Liang Shuming and Henri Bergson on intuition: cultural context and the evolution of terms

by Yanming An

Philosophy East and West

Vol.47 No.3

Pp.337-362

1997.07

Copyright by Hawaii of University


From the end of the last century, as a sign both of the crisis of Chinese culture and of its rescue, many Western works in philosophy and the social sciences were translated into Chinese. As intellectuals in China borrowed the new concepts and terminology from these translations, they were eager to find answers to how it was that China had become weak and how China could be helped to regain its past glory. However, as Hans-Georg Gadamer points out, an interpreter cannot avoid the involvement of his own tradition or cultural prejudice when he deals with foreign ideas and concepts.(1) As a result, there often exists an important difference between the original European concept and its Chinese version. To identify this kind of difference and analyze the reasons for it is a useful task for cultural historians--useful because we can thereby find out some of the inherited presuppositions of Chinese culture. One such presupposition is the priority of ethics over epistemology. This means prizing certain European epistemological concepts as sources of ethical standards rather than as keys to reality. It means prizing moral inclination rather than cause-effect deliberation. The reverse is also true. Once we know these priorities, we have a useful tool for explaining the development of a philosopher's thought. We can look for evidence of the impact of priorities on his attempts to assimilate new foreign doctrines. This essay will approach this general issue through a comparison of the concept of intuition in Henri Bergson (1859-1941) and its Chinese counterpart, zhijue in Liang Shuming (1893-1988), a prominent philosopher and social reformer in contemporary China. It will answer three closely related questions. First, what does "intuition" mean to both Bergson and Liang Shuming? Second, what does the Chinese cultural heritage contribute to the formation of Liang's zhijue? Third, what is the historical fate of zhijue in the development of Liang's thought, or what is the relation between his early term zhijue and his later term lixing (reason)? We will start with the third problem. The Appearance and Disappearance of Zhijue A terminological study shows that the term zhijue exists neither in the Confucian classics nor in the other literature of traditional Chinese culture. As a matter of fact, it is a modern Chinese version of the Western term "intuition." From the beginning, it has borne the apparent imprint of Henri Bergson's Vitalism. Bergson's concept of intuition, along with his two major books, An Introduction to Metaphysics and Creative Evolution, were translated into Chinese at the beginning of this century. Very soon they received a warm response in Chinese intellectual circles. Around 1915, Liang became familiar with Bergson through the "Western philosophy books" that he "borrowed from a friend, Zhang Shenfu."(2) In a 1916 essay, he applied Bergson's idea to an exploration of some Buddhist issues.(3) In 1921, Liang contributed another essay to a magazine in which he not only employed the concept of zhijue but also dealt with the relation between zhijue and lizhi (intellect) in Weishi Buddhism and Bergson.(4) Later in 1921, Liang lectured and published his major philosophical book, Dongxi fang wenhua jiqi zhexue or Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies.(5) Therein he systematically demonstrated his concept of zhijue and clearly defined it as the opposite of lizhi. He even insisted that these two concepts, respectively, characterized Chinese and Western cultures and therefore might account for the principal difference between them. However, at least from the time of a lecture given by him in 1934, not only was zhijue replaced by another concept, lixing, but the term itself virtually disappeared.(6) This replacement seems to have been deliberate, because zhijue hardly appears of in any of Liang's works after this time. Concerning this phenomenon, as well as the relation between zhijue and its substitute lixing, there are two representative opinions among students of Liang's thought. The first is offered by Professor Guy S. Alitto: Why did he [liang] abandon Vitalism and intuition (zhijue) for lixing? His post-1949 Marxist critics have claimed that he had been forced to because such goods had "gone out of fashion," or because such flagrantly obscurantist thought had been decisively and permanently discredited in the 1923 Science and Philosophy of life debate. All have agreed that the actual content of lixing was exactly the same as the intuition of his first book.(7) A careful reading of the context of this passage may reveal that Professor Alitto's view is fully consistent with the explanation of Liang's "Marxist critics." However, it seems to me that the opinions of these critics are themselves suspicious. The core of their argument is that the fear of being viewed by his contemporaries as "out of fashion" primarily accounts for Liang's abandoning of the term zhijue. If this judgment is true, then Liang appears to have been an academic opportunist, and what he hoped to gain was not the truth but the praise of the masses. However, this does not seem to fit Liang's personality and attitude toward life. For example, Liang had earlier offered two ideas--on "the premature birth of Chinese culture" and "there being no such thing as revolution in ancient China"--that certainly were not in tune with Marxist theory in China. After the Communist victory in 1949, these ideas not only sounded very much "out of fashion," but also caused Liang to suffer theoretical attacks and political persecution, including a fierce critique from Mao Zedong himself. Nevertheless, we can still find them in an essay by Liang in 1974.