Mysticism and Logic In Seng-Chao's Thought

RICHARD H. ROBINSON
Philosophy East and West 8, no. 3/4, October 1958-January 1959.
(c) by The University Press of Hawaii.
p.99-120


. P.99 I. INTRODUCTION ANYONE WHO has followed in the pages of this journal the serpentine course of the disputes between Dr. D. T. Suzuki and his opponents will readily appreciate the confusion that beset Chinese Buddhist intellectuals around A.D. 400. As Słng-chao (374--414)(1) likening his times to AAryadeva's, says, "At that time, the Tiirhikas [non-Buddhists] ran riot, heterodoxies arose in conflict, and perverse debates umperilled the truth, so that the Right Way was nearly lost in confusion."(2) For Słng-chao and his contemporaries, Naagaarjuna and AAryadeva were the long-awaited guides to the Right Way. However, the modern disputants cannot share the ancients' assumption that there actually is one final answer. Neither the two Indian bodhisattvas nor their Chinese disciples can be taken as beacons in our contemporary debates on the relationship of the mystical to the rational. Nevertheless, in the process of analyzing the fifth-century Chinese analogues, certain aspects of this topical problem will be clarified. The muddle of Słng-chao's day arose from inattention to the offices that terms occupy in systems, from handling concepts promiscuously apart from their defining contexts. This was only to be expected in the intellectual flux of China around A.D. 400. New philosophical systems were being introduced from India, contradicting each other, and all claiming the adherence of Chinese Buddhists. Native Chinese thought was still in a state of riotous disequilibrium consequent upon the overthrow of Han orthodoxies . Thinkers were inventing, syncretizing, and synthesizing. Fashions in thought changed decade by decade. In this flux, excited but intellectually insecure monks alternately glorified the achievements of their day and lamented the corruption and instability of their degenerate age. This is _____________________________________________________ (1) Tsukamoto Zenryuu, ed., J(-+o) ron kenkyuu (Cha-lun Studies) Kyoto: H(-+o)z(-+o)kan, 1955), pp. 120-121, establisheds these dates as more probable than the traditional ones, 384-314. (2) Preface to the Twelve Topic Treatise, Taish(-+o) Shinshuu Daiz(-+o)ky(-+o) (Tokyo: Taish(-+o) Issaikyo kank(-+o)kai 1924-1934), LV, p. 77b15. p.100 the milieu in which Słng-chao thought out and recorded his ideas about man's relation to the Absolute. Słng-chao was one of the personal disciples and translating assistants of the great translator Kumaarajiiva. As a gifted stylist and independent thinker, he was instrumental in interpreting to his contemporaries the Maadhyamika teaching that Kumaarajiiva brought to China for the first time. His surviving essays, collected in the Chao-lun,(3) his commentary on the Vimalakiirtinirde'sa-suutra,(4) and his prefaces to Suutras and 'Saastras, constitute the largest body of literary remains of any Chinese Buddhist of that period.(5) The Chao-lun has been perennially popular among thinking Chinese Buddhists, but serious modern scholarship on Słng-chao begins with T'ang Yung-t'ung, in his History of Pre-Sui Chinese Buddhism.(6) Waiter Liebenthal's The Book of Chao(7) incorporates T'ang Yung-t'ung's work on the subject, presents the first modern and annotated translation of the text, and breathes a series of problems concerning Słng-shao's place in the history of Chinese thought and religion. A study group in the Univer sity of Kyoto, directed by Tsukamoto Zenryuu, translated the Chao-lun into modern Japanese, and produced a series of essays on separate topics. Their work was published in 1955 as Studies in the Chao-lun.(8) Thus, the basic stage in Słng-chao studies has been completed. However, a number of fundamental questions remain open to further inquiry. The first outstanding question concerns the character of Słng-chao's mysticism. Liebenthal's general view was that Słng-chao was primarily an ecstatic and that his writings were intended to hint at the content of an inexpressible ecstatic vision. "Though put forward as a theory of the Identity of Illusion and Reality, the Middle Path actually signified a personal mystical experience; in his vision, Chao saw the Absolute,-immutable, empty, or filled with the image of Nature itself, aloof and gracious."(9) "Without precluding further investigation, we may say that Chao's religious experience--his sudden discovery of a changed world--is similar to that of Ch'an monks."(10) The second question, whether Słng-chao's paradoxes signal a rejection _____________________________________________________ (3) Taish(-+o) XLV.150-161. (4) Taish(-+o) XXXVIII.327-419. (5) Walter Liebenthal, The Book of Chao (Peking: Catholic University of Peking, 1948), p. 9 (hereafter, Liebenthal). (6) T'ang Yung-t'ung, Han Wei Liang-chin Nan-pei-ch'ao Fo-chiao-shib (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1938), pp. 328-340. (7) See note 5, above. (8) Tsukamoto Zenryuu, op. cit. see reviews by A. Waley, BSOAS 19 (1957), 195-196 and P. Demiéville, T'oung-pao, XLV, Nos. 1-3 (1957), 221-235. (9) Liebenthal, p. vii. (10) Ibid., p. 41. p.101 of reason, is concomitant with the first. Liebenthal says, "Chao's intention is not to elucidate Buddhist theory, but to force the reader to admit the impossibility of solving the riddle of Existence by rational thinking The paradox itself, not its rational solution, is the priceless find he is seeking."(11) "He speaks in paradoxes. These do not make a theory, but are meant to lead the reader before the Gate of Mystery, to the borders of the Unknown, so that he may gaze into the unfathomable in a moment of ecstasy and share Chao's experience. What this experience contained, Chao does not say."(12) The third question concerns Słng-chao's formal reasoning and its relation to Naagaarjuna's. Liebenthal says, "Chao's syllogisms are not genuine prasa^nga [reductions to absurdity]. For Naagaarjuna merely refutes-mundane entities, but Chao wishes to establish the existence of supramundane ones."(13) Kajiyama Yuuichi(14) holds that Słng-chao's logic is wholly different from Maadhyamika. He also states(15) that worldly logic and supra-worldly logic ate different and must not be confused. He concludes that Słng-chao's understanding of Naagaarjuna was imprecise. However, neither Liebenthal nor Kajiyama and his colleagues examined the purely formal features of Słng-chao's reasoning. They judged it as to content and intention rather than as to formal structure. A common factor in these questions is the relation between mysticism and rationality. On this important point, previous Słng-chao studies have presupposed what Rudolph Otto(16) termed "the peculiar logic of mysticism, which discounts the two fundamental laws of natural logic: the law of Contradiction and of the Excluded Third. As non-Euclidean geometry sea aside the axioms of parallels, so mystical logic disregards these two axioms; and thence the 'coincidentia oppositorum,' the 'identity of opposites' and the 'dialectic conceptions' arise." This theory is stated precisely enough that it can be subjected to verification. It is important to do so, because the advocates of non-rational intuition ate continually exhorting us to forsake the rational, while the enemies of mysticism warn us against forfeiting our mason. As Suzuki says, "Paradoxical statements are therefore characteristic of praj~naa-intuition. As it transcends vij~naana (logic), it does not mind contradicting itself; it knows that a contradiction is the outcome of diffentiation, which is the work of _____________________________________________________ (11) Ibid., p. 38. (12) Ibid., p. 44. (13) Ibid., p. 32. (14) Chao-lun Studies, p. 216. (15) Ibid., p. 219. (16) Rudolph Otto, Mysticism East and West (New York: Meridian Books, 1957), p. 45. p.102 vij~naana. Praj~naa negates what it asserted before, and, conversely, it has its own way of dealing with this world of dualities. The flower is red and notred; the bridge flows and not the river."