William James and Yogaacaara philosophy: A comparative inquiry

By Miranda Shaw
Philosophy East and West
Volume 37, no.3
July 1987
P.223-244
(C) by the University of Hawaii Press


P.223 INTRODUCTION A general kinship between the philosophy of William James and certain aspects of Buddhist thought is immediately apparent and frequently noted.(1) This kinship is most apparent in their shared conviction that the self is not a permanent entity or "soul-substance,'' but is rather an aggregate of processes (Buddhism's skandhas) including a momentary series of states of consciousness (James' "stream of consciousness" and Buddhism's cittasa.mtaana) .(2) There are, however, deeper comparisons that can be made between James and specific Buddhist thinkers. For instance, the concept of "pure experience'' in the philosophies of James and Nishida Kitaroo have much in common. David Dilworth has written a splendid essay on this,(3) and my article is meant in a sense to complement that study. Dilworth notes that the founder of the Kyoto school of Zen philosophy was influenced by James, having been introduced to James' books by D. T. Suzuki.(4) Dilworth explains that James' philosophy struck a familiar chord for Nishida, highlighting streams of thought that were already present in Buddhism, but fully enough absorbed into the background that Nishida was inspired to make them explicit once again, in the process adding the distinctive touch of the religious genius for which he is renowned in the global philosophical arena. The Kyoto school of philosophy in turn has come to the West and is stimulating Western philosophy in a process of cross-fertilization that characterizes the current international intellectual climate. The purpose of this essay is to explore some of the similarities between James and Buddhist thought that rendered the Cantabrigian's philosophy so compatible with Nishida's Zen philosophy. In order to do this, I will analyze the parallels between James' thought and that of early Yogaacaara philosophy,one of the two main streams of Maahayaana philosophy in India. Yogaacaara philosophy, no less than Madhyamaka, was familiar to and assimilated by the formulators of Ch'an in China. What suggests a comparison of William James and Yogaacaara Buddhism is the numerous parallels between their analyses of experience and the pragmatic theories of truth that they developed to retain a degree of epistemological realism in view of those analyses. My discussion begins with a section on the primacy of experience for both James and Yogaacaara, since this constitutes the cornerstone of their respective metaphysics. The rest of the essay examines the nexus of philosophical insights that informs the interpretation of experience by each system, under the headings of(l) experience as a constructive activity and abhuutaparikalpa, (2) the external world: a pluralistic universe and paratantra, (3) pure experience and parini.spanna, and (4) pragmatism and arthakriyaa. P.224 The discussion of James draws on an array of his writings. I developed this discussion on the basis of his Essays in Radical Empiricism (published in 1912) because it embodies his mature philosophy. However, quotations are drawn from a range of his works, starting with the relatively early Psychology (the Briefer Course, 1892). James' philosophy is consistent on the topics covered in this essay. The descriptive model of experience and its metaphysical underpinnings outlined in Psychology form the basis of the understanding of experience that informs all of his subsequent work. Further, Psychology was an exercise in the empiricism that Essays advocates, while pragmatism pervades all of his writings.(5) The discussion of Yogaacaara focuses on the Madhyaantavibhaaga-`saastra, "Treatise on Discrimination between the Middle and Extreme (Views), '' the first systematic formulation of Yogaacaara philosophy.(6) My translations are from Susumu Yamaguchi's critical Sanskrit edition of the Madhyaantavibhaaga (hereinafter cited as Y with page citations), which includes Vasubandhu's commentary (bhaa.sya) and Sthiramati's subcommentary (.tiikaa).(7) One issue that arises at the outset is that of the possible influence of Buddhist thought in general and Yogaacaara in particular upon William James. There is no doubt that James was exposed to Buddhist thought. He and his neighbor Charles Lanman, a Sanskrit scholar who worked mainly with early Buddhist texts, were close friends, and he knew Paul Carus, another student of early Buddhist thought.(8) James also owned and annotated a number of books on Buddhism, such as Paul Carus' History of Buddhism, Warren's Buddhism in Translations, Koeppen's Die Religion des Buddha, and Max Mller's Hisotory of Ancient Sanskrit Literature.(9) Despite his acquaintance with Buddhist thought, there is little evidence that his philosophy is deeply informed by Buddhism. The works to which he had access discuss the basic doctrines of Buddhism, but James rarely refers to these doctrines in his writings. An isolated reference occurs in Varieties of Religious Experience: I am ignorant of Buddhism... but as I apprehend the Buddhistic doctrine of Karma, I agree in principle with that.(10) In his Psychology--wherein James lays out the views of the self, perception, and the stream of consciousness that are so acutely analogous to those of Buddhism-he does not cite Buddhism, but bases his discussions on his own scientific knowledge of physiology and psychology, upon which foundation he doubtless could have developed his views independently and then perhaps noticed the Buddhist parallels later. Further disconfirmation of Buddhist philosophical influence upon James is the selectivity of his own interest in world religions. It was not an interest in philosophy, logic, or doctrine that guided his study of world religions, but his interest in personal religious experience and meditative or mystical states, toward the end of developing an objective science of religions based on the psychology of that experience. James' interest in the psychology rather than the philosophy of P.225 Buddhism is seen in Varieties, wherein he discusses not the doctrines of Buddhism, but Buddhist meditative states.(11) From this, one might infer that James was more knowledgeable about the psychological than the technical aspects of Buddhist philosophy. Given the state of Buddhist scholarship in his day, he certainly would not have been aware of the Yogaacaara doctrines that so closely parallel his own. While the question of the influence of basic Buddhist doctrine upon James' thought must remain an open question, there is no doubt that he developed his philosophy of "experience only'' independently of that system. Therefore, these two highly analogous philosophies arose independently in second-century India and nineteenth-century New England. I. THE PRIMACY OF EXPERIENCE William James stated that he intended to formulate a philosophy based solely on postulates drawn from experience, and he called his philosophy radical empiricism: To be radical. an empiricism must neither admit into its constructions any element that is not directly experienced, nor exclude from them any element that is directly experienced.(12) Guided by this criterion, he derived what for him was the primary and incontestable fact: The first and foremost concrete fact is that consciousness of some sort goes on... [;] 'states of mind' succeed each other.(13) That is, the principal fact of experience is experience itself. This fact, for James, is also an encompassing fact. Since an experience consists of its content, there is no reason, nor is it possible, to imagine an experience apart from its content: What represents and what is represented is here numerically the same;... we must remember that no dualism of being represented and representing resides in the experience per se.... There is no self-splitting of it into consciousness and what the consciousness is `of.' Its subjectivity and objectivity are functional attributes solely, realized only when the experience is 'taken,' i.e., talked-of, twice... by a new retrospective experience.