(8) Another explanation comes from Dr. Zheng Dahua of the People's Republic. In a 1993 book, where he compares the concepts of lizhi and lixing, Dr. Zheng states that "As far as these features [of lixing] are concerned, there is really some partial overlap (xiangtong zhichu) between lixing and zhijue."(9) Now, to say that there is a "partial overlap" is also to acknowledge that there is a partial non-overlap. Compared to Professor Alitto's unquestioning acceptance of the "Marxist criticism," Zheng's comment shows important progress in understanding the relation between the two concepts. Nevertheless, Zheng does not go far enough to identify what this non-overlapping part is and to ask why Liang has abandoned his concept of zhijue. In my view, the disappearance of Liang's zhijue is not an academically trivial problem. As we know from the history of philosophy in both China and the West, a basic concept often functions as an Archimedian point in a philosopher's system. The elimination of such a concept may result from the philosopher's profound doubt concerning either the accuracy of the concept or the system as such. In some cases, it may signal either the onset of an intellectual crisis or a remarkable development in the philosopher's thought. I believe that Liang's substitution of lixing for zhijue fits into this general rule. The criticisms above leave me with two responsibilities. First, I must find a reason different from Professor Alitto's to explain Liang's abandoning of zhijue. Second, I have to go beyond Dr. Zheng's work to explain the difference between zhijue and lixing. I would start this two-fold task with an analysis of the foreign origin of Liang's zhijue, namely Bergson's concept of intuition. Bergson's Concept of Intuition In looking closely at the various relevant passages in Bergson's writings, we may find that there is an inconsistency in his statements about intuition and its relation to the concepts of "intellect" and "instinct." On the one hand, he seems to contend that a sharp and irreconcilable antagonism obtains between intellect and intuition. On the other, he insists that intellect and intuition supplement each other, and that reality in its fullness is revealed only by a combination of the two. As Gustavus W. Cunningham points out, "the first view he [Bergson] constantly and explicitly emphasizes; the second he seemingly unconsciously and implicitly holds."(10) I will demonstrate these two views in what follows. Intuition as Opposed to Intellect All science and all philosophy are aimed at the attainment of a true understanding of reality. However, there is first of all the question of what reality is. According to Bergson, "This reality is mobility. Not things made, but things in the making, not self-maintaining states, but only changing states, exist.... All reality, therefore, is tendency, if we agree to mean by tendency an incipient change of direction."(11) There are two kinds of method for the investigation of this reality. The first Bergson calls "intellect," or "intellectual method."(12) It is not only a cultural inheritance passed down from Plato and Aristotle, Galileo and Kepler, and Kant and the post-Kantians, but also a method conforming to "the habit of our thought."(13) We tend to take everything that is to be comprehended and force it into intellectual molds, and shape every problem that presents itself to us according to an intellectual construct. However, in Bergson's view, this method is essentially wrong. First of all, what is identified by the intellect as an object is not reality as such, but a substitution that is constructed by the intellect itself. From mobility itself our intellect turns aside, because it has nothing to gain in dealing with it. If the intellect were meant for pure theorizing, it would take its place within movement, for movement is reality itself, and immobility is always only apparent or relative. But the intellect is meant for something altogether different.... It always starts from immobility, as if this were the ultimate reality: when it tries to form an idea of movement, it does so by constructing movement out of immobilities put together.(14) This ultimate fallacy necessarily leads to many derivative mistakes. Intellect has to depend on a "point of view" to approach an object, and on "symbols" to translate mobility, so the result must vary with the change of these points of view and symbols.(15) Intellect is a photographic method and simply gives us snapshots, so it is unable to provide us with "reality in all its sinuosities."(16) Intellect can only represent an inner life "by concept, that is by abstract, general, or simple ideas." This will definitely result in life losing its "variety of qualities, continuity of progress, and unity of direction."(17) In essence, what intellect aims at is not "disinterested knowledge," but a certain "practical end."(18) In contrast to intellect, according to Bergson, intuition or the intuitive method comes from a "new philosophy"--namely his own, although, historically, it "flashed" momentarily in the works of Descartes, Leibniz, and especially Spinoza.(19) Bergson defines intuition as "the kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible."(20) Due to the identity of intuition with reality, intuition as a method is qualitatively superior to intellect. In intuition, "what I experience will depend neither on the point of view ..., since I am inside the object itself, nor on the symbols . . ., since I have rejected all translations in order to possess the original."(21) And I am "capable of following reality in all its sinuosities and of adopting the very movement of the inward life of things."(22) What intuition can offer me is a "disinterested knowledge." Based on this comparison, Bergson concludes that, in order to grasp reality as such, "We must break with scientific habits which are adapted to the fundamental requirements of thought, we must do violence to the mind, go counter to the natural bent of intellect."(23) It is obvious that, in this context, the concept of intuition is treated by Bergson as a direct opposite of intellect. The two are different not only in quantity but also in quality. In other words, intuition is more valuable than intellect in both epistemology and ontology. Intuition that Integrates with Instinct and Intellect Bergson, especially in his Creative Evolution, consciously or unconsciously offers another model for the relation between intuition and intellect. In contrast to the original one, first of all, it adds a third major concept, "instinct." Bergson defines instinct as "a natural ability to use an inborn mechanism."(24) He further claims that this definition "determines at least the ideal limit toward which the very numerous forms of instinct are traveling."(25) Instinct is typically shown in the case of animals. Its function can be clearly illustrated through an example provided by Bergson himself. When a horsefly lays its eggs on the leg or shoulders of a horse, it acts as if it knew that its larvae have to develop in the horse's stomach and that the horse, in licking itself, will move the larvae into its digestive tract. Bergson believes that instinct closely associates with "life" itself. It is an "innate knowledge of a thing,"(26) and "is molded on the very form of life."(27) It is essentially a "vital process."(28) And, "the instinctive knowledge . . . has its root in the very unity of life, which is, to use the expression of an ancient philosopher, a `whole sympathetic to itself'."(29) Accordingly, it possesses a great advantage in dealing with "life" in comparison with intellect or intelligence.(30) Bergson concludes: Instinct finds the appropriate instrument at hand: this instrument, which makes and repairs itself, which presents, like all the work of nature, an infinite complexity of detail combined with a marvelous simplicity of function, does at once, when required, what it is called upon to do, without difficulty and with a perfection that is often wonderful.(31) However, instinct also has its remarkable disadvantage. First, it "is necessarily specialized, being nothing but the utilization of a specific instrument for a specific object."(32) Second, "it is incapable of going so far in quest of its object; it does not speculate."(33) The horsefly knows its prey, but it knows little else instinctively. Further, it does not know that it knows; and its unreflective knowledge is converted immediately into behavior. Taking this disadvantage as a point of departure, Bergson, in a new context, develops his concept of intuition: "By intuition I mean instinct that has become disinterested, self-conscious, capable of reflecting upon its object and of enlarging it indefinitely."(34) It is obvious that intuition is something retaining the advantage of instinct, while discarding its disadvantage. When talking about the existence and function of intuition, Bergson often has in his mind the image of an artist. Our eye perceives the features of the living being, merely as assembled, not as mutually organized. The intention of life, the simple movement that runs through the lines, that binds them together and gives them significance, escapes it. This intention is just what the artist tries to regain, in placing himself back within the object by a kind of sympathy, in breaking down, by an effort of intuition, the barrier, the space put between him and his model.(35) This illustration leads to a new model of the relation between intuition and intellect. Now they come to be "two faculties" of human consciousness,(36) in contrast to the animal's experience, which is characterized by instinct. It is only the fact that intuition and intellect serve different spheres of human knowledge that distinguishes them. Intelligence, by means of science, which is its work, will deliver up to us more and more completely the secret of physical operations. . . . But it is to the very inwardness of life that intuition leads us.(37) Intuition and intellect represent two opposite directions of the work of consciousness: intuition goes in the direction of life, intellect goes in the inverse direction, and thus finds itself naturally in accordance with the movement of matter.(38) Furthermore, according to Bergson, intuition and intellect are complementary. On the one hand, "intuition may enable us to grasp what it is that intelligence fails to give us, and indicate the means of supplementing it."(39) On the other, although intuition transcends intelligence, it gets from intelligence the push that makes this possible. "Without intelligence, it would have remained in the form of instinct, riveted to the special object of its practical interest, and turned outward by it into movement or locomotion."