Three approaches to authentic existence: Christian, Confucian, and Buddhist

Frederick J. Streng
Philosophy East and West 32, no. 4(October, 1982).
(c) by the University of Hawaii Press.
p.371-392


. P.371 To live authentically human beings must know and actualize "the nature of things." This is the centuries-long claim of religious seers and philosophers in Eastern and Western cultures. For people to live out their fullest potential they need to awaken to the deepest reality in existence. All human beings can and should pursue quality living through an insight into the nature of existence. This call to perceive the most comprehensive reality of life has two interrelated aspects: the first is that the object of this knowledge is the reality which is prior to, and will remain after, one's existence and which is also the basis for all forms of existence. The second is the recognition that living in, or in relation to, that reality requires a change--a deepening, an enlightening, a revelation--in the way one usually apprehends the world. The philosophical implication of this two-sided concern to live authentically is that religious notions about the nature of ultimate reality have two connotations. The first is that the ontological claim intends to account for all existence; the second is that the nature of reality is a criterion for determining the difference between a lesser and greater quality of "being in the world." Thus, while an understanding of the nature of things applies to all existence, it also expresses the claim that some moments and forms of existence are better than--not just different from--others. By focussing on these bipolar aspects of religious ontologies, we are calling attention to the existential character of such ontological formulations. By reminding ourselves that these formulations are not just abstractions, but forces in the formation of perception and self-awareness, we can become sensitive to some elements in the dynamics of religious awareness. By accenting the dynamic character of ontological claims in a religious context we are led to raise questions about the intentionality of these formulations as exposed in the ontological terms used, the relation of subject and object in knowing reality, and general definitions of religion. We will examine these aspects of the writings of three contemporary religious philosophers: Paul Tillich, a Christian; Chn-i T'ang, a Confucian; and Keiji Nishitani, a Buddhist. They are twentieth century thinkers who are well-read in scientific thought, aware of the modern malaise of human self-alienation, and recognize that they live in a religiously plural world. They are sensitive to the limitations in the formulations given in their respective religious traditions, but wish to expose the vitality and insight of "true spirituality" as they have reformulated the best from their religious and cultural backgrounds. What is most crucial for this analysis, however, is that they attempt to provide an understanding of existence in light of the general human situation, and give their prescriptions for authentic living in the context of cross-cultural human experience. _____________________________________________________ Frederick J. Streng is Professor of Religious Studies at Southern Methodist University. Dallas. Texas. This paper was first presented at the XIVth Congress of the International Association for the History of Religions, University of Monitoba, Winnipeg (Canada). August 18. 1980. Portions of it are included in P. Slater and D. Wiebe, eds., Traditions in Contact and Change (Waterloo. Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press. 1982). P.372 Nevertheless, each philosopher expresses the "true nature of things" differently, and gives a different prescription for living authentically. Tillich asserts that all existence depends on unconditional "being-itself," and that the anxiety produced by the dialectical nature of nonbeing and being in existence is overcome by individual acts of creating meaning. Chn-i T'ang holds that the very nature of existence is a harmonious rhythm of "nothingness within somethingness," and that conflict can be creative ly reformed when people fulfil their true humanity in relation to their position in the cosmic process. Keiji Nishitani, deriving his formulation from the background of Zen Buddhism, states that the deepest reality that human beings can know is "the field of emptiness, " and the solution to self-destroying delusions is to transform the quality of one's consciousness. We will compare three aspects in the writings of each of these men that indicate a relationship between an ontological claim and a prescription for authentic living. The three aspects are: [1] the different uses of positive and negative ontological terms, [2] the various understandings of the relation between the subjective awareness and objects of knowledge for knowing reality, and [3] the differences in a general conception of religion expressed within the framework of an ontology. By comparing these aspects of the three ontologies, we hope to show that there are not only interestingly different formulations of ultimate reality, but that each of these formulations correlates with a particular "manner" or "way" of achieving authentic living. This manner of expressing the deepest sense of life is conditioned by a "mode of valuing," that is, by an axiological process. The axiological process is defined by a deep structure for assessing value as part of a person's experience of "being in the world." We hope to show that these three spokespersons give different weight to aspects of the human experience: Tillich gives greatest weight to creative meaning, T'ang to social harmony, and Nishitani to the quality of consciousness. The different axiological processes, we suggest, are at the heart of both the ontology and religious life in the case of each religious philosopher. The importance of specifying different axiological processes is to allow for variation in deep perceptions of reality within a phenomenological study of religion. To reduce any two of the processes to the other mode of grasping reality would represent a distortion of the intentionality of the alternate processes. To the extent that we can accurately describe three different experiential structures that are based on their respective axiological processes, we call into question the assumption found in those philosophies of religion that define all religious phenomena as a single type of inner experience. We will note how the structure of valuing--indicated by each philosopher's use of positive and negative ontological terms, his understanding of subject and object, and his general definition of religion--is both a process and mode of valuing which molds the character of an experience of ultimate reality. In this way we hope to show that there are differences in the primary experiences of these men when they evaluate the p.373 quality of life in relation to an ultimate context. Conceptions of reality, notions of the self, and definitions of religion are like "the tip of the iceberg", for they expose different mechanisms of apprehending and then actualizing "the nature of things." THE RELATION OF POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE ONTOLOGICAL TERMS This section will analyze the use of positive and negative ontological terms in Tillich, T'ang, and Nishitani in an attempt to understand different ways that they have integrated the actual positive and negative impact of common human experience. Most people affirm that there is both continuity and change in the world; there is the world directly perceived as "being there" while at the same time nothing particular seems to last--whether it is a concrete thing, emotion, or idea. This is complicated by the fact that the experience of "our presence in the world" is determined by giving more value to one thing rather than to another. Thus, reflective human beings often recognize that what is seen as real is connected to the act of giving value, which takes place within a process of valorization. Paul Tillich, in his Systematic Theology, states that "being-itself" is the ground of all existence, and that finitude is the expression of the interaction between nonbeing and being. He asserts: The power of infinite self-transcendence is an expression of man belonging to that which is beyond nonbeing, namely, to being-itself.... .... [T]he dialectical problem of nonbeing is inescapable. It is the problem of finitude. Finitude unites being with dialectical nonbeing. Man's finitude, or creatureliness, is unintelligible without the concept of dialectical nonbeing.