(14) Thus, for James, the content should be included in the category of experience rather than in a separate category. Just as an experience is indistinguishable from its content, so its content is inextricable from the experience. James states that the first great pitfall that his radical empiricism prevents is "an artificial conception of the relations between knower and known."(15) On the basis of the indivisibility of experience, James concludes that the conscious field, its object, the attitude toward the object, and the sense of a self to which the attitude belongs all meld together to form "a full fact, the kind to which all realities belong, unlike the abstract 'object' when taken alone."(16) Here, the encompassing nature of experience for James becomes clear when he states that "all realities" are enveloped by it. His more radical way of stating it is that P.226 experience is all there is, the materia prima of everything, which cannot be pinned down to either inner or outer reality.(17) This is one of the meanings of James' term "pure experience." (For the other, more technical, usage see section IV.) "Pure experience" in this context is a slightly misleading term, for it connotes a form or level of experience that is pure or contentless, while James means by it that we live in a world that is purely, that is, solely, experience. Just as experience is the cornerstone of James' empirical philosophy, it provides the point of departure for the philosophy unfolded in the Madhyaantvibhaaga. The text opens in kaarikaa I.1 with the statement "imagination exists" (abhuutaparikalpo 'sti). That is, the mental life in all its vicissitudes is uncontestably real, an undebatable postulate of Yogaacaara philosophy. Imagination here is synonymous with what James calls experience, but the Sanskrit compound is more descriptive because it contains an explicit reference to its misleading quality. The full translation of the term is "imagination of the false (or unreal)." The next phrase specifies what is misleading about it: "There is no duality in it" (dvaya.m tatra na vidyate). Like James, Yogaacaara upholds the ultimate integrity of experience in its indivisibility into "experience" and "content.'' In Yogaacaara terminology, experience is "empty" (`suunya) of this division. Commenting on this verse, Sthiramati explains that "the imagination of what is false, being devoid of a real subject and object, is said to be empty" (abhuutaparikalpo hi graahyagraahakasvaruuparahita.h `suunya ucyate) (Y10). Sthiramati agrees with James when he explains that both subject and object are encompassed by experience or imagination, and hence inextricable from it: Indeed, it is not the case that the imagination of what is false is the perceiver of anything, nor is it perceived by anyone. (Y11) Imagination of what is false is to be treated as an indivisible unit. It is not the perceiver of anything because it encompasses its object; similarly, due to its enveloping nature, it cannot be objectified. James agrees that experience cannot experience itself: Experience in its original immediacy is not aware of itself, it simply is, and the second experience is required for what we call awareness of it to occur.(18) That is, the process of witnessing cannot be witnessed; it simply occurs. In James' words, "We should say 'it thinks' as we say `it rains' or simply: thought goes on."(19) Therefore, Yogaacaara, like James, upholds experience as the sole reality. Yogaacaara treatises refer to this postulate as cittamaatra or vij~naptimaatra. Although often translated as "mind only," the use of the noun "mind" tends to substantialize the concept in a way that Yogaacaara did not intend, by conjuring an image of a permanent substance and then inviting the label of absolutism, when it is the processual life of the mind--the conceptualizing process and the emotions--that is meant here, and not a static mental substrate or "cosmic consciousness" underlying variegated experience. P.227 II. EXPERIENCE AS A CONSTRUCTIVE ACTIVITY AND ABHUUTAPARIKALPA The previous section discussed how James and the Madhyaantavibhaaga both treat experience as an encompassing category that envelops experiencer and content, or subject and object, in a single category through which a definite dividing line cannot be drawn. That is. experience is an intermixture of subject and object and, due to the subjective elements, experience is constructive rather than passive. James asserted that "reality is an accumulation of our own intellectual inventions."(20) Yogaacaara's parallel assertion is implicit in its word for ordinary experience, abhuutaparikalpa. The verbal root of parikalpa is pariūk!p, "to construct, create, imagine, divide," a range of meanings that expresses how this mode of experience is disjunctive or dualistic and also constructive, creating the reality that we experience. Thus, experience in both philosophies is not simply synonymous with sensation or perception, but is an apperceptive and interpretative process as well. Both philosophies divide experience into two main phases, prereflective and reflective, and demonstrate various ways that experience is constructed during the reflective, or conceptual, phase. On the whole, James provides more extensive exemplification, offering an Abhidharma-like catalog of mental processes, partly because his thesis was more novel in his intellectual tradition and partly because he was doing pioneering work in the field of psychology as well. Yogaacaara, on the other hand, worked against the background of an extensive corpus of Abhidharma literature (detailed psychophilosophical analyses of the constituents of experience) and a pan-Buddhist conviction that all mental phenomena are constructed or "conditioned" (sa.msk.rta). Another reason for terseness in the Yogaacaara case is that the text was meant to serve as a springboard for a teacher's oral commentary, while James provided his own commentary and exemplification. James and Yogaacaara similarly describe a prereflective phase of experience, although James' description carries more rhetorical force, since he was going against the prevalent philosophical grain. He was arguing against Hume's atomistic theory of experience (which posits no connecting agent) and Cartesian and Kantian epistemological dualism. James describes the prereflective stage of experience as direct, immediate, and intuitive and calls this phase "sensation, " while the subsequent mental operations performed upon sensation he calls perception, conceptualization, or classification: 'Ideas' about the object mingle with the awareness of its mere sensible presence, we name it, class it, compare it, utter propositions concerning it.... In general, this higher consciousness about things is called Perception, [while] the mere inarticulate feeling of their presence is Sensation.(21) James describes the unity that characterizes the stage of sensation or immediate awareness, using the example of looking at a piece of paper. In the first moment of experience, the paper and the observer are unitary: P.228 There is no context of intermediaries or associates to stand between and separate the thought and thing ... but rather an allround embracing of the paper by the thought.(22) To say "This is a piece of paper, at which I am looking" involves interpretation, which is a constructive or intellectual process. Indeed, what is experienced is not an external piece of paper, but "the immediate results upon consciousness of nerve-currents as they enter the brain."(23) All that one can really say is that a sensation or experience has occurred: The paper seen and the seeing of it are only two names for one indivisible fact which, properly named, is the datum, the phenomenon, or the experience.(24) The Yogaacaara (and indeed pan-Buddhist) equivalents of James' "sensation" are spar`sa, literally "contact" between sense-organ and object, and vij~naana, the "consciousness" that results from their contact. The Madhyaantavibhaaga commentaters echo James' description of the prereflective phase of experience: Consciousness (vij~naana) is the cognizance of the mere thing (arthamaatrad.r.s.ti). 