(17) This is the sort of thing that Bertrand Russell meant when he said, "The logic of mysticism shows, as is natural, the defects which are inherent in any. thing malicious."(18) Quite apart from the question of the validity of mystical experience, we may ask whether this is actually the logical pattern of mystical discourse. This can be decided piecemeal by examining individual mystical texts. As an example, I propose to examine selected passages from Słng-chao's writings, particularly those passages that have led other investigators to believe that he considered the irrational as the gateway to the transcendental. Maybe we cannot solve, or even express, the riddle of Existence. But we need not accept apparent paradoxes as rationally insoluble, or decide that strange sayings are illogical, until a proper rational and logical analysis has been attempted. II. SÉNG-CHAO'S MYSTICISM Liebenthal's opinion that S łn g-chao is a mystic is virtually incontrovertible. I intend merely to elaborate and define it further. We cannot learn much about his mystical experience, as he did not write any accounts of it. Naturally, very little about personal experience can be inferred from generalized doctrinal statement. S łn g-chao quotes so extensively, so few of his words are his own, that even his ordinary feelings do not show through his literary mask. Consequently, inquiry is restricted to his discourse about contemplation, rather than his contemplative experience. Liebenthal(19) ventures some conjectures about Chao's inner development. The conjectures that I will make at the end of this article are radically different from Liebenthal's, but are no less speculative. Document 1(20) Suutra: While not arising from the trance of cessation (nirodha-samaapatti) to display all the postures [walking, standing, sitting and lying down)--this is samaadhi [lit. "still-sitting"]. _____________________________________________________ (17) D. T. Suzuki, "Reason end Intuition in Buddhist Philosophy," in Charles A. Moore, ed, Essays in East-West Philosophy (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1951), p. 24. (18) Bertrand Russell, Mysticism and Logic (London: Penguin Books, 1953), p. 26 (reprinted from Hibbert journal, July, 1914). (19) Op. cit., p. 8. (20) Vimalakiirti Commentary, Taish(-+o) XXXVIII.344c14-21; Liebenthal, p. 39. p.103 Chao: When the Hiinayaanists enter the trance of cessation, then their bodies are like dry wood and lack the power of moving and functioning. When the Mahaasattva enters the reality-samaadhi, (21) his mind-knowledge ceases forever, and his body fills the eight directions. He acts in compliance with crucial occasions, and his responding and meeting are endless. In rising, moving, advancing and halting, he does not forsake correct deportment. His practice of samaadhi is also according to the ultimate. When it says above that he does not manifest body or mind in the three planes, it means that he displays all the postures. Now, because he has no displaying, he is able to have nothing that he does not display. Nothing not displayed is identical with the essence of no displaying. I hope that gentlemen who investigate the metaphysical will have the means to understand the respects in which the two are the same, and to make the same the respects in which the two are different. This is Słng-chao's doctrine of samaadhi. In his view, it is not a state of trance which precludes ordinary activities, but a state of enlightenment in which the Holy Man is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent. Słng-chao evidently understood these powers as the attributes of saints who had reached the non-relapsing (avaivartika) stage. He probably did not consider himself to be a bodhisattva of such august attainments, so this passage is to be taken as a description of someone else's samaadhi. Document 2(22) Suutra: As for samaadhi, not to manifest body or mind in the three planes is samaadhi. Chao: Now, in the samaadhi of the dharmakaaya, body and spirit have both ceased. The Way (bodhi) is cut off from ordinary sense-spheres, and it is something that seeing and heating cannot reach. How then is it samaadhi when one manifests a body in the three planes and cultivates thoughts? 'Saariputra still had worldly retribution and was born in a body. Because worldly retribution is the root of thoughts, he considered human company an annoyance, and "sat still" under a tree. He was not able to make his body and spirit devoid of traces, and so he incurred this criticism. The general intention behind [Vimalakiirti's] criticism [of 'Saariputra] is to benefit [him] greatly. It is not that [Vimalakiirti] held onto other and self and had thoughts in terms of affirmation and denial. In the Indian Buddhist epistemology that underlies Słng-chao's doctrine, vij~naana corresponds, not to reason, but to sense-perception. Vij~naana is awareness of an object in a specific sense-mode, including awareness of the mental event of the preceding moment.(23) The operation that abstracts characteristic marks from the percepta is termed kalpanaa (construction, Imagination), or vikalpa (imagination). Bodhi is nirvikalpaka-j~naana _____________________________________________________ (21) bhuutalak.sana-samaadhi. Cf, Étienne Lamotte, Le traité de la grande vertu de sagesse, tome I (louvain: Bureaux du Muséon, 1944), p. 325, and Ta-chih-tu-lun, Taish(-+o) XXV.97a20. (22) Vimalakiirti Commentary, 344b23-29. (23) Th. Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism, (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1923), pp.13 ff. p.104 (knowledge free from imagination). This distinction between cognition that apprehends determinate marks and cognition that does not figment determinate marks is the theme of Słng-chao's earliest essay, Praj~naa Has No Knowing.