(40) In fact, these two faculties will help each other to pursue their full development. At this point, Bergson seems to be engaged in reconciling intuition and intellect and, therefore, establishing an integral basis for the great building of human knowledge as a whole. However, this effort must presuppose a new theory of reality. Bergson already realizes this important issue: "If consciousness has thus split up into intuition and intelligence, it is because of the need it had to apply itself to matter at the same time as it had to follow the stream of life. The double form of consciousness is then due to the double form of the real."(41) This is not the place to discuss in detail whether or not Bergson's theory is correct. As far as this essay is concerned, the most important thing is to point out that both of Bergson's models refer to the problem of the theory of knowledge. In other words, both, although appearing in different forms, aim to answer the question of why and how we could know reality. There is no room for ethical evaluation in either model. Both models influence the formation of Liang's opinion concerning the relation among lizhi, benneng (instinct), fixing, and zhijue. However, as a Chinese thinker in the traditional sense, he does not fail to open up an ethical dimension for this concept-cluster. This fusion proves to be the main source of his contribution as well as his confusion with regard to the relevant issues. The Influence of Weishi Buddhism and Neo-Confucianism He Lin, a prominent philosopher in China today, gives a convincing elucidation of Bergson's success among Chinese intellectuals in the 1920s: When reading Bergson's book, we can often smell some flavor of Chinese philosophy. For example, his belittling of science and emphasizing of philosophy, his praise of intuition, his discarding of symbols, and his negating points of view, all remind us of the philosophy of Laozi and Zhuangzi in the pre-Qin and Wei-Jin periods, and the philosophy of Lu Juyuan and Wang Yangming in the Song-Ming period; and his entire philosophy of change, which stresses duration and Creative Evolution, is also likely to remind us of such sayings as "The movement of heaven is full of power. Thus the superior man makes himself strong and untiring"; "The spirit is bound to no one place, nor the Book of Changes to any one form"; and "Things cannot exhaust themselves; hence there follows, at the end, the hexagram of Weiji [Before Completion]."(42) According to this statement, the popularity of Bergson is mainly due to the fact that Chinese intellectuals find in him something similar to what their own tradition already provides. However, we should not forget that there is another side to this same coin. The involvement of tradition may result in an inaccurate understanding of the subject with which the intellectuals are concerned. The existence of both these sides is proved in the case of Liang Shuming. The following is Liang's own description of his road to Bergson. After a period [in which I was] engaged in the study of Buddhism, I turned to Confucianism after 1920. At the beginning of this shift, it was the Ming Confucian Mr. Wang Xinzhai (Wang Gen 1483-1541) who gave me the greatest stimulation and led me through the door (of the Confucian school). What he praised most was ziran (spontaneity). This was the very point from which 6 began my comprehension of the Confucian school. . . . Afterwards I compared it with Western thought. I felt what most successfully developed its own idea and particularly suited my taste was the Vitalist philosophy, mainly represented by Bergson.(43) This passage indicates that both Buddhism(44) and the Neo-Confucianism of Wang Xinzhai stand as the background from which Liang starts to approach the philosophy of Bergson. This section will investigate the relevant ideas from the two schools. Feiliang and Zhijue. According to Weishi, or Consciousness Only, Buddhism, there are two faculties involved in the process of cognition. The first is "xianliang" (sensation),(45) which enables us, for example, to see the greenness and taste the bitterness in a cup of green tea. What xian liang perceives is not an integrated sense of "tea," but rather some individual sense datum like greenness or bitterness. The second faculty is "biliang" (intellect). Its objects are not sense data, but synthetic and integrated senses such as the awareness of tea with fragrance. Biliang enables us to fulfill the task of conceptualization through both division and integration, abstraction and generalization. Now a question arises: what is the fragrance of tea? Where does it come from? According to Weishi Buddhism, this could be answered by the existence of a psychological activity named "feiliang." Liang believes that fragrance falls in the category of significance (yiwei). According to his definition, significance is "neither equivalent to static sense data, nor identical to fixed concept. It is actually a lively inclination (huo xingshi) [among a variety of sense data]."(46) In Weishi Buddhism, significance is actually an illusive thing shaped through the operation of feiliang. Liang says: As a matter of fact, there is no such thing as subtlety in sound itself. There is no such thing as beauty in painting itself. There is no such thing as tastiness in candy itself. All these significances-subtlety, beauty, and tastiness--are added to [the objects] by the zhijue of human beings. Therefore zhijue just means feiliang.(47) According to He Lin's interpretation, "In general, feiliang simply means a capability that is unable to grasp reality."