(1) Here we see that the dialectical relationship between nonbeing and being is inescapable for anyone or anything in existence. Tillich points out that within Christian understanding there are two ways that nonbeing is related to being. First, nonbeing is expressed through the notion of the Greek phrase ouk on. This is the recognition that humanity is created out of nothing and must return to nothing. He points out: "The nihil out of which God creates is ouk on, the undialectical negation of being."(2) This leads human beings to a sense of radical negation, a sense of "being not." The other understanding of nonbeing that was integrated into Christian theology, according to Tillich, is one that is called "the dialectical form of nonbeing" in relation to being. This is expressed in the Greek phrase m(-+e) n.(3) The dialectical form of nonbeing is experienced existentially in the anxiety about the transience of life. For Tillich, this anxiety is rooted in the very structure of being-in-the-world; it is not a distortion of this structure.(4) The direct experience of nonbeing is the anxiety that every person has in having to die; it is an automatic direct experience that every person has of the dialectical relationship between nonbeing and being. Nonbeing, according to this position, is entirely dependent on being for any ontological value. Unlike the subsequent examples that we are going to consider, p.374 Tillich insists that "nonbeing is literally nothing except in relation to being."(5) Even in the direct experience of human finitude people must look at themselves and experience nonbeing from the viewpoint of "a potential infinity."(6) The power of being as being-itself cannot have a beginning or an end; it is simply the basic presupposition for anything to be. This power of being as experienced in the individual is the power of infinite self-transcendence. We should note, however, that infinity is not being- itself, because being-itself lies beyond "the polarity of finitude and infinite self-transcendence."(7) The power of infinite selftranscendence as it is related to being-itself is a very important notion in that one's reality is manifested by an activity of self-transcendence. (See below, the section on the definition of religion, which describes the manner by which value is actualized.) The infinite self-transcendence is a negation of the finitude experienced in life. Thus, while being-itself precedes both finitude and the infinite self-transcendence, infinite self-transcendence is the expression of being-itself within finitude. While Tillich holds that "Being is essentially related to nonbeing, "(8) being-itself is not essentially related to nonbeing. (In contrast, as we will note below, T'ang's position is that "nothingness" is inherent in "somethingness" as a principle of change, and Nishitani says that "being" becomes possible only within "a field of emptiness.") In a view asserting that being-itself is ultimate reality, a relation between being and nonbeing leads to disruption and chaos. Being-itself is the primal a priori. Continuity in life is therefore credited to the presence of "being," and any change is understood to be real where it is identified substantially as a causal force that arises from the being or "what is" from one moment to another. The "courage to be" is an act of a finite self-transcendence through dependence on being-itself manifested in the infinite drive to seek self-transcendence. In contrast to Tillich's affirmation of the unconditional being-itself, the NeoConfucian philosopher Chn-i T'ang stresses that Chinese cosmologies affirm an immanent order of change that involves "nothingness within somethingness." Change, in the Chinese world view, is not a finite order of reality that depends on being-itself. Rather the essence of things, in T'ang's words, "is exhibited in the capacity for adaptation and creation through interaction with the changing environment."(9) He argues that instead of conceiving the essence of an object as a permanent energy, the dominant Chinese view is that "the nature of an object lies in its capacity [the Chinese original implies the meaning of tolerance,-translator] for interaction with other objects."(10) The process of change cannot be avoided, as in some assumed eternal world or abstract infinity; the only options are a harmonious or disharmonious change. The latter is inappropriate change, such as growth taking place where dissolution should prevail--for example, a cancerous growth. The immanent natural order has an observable regularity. This regularity is not a predetermined force from the outside. Rather, p.375 it is a spontaneous and natural development, and inner tendency that brings about abundance and renewal.(11) According to T'ang the principle of regularity is also a principle of freedom. This is because the life principle (that is, the Tao) which makes any event possible does not determine the form of a specific event. Since the appearance of concrete objects or events arises through interaction with other objects, its nature is one of (regulated) freedom to interrelate with other things. The life force is not an external divine fate or unchanging essence, but the capacity to adapt or modify a particular object within a set of relationships. This capacity to change is inherent in both material and moral development. Thus, human moral development is intrinsically a part of the nature of things. T'ang emphasizes the creative responsibility of humanity by saying: ... Heaven endows every man with an ability to free himself from the control of his own mechanical habits and external forces, and thus he is able to create along with the change of his enviroment. An object or event needs interaction with other objects in order that its freedom in the process of creative evolution can be fully manifested.(12) The basic ontological concept that places change in the center of the life principle is that there is "nothingness within somethingness." Both "nothingness" and "somethingness" are important aspects of change whereby existence can be seen to have regular change without predetermined control and individual freedom in every occasion of existence without chaos. Every event or entity in existence has in its nature the capacity to "prehend other objects. Its ability to prehend lies in its nothingness [hs]."(13) He elaborates the importance of "nothingness" by commenting: The prehensive nature of an object is its Yin aspect. The essence of matter is its Yin nature. This Yin or prehensive nature lies in its nothingness, which not only takes external forces as somethingness but also renders them recessed.... The externalization of the power of an object is what we call shih [somethingness or substantiveness]. This externalized power depends on the power's being prehended by other objects and thus being dissipated and transformed into nothingness.(14) At the same time, the openness for relatedness, or prehension, is not sufficient to account for the manifestation of things. The ability to relate results in the actual formation of a particular thing or event. Thus, it is the interaction of nothingness and somethingness in all existing things that exposes the life principle. Because of the prehensive capacity, or nothingness, self-realization and self-fulfillment of something are possible. In describing the importance of the hexagrams in the I Ching for symbolizing the interaction of nothingness (hs) and somethingness (shih) T'ang states: The sixty-four hexagrams symbolically characterize that all existences interact with one another through their virtues or power, so that they give rise to new p.376 events or objects. The fundamental principle of giving birth to new events or new objects lies in the occasion that the firm matches the receptive and the moving matches the rest, so that there is interprehension between "somethingness" and "nothingness." This is why the concept chung ho [comprehensive and dynamic harmony] is an ultimate value.