(24) It is apparent that the term "intellect" is not the same as either sensory awareness (vij~naana) or image-construction (vikalpa). In the classical Buddhist epistemologies, as in the Neo-Platonic, the sensible and the imaginable are not the only knowables. There are intelligibles that ate neither sensible nor imaginable. The intelligible as a class includes the imaginable, but is not included in the imaginable. What the bodhisattva transcends in the exercise of praj~naa is not the intellect but the imagination. Słng-chao viewed the samaadhi of the dharmakaaya as a supersensuous mode of illumination. It is devoid of "traces, " i.e., of discursive symbolisms and conceptions. It is not a mere trance-state experienced by a human being sitting still under a tree. This is not uniquely Słng-chao's notion of samaadhi, but is the explicit doctrine of the Vimalakiirti-nirde'sa-suutra, on which the above passage is an exposition. Vimalakiirti criticized 'Saariputra's samaadhi because contemplation that depends on the senses or the imagination is not the dharmakaaya contemplation. This does not constitute a repudiation of the intellect, though it means that the content of the highest contemplation cannot be learned by inference and transcends the sensible and the imaginable. The Neo-Platonic and Medieval concept of the "ladder of cognition" offers sufficient analogy to Słng-chao's epistemology that it may illuminate by comparison. Thomas Aquinas, summarizing the schema of Richard of St Victor, says: These six denote the steps whereby we ascend by means of creatures to the contemplation of God. For the first step consists in the mere consideration of sensible objects; the second step consists in going forward from sensible to intelligible objects; the third step is to judge of sensible objects according to intelligible things; the fourth is the absolute consideration of the intelligible objects to which one has attained by means of sense-data; the fifth is the contemplation of those intelligible objects that are unattainable by way of sense-data, but which the reason is able to grasp; the sixth step is the consideration of such intelligible things as the reason can neither discover nor grasp, which pertain to the sublime contemplation of divine truth, wherein contemplation is ultimately perfected.(25)...The ultimate perfection of the human intellect is the divine truth.(26) _____________________________________________________ (24) Chao-lun, Part III, Taish(-+o) XLV. 153-154; Liebenthal, pp. 67-85. (25) Thomas Aquinas, Selected Writings (London: J. M. Dent, 1939; Everyman's Library No. 953). p.201 (Summa Theologica, Of the Contemplative life, Fourth Article, Reply Obj. 3). (26) Ibid., p.202 (Reply Obj. 4). p.105 Here "intellect" is used in its traditional sense, which embraces the functions that are now termed "reason" and "intuition." Reason, operating through analogy, is dependent on what is already known. The rational is not confined to the sensible and imaginable, though it can apprehend a certain class of intelligible objects by way of sense-data However, certain intelligibles are not to be known through reason, since they afford no real analogies with the lower grades of intelligibles. From this follows t he Thomist counterpart of the Buddhist doctrine of the Two Truths (satyadvaya), "That nothing is predicated univocally of God and other things" and "That not all terms applied to God and creatures are purely equivocal."(27) It is plain from the Thomistic example that a theory of mysticism may postulate a contemplation of intelligible things that are not accessible to discursive reason, without repudiating reason or advocating irrationality. There is a perfectly rational Thomist explanation of the passages from Eckhart that Otto cited as examples of "the peculiar logic of mysticism."(28) Słng-chao does not seem to have used any term equivalent to "reason." In his epistemology, the primary distinction is between cognition that apprehends marks and cognition that does not. He does not deal with the distinction between thought that operates through formal analogy and thought that does not. Thus, it cannot be said that his writings accept or reject reason. They simply do not mention it. However, though the concept of reason is not mentioned, formal reasoning is very much in evidence in Słng-chao's works. His theory of knowledge must be distinguished from his own modes of thought and expression. Document 3(29) Suutra: Maitreya, you should bring these gods' sons to give up the view which imagines bodhi. For what reason? Because bodhi cannot be attained with the body and cannot be attained with the mind. Chao: Bodhi is true enlightenment, absolute knowledge of the markless. Its Way is void and metaphysical, sublimely cut off from ordinary sense-spheres. Hearers have nothing to insert their hearing in, and knowers have nothing to exercise their knowledge on.(30) Dialecticians have nothing on which to fasten their words. Symbolizers [i.e., I-ching diviners] have nothing with which to give shape to their primary dichotomy [between ch'ien (heaven) and k'un (earth)]. Therefore the character of its Way is that, being subtle and markless, it cannot be considered existent, _____________________________________________________ (27) Ibid., pp. 148 and 150 (Contra Gentiles). (28) Rudolph Otto, op.cit., p.45. (29) Vimalakiirti Commentary, 362e-3-14. (30) Tao-tł-ching, chap. 50: "The tiger has no place on which to fasten its claw; the weapon has no place in which to insert in blade." Here Słng-chao likens the inscrutability of bodhi to the invulnerability of the Taoist "Perfect Man." p.106 and as its function is exceedingly vigorous, it cannot be considered inexistent. Therefore, though it is able to mirror the myriad things abstrusely, it does not radiate.(31) Its metaphysical track "goes beyond the carriage" yet it does not obliterate [things]. It is so great that it comprises heaven and earth, yet it does not rest on any support. It bends and saves the deluded multitudes, yet it has no private motives.... So then, it is only bodhi, the Way of great enlightenment, that though it has no knowing, has nothing that it does not know,(32) and though it has no action (wu wei) has nothing that it does not effect.(33) This nameless dharma is certainly not anything that names can name. We do not know how to express it, so we arbitrarily call it bodhi. This unconditioned (actionless) Way surely cannot be attained with the body or the mind. Here Słng-chao defines the Buddhist concept of enlightenment in Taoist terms. It is both transcendental and immanent, unimaginable (acintya) and ineffable (anabhilaapya), yet omnipresent and omnipotent. This is a description of Divine Wisdom rather than an account of the experience of human bodhisattvas such as Słng-chao and his teacher, Kumaarajiiva. It looks more like a mystical theology than a mysticism. The question then arises, how did Słng-chao know the nature of bodhi? What connection was there between his own religious experience, and his doctrine of enlightenment? He did not say how he knew, but the answer can be inferred from his writings. The above passage, like many of his others, is a patchwork of phrases borrowed from Chuang Tz(-+u), Lao Tz(-+u), the I-ching, and the Maaayaana Suutras. The Neo-Taoist Classics were recognized as authoritative by the devotees of "metaphysical studies" (hsüan-hsüeh)-the gentlemen and gentleman- monks who appear to have been the public to whom Słng-chao addressed his essays. The Suutras possessed scriptural authority, and their truth was taken as axiomatic because they were the Word of the