(48) For this reason, Weishi Buddhism is always doubtful of the function of feiliang. In the Weishi lexicon, feiliang is a "passive term, a negative term."(49) Liang revises the doctrine above in two points. First, in Weishi Buddhism, the term feiliang does not designate "a particular psychological faculty" as both xianliang and biliang do, but rather a kind of psychological activity that vacillates between xianliang and biliang. In contrast, Liang insists on treating feiliang as an independent faculty, or independent "stage" in human cognition, and decides to replace the term feiliang with zhijue in order to highlight this important change.(50) Second, in Weishi Buddhism, "significance" results from feiliang, and will primarily account for the existence of fallacy and absurdity, which necessarily accompany human knowledge. In contrast, Liang consciously or unconsciously tends to regard significance as an objective thing. He even claims that it is the unique object that feiliang/zhijue should seek.(51) He writes, "Zhijue means a knowing toward significance. . . . What zhijue comprehends is simply a significance, spirit, inclination, or tendency."(52) Afterwards, these two points play a remarkable role in Liang's understanding of Bergson. And they even become the components of his own concept of zhijue. The Antagonism of Intuition and Deliberation in the Chinese Tradition. There is a long tradition in the Confucian school of treating liangzhi (intuitive knowledge) and silu (deliberation) as two alternative sources of social behavior. Using the terms of the philosophers since the Song period, the former belongs to the category of tianli (heavenly principle), whereas the latter belongs to that of renyu (human desire). I will undertake a brief survey in order to reveal the traditional Chinese background of Liang's zhijue. The term liangzhi first appears in the Mencius, who also hints at the existence of its opposite, deliberation. Mencius writes: What makes a man able to act without having to learn is his liangneng (intuitive ability); what makes a man know without having to deliberate (luj is his liangzhi. There are no young children who don't know to love their parents, and none of them when they grow up will not know to respect their elder brothers. Loving their parents is benevolence; respecting one's elders is righteousness. What is left to be done is simply the extension of these to the whole world.(53) This statement has two key points. First, both liangzhi and liangneng are not treated by Mencius as epistemological concepts, but rather moral value ones. In other words, he does not employ them to answer such questions as "How could a man know the external, objective world? Why is it possible that man's knowledge corresponds to the essence of the world?" but rather "What makes a human being a human being? Why does there exist such a thing as human society?" Second, Mencius' statement clearly differentiates two kinds of attitudes toward other people and life as such. One directly comes from the absolutely good mind, which is forged, first of all, in a person's family life, while another comes through a deliberation that always involves some particular practical interest. In the Mencius, the former is definitely superior to the latter. This distinction is developed into an antagonism by Cheng Hao (1032-1085) of the Song period, who says, "Generally speaking, the trouble with man is that he is selfish (zisi) and mentally calculating (yongzhi). Being selfish, he cannot take action as a spontaneous response, and being mentally calculating, he cannot take intuition (mingjue) as his natural guide."(54) Here the selfishness and calculation belong to the category of deliberation, while spontaneous response and intuition are different names for liangzhi. In Cheng Hao's view, the former is not only the opposite of the latter, but also the source of trouble from which humanity suffers. An example to illustrate this antagonism can be acquired through a revision of Mencius' well-known parable of the child about to fall into the well.(55) When seeing this event, a bystander may be moved to save the child either by liangzhi or by a deliberation of the consequence of his behavior: the response from the child's parents, his own fellow villagers or friends, and so on. The former is associated with the heavenly nature of a human being, and necessarily leads to a good action, whereas the latter is associated with one's reflection on one's practical interests and probably leads either to the same action or to the opposite one. Herein lie the seeds of social trouble. Wang Yangming (1472-1529), the great leader of the Idealistic School in Ming times, further stresses the antagonism between liangzhi and deliberation. In regard to deliberation, he writes: The five powerful despots drove out the barbarians and honored the house of Zhou all because of their selfishness (sixin), and therefore they didn't follow with principle (li). Some people say that they acted in accordance with principle. This is because these people's mind (xin) is not completely pure; therefore they always admire the deeds of the powerful despots. They just pay attention to what looks good on the outside and completely ignore its relation to the mind.