'Mere' means that particular attributes (vi`se.sa) are not cognized; there is only the perception (upalabdhi) of the thing itself (vastusvaruupa). (Y31) After the nondichotomous and direct experience of the datum or mere thing, the sensations are digested or re-presented, as it were, and their significance establsihed. It is in this reflective phase--perception, conceptualization, or classification in James' terminology, and vikalpa, prapa~nca, or sa.mj~naa in Yogaacaara's--that experience becomes a constructive process. The sensations are interpreted in light of past experience, including cultural and linguistic constructs and individual interests and preferences. James identifies the first agent of construction as attention, because attention selects which aspects of a field of awareness will receive its focus: Consciousness is always interested more in one part of its object than in another, and welcomes and rejects, or chooses, all the while it thinks.... Accentuation and Emphasis are present in every perception we have.(25) For James, the result of attention is the reification of certain aspects of the reality that is transmitted by the sensations: Out of what is in itself an indistinguishable, swarming continuum, devoid of distinction or emphasis.... Attention... picks out certain sensations as worthy of notice, choosing those that are signs to us of things which happen practically or aesthetically to interest us, to which we therefore give substantive names and to which we give the status of independence and dignity.(26) James notes that names and seemingly independent things are the products of the reification process. The independent status of objects is purely an attributed status according to James because, as discussed above in section I, he claims subject and object to be inextricably interfused in the prereflective phase of experience. James further notes that the world we construct is stable and uniform P.229 while experience and phenomena are dynamic and ever-changing.(27) Similarly, for Yogaacaara and indeed all Buddhism, the basic products that the hypostatization of the field of awareness produces are phenomena whose seeming independence belies their underlying interconnectedness and whose seeming staticity betrays the momentariness of existents and the stream of consciousness. For both James and the Madhyaantavibhaaga, these names and forms have an interreferential character, for they are established through mutual opposition--for example, subject as opposed to object, thought to thing, being to nonbeing, black to white--and also through mutual interrelationship-for example, above, below, more, farther, brighter, similar, and so forth. James holds that there is no single, objective quality that does not vary according to its context. In Psychology and Essays, he gives many examples of this interreferentiality. A few examples from the visual sphere are that something violet appears more intense when juxtaposed with yellow; black looks darker next to white than to gray; something bright becomes dull with the appearance of something brighter; and so forth.(28) In addition, objects tend to be defined in terms of their function, which again expresses a relation, namely, to human needs and purposes. Some qualities are clearly values that have been subjectively attributed and cannot be said to inhere in the phenomena themselves, such as preciousness, dangerousness, rarity, beauty, and repulsiveness. Yet, James points out, these same qualities cannot simply be relegated to the mental or purely nonobjective realm, either, because they have a physical realm of activity in their effects upon human physiology and even behavior.(29) Therefore, while reflection seems to reveal definite images and objective attributes, what in fact is occurring is a complex classificatory process that takes into account a variety of contexts, functions, and relations. These relations occur within experience, forming its self-referential quality and supporting James' thesis that what we experience is, after all, not an external world, but pure experience: My thesis is that if we start with the supposition that there is only one primal stuff or material in the world... and if we call that stuff `pure experience,' then knowing can easily be explained as a particular sort of relation towards one another into which portions of pure experience may enter. The relation itself is part of pure experience.(30) For this reason, James likens consciousness to a stream in which every definite image in the mind is steeped and dyed in the free water that flows round it... the sense of its relations.... The significance, the value, of the image is all in this halo or penumbra that surrounds and escorts it,--or rather that is fused into one with it.(31) On this point, Yogaacaara agrees with James that the stream of consciousness conditions itself. For James, each image in the stream is "steeped and dyed" by the surrounding images, that is, by the interreferential context provided by P.230 experience itself. For Yogaacaara, too, previous moments in the stream of consciousness condition later ones (Y25): Dualistic thought (vikalpa) is constructed by other dualistic thought (Y23) and Consciousness arises with the appearance of objects through the ripening of its own seeds. (Y11) These seeds (biija) incubate in the aalayavij~naana, a "store consciousness" that functions to shape future actions, perceptions, and feelings on the basis of past ones through the action of "perfuming" (vaasanaa). The aalayavij~naana is an integral part of abhuutaparikalpa and, as its underlying causal basis (hetupratyaya), is its fundamental or basal structure(Y33). Because of their strong emphasis on the unity of subject and object in the prereflective phase of experience and the active role of the subject in constructing the reflective phase of experience, both James and Yogaacaara have at times been characterized as propounding forms of idealism. James has been characterized as a Berkelian idealist by E. C. Moore and A. O. Lovejoy.(32) Although some current studies are disputing this interpretation,(33) Yogaacaara consistently has been interpreted as idealism. For instance, Ashok Chatterjee says that for Yogaacaara the world is unreal and "consciousness is the sole reality."(34) Surendranath Dasgupta claims that Yogaacaara is an "uncompromising idealism" for which the external world does not exist, but is constructed by "ignorant minds."(35) T. R. V. Murti calls it "idealism par excellence... the only genuinely idealistic school in India,"(36) while no less a Buddhologist than Edward Conze calls it "a metaphysical idealism, which teaches that consciousness... creates its objects out of its own inner potentialities."(37) These various assessments rightly acknowledge the primacy of experience in its constructive or illusionary aspects for James and Yogaacaara. However, they do not recognize that James and the Yogaacaara of the Madhyyantavibhaaga and its commentaries do not deny the existence of phenomenal reality. Rather, they conflate subject and object, inner and outer, into a single category that includes both. The Madhyaantavibhaaga itself never states that abhuutaparikalpa creates or imagines the phenomenal world; what it imagines or creates is dualism, most notably subject-object dualism. Sthiramati explains that this is what makes it imagination of what is unreal: The term 'unreal' means that this [the external world] does not exist in the way that it is constructed, i.e. in the form of subject and object. 