(15) The immanent interaction of "nothingness" and "somethingness" is at the base also of T'ang's understanding that there is a natural harmony in life; even conflicts lead to harmony. The process of natural development is an extension of any identifiable entity while at the same time the entity is open to interaction. What appears to be a conflict in the short-term view is a development and reintegration in a long-term view. He describes the resolution by pointing out that it lies in the two interacting objects' conscious expansion of their interactive perspectives through their own exploration of a broader path, so that they can form two broader evolutionary processes and these two processes interact with two each other again.... Only because of this, all existence can continue to be born and to grow, and the universe thus can perpetuate its existence.(16) This understanding of the inner bipolar interaction of prehending "nothingness" and actualization of "somethingness" is quite different from that found in Tillich's understanding of the nature of things as unconditional "being-itself" which is only partially experienced in conditioned existence, where nonbeing is in conflict with being-itself. From T'ang's perspective, the dissolution of entities or events is in the nature of things; to become anxious about it is to be ignorant of the "nothingness" which is one necessary pole of the creative life principle. Inherent in any positive , or firm, aspect of life there is a force that simultaneously pushes toward the negative, or yielding. Similarly the yielding process, or "nothingness," becomes eventually an expression of the firm, or "somethingness." The last expression of "the nature of things" which we will examine is the affirmation made by Keiji Nishitani, a philosopher speaking out of the background of Zen Buddhism. He claims that the most comprehensive understanding of "being" in relation to the experience of change and disappearance is found in the standpoint of "emptiness." He summarizes his position by saying,"It is only in a field where the 'being' of all things is a being at one with emptiness that it is possible for all things to gather into One, even while each is a reality as an absolutely unique being."(17) This notion of emptiness is not the negative principle that calls into question the reality of life, as we saw in Tillich's ontology, nor is it a negative pole in the bipolar rhythm of change, as in T'ang's understanding. Rather it is the root, or basic, field in which the affirmative and negative are possible at all. In emphasizing the relativity and temporality of the basic character of "being" he writes: ....[A] system of "being" becomes really possible, not on a field where the system of "being" is seen only as a system of "being," but on the field of p.377 emptiness where being is seen as being-nothingness as well as nothingness-being; namely, in a place where the reality of beings, at the same time, takes on a temporary and so far basically "illusory" character; in a place where the mode of being becomes possible whereby things precisely in their true reality are temporary appearance, and precisely as things-in-themselves are phenomena.(18) At this point we should already note that the "field of emptiness" is not a substantive reality, but much more a state of consciousness which gives a certain quality or character to the arising and dissipation of existence. The emptiness which Nishitani talks about is not a nihilum as in the notion of nihilism. Rather it is a continual emptying of the self-centered grasp of personality and attachments to things.(19) The interplay between the affirmative and negative aspects in emptiness, however, is perceived only when one realizes that it requires a complete negation of any abstraction of emptiness or being-in-itself. Thus, this is a radical kind of negativity which seeks to plumb the very depths of a notion of emptiness by negating even "emptiness" as a notion. Only by negating the particular forms of one's experience can one get beyond the negation it self to a sense that there is an intrinsic relatedness between all things. One must pass through the nihilism of nihilistic existentialism, which, in simply negating essences, judges life to be absurd. Nishitani claims that once a person passes through the claim of absolute negativity as the opposite to a universal essence (that is, "being-itself"), then one does not perceive life as absurd when confronted with nonbeing; nor need a person develop his or her ego strength as a superman or wonder woman. Rather, a new "mode of being" (nonattaching to being-itself) takes form as one moves through the depth of nihilism. The deep realization of the emptiness of everything makes it possible to penetrate the ontological reality of all particular things while at the same time affirming the relative reality of particular things in existence. Emptiness, as understood here, is not a reality as being-itself, nor as a part of the intrinsic rhythm of all change; there is no reality outside the language system that correlates with the notion of emptiness. This is affirmed not because there is nothing whatsoever outside the language system, but because words are seen to be powerful, but inaccurate, constructors of experienced reality. Ontological terms should not be seen primarily as indicators of some thing outside of the language system in a one-to-one correlation with any concept. Thus, to perceive the nature of emptiness--in distinction to the notion of "emptinees"--is to avoid identifying this term with some presumed substance or principle. As soon as emptiness is taken as a reality either in the subject or as a-reality outside of the self, it is no longer the root source for both the subjective and objective experience. The effort to avoid both an absolute nihilism and a simply negative pole of an essentialism is matched only by the intensity with which Nishitani affirms that one must perceive the relationships between particular things while at the same p.378 time maintaining their particularity. He says that from the standpoint of emptiness, each thing is itself while not being itself, is not itself while being itself; its 'being' is unreal in its truth and true in its unreality. This may sound queer at first but, in fact, through such a view, we are enabled for the first time to conceive a 'force' by virtue of which all things are gathered and brought into relationship to one another--a 'force' which, since ancient times, has been called nature (physis, natura).(20) If one were not to assume this intrinsic relatedness through the "ground of emptiness, " Nishitani is ready to admit, something would exist "in-itself, " namely, when it is separate from everything outside of itself. In the everyday conventional subject-object awareness, the identification of something-in-itself is significant because it excludes what is not-itself. This results in a total lack of being able to perceive the nature of anything outside of oneself, and finally ends up in a chaotic awareness. " Only on the field of emptiness, " Nishitani continues, "where being is being-nothingness as well as nothingness-being, is it possible that each being is itself in the face of all the others, and thus, at the same time, is not itself to all the others."