Buddha. Thus the truth of Słng-chao's fundamental principles was posited as a revelation, not based on experience (pratyak.sa) , and not established by inference (anumaana) from experience. Since Słng-chao's language is borrowed, we cannot say that it reveals his religious experience. Yet, for all we know, his experience may well have been profound, and he may have felt that his language expressed it in so far as language can express such experience. Borrowed and even trite phraseology often serves to express a very personal and intense psychological event Liturgics, for example, are standard and public, yet they provide vehicles for personal devotion. We cannot admit, as Joachim Wach would _____________________________________________________ (31) Cf. Tao-tł-ching, chap. 58: "Though it lights, it does not shine." (32) Cf. Chao-lun, Part III, Taish(-+o) 153a27; liebenthal, p. 71; Document 13, below. (33) Tao-tł-ching, chap. 48: "Though there is nothing that it does, there is nothing htat it does not do." p.107 have it, (34) that the intensity of religious awareness can be discerned through scrutiny of recorded utterances. Yet, by the use of certain phrases, Słng-chao signals his adherence to a tradition on the question of illumination, and so enables us in some measure to understand his ideas, though not his inner life. Document 4(35) All-knowledge (sarvaj~nataa) is the ultimate of knowledge... the manifold figures are mirrored together. It is only all-knowledge that has no knowing yet has nothing that it does not know. For what reason? If there is mentation (citta), then there is a field.(36) If there are fields, then there are boundaries. When fields and boundaries have taken shape, then one's knowledge has limits. When one's knowledge has limits, then one's cognition is not all-embracing. The Perfect Man has no mentation.(37) As he has no mentation, he has no held. As he has no field, he has no boundaries. Since he has no fields and boundaries, his knowledge is limitless. Since his knowledge is limitless, the range of his cognition is boundless. Therefore he is able to know all the dharmas in one thought, at one time. In this theory of knowledge, mentation is consciousness of determinate objects and specific attributes. It is directed to the realm of the sensible and the imaginable. It cannot comprehend the subtle and markless. Omniscience is possible only when cognition is not limited by determinate boundaries. Document 5(38) Now, the existent arises from the mind, and the mind arises dependent on the existent. False notions keep to the realm of affirmation and negation, and so divergent theories about the existent and the inexistent are disputed pell-mell. As for one who can make his ideas empty, merge his mind into the sphere of the absolute, sublimely keep to the center of the circle,(39) and contemplate existent and inexistent as a unity, though his knowledge pervades the myriad things, it is never existent, and though his abstruse mirroring has no cognition it is never inexistent. Therefore he can equalize heaven and earth, considering them as one in significance, without erring from the actuals. He mirrors the manifold existents with his metaphysical intelligence, yet things and self are a unity. Because things and self are a unity, his _____________________________________________________ (34) Joachim Wach, The Comparative Study of Religions (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), especially p.35. (35) Vimalakiirti Commentary, 365a8 ff. (36) Chuang-Tz(-+u), chap.2, Chuang-Tzu-pu-cheng (shanghai: Commercial press, 1947), P.1B.17b; also James legge, the Writings of Chuang-tzu, sacred Books of the East, vol. XXXIX (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1891), p. 185. (37) Wu-hsin ÁLĄ▀ (no mentation) is a common phrase in the chuang-Tzu commentary of kuo Hsiang (died A.D.313) . See Chuang-Tzu-pu-cheng, 1A.12a-b, 1A.16a, 1B.13a, 1B.28b, 2B.1a, 2B.9a, and 2B.24b; also see Fukunaga K(-+o)ji, Chao-lun Studies (cf. notes 1,8, above), pp. 254-255. This Neo-Taoist term was taken up by the Ch'an sect. See D. T. Suzuki, The Zen Doctrine of No-mind (London: Rider a Co., 1949). (38) Vimalakiirti Commentary, 372c17; Liebenthal, p.33. (39) Chuang-Tzu, chap. 2, 1B.13b; Legge, S.B.E., vol. 39, p.183. p.108 knowledge has no operation of cognition. Because he does not swerve from the actuals, he is himself identical with each thing. In Documents 4 and 5, the function of praj~naa or bodhi is defined as merging the opposites and knowing unity. Praj~naa is knowledge free from the subject-object distinction. The individuality of the myriad things is not obliterated, yet they are known as free from plurality. This is the well-known mystic vision of one in all and all in one. The Chinese term translated as "cognition" in passages 4 and 5 is chao ĚË, which concretely means "shine, illuminate." By the fourth century A.D., it had become a regular term for "cognition." In Słng-chao's later writings, it indicates cognition by praj~naa in particular, a specialization of meaning that is to be found also in Ch'an literature. In its later use, it may be translated "intuition." Here, however, it comes close to "intellect."(40) "Mirroring," in the above passages, designates the cognitive aspect of Praj~naa. The mirror occurs commonly in Chuang Tzu and in the Mahaayaana Suutras as a figure for perfect, effortless, and non-dualistic cognition.(41) Słng-chao certainly presents a mystical philosophy, yet he has left not so much as one sentence of explicit spiritual autobiography. Perhaps he considered that the recounting of his experiences would have been prideful and immodest. Certainly the Buddhist tradition contains numerous warnings against publicizing one's attainments, and in this tradition there was no Augustine to show how in writing an autobiography, a devotee might humble himself and glorify the Other. The result is that we know only Słng-chao's doctrines on the subject of samaadhi. Tsukamoto Zenryuu says: Though the (Neo-Taoist) metaphysician Słng-chao might be proud of himself, the monk Słng-chao had nothing to boast about. Depending on the absolute monarchial authority of Yao Hsing, the non-Chinese "Heaven-prince," associating with a teacher who lived with court women and with the elders of Kumaarajiiva's school who received official emoluments and contended for authority and advancement, the young Słng-chao, overwhelmed by the stimulus of doctrines from the continual new translations, let wider thoughts about the suffering of living beings be concealed and also tended to forget to examine the basis in actuality of himself and the people, who were profoundly separated from the Holy One, and as he was not blazing with ardent aspiration for the experience of enlightenment, it was inevitable that he should end up not indicating a concrete empirical method for realizing the Holy Mind.