'Imagination' means that an object does not exist in the way that it is imagined. (Y13) James, too, encompasses subject and object in a single category rather than reducing the external world to the subject's consciousness. The aforementioned interpreters of James classify him as a metaphysical, or ontological, idealist along with Berkeley, while the interpreters of Yogaacaara similarly place it in the metaphysical idealist camp. That they are not metaphys- P.231 ical idealists, but share a position of phenomenal realism, constitutes the theme of the next section. III. THE EXTERNAL WORLD: A PLURALISTIC UNIVERSE AND PARATANTRA Since both James and Yogaacaara define reality in terms of"experience only," their philosophies have been mistaken for metaphysical idealism, which denies the existence of the external world of phenomena. Yet neither philosophy denies the existence of external objects that exist independently of the experiencing subject, however much they delimit that independence. Both philosophies maintain an element of realism, but they nuance that realism with a recognition of the relativity of all phenomena. James' view of relativity emerges in his characterization of the universe as pluralistic, while for Yogaacaara it appears in the discussion of paratantra. James was quite straightforward in his phenomenal realism. He characterized himself as a "realist"(38) and declared that I am... postulating here a standing reality independent of the idea that knows it.(39) Some of his colleagues, such as Rudolf Lotze, held that a thing that is taken in two relations cannot be the same thing in each, that is, that the M in M-L must be different from the M in M-N. In opposition to this atomistic (and Humean) position, James asserted that "one and the same world is cognized by our different minds."(40) He argued that the various relations, being conceptual, are substitutional and variable, while the M in each case is the same piece of sensible experience.(41) This hearkens back to his psychology of experience, which posits two phases: (1)direct sensation and (2) conceptual knowledge, which consists of establishing various relations. James never meant to deny the existence of external objects; he simply insisted that there is no dualism of subject and object in experience. Yogaacaara's affirmation of the reality of phenomena reflects the necessity of treading the Buddhist middle path between the ontological extremes of nihilism and absolutism, or negation (apavaada) and reification (samaaropa) , of existents. In charting its course between these two extremes, Yogaacaara used as its guiding principle the crowning Mahaayaana doctrine of emptiness (`suunyataa). Emptiness was as misunderstood in second-century India as it is today, for it perennially is mistaken for "nothingness" or "nonexistence," a doctrine of totalistic nihilism. Yogaacaara was aware of and consciously addressed this misconception, sometimes with a note of irony, as when Sthiramati comments: The definition of emptiness is wrongly understood if one thinks that everything exists or that nothing exists. For one thing, this would mean the nonexistence of emptiness, too. (Y14) Simply stated, for something to be empty, something must exist! When Sthiramati says that P.232 emptiness would not be possible if what is designated as empty were nonexistent, like impermanence and so forth, (Y14) he is appealing to the fact that the doctrine of emptiness, like those of nonself, impermanence, and momentariness, arose in order to describe something, through antecedent predication. That is, "emptiness pertains to one thing in terms of something else" (anyena hi anyasya `suunyataa d.r.s.taa) (Y14), as when it pertains to a monastery in terms of elephants or absent monks.(42) According to the Madhyaantavibhaaga, imagination of the unreal exists, and emptiness is the absence of duality in it. Sthiramati comments: Emptiness is indeed this very thing, the absence of subject and object in imagination of what is false; therefore, emptiness is not nonexistence. (Y 11) Here, both subject and object are held to be illusory; it is not simply the object that is illusory. Being a Buddhist philosophy, Yogaacaara is just as concerned with the abandonment of belief in a self as it is with the cessation of mistaken reifications of phenomenal reality. The `saastra is very explicit in stating that the experiencer (bhokt.rvastu) is empty (`suunya) along with what is experienced (bhojanavastu) (Y53). It emphasizes that the subject and object are inseparably related to one another, which would not be possible if either did not exist or were reducible to the other. Their inseparable relatedness or mutual relativity is what the commentary on this passage calls "great emptiness" (mahaa`suunyataa)(Y 54). Having established that emptiness does not imply the nonexistence of phenomenal reality, Yogaacaara never wavers on the point that concepts of external objects do not mirror or grasp those objects. Yet to say that experience is a mental construct (parikalpa or vikalpa) is not the same as saying that what one is experiencing is purely mental. According to the Madhyaantavibhaaga: It (an object) does not exist as it appears, but it does not exist in every respect. (Y20) A relevant metaphor occurs in the La^nkaavataara-suutra, which likens the operation of imagination of what is false to a magician's conjuration: Depending upon grass, wood, shrubs, and creepers... all beings and forms take shape... which appear endowed with individuality and material body.... Like-wise... the false imagination recognizes a variety of appearances.(43) Experience may have an illusory aspect, like a magic show, but it does not arise in a vacuum. The grass and creepers in the metaphor represent the objective cause (aalambanapratyaya) or basis (a`sraya) of consciousness, the "mere thing" (vastumaatra) , while the beings and forms are the verbal designations of the experience, which, however illusory, is dependent upon objects. A classical Yogaacaara metaphor invoked by Sthiramati is that of a rope mistaken for a snake in the dark or due to a magical trick: The nature of a snake is absent from the rope; therefore, the rope is empty with regard to that (that is, a snake) at all times, but the rope is not empty in every way (that is, is not nonexistent). (Y14) P.233 The Yogaacaara concept of "consciousness only" does not imply the existence of the experiencer and the nonexistence of external phenomena, nor does it absolutize abhuutaparikalpa or aalayavij~naana as the basal structure of abhuutaparikalpa. Sthiramati is quite explicit about not intending to subordinate the object to the subject or make the object somehow reducible to the subject: Subjectivity (graahakatvam) is not possible if no object (graahya) exists. (Y26) Since there is no object in the absence of a subject, it is not possible for there to be a subject when there is no object, (Y11) To uphold the sole existence of the subject or even of consciousness itself would be to fail to attain the nondual, transcendent wisdom of a bodhisattva that this text means to impart (Y27). It is simply that the subject and object, in their oneness, relativize each other. Thus, neither James nor Yogaacaara denies the existence of an external world, and both agree that it is the basis of our multifarious interpretations of it. This is a phenomenally realistic view; what they protest is the ordinary way of seeing the world as external, separate from the experiencer, and consisting of discrete, static entities. They share a vision of the relativity and interrelatedness of all things. Section II preceding discussed their rejection of the hypostatization of the flow of experience into absolute, permanent entities. James laments how concepts construct a world of mutual exclusion: What we conceptualize, we cut out and fix, and exclude everything but what we have fixed. A concept means a that-and-no-other.(44) In the same vein, Sthiramati says: Indeed, consciousness takes on the appearance of manifold images, in the form of all sorts of independent things. like the eyes in the tail of a peacock... (but) the independent elements (dharmasvabhaava.h) ... are merely illusion (bhraantimaatra). (Y31) Clearly, the non-separateness of subject and object for James and Yogaacaara is not limited to that case, but extends to all phenomena in some sense, This is seen in James' insistence upon a pluralistic universe and Yogaacaara's adherence to the classical Buddhist doctrine of mutual causation, implying the interconnectedness of all things. In Buddhism, this interconnectedness is all-embracing. There is no limit to the causes of a given event. As Vasubandhu states in his Abhidharmako`sa: "All the elements (of the universe) are the general cause of an event."