(21) The result of perceiving the world from this standpoint is that the uniqueness of a thing requires that it is situated as the root center of all other things. The relationship that particular unique things have with each other while being essentially interrelated is called "circuminsessional'' by Nishitani. When a particular thing recognizes its basic character as "no-self nature" it recognizes that its being is one with emptiness; by letting go of its own "self" it becomes a participant in the center of all other unique particulars. From the standpoint of emptiness, then, a thing "is" in terms of its own "selfhood" when it both is subordinate to all other things and at the same time becomes the center for all other things. Since the field of emptiness is also identified as the field of the "circuminsessional relationship," all things manifest their own reality when they have let go of grasping after some unique essence of themselves and found their own absolute selfhood in complete interrelatedness. The mode of being which is the genuine "suchness" of a thing is that it is inaccessible to identifying it simply with either the subject or the object; rather something really "is" when it is identical with itself and at the same time with other things. All things in the world, then, are seen to be interrelated. To be interrelated means being both the center and the supportive aspect of, or subordinate to, another thing at the same time. The absolute interdependency that one thing has with another for its own unique selfhood is expressed by the term "circuminsessional," in which "all things in their 'being' thus enter into another home-ground, are not themselves and, nevertheless precisely as such (i.e., on the field of emptiness) are themselves to the very end."(22) This web of circuminsessional interpenetration is called by p.379 Nishitani a "mode of being"; it is "the thing's in-itself mode of being, its nonobjective mode of being as 'middle,' its selfness."(23) RELATION OF SUBJECT AND OBJECT IN KNOWING REALITY Related to the use of positive and negative ontological terms is the understanding of the relation between subjective awareness and the object of knowledge. Two issues in the development of authentic living that arise in the three philosophers under consideration are [1] the degree of difference and identity between the subject who knows and the object known, and [2] the assumed capacity of the subject "to know" the nature of reality in concrete experience. Paul Tillich affirms a radical difference between the subject who knows and the object known. This is consistent with his ontology whereby an existing being is only partially manifesting being-itself, and is under the threat of nonbeing. Human beings seek self-transcendence in knowing unconditional being-itself (as will be discussed in the subsection on his definition of religion). An epistemological presupposition for the effort to create meaning is that the object of the deepest human awareness is something other than one's self. Humanity is seen, by Tillich, as a kind of being who is immediately aware of a subject-object bipolarity in the structure of being.(24) To ask the question about "being"'presupposes two actualities: (I)an asking subject, and [2] an object about which the question is asked. The experience of self-centeredness in an objective world is the basic dialectical ontological structure of life. This structure is something which, says Tillich, cannot be derived; it must be accepted.(25) While "self" and "the environment in which the self exists" determine each other, Tillich insists that selfhood "is an original phenomenon which logically precedes all questions of existence." (26) Human beings have an immediate experience of the polar structure of vitality and intentionality. Human vitality requires intentionality in order to relate meaningful structures to the dynamic that is inherent in the nature of being. This becomes crucial in the expression of human selfhood since it is through the shaping of reality in meaningful structures that human beings can formulate their sense of selfhood. It is, as a matter of fact, the aspect of self in relation to the world as expressed in subjective reason and objective reason which makes the self and the world a structured whole. As Tillich says, "Without reason, without the logos of being, being would be chaos, that is, it would not be being but only the possibility of it (me on)."(27) The experienced world is regarded as having "reality" when it is looked on by the mind. And a segment of this reality is used as a symbol when one wants to express the notion of God. When God is seen as the ground of being, he transcends the subject-object bipolar sensibility. If he is brought into this subject-object structure of being he ceases to be the ground of being and becomes one being among others. Any concrete assertion about God must be symbolic. p.380 Nevertheless, Tillich says, the statement that God is being-itself is a nonsymbolic statement.(28) This is, in part, because the very act of thinking must start with being. Thought, he says, "cannot go behind it as the form of the question itself shows. If one asks why there is not nothing, one attributes being even to nothing."(29) Similarly the dialectical experience of being and nonbeing in existence leaves human beings in a constant tension about whether they have perceived and properly formulated a symbolic grasp of the nature of life. The notion of causality to account for the continuity and changes of life is, according to Tillich, an expression of the abyss of nonbeing in everything.(30) It shows the inability of anything to rest on itself and its need for other things as a condition for its own survival. This is a very important assumption that Tillich expresses in his understanding of how the reality of being is related to change, since change is here understood to result automatically in anxiety over the threat of nonbeing. Any change assumes two things: [1] that there should be an unchanging being, and [2] that change is the threat to that basic reality. Thus, the essential condition of existence that there is finitude, anxiety, and the threat of nonbeing. As I pointed out earlier, Tillich's account of human existential anxiety due to the threat of nonbeing in conflict with being is not in agreement with T'ang's understanding of change in existence. Since T'ang's ontology requires both "nothingness" and "somethingness" as a natural expression of any existing entity, it is not surprising that knowledge of the rhythm of life is also a combination of an intuition arising from within the person and a specific mentalperceptual creation which depends on identifying perceptions in the immediate moment. In T'ang's understanding of the dynamic nature of existence, an entity is not conceived as an independent thing nor held as an abstract object of thought. An entity is defined according to its position in relation to other things. He elaborates the notion that entities are always in a continuum and in a succession in the following way: [I]n Chinese thought an object is not conceived merely as something occupying specific space and time; therefore an abstract concept of infinite space and time has never existed in Chinese philosophy. The I Ching speaks of wei [position or location] rather than space; [it] speaks of hs [successive order or occurring order] instead of time. Every object has its position, and its rise and development are in accordance with occurring or successive order.... [E]vents or objects are not separate from their posi- tion and succession.(31) The location of any object, then, is a designation of a perspective in a field of relationships; similarly, an object is defined by its function in relation to a set of activities. An object is partially defined by the subjective apprehension, which itself is conditioned by the field of activities in which objects are defined. The interaction of a prehending force and an extending force in the arising of objects and subjects, for T'ang, does not lead to a radical relativity whose expression of p.381 reality ultimately resides in a quality of consciousness--as we will see in Nishitani's identification of all things in the "field of emptiness." For T'ang, the principle of life requires the "somethingness" of the immediate situation as well as the "nothingness" inherent in change; there is, in his words, "the unfailing process of evolution in which there are infinite varieties of interaction among the myriad beings."