(42) _____________________________________________________ (40) P. Demiéville, Le Concile de Lhasa (Paris: presses universitaires de france, 1952), p.78,n.2. (41) P. Demiéville, Le miroir spirituel (Basel: Verlag fur Recht und Gesellschaft, 1947), Sinologics I. 1, p.112-137. (42) Chao-lun Studies, p.160. p.109 In this passage and in many others, professor Tsukamoto has vividly stated the metal dilemma at the heart of a religious enterprise supported by the secular power. Yao Hsing was zealous, but high-handed, and though he was a lavish donor to the cause of the Dharma, he did nor hesitate to make monks break the code of the very vinaya (monastic rule) that was translated under his patronage. Nevertheless, though Słng-chao was a favorite of Yao Hsing's, it is not legitimate to say that he forgot about the sufferings of living beings, or that he was not fired with zeal for the realization of bodhi. Słng-chao's moral life was undoubtedly beset by severe conflict, but probably even his closest contemporaries were in no position to judge it, and certainly we nowadays cannot. As for "a concrete empirical method for realizing the Holy Mind," by which Tsukamoto says later that he means a manual of dhyaana (contemplation), it should be noted that Kumaarajiiva's first translation was such a text, the Bodhisattva-dhyaana,(43) which was requested by Słng-jui, one of the elder distinguished monks, who became Kumaarajiiva's leading disciple and a favorite of Yao Hsing's. Słng-jui's biography says that he practiced dhyaana assiduously and became noted for his sanctity.(44) Słng-chao might well have practiced the methods of contemplation prescribed in this text, which is a Hiinayaana manual with a Mahaayaana appendix attached to it. However, he would have done so with the full realization that such practices were imperfect dhyaana and led to inferior samaadhis. It is more probable that the study of the Suutras and 'Saastras and the contemplation of their doctrines were his "concrete empirical method for realizing the Holy Mind." As with the later Chinese San-lun School, he most likely con sidered that the elimination of wrong views through dialectic was an efficacious method leading to revelation of the truth. III. LANGUAGE AND TRUTH. Słng-chao frequently discusses the relation of language to fact, and the problem of talking about the unimaginable. In the Vimalakiirti Commentary, his statements on the subject are seen in the context of the Suutra's teachings about language and truth, of which they are simply elucidations. Document 6 The making of words arises from erroneous apprehension. In the dharmas, there is nothing to be apprehended, so they are intrinsically devoid of words and marks. _____________________________________________________ (43) Taish(-+o) No. 614, XV.269-286. (44) Taish(-+o) L. 362a22ff. arthur F. Wright, trans., Słng-jui Alias Hui-jui, in Leibenthal Festchrift, Sino-Indian Studies, vol. V, Parts 3 & 4 (Santiniketan: Visvabharati University, 1957), p.274. p.110 The wise do not cling to false designations.(45)... He only says that the marks of the dharmas cannot be expressed. He does not fasten words onto the marks of the dharmas. This language is the end-point of language.(46)... [The Tathaagata] cannot be named by names, and cannot be marked by marks.(47)...To have words about the wordless is not so good as to have no words about the wordless.(48) Some passages in the Chao-lun clarify these statements: Document 7(49) The flourishing of words and traces produces divergent paths (heterodoxies). But wards have something that cannot be expressed, and traces have something that cannot be traced. Therefore the skillful speaker of words seeks to express what cannot be expressed, and the skillful tracer of traces seeks to trace what cannot be traced. The word rendered "traces" also means "footprints." It refers to the literary remains of the ancient sages. The allusion is to a passage in Chuang Tzu(50) where the footprint is contrasted with the shoe that made it Słng-chao is stressing that meaning does not reside in language but is inferred from it. Document 8(51) If you Seek a thing through a name, in the thing there is no actual that matches the name. If you seek a name through a thing, the name has no efficacy to obtain the thing. A thing without an actual to match its name is not a thing. A name without efficacy to obtain a thing is not a name. Therefore, names do not match actuals, and actuals do not match names. Since them is no matching of names and actuals, where do the myriad dharmas occur?... Thus we know that the myriad things are not absolute, but arbitrary designations. Słng-chao here expresses a position that 'Suunyavaadins and Taoists both held, namely, that actuality cannot be articulated into a set of discrete actuals ordered homologously to an ideal language. He repudiates the notion of a one-to-one correspondence between entities and words. This is what he calls "the doctrine of names." It looks like the doctrine of Late Chou philosophers such as Hsün Tzu, who maintained that it is possible to define terms so that they correspond to actuals.(52) The term "actual" (shih, ╣ŕ ) is the Late Chou logicians' expression for the existential coun- _____________________________________________________ (45) Vimalakiirti Commentary, 352c2. (46) Ibid., 399a27. (47) Ibid., 411a27. (48) Ibid., 399b29. (49) Chao-lun, Letter to Liu I-min, Taish(-+o) XLV. 157a6 ff.; Liebenthal, p. 109. (50) Chuang-Tzu, chap. 14, 5C.20b; legge, S.B.E., vol. 39, p.361. (51) Chao-lun, part II, Emptiness of the Non-Absolute, Taish(-+o) XLV. 152c20; liebenthal, p. 65. (52) The Works of Hsüntze, H. H. Dubs, trans. (London: Arthur Probsthain, 1928), chap. XXII. pp.281-299. p.111 terpart of a term. The "doctrine of names" is rather similar to one that Bentrand Russell once put forward: "The first requisite of an ideal language would be that there should be one name for every simple, and never the same name for two different simples."(53) Russell, unlike Hsün Tzu, was not optimistic about the possibilities of constructing an ideal language. Słng-chao seems to have been aware that even an ideal language would correspond only to a conventional interpretation of reality, and not to reality itself. IV. SENG-CHAO'S PARADOXES. A pattern that occurs in Document 3 is repeated time and again in Słng-chao's writings. It is, "Though bodhi has no knowing, there is nothing that it does not know; though it has no action, there is nothing that it does not effect." Document 9(54) The dharmakaaya has no presence yet there is nowhere that it is not present. Because it has no presence, it is not present at a [particular] place. Because there is nowhere that it is not present, it is not apart from places. These paradoxes are easily resolved when it is recognized that "knowing," "action," and "presence" are used in two different senses each--the mundane sense (laukika-satya) and the absolute sense (paramaartha-satya). This is the doctrine of the Two Truths that underlies the seeming contradictions of the Praj~naa-paaramitaa Suutras. Bodhi does not know in the mundane sense, because mundane knowing is directed towards the sensible and the imaginable. However, bodhi is all-knowledge (sarvaj~nataa`) because i t knows the own-being of things, namely, their lack of own-being. Liebenthal's opinion that Słng-chao was trying to establish positive conclusions about the existence of supramundane entities stems partly from