(56) According to this statement, the value of an activity is not decided by an external achievement, but by the internal mind that causes this achievement. The five powerful despots deserve no high praise, because what propels their deeds is not principle/liangzhi, but rather selfishness/ deliberation. Wang Yangming defines liangzhi as follows:: Liangzhi is a nature conferred on us by Heaven, a spontaneous, intelligent, and intuitive (mingjue) element in the substance of our mind. Any ideas that arise are, without fail, automatically comprehended by this liangzhi of our mind. If they be good, liangzhi in our mind automatically comprehends this. But if they be evil, this, too, liangzhi automatically comprehends.(57) Here liangzhi is not a faculty to "find the appropriate instrument at hand"(58) and to satisfy the direct needs of life. It is a "spontaneous, intelligent, and intuitive" criticism of the ideas raised in mind, an intellectual agent to urge people to live a virtuous life. Next is Wang Yangming's student, Wang Gen (Wang Xinzhai), who leads Liang Shuming into the Confucian school. Because of him, an element of benneng is inserted into the original concept of liangzhi. He writes, "The substance of heavenly nature itself is lively and active. It is just (what makes) birds fly and fish jump."(59) The same idea is more clearly expressed by Wang Bi (Wang Dongya), Wang Gen's son and doctrinal transmitter. "In my opinion, both Shun's dealing with his parents and Confucius' acting in accordance with change (qudang)(60) originate from the subtle use (miaoyong) of mind. This subtle use is the same one that propels people to eat as they feel hungry, and to sleep as they feel sleepy."(61) Both citations contain a serious conceptual confusion. The "heavenly nature" and "subtle use of mind" are simply other names for liangzhi in the sense of Wang Yangming, whereas what results in the flying of a bird and the jumping of a fish and what makes people go to sleep and eat need obviously to fit into the category of benneng In comparing the former to the latter, Wang Gen and his son enlarge the connotation of the concept liangzhi. It actually includes both benneng and liangzhi in the original sense. In order to differentiate one from the other, we had better follow Liang and call Wang Gen's liangzhi "spontaneity." Two points should be stressed again. First, in the Chinese tradition from Mencius to Wang Gen, both liangzhi and its opposite, deliberation, are always treated as ethical concepts. They refer to human practical behavior, attitude toward life, or value choice. Second, Wang Gen and his Taizhou school tend to put both benneng and liangzhi into a single bag, "spontaneity." This distorts the doctrine of Mencius and Wang Yangming. The following section will prove that the first point leads to Liang's idea of zhijue as an equivalent of liangzhi, while the second point partially accounts for his introducing benneng into his concept of zhijue. Liang's Concept of Zhijue In Eastern and Western Cultures, the concept of zhijue is employed by Liang to feature Chinese culture as a whole. However, a scrutiny of all the relevant passages there reveals the fact that he actually uses it in three senses without always realizing or identifying the change in meaning. They are zhijue as a method of knowledge, zhijue as an equivalent of benneng, and zhijue as an equivalent of liangzhi. Zhijue as a Method of Knowledge. In Liang's view, Chinese metaphysics is fundamentally different from either Western or Indian metaphysics both in the problem on which it focuses and in the method it applies to resolve this problem. With regard to the problem itself, the ancient Chinese philosophers never bother themselves to discuss such a "stagnant and static problem"(62) as monism versus dualism or materialism versus idealism. In contrast, according to Liang: In the Chinese metaphysics transmitted from very ancient times, there is a principal issue permeating all learning, no matter how great or trivial, profound or shallow. This is a set of ideas referring to that which changes, not the static. What they [Chinese philosophers] talk about is simply abstract rules of change, not problems concerning concrete things.(63) In fact, concepts like yin and yang and qian (the creative) and kun (the receptive) in Chinese philosophy, and the "metal," "wood," "water," "fire," and "soil" of Chinese medicine, do not refer to any visible, physical things in either the human body or the universe. Instead, simply, they symbolize certain kinds of "significance." For instance, Liang warns that we should not equate the Chinese concept of the five elements with the Indian concept of the four Greats: earth, water, fire, and wind. "The former refers to abstract significance, the latter to concrete substance."(64) The particularity of this problem calls for a corresponding method to deal with it. In contrast to their Western and Indian counterparts, Chinese philosophers developed a method that Liang calls zhijue. He asks: What do we use to recognize that kind of significance or tendency? It is zhijue. In order to know the significance or tendency, we have to use zhijue to experience (tihui) and ruminate (wanwei). What are called yin and yang and qian and kun cannot be grasped through sensation (ganjue); also, they are not abstract concepts formed through the operation of intellect (lizhi). Those are dynamic and harmonious concepts, whereas the concepts that are formed through lizhi are ones that are all definitive and fixed.