(32) Just as the knowledge of objects of perception are intrinsically connected to perspective and to their functions in relation to their respective fields of activities, T'ang holds that the knowledge of the deepest religious reality is a combination of the intrinsic "human nature-human heart" that permeates the whole order of existence and the effort-filled cultivation of a rich embodiment of "human nature-human heart" in actual life. He describes the actualization of the "human nature-human heart," which is the "subject of infinity and transcendence"(33) when he says: At their early stage;infinity and transcendence are like a bud--a bud of"the will to create," a bud of creativity which spontaneously permeates our "human heart" in its immediacy. This is called "the seed of earnest jen" [human naturehuman heart].... It is embodied directly in our natural life and physical constitution, as a master of them, transforming our physical constitution into a subject of morality sustained and beautified by its creativity.... [I]t awakens the "human heart"-"human nature" from sl- umber and transforms and nurtures the "human heart"-"human nature" and helps it grow. Here lies the genuine and genial path life to the real establishment of our actual life and also to making ourselves and our "fate" established.(34) The actualization of the transcendental ideal is the true spiritual goal for T'ang. The deepest religious realization is not a symbolic grasp of the unconditional object of knowledge, God, as suggested by Tillich, nor the empty mode of consciousness that is totally unattached to any form-as we will see in Nishitani's insight into the nature of things. For T'ang the demand of spiritual knowledge is a self-awareness that arises from humanity's transcendent nature. In true self-awareness a person grasps the highest values rooted in human nature itself. He points to a reality of human life that transcends any formal claims by the major religious tradition, and comments as follows: The moment in which [man] is engaged in the "authentic" self-awareness is the moment in which he transcends his own religious spirit, confirming and intuitively apprehending man's spirit of self-confidence which comprehends and is on and above the religious spirit.(35) The actualization of transcendent knowledge, however, does not mean that one can leave the interaction of concrete form and universal ideals; this knowledge does not eliminate the ordered rhythm of change or transport one to a divine or unconditioned realm. Rather, it leads to a self-confidence in the capacity of human nature which is always extending beyond the fulfillment of any given moment. He elaborates: p.382 .... [W]e must be self-confident that the "human heart" and "human nature" that can produce and be responsible for that faith or belief also possesses, or is identical with, or is the passage to, the transcendent existence or the transcendental state of mind and source of all the grave, holy values in faith as well. However, this means that our mind cannot extend merely in its line of infinity and transcendence to form all kinds of religious belief; and we must also have a great spiritual leap back or retrospection and come to be self-aware of the beliefs; then in the retrospection we suddenly discover that all grave and holy values in faith are rooted in our "human heart" and "human nature" itself.(36) For T'ang, then, the subject and object merge without ever becoming identical; and the human subject has the innate capacity to know "human nature," but always through the continuing creative act of incarnating "transcendent existence" in particular forms. Like T'ang, Nishitani asserts that subject and object are not separate entities; however, he takes the interaction farther by insisting that the basic "empty" (or radically related) character of a particular form makes it identical (in a negative way) to all other forms. In the "field of emptiness" a thing is "itself" when it is "not-itself" (without ceasing to be itself). While both T'ang and Nishitani recognize that existence is basically a process of interrelations, rather than materializations of esse- nces, T'ang insists that "somethingness" (substance, materiality) as it appears in naive perception is an essential part of the rhythm of change, while Nishitani holds that in the most profound level of awareness there is only codependent arising of changing forms. Nishitani thus rejects the notion that there is anything essentially real external to us; there is only that reality that emerges in relation to certain processes of awareness, some of which include more attachment to external things than others. There is no entity or principle, such as the "rhythm of change," that maintains itself in an unchanging way. The standpoint of emptiness requires that a person penetrate directly to the precise point of what makes something what it is; otherwise it cannot really be known. In order to "penetrate directly" one has to let go of the assumption that the reality of what is perceived is composed of something other than what the perceiver is. The common reality in both, according to Nishitani, is that both of them are empty of any substantial essential being. No essence or anything else can stand ontologically independent of anything else. Nishitani summarizes this by saying, "That a thing is itself means that all other things, without ceasing to be in themselves, are in the home-ground of that thing; that precisely in the point where it is in its own home-ground all other things are present too and that all other things plunge their roots into its base."(37) He distinguishes this view from existential nihilism, which is a doubting mode of sensitivity that calls into question both substantial and subjective reality; the standpoint of emptiness of which Nishitani talks here is one in which a person foregoes the substantial and subjective realities while at the same time affirming the close essential interrelationship between all things. The mode of being called "emptiness" is also regarded by Nishitani as a p.383 standpoint or perspective. To perceive emptiness requires converting one's consciousness to the place of emptiness, and thereby stopping the ego-identification with the particular forms of things as if they had independent essential being. It is to accept that while one is thinking, perceiving, and feeling, one recognizes the lack of selfhood in oneself and in all other things. To let go of either absolute subjectivity or absolute objectivity is to transcend the conventional standpoint. Therefore, in emptiness nonbeing is not a threat-producing anxiety of an egocentered consciousness. Nor is it a threat to a person trying to transcend the limitations of a finite self. In converting to the standpoint of emptiness there is a release from the assumption that the self-transcendence is a particular act or a series of acts to become something--as suggested by Tillich. It is the recognition that one already is a particular entity while at the same time transcending that particularity. The shift to a process of knowing designated as the "standpoint of emptiness" is a shift from a mode of constructive consciousness that is fundamentally an "act of designation"-designating, or separating, one thing from another--to the negation of substantiation and specification of one thing over against another. This is to know that the true selfness of fire, for example, is nonfire, or that the selfness of a tree is "non-tree." What we perceive, then, is that the selfhood of any particular thing is known by its context, and that there is no self-identifying essence that separates it from all other things. The immediate realization of "emptiness as-a mode of being" is also becoming conscious of the field of emptiness in a certain way. Nishitani states this explicitly when he says that the field of emptiness "opens up, as it were, still nearer to ourselves than the ourselves we are ordinarily thinking of. In other words by converting from what is ordinarily called 'self' to the field of emptiness, we become truly ourselves."(38) In such a field of emptiness, the experience is not as in other fields of experience that the mind is reflective or that the awareness within this consciousness is an intellectual intuition. Nishitani makes this clear when he says, Ordinarily, our self is conceived as something knowing itself, being conscious of itself or intellectually intuiting itself. But what I term self-awareness here does not mean a field where in any sense the self knows itself. On the contrary this is just where such a "self" and such "knowledge" are emptied.