(45) The vision that emerges (and is so powerfully and poetically evoked by Hua-yen Buddhism) is one of universal cooperation and interpenetration. This is expressed in the Yogaacaara term for what exists, paratantra, literally, "other-dependent." It is also evoked by the verb from which -tantra is derived, ūtan, "to weave," suggesting the interweaving of numerous strands of existence. This is the level of things just as they are, which is experienced directly in the preconceptual phase of awareness, and hence is unformulable in words: P.234 Paratantra means ruled by others (parava`sa).... It is not constructed (akalpita), is born from causes, and is thoroughly inexpressible (anabhilaapyas sarvathaa). (Y22) Further, paratantra is defined as the "pure, worldly domain" (`suddhalaukikagocara), that is, phenomena unobscured by ignorance or mental defilements (Y22). To see reality in this way is not to lose sight of the particularities, for example, the separate eyes in the tail of a peacock. It is simply to see their connectedness, to see that no one thing has independent (svabhaava) existence. Unlike Yogaacaara, James was making an original statement with his vision of a pluralistic universe, He devotes at least half of A Pluralistic Universe to refuting what he calls the "absolutistic monism" of Bradley, Spinoza, and Emerson, because they make an abstract "whole" prior to the experienced parts. He also rejects theories that disjoin phenomena totally in order to provide an alternative to monism. James argues for an abandonment of these two extremes on the ground that they have no empirical basis: Neither abstract oneness nor abstract independence exists; only real concrete things exist.(46) In keeping with his empirical orientation, he argues first for a move away from the purely abstract back to the realm of experience, wherein things are indeed experienced as continuous and as entering into various relations with one another. The ontological implications of these experienced continuities and relations should be taken into account, he says, "in a world where experience and reality come to the same thing."(47) In the case of any A and B, the very fact that they can enter into relation shows, for James, that they are not entirely distinct, "not separated by a void," not mutually impenetrable or irrelevant; rather, they are co-implicated and "must have an inborn mutual reference each to each."(48) For James, the mutual relatedness of phenomena does not cancel out their separateness, however mutually exclusive the logical categories of unity and disunity, oneness and manyness, may seem to be: "In life distinct things can and do commune together every moment."(49) Thus, James opts for a nonmonistic and nonatomistic position that closely resembles that of Buddhism, holding that in one sense things retain their particularity, in another they are interconnected and compenetrable: Without being one throughout, such a universe is continuous. Its members interdigitate with their next neighbors in manifold directions, and there are no clean cuts between them anywhere.(50) James offers a vision of infinite and all-embracing relativity that equals that of Buddhism: Our 'multiverse' still makes a 'universe'; for every part, tho it may not be in actual or immediate connexion, is nevertheless in some possible for mediated connexion, with every other part however remote, through the fact that each part hangs together with its very next neighbor in inextricable interfusion.(51) P.235 James says that his version of unity is not "the monistic type," but what he prefers to call "the type of continuity, contiguity, or concatenation,"(52) which is in effect an equivalent of the Buddhist doctrine of pratiityasamutpaada and Yogaacaara's conception of paratantra. IV. PURE EXPERIENCE AND PARINI.SPANNA As discussed in the preceding section, the external world is not unreal for James or early Yogaacaara, but they agree that what is real cannot be approached directly through words or concepts. It can only be experienced through direct, unmediated experience. This is the more technical usage of James' term "pure experience." When he uses the term in this technical sense, it refers to direct, preconceptual, and unreified experience: 'Pure experience' is the name which I give to the immediate flux of life which furnishes the material to our later reflection with its conceptual categories.(53) What is experienced in pure experience is a that which is not yet any definite what, tho ready to be all sorts of whats.(54) A concept is part of the stream of pure experience, too, insofar as it is directly experienced; however, the concept displaces the corresponding phenomenon as the object of direct awareness.(55) Similarly, retrospective conceptualization about a given concept replaces it as the immediate content of the ongoing stream of experience. A phenomenon in its pure state, unqualified by concepts, before even its name has been conceived, is what James means to indicate by "the mere that" and is precisely what Buddhism tries to capture in the terms tathataa and dharmataa, variously translated as "suchness," "thatness," and "bare reality." James agrees with Yogaacaara that this awareness (vij~naana) occurs in the first moment of sensation. According to James: It reduces to the notion of what is just entering into experience, and yet to be named... before any belief about the presence had arisen, before any human conception had been applied.... We may glimpse it, but we never grasp it; what we grasp is always some substitute for it.(56) James could have been writing a Yogaacaara treatise here, saying that the content of such experience comes before belief (d.r.s.ti) and conception (vikalpa) and can be glimpsed or seen (dar`sana), but not grasped (anupalabdhi or anupalambha). They also agree on the vividness of pure experience. Speaking like a seer who is familiar with this mode of experience, James reports its clarity and vividness,(57) a characteristic of direct experience that the Yogaacaara logicians expressed with the term sphu.tatva.(58) Thus, the realm of pure experience is not a transcendental or objectless realm for either James or Yogaacaara. It is the realm of ordinary life and phenomena, but experienced directly, with no intervening conceptualization. The Yogaacaara term P.236 for this mode of experience is parini.spannalak.sa.na, defined as the "sphere of nondiscursive wisdom" (avikalpaj~naanagocara) (Y22). There is only one reality, paratantra. When viewed with attachment, with a mind that engages in falsely dualistic constructions (vikalpa) , paratantra becomes obscured by imaginative projections (parikalpita). It becomes sa.msaara, the realm of suffering. When the experiencer sees through the dualisms that s/he has injected into an inherently wholistic process, paratantra is seen "as it really is" (yathaabhuutaartha) and hence is in that sense perfected or consummated (parini.spanna).(59) Seen for what it truly is, this world has become nirvaa.na, the realm of bliss, serenity, and liberation. Clearly, the three "natures" of Yogaacaara's tripartite scheme do not describe three levels of reality. They describe different ways of experiencing reality, which remains the same throughout, and this constitutes the unity and interchangeability of the three natures. In the process of awakening to reality, imagination of what is false has to be purified (vi`sodhyaartham) of duality or illusion. This purification is possible because, as stated in Madhyaantavibhaaga I.1, "emptiness exists in it," that is, because it is ultimately empty of subject-object duality and all dualism. Therefore, emptiness is the "basis of purification" (vi`suddhi-aalambana) (Y48). Emptiness is also the basis of purification because it establishes the identity of the three natures themselves. It is emptiness, the absence of unchanging substances and intrinsic, independent, fixed identities, that makes possible their interchangeability and transformability into one another. For Yogaacaara. parini.spanna, the mode of purified awareness, is the goal of Buddhist practice. The term is a past passive participle meaning "perfected" or "consummated,'' showing that it is something that is the result of action; it is a mode of experience, not an ontological category.