  of Women," Mothering:
   Essays in Feminist Theory, p. 315.
19 Sara Ruddick, Maternal Thinking, pp. 13 and 17.
20 If  men  can  be  mothers, it  may  be  argued, the  word
   "parenting"  is  preferable  to  "mothering."   But  many
   feminists, including  Ruddick, believe that this fails to
   honor the fact that mothers  are, in fact, overwhelmingly
   women. It posits an ideal that is far from being realized
   as if it were real, and thereby  falsifies  the realities
   of patriarchy.
21 Maternal Thinking, chapters 3, 4 and 5.
22 Ibid., p. 206.
23 Ibid., p. 57.
24 Ibid., 71-2.
25 Ibid., pp. 170 and 171.
26 Ibid., pp. 78 and 98.
27 Ibid., p. 130.
28 David   J.   Kalupahana,  The   Principles   of  Buddhist
   Psychology  (Albany: State University  of New York Press,
   1987), p.  144.  Kalupahana  was  referring  to  Buddhist
   psychology, but in the same context he also discusses the
   philosophy   of  William  James,  which  bears  a  strong
   resemblance   to   Buddhist   philosophy,  according   to
   Kalupahana.
29 Sandy  Boucher, Turning  the Wheel (San Francisco: Harper
   & Row, 1988), pp. 2-3.
30 As  reported  by Taaranaatha  (The  Origin  of the Taaraa
   Tantra,  tr.  David  Templemen;  Dharamsala,  Library  of
   Tibetan  Works and Archives, 1981, pp.  11-12), in a past
   life  Taaraa  was a young  girl named  J~naanacandra, who
   Heard the teachings of a Buddha and generated the mind of
   enlightenment.  Some monks  who knew that she had done so
   advised  her  to seek  a male  body  in  her  next  life,
   contending  that  this would  be more  appropriate  to an
   enlightened  being, but  she  replied: There  is  no such
   distinction   as  'male'   and  'female'   and  therefore
   attachment  to  ideas  of 'male'  and  'female'  is quite
   worthless.  Weak-minded  worldlings are always deluded by
   this.  And so she vowed, 'There are many who wish to gain
   enlightenment  in a man's form, and there are but few who
   wish  to work  for the welfare  of sentient  beings  in a
   female form. Therefore, may I, in a female body, work for
   the welfare  of beings  right  until  sa.msaara  has been
   emptied.'
    The story and her response indicate  that although  from
   the  point  of view  of enlightened  beings  there  is no
   inherently   existent   difference   between  "male"  and
   "female", still worldly beings conceive in these ways due
   to  their  delusions, and  so  Taaraa, although  she  had
   personally transcended  such delusions, still perceived a
   need to continue  in a female  form for those who had not
   attained her level.  She indicates that this is necessary
   to provide  women  with  a role  model, a woman  who  has
   attained  Buddhahood, and to show  men who  are mired  in
   misogynist  conceptions  that  women  are able  to attain
   Buddhahood.  See also Stephan  Beyer, The Cult  of Taaraa
   (Berkeley: University  of  California  Press,  1973), pp.
   64-5.  For an extensive  discussion  of the discrepancies
   between  Buddhist  theory  and  the Actual  practices  of
   Buddhists  regarding  gender differences, see Diana Paul,
   Women  in  Buddhism  (Berkeley: Asian  Humanities  Press,
   1979).

31 See The Path of Comp assion: Writings on Socially Engaged
   Buddhism, ed.  Fred Eppsteiner (Berkeley: Parallax Press,
   1985) and Dharma  Gaia, ed Allan Hunt Badiner  (Berkeley:
   Parallax  Press,  1990).  For  information  on  Sarvodaya
   Shramadana,  see  Joanna  Macy, Dharma  and  Development:
   Religion as Resource in the Sarvodaya Self-Help  Movement
   (West Hartford, CT.: Kumarian Press, 1983; revised 1985).
32 The tantra system in particular explicitly esteems women,
   as is evidenced  by the  fact  that  the  fourteenth  vow
   required of all tantric practitioners  is "not to slander
   women, who are the source of wisdom." See Beyer, p.  405.