(39) For the same reason, the base of all consciousness from the standpoint of emptiness is not the unconscious or the subconscious. The original selfawareness is then not-being-a-self while being-a-self. This means, says Nishitani, that our self-in-itself, on the field of emptiness, stays at the home of all other things. On the field of emptiness, the center is everywhere: all things--each in its nonobjective and "middle" in-itself-ness--are an absolute center. On that field, therefore, it is impossible for our self to be self-centered like the "self" as ego or p.384 subject. Rather, it is precisely in the absolute negation of that self-centeredness that the field of emptiness can ever open up.(40) The field of emptiness ultimately appears as a field of wisdom which is called the "knowing of unknowing." (41) When the self has a field of emptiness as its home ground, it is free from the attachment to things-in-themselves or to abstract principles. Then "selves" can truly be. RELIGION AS A MEANS FOR ACTUALIZING THE HIGHEST VALUE If the manner of expressing one's deepest sense of being-in-existence is indeed interdependent with a process and mode of evaluating events and experiences, one's conception of the nature of reality will reflect the most significant general procedures wherby one can experience fulfillment. These procedures are indeed reflected in the ontologies of Tillich, T'ang, and Nishitani. Even more directly, these procedures are articulated in the discussion of each of these philosophers as they consider the question: What is religion? Each has answered that question in terms of his understanding of the general human situation. In the last two sections we have outlined a few key elements in each of their ontological and epistemological statements about the general human situation. In this section we will point out the definition of religion of each thinker as a reflection of a particular ontology, since each intends with his definition to describe how it is the appropriate procedure to actualize the ultimate reality in everyday living. For Tillich human existence is that sort of reality whose fulfillment is in or through meaning. He makes this clear when he defends his analytic-intuitive philosophical method--which he calls "metalogic"--for understanding the core of religious life; this method, he says, must assume that the principles of meaning to which consciousness submits itself in the spiritual act are at the same time the principles of meaning to which being is subjected. It must assume that the meaning of being comes to expression in the consciousness informed by meaning.(42) In this way Tillich justifies his contention that it is possible to know something; the self can truly be aware of the nature of existence in which it already is ensconced. Human consciousness strives for a fulfillment of meaning; to be human means that a person tries to unify all the elements of one's consciousness, both the ideal or theoretical aspects and the material or practical aspects of one's experience. Reality is not exterior to the act of the human spirit that seeks either to receive or to bestow a unifying awareness of all facets of life. He makes clear that meaning is the core of conscious existence. He says: Meaning is the common characteristic and the ultimate unity of the theoretical and the practical sphere of spirit, of scientific and aesthetic, of legal and social structures. The spiritual reality in which the spirit-bearing forces (Gestalt) lives and creates, is a meaning-reality [Sinnwirklichkeit].(43) p.385 There are three elements in every expression of meaning: [1] an awareness of the interconnection of the separate aspects of meaning, [2] the awareness that every particular meaing is related to an unconditioned and ultimate meaningfulness, and [3] that while there is no complete unity of meaning in any existing (and, thus, conditioned) meaning there is "the demand to fulfill the unconditioned meaning." (44) Here is the basis for Tillich's claim that every cultural form has as its basis an ontological charac- ter; any cultural form can be a medium for the spirit-bearing forces. Indeed, not all cultural expression has an intention to express the unconditioned meaning; in fact, there are demonic expressions when the unconditional meaning is denied. However, it is the demand for the attempt to present the unity of all meaning that makes the unconditional meaning actual in form.(45) The consciousness of meaning, then, is the place where the spirit takes form. It is an act of ego-consciousness whereby human beings manifest infinite selftranscendence; it expresses the ontological negation of nonbeing. This makes the highest value in human life an act which depends on being-itself, and which at the same time is a positive action within finite existence. The role of the personality in exposing both the partially unified cultural meaning and the unconditional ground for all meaning is made clear when Tillich states: A real meaning-fulfillment is one in which bestowal of meaning takes place in the sphere of individual reality bound to nature; and ideal fulfillment is one in which the giving of meaning involves no transformation in the material sphere, but rather a fulfillment of the existent thing in its immediate formation.... [P]ersonality is the place of meaning-fulfillment, both real and ideal.(46) At the same time Tillich makes clear that there is a distinction between the expression of (partially) unified meaning in culture and the self-conscious awareness of the unconditioned meaning of religious life. In this context, religion is the attempt to grasp the unity of meaning which is directed toward what exists unconditionally (das unbedingt Seiende).(47) The definition of religion is: "the sum total of all spiritual acts directed toward grasping the unconditional import of meaning through the fulfillment of the unity of meaning."(48) The basic form for the synthesis of form, content, and the Unconditional is a symbol. This symbol of unity can never be regarded as absolute; otherwise, it is demonic. It is, rather, "a symbol of the plumb line by which all [syntheses] are measured and found wanting; it is the plumb line that symbolizes authentic fulfillment of meaning."(49) In sum, the true spiritual consciousness for Tillich is the creation of a reality through meaning which stands under the demand of Unconditioned reality; the purest form of this is a symbol which paradoxically unifies and judges all symbols. For Chn-i T'ang "god" is not the central issue of spiritual life. Similarly, myths and symbol systems--while always found in religious institutions-are peripheral to the core of the immanent religious spirit in all humanity. He insists that Confucianism shares with all major religions the p.386 central demand of religious life, namely, "man lives to find a sure place to establish himself and his 'fate.'"(50) Human beings "establish" themselves within the order of the universe by realizing that their well-being is inseparable from that of all other beings. A person's "fate" (ming) is not--as pointed out above-an unchangeable predestination; it is the ultimate context in which particular actualizations of one's of obligations as a moral agent are set. T'ang explains how a religious spirit and activity is needed beyond philosophic, scientific, or aesthetic interests in order to "establish" oneself in an ultimate context: .... [M]an can acquire the place for such establishment only when his mind of infinity and transcendence, as much as his life and existence, are established or settled. This establishment depends on man's possession of the following things: religious belief or faith, the demand of the religious spirit through which the infinity and transcendence of the mind are manifested, religious morality, and moral deeds. This establishment can be found in most religions and the Confucionist religion.