his translating as "it contains every object"(55) what I render as "there is nothing that it does not know. It is to be noted that "there is nothing that it does not know" is not interchangeable with "there is something that it does know. The first proposition is true even when there is nothing at all, while the second is true only when something exists. _____________________________________________________ (53) Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1922), "Introduction" by Bertrand Russell, p.9. (54) Vimalakiirti Commentary, 411b8. (55) Liebenthal, p.32. p.112 Some features of this paradoxical pattern must be explained with reference to Słng-chao's concept of negation and opposition. This can be worked out from the following passage. Document 10(56) To say that [praj~naa] is not existent is to say that it is not affirmed as existent, but does not mean that it is affirmed as not existent. To say that it is not inexistent is to say that it is not affirmed as inexistent, but does not mean that it is affirmed as not inexistent. It is not existent and it is not not existent; it is not inexistent, and is not not inexistent. This passage obviously concerns the tetralemma (catu.sko.ti). The formula is stated in the Muula-madhyamaka-kaarikaas, XVIII. 8:(57) "Everything is real,. or not real, or both real and not real, or neither real nor not real--this is the accommodated teaching of the Buddhas." The commentary on this verse in the Chinese Chung-lun, translated by Kumaarajiiva while Słng-chao was studying with him, is as follows: Document 11(58) As for "everything is real," when you search for the real-nature of the dharmas, [you find that] they all enter the absolute truth, are all equal,and have the mark of oneness, that is, absence of marks. It is just like the different colors and different tastes of all streams which become one color and one taste when they enter the great ocean. As for "everything is unreal," when the dharmas have not entered reality (tattva or bhuutalak.sa.na), they are seen through discrimination one by one and are all devoid of reality. They only exist because of the combining of conditions. As for "everything is both real and unreal, " there are three classes of living beings-superior, medium, and inferior. The superior look on the marks of the dharmas as "not real and not unreal." The medium look on the marks of the dharmas as "all both real and weal." The inferior, because their powers of knowledge are shallow, look on the marks of the dharmas as "partly real and partly unreal." Because nirvaa.na and the unconditioned dharmas are imperishable, they look on then as real Because sa^msaara and the conditioned dharmas are counterfeit, they look on them as unreal. As for "[everything] is not real and not unreal," the Buddha declared 'not real and not unreal' in order to refute "both real and unreal." Question: In other places, the Buddha declared "detachment from not-real-and-not-unreal." Why does it say here that "not existent and not inexistent" is what the Buddha declared? _____________________________________________________ (56) Chao-lun, Letter to Liu I-min, Taisho 156b26; Liebenthal, p.106. (57) Number refers to chapter and stanza of Louis de La Vallée Poussin, ed., Muula-madhyamakakaarikaas. Bibliotheca Buddhica (St. Petersburg: Imperial Academy of Sciences, 1903-1913), vol. IV. (58) Taish(-+o) XXX.25a18-b2. p.113 Answer: In Other places, it was declared in order to demolish the four kinds of attachment. But here there is no discursive fancy (prapa~nca) towards the tetralemma. When one hears the Buddha's declaration, then one attains bodhi. Therefore he says, "not real and not unreal." Candrakiirti in his Prasannapadaa gives a somewhat different interpretation of the stanza in question.(59) He considers the tetralemma as an expedient device (upaaya) that the Buddha uses in giving progressively higher instruction to the different grades of beings. First, the Buddha speaks of phenomena as if they were real, in order to lead beings to venerate his omniscience. Next, he teaches that phenomena are unreal, because they undergo modifications, and what is real does not undergo modifications. Thirdly, he teaches some hearers that phenomena are both real and unreal--real from the point of view of worldlings, but unreal from the viewpoint of the saints. To those who are practically free from passions and wrong views, he declares that phenomena are neither real nor unreal, in the same way that one denies that the son of a barren woman is white or that he is black. These interpretations are concerned with the content and intention of the formula, and only incidentally indicate its logical structure. In a previous article, I suggested a possible logical interpretation.(60) I postulated a quantification for the terms of the four propositions, and produced a correlation with the four Aristotelian forms. The tetralemma is thus tranformulated into: "'All X is A', or 'All X is non-A' or 'Some X is A and some X is non-A' or 'All X is A and all X is non-A'". The word shih ČO, translated "affirm" in Document 10, behaves in a puzzling way. It will be interesting to discover what logical meanings it may have. First, let us assume that Słng-chao understood the terms of the tetralemma to be quantified as in the preceding paragraph. Let "P" stand for "Praj~naa," add "E" for "existent." The key propositions then are: "P is not E, and P is not non-E," and "P is not non-E, and P is not non-non-E." These are both in the form of the fourth lemma. If this lemma is to be interpreted as "No P is E, and no P is non-E," then fei-shih (it is not affirmed) equals "no," and shih (affirm) equals "at least some, any." Taking shih in this way as an existential quantifier, the logical structure of Document 10 may be formulated: (a) "P is not E" means "No P is E." (b) "P is not E" does not mean "Some P is non-E." _____________________________________________________ (59) J. W. De Jong, Cinic chapitres de la Prasannapadaa (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1949). pp. 27-28. (60) Richard H. Robinson, Some Logical Aspects of Naagaarjuna's System, Philosophy East and West, VI. No. 4 (January, 1957), 301. p.114 (c) "P is not noon-E" means "No P is non-E." (d) "P is not non-E"does not mean "Some P is non-non-E." (e) "P is not E, and P is not non-E." (f) "P is not non-E, and P is not non-non-E." Substituting according to (a) and (c), (e) becomes: "No P is E, and no P is non-E," (f) becomes: "No P is non-E, and no P is E." Thus it appears that (e) and (f) are identical. Since the two constituent propositions of the fourth lemma are each other's contraries ("No P is E," and "No P is non-E") the negation of their respective predicates leaves the whole lemma unchanged; the operation is infinitely regressive. Document 12(61) It is like the three positions--east, west, and middle--with regard to each other. When we say that the middle is not the east, we do not say that it is identical with the west. On the basis of the preceding statements, we should say "To say that it is 'not east' is to say that it is not affirmed as 'east,' but does not mean that it is affirmed as 'not east' and that 'not east' is determined as 'west.' To say that it is 'not west' is to say that it is not affirmed as 'west: but does not mean that it is affirmed as 'nor west' and that 'not west' is determined as 'east.'"