(65) Here zhijue is described by Liang as a method of knowledge distinct from lizhi. The "significance" or "tendency" is its object, and the dynamic or harmonious concept is its tool to accomplish the knowing. Both Weishi Buddhism and Bergson's Vitalism help to form Liang's zhijue as a method. From the former, he gets not only the idea of "significance," but also feiliang/zhijue as a mode of cognition to deal with it. From the latter. that is, from Bergson's first model, he acquires the idea of the antagonism between intuition and intellect-or, in Chinese, between zhijue and lizhi. However, in contrast with Bergson, Liang does not claim superiority for zhijue as a method over lizhi. In theory, there are two reasons for this. First, Liang hesitates to treat "significance" or "tendency" as equivalent to "reality" in Bergson's terminology, and hesitates to equate a knowing about it to a comprehension of reality as such. Second, Liang even doubts if Bergson's intuition could truly attain the truth of reality. He emphasizes that "It is really hard for us to accept what he [Bergson] says, because his method is doubtful. Since zhijue is not something unselfish and de-subjective, but something subjective and emotional, how could it get the real?"(66) In practice, Liang is worried about the consequences that have already been seen in China of using zhijue as a method. In Eastern and Western Cultures, Liang is wrestling painfully with the questions of why it is that China, once a strong and wealthy country, has became so backward in recent decades, and what it is in Chinese culture that is primarily responsible for this depressing situation. In concrete, and sometimes loquacious, language, he compares the very different consequences of the Chinese zhijue and the Western lizhi in the fields of machine technology, medicine, astronomy, and public administration. In all these cases, zhijue is inevitably painted as something stupid and laughable, and it is seen as directly responsible for the disastrous turn of events in China.(67) From these passages we make no mistake in concluding that, according to Liang, the Chinese people must introduce lizhi into their stream of knowledge if they still have any desire to save their country. Based on the analysis presented above, I believe, at this point, that it can be said that Liang is unquestionably a severe critic of zhijue, or more precisely, of zhijue as a method of acquiring knowledge.(68) Zhijue as an Equivalent of Benneng. There is no denying that Liang in his many writings, including Eastern and Western Cultures, praises zhijue as a virtue higher than lizhi. In fact, he seems to be turning into an advocate of what he has previously attacked. This contradiction comes mainly from a confusion over his use of the term; that is, he applies the same term, zhijue, without further explanation, to denote different objects. In many instances, Liang tends to use zhijue as the equivalent of benneng. This can be proved by the following observations. First, zhijue and benneng often appear in his works as interchangeable: A benneng, zhijue in pursuit of correctness and good can be found in every person,(69) Humaneness is simply benneng, qinggan (feeling), and zhijue.(70) Second, he often uses zhijue to denote something that should have been expressed by the term benneng: Things like the "universal love" of Mohism and the mercy of Buddhism can be called "following the guidance of feeling" (renqing suozhi).... Even, as an unworthy person is bound to do, indulging in sensual pleasure and refusing to turn back may also be viewed as "following the guidance of zhijue."(71) For the majority of philosophers in both China and the Western world, what causes "indulging in sensual pleasure" should be called benneng. In putting zhijue in place of benneng, Liang is actually telling his readers that there is no substantial difference between benneng and zhijue. The conclusion that zhijue/benneng is still among the highest of virtues, no matter what the consequences may be, must sound quite absurd to mainstream Confucian philosophers. In my view, this absurdity springs from two sources. The first is Liang's belief in Wang Gen's concept of spontaneity. The second is Liang's misunderstanding of Bergson's idea of the relation between intuition and instinct. It is true that, in order to highlight the weakness of intellect, Bergson emphasizes the similarity between instinct and intuition, but he never in fact equates them. Zhijue as an Equivalent of Liangzhi. Liang's zhijue has a third meaning. He states that "today we should refer to Mencius' liangzhi and liangneng as zhijue."(72) For the sake of clarity, I am going to call zhijue "an equivalent of liangzhi." This definition implies that Liang accepts the conception held by mainstream Confucianism, even though he still keeps the Chinese version of Bergson's term, intuition. In contrast to benneng, liangzhi is not a biological concept, but a social-moral-ethical one. It does not aim to satisfy the physical needs of the individual person, but to maintain a harmonious social network, or social organization. It is not a direct response to an event in the external world, but an intuitive evaluation in the mind of an individual who confronts an external event. In Liang's view, a zhijue in the sense of liangzhi will bring about in people "a good attitude toward life,"(73) namely an attitude to live in accord with the principle of the universe. As we have already demonstrated, Bergson's concept of intuition is embodied in the artist, who is naturally and automatically able to comprehend the substance of reality. In contrast, Liang's zhijue as an equivalent of liangzhi is embodied in the Chinese sages, primarily Confucius himself. According to Liang, Confucius takes it as the most desirable kind of life to be in harmony with the rhythm of the universe. The universe is a great flow, a constant process of production and reproduction. Parallel to this universe, society is also constantly undergoing change. It is simply an exercise in dreaming to seek out some fixed rules that will ensure our correct response to all challenges. In fact, the only valid course of action is to follow the guidance of zhijue. Liang argues that "[The way chosen through] zhijue is always right. We do not need to seek correctness in the external world. The life of a human being is a flowing and changeable integrity. One will naturally take for oneself the most right, secure, and proper path."