(51) The basic human spiritual act, then, is any appropriate emotional, intellectual, and physical expression of oneself in relation to the natural rhythm of change in the universe. By doing an appropriate moral-spiritual action a person expresses the inherent value in the "human-heart." The highest expression of value in the universe is self-confidence arising from the intuitive participation in the rhythm of change. T'ang says: .... [T]he final stage of the development of man's religious spirit ends in approaching the spirit of self-confidence.... Since Confucius and Mencius, the Confucianist has emphasized the spirit of self-reflection, self-awareness, and self-confidence. This spirit will become the convergence of all religions in the long run.(52) This manifestation of the highest human value is not separate from values inherent within all nature. Ultimately, all existence is an expression of value, which, however, cannot be measured in mathematical units of measure. Changes in existence can sometimes be measured mathematically when the existing objects are externally related to each other. However, changes in external relations can also cause qualitative changes because of shifts in the manner or mode of relationships. T'ang explains: Among the higher levels of existences, the change of quantity often alters modes of interaction and thus produces qualitative differences. The value of an object is exhibited in its capacity for promoting the growth, development, or realization of human or other kinds of beings. Therefore, value is found in the sum total of relations between the object and the subject rather than in a mathematical formula.(53) Thus, value is a reality expressing internal relationships; this reality is measured by its capacity to actualize a goal which fulfills the self-awareness and self-confidence of a conscious being. It is important to note here that the deepest sense p.387 of such self-awareness is the avoidance of self-centeredness, which is the expression of "human-heart" (jen). Even craving for survival or conflict between individuals are not morally neutral or without implications of value; they must be seen within the ultimate context of the harmony or internal order as a facet of the growth of things. Without an implicit internal order, T'ang insists, the struggle or conflict between individual entities is "totally impossible."(54) The realization of the "human-heart" by continuing and completing the inherent harmony of all things is most clearly expressed for T'ang in the three "sacrificial worships" of heaven-and-earth, a person's ancestors, and the great Teacher (Confucius). The multiple objects of reverence are, for T'ang, expressive of the deepest spiritual reality. Having multiple and particular personal experiences of a universal abstract spirit is important in actualizing the most profound kind of self-awareness. He describes how Confucian worship integrates the general experiences of multiplicity and unity: In our view, religious spirit not only must have one place of concentration [that is, as a universal pure spirit], but also a place of expansion. The religion of absolute faith in the uniqueness or "one" of God never in fact exists.... [A]ncestors and sages represent the "principle of many"; the universe as a whole and, inside it, the whole of reality of all beings, lives, spirit, and values represent the "principle of one."(55) The importance of these "worships" is in the "transcendental contemplation" of the virtues of heaven-and-earth. This sort of contemplation is itself an act of creation and preservation of the virtues symbolically recalled through worship. The act of worship is an embodiment of those ideals at just that moment.(56) Thus, it is partially the creation of the worshipper. This "transcendental contemplation" expresses a relationship to inner truths of life; it is a conscious process in which one grasps the nature and movement of life. It is also a process whereby a person embodies values which apply to all moments of one's life. Through a deep inner participation in the awareness of the origins and most fulfilling values of one's particular existence a person can make appropriate decisions for applying this organic grasp of life to his or her individual situation. Only after one has perceived the constellation of interacting forces of one's present situation can a person make the right moral choice in action. The result of this kind of intuition is not basically an act of individual "being"; it is a decision to manifest the appropriate function of one's being as related to the moment in the rhythm of change. This is the establishment of one's self and one's 'fate,' the actualization of integrity. T'ang summarizes the core of religious life as follows: .... [T]he root of religious spirit lies in the transcendental completion and eternity of the demand for preservation and emergence of values. In the universe, growth of natural things, cultivation of human culture, the achievement of the realm of human integrity--all are activities of creating and actualizing values.(57) Like Tillich and T'ang, Nishitani sees the self in its conventional cultural form as an expression of the nature of things. At the same time they all point out that p.388 without a deeper awareness than is commonly experienced, a person will be caught in the overwhelming sense of transience and meaninglessness. However, for Nishitani, the key to gaining a fulfilling perspective is not the personal creation of symbolic meaning that stands under the demand of the Unconditional; nor is it the establishment of a person in his or her proper position in the eternal rhythm of change; rather, it is full awareness of the manner of our existence. Full awareness requires a break-through in the field of consciousness so that one no longer is aware of a separate ego which is presumably to be fulfilled. To see the world in representations, or through a subject-object awareness, is only one--and a limited--way of being-in-existence. It is a self-centered way of being. Nishitani explains the peculiarity of this way of being by commenting: "What is called the 'ego' consists of the procedure that the self-consciousness endlessly reflects only itself."(58) To recognize that we participate in different modes of becoming by means of different modes of consciousness is a basic step in seeing the self within the horizon of "fundamental nothingness." Thus, his brief, but revealing, statement on the power of knowing is not surprising: "Knowing always contains a sort of transcendence over what is known."(59) For Nishitani religion is defined as "an existential exposure of the problematical which is contained in the usual mode of self-being."(60) While all of life is transient, and human beings encounter the reality of non-being at each step, it is only in religion that human beings reach a deepening of the perception of their transience so that they see nothingness manifest in their own being. In Zen this awareness is called "coming to oneself." Nishitani explains such a moment of awareness when he writes: The opening up of the horizon of nothingness out of the ground of our life is the occasion of the radical about-face in our life itself. This turn-about is no other than the transformation from the self-centered (or man-centered) attitude which asks concerning all things, what is their use to us (or to man), to that of asking, for what purpose do we ourselves exist.(61) This awareness must be more than an intellectual comprehension of reality; it has to be a total realization in spirit, soul and body. As Tillich spoke of "meaning-reality"--that is, of the reality of our being known through meaning--and T'ang called for the actualization of one's "human-heart" to make oneself "a 'real' man," so Nishitani says that placing our self in the "horizon of nothingness" is the moment when "reality itself comes to its own realization."(62) He elaborates this notion by commenting: This real awareness of Reality is our real being itself and constitutes the true reality of our existence. And this is because that awareness actualizes itself as one with the self-realization of Reality itself.(63) In this context he proposes to answer the question of "What is Religion?" by "tracing the oath through which the quest for what is truly real is really pursued."