(60) In James' philosophy, pure experience at first glance seems only to be a descriptive term for the direct awareness that occurs in the first moment of every sensation. Yet James envisions a soteriological role for pure experience as well. He acknowledges that concepts and philosophy have a practical value, but goes on to say that ultimately they must be abandoned if a direct experience of reality is to be gained: Theoretic knowledge... is knowledge about things, as distinguished from living contemplation or sympathetic acquaintance with them. ................................................... Direct acquaintance and conceptual knowledge are... complementary of each other.... But if, as metaphysicians, we are more curious about the inner nature of reality or about what really makes it go, we must turn our backs upon our winged concepts altogether.... Dive back into the flux itself... if you wish to know reality.(61) James characterizes the state of mind that dives back into the flux of reality as a passive, luminous. "intuitive sympathy," which would make a fine translation of the Buddhist term for direct, intuitive wisdom, praj~naa. James agrees with Yogaacaara that the purpose of life and of philosophy is to restore pure experience in its direct immediacy: P.237 Reality falls in passing into conceptual analysis; it mounts in living its own undivided life--it buds and burgeons, changes and creates.... Philosophy should seek this kind of living understanding of the movement of reality, not follow science in vainly patching together fragments of its dead results.(62) Other philosophies try... to restore the fluent sense of life again.... The perfection with which any philosophy may do this is the measure of its human success and importance in human history.(63) From the preceding discussion, it should be clear that if James and early Yogaacaara were to be included in the idealist camp, it would be on the side of epistemological idealism rather than of ontological idealism. Nonetheless, neither philosophy constitutes a pure or thoroughgoing epistemological idealism either, because they consider only the reflective phase of experience to be subjectively constructed. They both posit a level or mode of experience in which experience is unmediated and hence has direct access to phenomenal reality. V. PRAGMATISM AND ARTHAKRIYAA James' and Yogaacaara's dichotomy between words and reality would seem to leave them without any criteria for determining the validity of a given concept, statement, or practice, since all verbal and conceptual constructs falsify the contents of pure experience. Yet each philosophy does offer such a criterion, and their criteria are remarkably similar. James' answer to this dilemma is expressed by another name that he gave to his philosophy, pragmatism, which Yogaacaara's criterion comes in the form of arthakriyaa. The thrust of both of these positions is that action is both the goal and the measure of the truth of ideas. That is, the consequences of ideas when they are implemented determines their truth. James summed up the principle when he wrote: On pragmatic principles we can not reject any hypothesis if consequences useful to life flow from it.(64) Similarly, one of the meanings of arthakriyaa is "useful action" (while a related term, arthakriyaakaarin, means "capable of useful action"). In both the Jamesian and the Buddhist contexts, the consequences of ideas can be borne out in two spheres of meaning and action. One is that of ordinary life, wherein concepts serve the attainment of the practical necessities of daily living. The other is the higher life of humankind, wherein concepts support the pursuit of moral and spiritual aims and aspirations. James rejects concepts as a way to approach truth, but he acknowledges their usefulness in daily life: "The function of intellect is practical rather than theoretical."(65) The usefulness of any given concept is measured by its consequences, and this usefulness is coordinate with its validity or truth: They [concepts] have, indeed, no meaning and no reality if they have no use. But if they have any use they have that amount of meaning.(66) P.238 This understanding of truth is consistent with his stance of subject-object nonduality, because usefulness is always dependent upon a specific point of view or purpose: Truth is a relation inside of the sum total, obtaining between thoughts and something else, and thoughts, as we have seen, can only be contextual things.(67) At the same time, James' pragmatism retains its empirical basis, for the pragmatic test of truth also proceeds in reference to pure, "sensible" experience. To be proved as true, an intellectual operation must be confluent with a wave in the "finite stream of feeling": Only in so far as they lead us, successfully or unsuccessfully, into sensible experience again, are our abstracts and universals true or false at all.(68) If James denied the existence of a world external to consciousness, the empirical test would not be possible. If thoughts were things, then the thought of a fire would be very handy if one were stranded in a blizzard, but, as James points out, some fires will burn sticks and warm our bodies and some will not: Mental fire is what won't burn real sticks.... Mental knives may be sharp, but they won't cut real wood.... With 'real' objects, on the contrary, consequences always accrue; and thus the real experiences get sifted from the mental ones, the things from our thoughts of them.(69) To put it simply, the pragmatic aspect of empiricism means that when a concept is true its application will "work satisfactorily."(70) Arthakriyaa can be translated as "to work satisfactorily" or "workability." Other possible translations are "causal efficacy, " "successful action," and "useful action."(71) The concept does not figure in the Madhyaantavibhaaga, but it was developed by later Yogaacaara logicians--notably by Dharmakiirti in his Pramaa.navaarttika(72)--as part of pramaa.na theory, the theory of the sources and criteria of valid knowledge. Arthakriyaa was designated as the means of distinguishing between real and erroneous perceptions. One classical Yogaacaara example is that of fire. One can have a valid perception of a fire, a mistaken perception of a fire, or merely a mental image of a fire. The test of validity is whether the fire can burn fuel and cook food.(73) Another classical example is that of a mirage. One can have a perception of water when what one is in fact seeing is only a mirage. The test in this case as in the case of fire is the consequences of the cognition when acted upon. If one can drink and quench one's thirst, then the perception of water has been a valid one. Admittedly, "water" is a mental construct (vikalpa) and corresponds to the parikalpa mode of experience. What is actually perceived, the thing itself (vastumaatra). is ultimately indeterminable in the conceptual sphere; it is only determinable in a specific context. The Madhyaantavibhaaga adduces that where a human being sees water, a preta (insatiable ghost) sees a river of pus and excrement, while a yogin engaged in certain types of meditation might see nothing at all or might see in its place skeletons or another object of meditation P.239 (Y21). Another example that might be more directly accessible to us might be that of an apple. Where we see food, a physicist might see a configuration of atoms, a botanist might see a seed-bearing vehicle, an artist might see a red sphere to paint, a native of some tribe might see the manifestation of the god of that tribe, and so forth. The apple exists, as paratantra, but due to its emptiness, its lack of intrinsic identity, it can be seen as many things--in James' terms, taken in many relations--depending upon the point of view and purposes of the perceiver. Usefulness has to be usefulness to someone; it is not a function of the object so much as of the subject, although the capability of usefulness in various contexts--and of giving rise to a cognition, be it a cognition of water, pus, or skeletons--resides in the real object. It is the unresolvability of objects into universally valid concepts that makes a test of validity necessary. This ultimate unresolvability is also what limits the validity established by arthakriyaa to a particular context. According to Dharmakiirti, that validity pertains to the conventional level of truth and reality (vyavahaara)(74) and thus cannot claim ultimacy. James acknowledges the same limitation or context-dependence in his pragmatic test of truth: How is success to be absolutely measured when there are so many environments and so many ways of looking at the [successful] adaptation? It cannot be measured absolutely; the verdict will vary according to the point of view adopted.