... Answer: "If 'the not existent and not inexistent' is affirmed as the middle why labor to use the term 'middle' separately? East, west, and middle are like this, coo. Further, 'not east' is not necessarily identical with 'not east.' [i.e., one "not east" is not necessarily identical with any other "not east."] 'South' and 'north' are also not 'east.' 'Not west' is not necessarily identical with 'not west.' 'South' and 'north' are also 'not west.' If you pattern 'not existent and not inexistent' on 'not east and not west,' then you can understand it." The analogy of the directions poses the problem in terms of the different kinds of opposition. "Not east" is the contradictory of "east," but "west" is not the contradictory of "east;" but only its contrary. Yüan-k'ang seems to be aware of the problem of extension and of a kind of indeterminacy of complements. However, his analogy leads him astray, since "existent and inexistent" is a two-term pattern, while the directions constitute a five-term system. The spatial illustration presents the idea of contr ariety vividly, but obscures the principle of the quantity of terms on which the distinctions between different kinds of opposition depend. Several passages in the Chao-lun support the supposition that Słng-chao understood the tetralemma as involving quantification. "In some respects the myriad things are not existent, " and "In some respects the myriad _____________________________________________________ (61) Yuan-k'ang, Chao-lun Shu, Taish(-+o) XLV.188a9. p.115 things are not inexistent." "Since in some respects they do not exist, they cannot really exist." "Since in some respects they do not inexist, they cannot really inexist."(62) Another passage in the same essay reiterates Słng-chao's acceptance of the fourth lemma: "'Not existent and not inexistent' is indeed speech about Absolute Truth."(63) Given the general rules of interpretation that I have extracted from Document 10, Słng-chao's paradoxes do not violate the rule of contradiction. They are simply oxymora--rhetorical paradoxes. V. SÉNG-CHAO'S SYLLOGISMS In form, the essays in the Chao-lun are a composite of rhetorical exposition and formal demonstration. Rhetorically, devices from Taoist literature and from the 'Suunyavaadin Suutras such as the Praj~naa-paaramitaa and the Vimalakiirti-nirde'sa are blended together into a thoroughly ambivalent style. In the formal demonstrations, which are the particular concern of this article, Słng-chao imitates Naagaarjuna's formal reasoning, though he also employs forms that Naagaarjuna did not use. His attempts to use the hypothetical syllogism are of special interest, as this was prominent in Naagaarjuna's reasoning, but relatively unimportant in both the 'Suunyavaadin Suutras and Taoist literature. Fallacy of the Antecedent Consider the structure of this section of Document 4: "If there is mentation, then there is a field. If there are fields, then there are boundaries. When fields and boundaries have taken shape, then one's knowledge has limits. When one's knowledge has limits, then one's cognition is not all-embracing. The perfect Man has no mentation. As he has no mentation, he has no field. As he has field, he has no boundaries. Since he has no fields and boundaries, his knowledge is limitless. Since his knowledge is limitless, the range of his cognition is boundless." The propositional form of this argument is: This is a remarkable chain of four successive implications, However, the syllogism is invalid, because it exemplifies the fallacy of negating the antecedent four times, once in each stage of the conclusion. It is evident that, in spite of the formal complexity of the successive implications, Słng- _____________________________________________________ (62) Chao-lun, Part II, Taish(-+o) 152b18 ff.; Liebenthal, pp. 62-63. (63) Ibid., Taish(-+o) 152b28; Liebenthal, p. 63, last two lines. p.116 chao was not aware of the nature of implication, at least when he wrote this passage. A simpler variety of the same construction occurs in Praj~naa Has No Knowing.(64) Document 13 If there are some things that are known, then there are some things that are not known. In the Holy Mind there are no things that ate known. Therefore there are no things in it that are not known. The propositional form of this invalid syllogism is: A further interesting feature of this argument is the initial implication, which expresses Naagaarjuna's concept of negation as the complement of 1 finite extension, universal and null terms being excluded from consideration.(65) Compare Madhyamaka-kaarikaas, XIII.7: "If something non-empty existed, then there might be something termed empty," and XXVII.18: "If 'both eternal and non-eternal' were established, then 'neither eternal nor non-eternal' might be established" Probably Słng-chao constructed this argument in imitation of one of Naagaarjuna's syllogisms which commit the fallacy of the antecedent, for example, Madhyamaka-kaarikaas VII.17: "If any non-arisen entity occurred anywhere, then it might arise; but, since it does not exist, the entity cannot arise."(66) Document 14(67) Would you say that they inexist? Then annullist views would not be erroneous. Would you say that things exist? Then eternalist views would be correct. Because things are not inexistent, annullist views are erroneous. Because things are not existent, eternalist views are not correct. The form of this argument is: It consists of two hypothetical syllogisms in tandem. In both, the antecedent is negated, and the argument is fallacious. _____________________________________________________ (64) Chao-lun, Part III, Taish(-+o) 153a27; Liebenthal, p.71. (65) Robinson, op.cit., pp. 299-300. (66) Ibid., p.297. (67) Chao-lun, part II, Taish(-+o) 152b26 ff.; Liebenthal, p.63. p.117 Modus Ponens There are two valid examples of the affirmation of the antecedent in Emptiness of the Non-Absolute. Document 15(68) If you would say that they exist, their existence arises non-absolutely. If you would say that they inexist, their forms have taken shape. Having forms and shapes, they are not identical with the inexistent; being non-absolute, they are not real existents. The logical structure Of this passage is easier to see if it is reworded as follows: (1) If things' existence arises non-absolutely, then the things do not really exist. The existence of things arises non-absolutely. Therefore, things do not really exist. (2) If things have shapes, then they do really inexist. Things have Here, as in Document 14, there are two hypothetical syllogisms in tandem. shapes. Therefore, they do not really inexist. However, in this case the syllogisms are valid, though not rigorously stated. Modus Tollens Document 16(69) If the present reached the past, there should be the present in the past. If the past reached the present, there should be the past in the present There is no past in the present, so we know that it does not come. There is no