(64) p.389 The key activity in this quest is the shift out of everyday consciousness to an intuitive identity with the nothingness that is at the root of the field of "being." In the everyday consciousness which objectifies our experience, we rarely are in contact with ourselves, only with images of ourselves. Similarly we are not in contact with things in the world, but our ego-based response to them. While all things, self, and feelings are relatively real, he continues, "it cannot be said that they are present in their true reality in the field of consciousness, where they are always present only in the form of representation."(65) To shift out of everyday consciousness a person must experience "Great Doubt." This kind of deep probing of the empty-self is quite different from a common awareness of the transience and uncertainty of existence experienced by many people. Nishitani describes the uncovering of the nothingness as the foundation of oneself and all things as the "Great Doubt"; it is a self-awareness more fundamental than ego-consciousness: ... [W]hen the self breaks through the field of "being" only, that is, the field of consciousness, and reaches the nothingness lying at the base, it is able for the first time to attain a subjectivity that can not be objectified in any way. This is a selfawareness more basic than self-consciousness.(66) Such an awareness of nothingness appears as inevitable; and the person becomes a mass of doubt. Here Nishitani is cautious to warn the reader that this realization of the nothingness at the foundation of both subjectivity and objectivity is not the annihilation of them; it is, however, the death of the "ego" understood as the illusory, self-centered attachment to the self-image. ONTOLOGIES AS EXPRESSIONS OF AXIOLOGICAL STRUCTURES The conclusion of this comparison is that there are three different axiological structures, or processes of evaluating human experience, represented in the three ontologies examined. By analyzing three aspects in the religious philosophies of Paul Tillich, Chun-i T'ang, and Keiji Nishitani we see that there are pervading processes of evaluation which inform their basic orientations. By examining the positive and negative ontological terms, the relation of subject and object, and the general definitions of r eligion we can see three basically different approaches to authentic living. These different approaches organize their understanding of authenticity in relation to different modes of experiencing life: through the creation of meaning under the demand of being-itself, establishment of one's place in the cosmic rhythm of change through moral choice, and full awareness of the transience and interrelated arising of existence. The differences of the three axiological structures can be summarized as follows. Tillich advocates the actualization of authentic living through the individual creation of meaning. The source for the reality of meaning is the unconditional "being-itself"; it is basic to, but distinct from, existence which is defined by the threat of nonbeing. A basic structure of experience in existence, according to Tillich, is the bipolar distinction between subject and object. To p.390 know the nature of things requires an act of ego-consciousness whereby a person transcends the tension of being and nonbeing through symbols. Symbols give the reality of meaning to life. This sense of reality assumes ideal essences which provide life with value. Therefore, life has a reason and meaning through a categorization of what "is," and through symbolic meaning that partially reflects the unconditional source of all events. T'ang advocates the actualization of authentic living through establishing one's "self" within the transcendent order of change. This order of change (or life-principle) is expressed as "nothingness within somethingness." It is the basis for any existing form; however, any form has the freedom to manifest its basic character in an individual way. The knowledge of oneself in the order (rhythm) of change is possible because "human-nature" is essentially transcendent and infinite. Through actualizing human-nature in everyday affairs a person becomes a "true" person, thereby fulfilling one's cosmic moral obligations. The fulfillment of moral obligations is the manifestation of one's nature in relation to the order of change. Nishitani advocates the actualization of authentic living through developing full awareness of the habitual self-constricting force of conventional egoconsciousness. For him, authentic "being" is becoming fully aware that the "field of emptiness" is the basic nature of all being. The emptiness of all things is directly perceived by dropping attachment to a subject-object dualism. This perception is possible through the Great Doubt. Authentic living, according to Nishitani, does not come about through the activity of ego-consciousness to create meaning, nor through an intuitive grasp of the transcendent order of change; rather, it comes from a quality of consciousness known as "no-self" or "empty mind." By examining the differences in these structures of valuing life experiences, we can see that the communication of a sense of reality is an expression of a process of evaluation (which can be defined by its axiological structure). Where ontologies are given to help people understand the nature of authentic living, they expose not only conceptual systems but also processes of valuing whereby that reality is given form and content. Thus, an understanding of religious ontologies requires a concern for "modes of valuing" which are implicit in different ontological expressions. NOTES 1. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), pp. 191 and 189. 2. Ibid., p. 188. 3. Ibid., p. 179. 4. Ibid., p. 191. p.391 5. Ibid., p. 189. 6. Ibid., p. 190. 7. Ibid., p. 191. 8. Ibid., p. 202. 9. Chn-i Tang, "Cosmologies in Ancient Chinese Philosophy," Chinese Studies in Philosophy 5, no. 1 (Fall 1973): 17. 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid., p. 12. 12. Ibid., p. 16. 13. Ibid., p. 17. 14. Ibid., p. 24. 15. Ibid., p. 22. 16. Ibid., pp. 22-23. 17. Nishitani Keiji, "The Standpoint of 'Suunyataa," trans. Jan van Bragt, Eastern Buddhist, New Series 6, no. 2 (October 1973): 66. 18. Ibid., p. 64. 19. See Nishitani Keiji, "Nihilism and 'Suunyataa," trans. Yamamoto Seisaku, Eastern Buddhist, New Series 4, no. 2 (October, 1971): 30-49; 5, no. I (May, 1972): 55-69; and 5, no. 2 (October, 1972): 95-106. For another useful examination of negativity in certain Buddhist and Western formulations see Masao Abe. "Non-being and Mu: the Metaphysical Nature of Negativity in the East and the West," Religious Studies 11,no. 2 (June, 1975): 181-192. 20. Nishitani, "The Standpoint of 'Suunyataa, " Eastern Buddhist 6, no. 2: 66. 21. Ibid., p. 67. 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid., p. 68. 24. Systematic Theology, vol 1,p. 164. 25. Ibid., p. 174. 26. Ibid., p. 169. 27. Ibid., p. 171. 28. Ibid., p. 238. 29. Ibid., p. 163. 30. Ibid., p. 196. 31. Chn-i T'ang, "Cosmologies in Ancient Chinese Philosophy," Chinese Studies in Philosophy 5, no. 1 (Fall, 1973): 59. 32. Ibid., p. 28. 33. "Religious Beliefs and Modern Chinese Culture, Part II: The Religious Spirit of Confucianism," Chinese Studies in Philosophy 5, no. 1 (Fall, 1973), p. 59. 34. Ibid., p. 60. 35. Ibid., p. 56. 36. Ibid., p. 55. 37. Nishitani, "The Standpoint of 'Suunyataa, " Eastern Buddhist 6, no. 2 (October 1973): 66-67. 38. Ibid. 39. Ibid., p. 70. 40. Ibid., p. 77. 41. Nishitani, "The Standpoint of 'Suunyataa, " Eastern Buddhist 6, no. 1 (May, 1973): 70. 42. Paul Tillich, What Is Religion?, ed. and with Introduction by James Luther Adams (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), p. 42. 43. Ibid., pp. 56-57. 44. Ibid., p. 57. 45. Ibid., p. 59. 46. Ibid., p. 64. 47. Ibid., p. 66. 48. Ibid., p. 60. 49. Ibid., p. 22, This is a formulation of James Luther Adams, who wrote the introduction to Tillich's What Is Religion? p.392 50. Chun-i T'ang, "Religious Beliefs," p. 51. 51. Ibid., p. 52. 52. Ibid., p. 56. 53. T'ang, "Cosmologies," p. 36. 54. Ibid., p. 41. 55. T'ang, "Religious Beliefs," pp. 71-72. 56. Ibid., p. 80. 57. Ibid., p. 79. 58. Keiji Nishitani, "What Is Religion? " in Philosophical Studies of Japan, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, 1960), p. 34. 59. Ibid., p. 33. 60. Ibid., p. 35. 61. Ibid., p. 24. 62. Ibid., p. 25. 63. Ibid. 64. Ibid., p. 26. 65. Ibid., p. 30. 66. Ibid., p. 36.