(75) In their pragmatic theories of truth, James and Yogaacaara were both concerned with the practical necessities of daily life, but also with the moral and spiritual dimension of life. James was deeply interested in religion but, in accordance with his pragmatism, was more interested in religious experience and in the fruits of a spiritual life than he was in the doctrinal or institutional aspects of religion. He held that theological statements can be subjected to the same test of truth as practical ones, that is, by judging their practical results: If theological ideas prove to have a value for concrete life, they will be true, for pragmatism.(76) Therefore, on pragmatistic principles, if the hypothesis of God works satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word, it is true. Now... experience shows that it certainly does work.(77) His Varieties of Religious Experience is a compendium of the fruits of various religious beliefs and even different types of religious belief and temperament. These fruits include courage; hope; moral strength; personal integration; and lives of great piety. charitable works, and mystical attainment. Clearly, James' criteria for religious truth--which include immediate luminosity and philosophical reasonableness along with moral helpfulness(78)--allow of a plurality of religious "truths." He acknowledged and defended his conflation of the notions of "truth" and "what is beneficial or efficacious"(79) and concluded: "What other P.240 kind of truth could there be, for [pragmatism], than all this agreement with concrete reality?"(80) The Madhyaantavibhaaga does not say that religious beliefs and practices are justified by their practical consequences, but this stance characterizes Buddhism in general. Buddhists have long upheld the difference between conventional, everyday language (vyavahaara) and ultimate truth (paramaarthasat), which is experienceable but not verbally expressible. Therefore, Buddhist teachers employ upaaya, skillful liberative techniques and provisional teachings, in order to teach the Dharma. The value and meaning of these upaaya inhere in their practical results, so they are meant to be empirically tested and then abandoned once the practitioner has reached the goal. This attitude toward the Buddhist teachings informs some of the radical statements in Praj~naapaaramitaa and Madhyamaka literature that there is no Buddha, no Dharma, and no path to liberation. Although Yogaacaara would not disagree with such statements, they do not characterize Yogaacaara literature. One can infer that one reason they do not might be the justification for them that is provided by the epistemology presented in this essay. The statements "there is enlightenment" and "there is no enlightenment" may be equally false insofar as they proceed from the dualistic thinking of imagination of what is false. However, the statement and conviction that there is enlightenment is more helpful and can be tested in practice with splendid results. There must be some way to differentiate the statement "there is enlightenment" and other statements of religious and practical value from totally deluded or nonsensical statements. Dharmakiirti's pragmatic epistemology provides such a method. In conclusion. neither James nor Yogaacaara completely devalues concepts as purely subjective and divorced from phenomenal reality. They hold that concepts serve as a bridge that can be crossed to that reality through praxis and, as such, are valuable and even indispensable. CONCLUSION In this essay I have documented various parallels between the thought of William James and early Indian Yogaacaara philosophy as it is expressed in the Madhyaantavibhaaga-`saastra and Vasubandhu's and Sthiramati's commentaries upon it, focusing on their views of experience and examining the analogousness of their respective conclusions that subject-object dualism is illusory, reality is not verbally formulable or conceptually graspable, and the pragmatic test of validity provides a criterion for truth. James and Yogaacaara both developed philosophies that emphasize the encompassing nature of consciousness without becoming monistic, metaphysically idealistic, or atomistic. For both James and Yogaacaara, the pragmatic test of validity accomplishes a dual philosophical aim. It prevents the absolute reification of any given conceptual construct and at the same time prevents a totally deconstructive or nihilistic denial of meaning and truth. P.241 These similar philosophical systems arose in different cultural contexts in response to entirely different intellectual milieux. James was working within the empirical tradition of Bacon, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. He protested the subjectivistic idealism of Humean and Berkelian empiricism and sought to overcome the epistemological dualism of Descartes and Kant. Yogaacaara was heir to the radical via negativa of the Praj~naapaaramitaa literature and sought a mediating epistemological alternative to Madhyamaka's two-truth theory, which seemed to accord truth to the nonconceptual sphere of ultimacy (paramaarthasat) and leave little basis for distinguishing between valid and invalid conventional (vyavahaara) verbal and mental constructs. Each philosophy exerted tremendous influence in its own hemisphere. William James' thought left its mark in the fields of psychology and comparative religion. His philosophy contributed to the rise of modern pragmatism, possibly influenced Husserlian phenomenology,(81) and currently provides a resource for the pragmaticization of analytic philosophy.(82) In the religious sphere, James' ideas provided one of the inspirational forces behind the evolving New Thought movement and even Alcoholics Anonymous. In the Eastern hemisphere, Yogaacaara modified Madhyamaka philosophy over centuries of debate and permeated T'ien-t'ai and Ch'an formulations in China and Tendai and Zen in Japan. The influences of James and Yogaacaara then converged in the modern Kyoto school of philosophy. Judging from the breadth of their respective streams of influence, these philosophies have provided a compelling key to life for many people. They both offer a perspective that can accommodate epistemological idealism, phenomenal realism, and the possibility of direct, intuitive knowledge of reality, as well as a pragmatic justification for the linguistic and symbolic constructs used to point to that reality. NOTES 1.See, for example. Kenneth Inada and Nolan Jacobson, eds., Buddhism and American Thinkers (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press. 1984), pp. vii, xv, 49, 76. 2.See D.C.Mathur, "The Historical Buddha (Gotama), Hume, and James on the Self: Comparisons and Evaluations," Philosophy East and West 28, no. 3 (July 1978): 262-270. 3.David Dilworth, "The Initial Formations of 'Pure Experience' in Nishida Kitaroo and William James," monumenta Nipponica 24, nos. 1-2 (1969): 93-111. 4.Dilworth, "initial Formations," p. 95. Suzuki probably was introduced to James' writings by Paul Carus, with whom he lived and worked as a translator, because Carus was keeping abreast of the formulation of American pragmatism by James and Charles Sanders Peirce. This information was related to me by Eugene Taylor of the Department of Psychiatry, Harvard Medical School, who has an article, "William James and Swami Vivekananda: Asian Psychology at Harvard in the 1890's, " forthcoming in Prabuddha Bharata, that documents James' personal connections, both direct and indirect, with Asian scholars. 