present in the past, so we know that it does not depart. This argument consists of two hypothetical syllogisms in tandem; In both, the consequent is negated, and thus both are valid instances of modus tollens. Document 17(70) If the myriad things were inexistent, then they should not arise. If they arise, then they are not inexistent. Thus we know that because they arise from conditions, they do not inexist. The second implication is a valid conversion of the first, obtainable by negating the consequent of the first. The conclusion follows validly from either the first implication (by modus tollens) or the second implication (by modus ponens). _____________________________________________________ (68) Chao-lun, part II, Taisho 152c16; Liebenthal, p.65. (69) Chao-lun, Part I, Things Do Not Shift; Taisho 151c14 ff.; Liebenthal, p.53. (70) Chao-lun, Part II, Taisho 152c6; Liebenthal, p.64. p.118 Dilemmas As the dilemma was one of Naagaarjuna's favorite devices,(71) there is some interest in comparing Słng-chao's dilemmas with Naagaarjuna's. Contrary to expectation, I have found only two dilemmas in the Chao-lun, both in the first essay, Things Do Not Shift. Document 18(72) What other people mean by motion is that because past things do not reach the present, they move and are not still. What I mean by stillness is that because past things do not reach the present they are still and do not move. [According to others] they move and are not still, because they do not come. [According to me] they are still and do not move, because they do not depart. This dilemma is an inference of contradictory conclusions from the same reason. Most of Naagaarjuna's dilemmas, though, draw the same conclusion from contradictory reasons, for example, Madhyamaka-kaarikaas XXV. 1--2: "[Opponent:] If all this [world] is empty, then there is no arising and perishing, and no one's nirvaa.na through abandonment or cessation is asserted. [Naagaarjuna:] If all this [world] is non-empty, then there is no arising and perishing, and no one's nirvaa.na through abandonment or cessation is asserted."(73) Document 19(74) Since [other people] know that past things do not come, they think that present things can pass. [But I say,] since past things do not come, where do present things go? What does this mean? If you seek past things in the past, they are never inexistent in the past. If you seek past things in the present, they ate never existent in the present. They are never existent in the present, so we understand that things do not come. Because they are never inexistent in the past, we know that things do not depart. If next we examine the present, the present likewise does not pass. Słng-chao contradicts the opponent's conclusion that present things can pass,while he accepts his reason--that past things do not come. This is a dilemma of the same type as that in Document 18. V. CONCLUSIONS ABOUT SENG-CHAO'S LOGIC (a) Słng-chao's paradoxes are only apparent, and ate easily resolved by the doctrine of the Two Truths and by determining the quantity of his terms. _____________________________________________________ (71) Robinson, op.cit., pp. 303-304. (72) Chao-lun, Part I, Taish(-+o) 151a22; Liebenthal, pp.47-48. (73) Robinson, op.cit., p.304. (74) Chao-lun, Part I, Taish(-+o) 151a28; Liebenthal, p.48. p.119 (b) He understood the terralemma, and thus had some knowledge of the logic of classes. (C) He employed the hypothetical syllogism but not as frequently as Naagaarjuna. Like Naagaarjuna, he sometimes violated and sometimes observed the rules of conversion. Thus his control of simple propositional logic was poor. (d) He constructed very few dilemmas, and those that he did construct were not of the same type as Naagaarjuna's commonest dilemmas. (e) In view of the foregoing, I conclude that Słng-chao was not antilogical, though his manipulation of logical forms was imperfect. He tried to reason formally, and sometimes succeeded. This inquiry has been concerned chiefly with features of Słng-chao's reasoning that have counterparts in early Maadhyamika writings. His logical forms also owe much to the Chinese tradition. He uses the so-called "chain syllogism,"(75) and his preference for carrying two arguments in tandem obviously belongs to the p'ien-wen (double-harness literary style) tradition.(76) This, though, is another subject. VI. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS It cannot be established that Słng-chao's paradoxes themselves, rather than their rational solution, ate the goal. These paradoxes, like Naagaarjuna's, serve to demonstrate that reality cannot be described by means of the concept of own-being (svabhaava) and with terms that exactly match actuals. But if one understands the rational solution to these apparent contradictions, then one is brought face to face with the mystery of the relation between symbols and actuals. Słng-chao's syllogisms do not aim to establish the existence of supramundane entities any more than Naagaarjuna's did. The Indian master and his Chinese follower understood the tetralemma in the same way. Whenever Słng-chao asserted one of the first three lemmas, he did so with the explicit sanction of Madhyamaka-kaarikaas XVIII.8, and the Chung-lun commentary on that verse. That is, he employed such expressions as heuristic designations. Further, his errors in formal reasoning were ones that Naagaarjuna had committed before him. To the extent that surviving materials do not indicate that Słng-chao was aware of the rule of contradiction or the rule of the excluded middle, his understanding of Naagaarjuna was imperfect.(77) _____________________________________________________ (75) Derk Bodde, China's First Unifier (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1938) pp.228-232. (76) E. R. Hughes, Chinese Epistemological Methods, Charles A. Moore ed., Essays in East-West Philosophy, pp.59 ff. (77) Robinson, op. cit., p.295. p.120 Nevertheless, his hypothetical syllogisms are genuine prasa^nga in form. The ontological objective of Słng-chao's arguments, as it can be inferred from his writings, is not to establish any 'positive" entities as existent, but quite simply to demonstrate that "existent" and "inexistent" cannot be absolutely and universally predicated of anything. Reality belongs to an order that is fundamentally incommensurable with symbolic systems such as language. Nevertheless, language performs a function in establishing this very truth. Słng-chao was in agreement with Wittgenstein's conclusion in the Tractatus: "My propositions are elucidatory in this way; he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.) He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world right. Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent."(78) It seems that in fifth-century China, as in the modern world, at least one thinker saw an intimate connection between logical or dialectical forms and the mystery of reality, that he saw the road to bodhi, not in the practice of trances, but as a journey through, on, and over propositions about existence and inexistence. _____________________________________________________ (78) Wittgenstein, op. cit., 6.54, pp.188-189.