5.William James Earle, "William James," in Paul Edwards, ed., Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: Collier Macmillan Pub., 1973), 4:242, 246. 6.The authorship and date of the work have not been determined, although the commentary and subcommentary can be dated with some confidence to the fourth or fifth century. The text itself is P.242 attributed to a Maitreyanaatha. who taught or revealed it to Asa^nga. The exact identity of Maitreyanaatha is debated, as is whether a divine revealer or human preceptor is meant. 7.Susumu Yamaguchi, ed., Madhyaantavibhaaga.tiikaa: Exposition Syst ‚m atique du Yogaacaaravij~naptivaada (Nagoya, Japan: Librairie Hajinkaku, 1934), hereinafter cited as Y in body of essay. I do not cite Gadgin Nagao's edition of the Madhyaantavibhaaga-bhaa.sya (Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1964) because it does not include Sthiramati's.tiikaa. 8.See my note 4 preceding. 9.Eugene I. Taylor, "Psychology of Religion and Asian Studies: The William James Legacy," Journal of Transpersonal Psychology 10, no. 1 (1978): 69-70. 10.William James, Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature (New York: Random House, Inc., 1902), p. 512. 11.James, Varieties, pp. 391-393. 12.William James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, ed. Fredson Bowers and Ignas K. Skrupskelis (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 22. 13.William James, Psychology, American Science Series, Briefer Course (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1982), p. 152. 14.James, Essays, p. 13. 15.James, Essays, p. 27. 16.James, Varieties, p. 489. 17.James, Essays, p. 69. 18.James, Essays, p. 65. 19.James, Psychology, p. 152. 20.William James, The Meaning of Truth, ed. Fredson Bowers and Ignas K. Skrupskelis (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1975), p.43. 21.James, Psychology, p. 13. 22.James, Meaning of Truth, p. 35. 23.James, Psychology, p. 12. 24.James, Meaning of Truth, p. 36. 25.James, Psychology, p. 170. 26.James, Psychology, p. 171. 27.James, Psychology, p. 154. 28.James, Psychology, p. 155. 29.James, Essays, pp. 75-76. 30.James, Essays, p. 4. 31.James, Psychology, pp. 165-166. 32.E. C. Moore, William James (New York: Washington Square Press, 1965), p. 144; A. O. Lovejoy, The Thirteen Pragmatisms and Other Essays (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1963), p. 142. 33.Notably, Janice Dean Willis, On Knowing Reality: The Tattvaartha Chapter of Asa^nga's Bodhisattvabhuumi (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979); Thomas A. Kochumuttom, A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience: A New Translation and Interpretation of the Works of Vasubandhu the Yogaacaarin (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1982); Stefan Anacker, Seven Works of Vasubandhu: The Buddhist Psychological Doctor (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984) ; Bruce Cameron Hall, "The Meaning of Vij~napti in Vasubandhu's Concept of Mind." Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 9, no. 1 (1986): 7-23. 34.Ashok Chatterjee, The Yogacara Idealism (Delhi, Varanasi, & Patna: Motilal Banarsidass,1975), p.24. 35.Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, (Delhi, Varanasi, and Patna: Motilal Banarsidass, 1975), vol. 1, p. 145. In all fairness it should be remarked that he based this interpretation on his study of the La^nkaavataara-suutra, which contains many extremely idealistic passages and is not a classical Yogaacaara text, but is only loosely associated with the school. See note 43 following. 36.T.R.V.Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1960), p.316. 37.Edward Conze,Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies (London: Bruno Cassirer, 1967), p. 78. P.243 38.James, Meaning, of Truth, p. 106. 39.James, Meaning of Truth, p. 88. 40.James, Essays, p. 49. 41.James, Essays, pp. 50--51. 42.Yogaacaara based its definition of emptiness on a formula found in the Cu.lasu~n~nata-sutta, to the effect that emptiness is the "presence of an absence," which requires the absence of something and the presence of that from which it is absent. The sutta gives the examples of a meditation hall that is empty of elephants and a forest that is empty of villages. See Gadgin M. Nagao, "What Remains in `Suunyataa: A Yogaacaara Interpretation of Emptiness," in Minoru kiyota, ed., Mahaayaana Buddhist Meditation: Theory and Practice (Honolulu. Hawaii: University Press of Hawaii, 1978), pp. 67-69 and pages following. 43.Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki, trans., The La^nkaavataara Suutra (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1932), p.51. The earliest Yogaacaarin to cite this suutra was Sthiramati. For a discussion of its date and association with the Yogaacaara school, see Jikido Takasaki, "Sources of the La^nkaavataara and its position in Mahaayaana Buddhism," in L. A. Hercus, ed., Indological and Buddhist Studies: Volume in Honour of Professor J. W. de Jong on his Sixtieth Birthday (Canberra, Australia: Faculty of Asian Studies, 1982) : 545-568. 44.William James, A Pluralistic Universe, ed. Fredson Bowers and Ignas K. Skrupskelis (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 113. 45.Abhidharmako`sa II.50, trans. and cited by F.Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic (New York: Dover Pub., 1962), vol. 1, pp. 130-131. 46.James, Pluralistic Universe, p. 32. 47.James, Essays, p. 30. 48.James, Pluralistic Universe, p. 31. 49.James, Pluralistic Universe, p. 116. 50.James, Pluralistic Universe, p. 115. 51.James, Pluralistic Universe, p. 146. 52.James, Pluralistic Universe, p. 147. 53.James, Essays, p. 46. 54.James, Essays, p. 46. 55.James, Essays, p. 66. 56.James, Pragmatism, p. 119. 57.James. Psychology, p. 14. 58.F. Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic (New York: Dover Pub., 1962), 2:398 n.5. 59.Gadgin M. Nagao, "The Buddhist World-View as Elucidated in the Three-Nature Theory and Its Similes, " Eastern Buddhist 16, no.1 (Spring 1983): 14. 60.Nagao, "Buddist World-View." p.2. 61.James, Pluralistic Universe, pp. 111-113. Throughout the chapter he alternates between presenting it as Bergson's position and advocating it as his own, reached independently (pp. xxiii, xxiii n. 8, and n. 101.3). 62.James, Pluralistic Universe,p. 118. 63.James, Essays, p. 45. 64.James, Pragmatism, p.131. Potential problems with James's pragmatic theory of truth are discussed by Israel Scheffler in Four Pragmatists: A Critical Introduction to Peirce, James, Mead and Dewey(New York: Humanities Press, 1974) , pp. 110-116. 65.James, Pluralistic Universe, p.110. 66.James, Pragatism, p. 131. 67.James, Essays, p. 66. 68.James, Essays, p. 49. 69.James, Essays, p. 17. 70.James, Meaning of Truth, p. 131. 71.For a comprehensive discussion of the philology and ranges of meaning of this term, see Masatoshi Nagatomi, "Arthakriyaa," Adyar Library Bulletin 31-32, Dr. R. Raghavan Felicitation Volume(1967-68): 53-72. P.244 72.For a discussion of Dharmakiirti's philosophical affiliations, see Dalsukhbhai Malvania's critical edition of the Dharmottarapradiipa (Patna: Kashiprasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1955), pp.xvi-xxiv. 73.Nagatomi, "Arthakriyaa," pp. 56, 62. 74.Pramaa.navaarttikav.rtti, ¢ŗ.6-7, cited by Nagatomi, in "Arthakriyaa," p.62; see also p.63. 75.James, Varieties, p. 367. 76.James, Pragmatism, p. 40. 77.James, Pragmatism, p. 143. 78.James, Varieties, p. 19. 79.James, Pragmatism, pp. 42-44. 80.James, Pragmatism, p. 44. 81.For discussions of the relationship between James and phenomenology, see especially Bruce Wilshire, William James and Phenomenology (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1968) ; James M. Edie, "William James and Phenomenology," Review of Metaphysics 23, no. 3 (March 1970): 481-536; Richard Stevens, James and Husserl: The Foundations of Meaning (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974); Michael Tavuzzi, "A Note on Husserl's Dependence on William James," Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 10, no. 3 (October 1979): 194-196. 82.Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), p. xviii.