(74) Liang believes that a dialogue from the Analects exemplifies Confucius' opinion on zhijue. In the time of Confucius, the practice of "being in mourning three years over the death of one's parents" was respected by most people as an unchanging rule. But when one of his disciples inquires about the necessity of following this rule, instead of giving a definite answer, Confucius raises another question. For the sake of the huge love one has received from one's parents, doesn't one feel a natural impulse to mourn their death for three years? If so, one should act immediately to satisfy this feeling. If not, one might continue one's life as though nothing had happened, no matter how intense may be the pressure from society, relatives, and friends. Here "natural impulse" is simply another term for zhijue. Confucius certainly approves of the practice of "being in mourning three years." However, this approval is not based on any fixed rules or social customs, but rather on a people's "natural impulse"/zhijue. Zhijue is constant and universal, because its existence and movement always comply with the rhythm of the universe. Rules, on the other hand, are partial and temporary, because they come into existence in specific historical situations--and all rules will sooner or later be out of date. In fact, we should read in this light the famous saying in the Analects: "There are four things from which the Master was entirely free. He had no forgone conclusions, no arbitrary predeterminations, no obstinacy, and no egoism."(75) Liang insists that this is a fundamental doctrine that Confucius left to his disciples and to the Chinese nation as a whole. In opposition to this attitude is lizhi. It painstakingly seeks out fixed rules in order to resolve all the problems of everyday life. The "deliberation" or "calculation" that prevails in Western culture is lizhi in its extreme form. Superficially, Liang not only accepts the Chinese version of Bergson's intuition and intellect, but also continues Bergson's claim that the two are mutually antagonistic. However, this is not an antagonism in the sense in which Bergson would see it; rather, it is the antagonism that has been rooted for generations in the works of the Confucian philosophers. Liang's view is actually representative of a continuity in the idea of antagonism between liangzhi and deliberation in Chinese history. He compares these two attitudes as follows: Lizhi can provide human beings with a tool for calculation, and calculation categorically originates from selfish purpose. Therefore lizhi often comes with an impulse to possess, although by itself it is something unselfish, static, and [morally! neutral.... In contrast, Confucius always follows the guidance of zhijue. Most important is the sharpness and clarity of zhijue. The evils of humankind result from a paralysis of zhijue, while all the virtues of humankind originate simply from zhijue.(76) Accordingly, Liang concludes that since the dominant principle in Chinese culture is not lizhi but zhijue, Chinese culture is actually not lower, but rather is higher than its Western counterpart. I think that what Liang really wants to praise is simply zhijue in this sense. It is interesting to know Liang's own opinion on his three usages of zhijue. On zhijue as a method of knowledge, as we have already demonstrated, Liang held a negative view even in the first edition of Eastern and Western Cultures (1921). With regard to zhijue as an equivalent of benneng, Liang realized his confusion of zhijue with benneng shortly after the publication of the book. In the Preface to the third edition (November 1922), following the statement of his old views concerning Mohism, Buddhism, and the unworthy person that had appeared in the first edition, he announces, "Today I know that all these sayings are wrong. The 'universal rove' of Mohism and the indulging in sensual de sire of the unworthy person do not mean 'following the guidance of zhijue' at all."(77) Again, in Human Mind and Human Life (1984), Liang admits that his Eastern and Western Cultures conflated three kinds of benneng/zhijue, namely the "animal benneng," the "social benneng," and the "human benneng," which is equal to Mencius' liangzhi and liangneng. According to Liang, the first benneng should not have been treated as something superior to lizhi.(78) In contrast to the fate of the first two usages, "human benneng," or zhijue as an equivalent of liangzhi, remains in Liang's later works. This thesis will be proved by a textual examination in what follows. Liang claims that "liangzhi is simply identical to zijue (self-consciousness)."(79) Then, elsewhere, he asks: "What are self-consciousness and self-discipline? Loving good and hating evil, while being aware [of this love and hatred] is called self-consciousness, and taking self consciousness as the ground to act only in accordance with what we really wish is called self-discipline. What the term fixing emphasizes is only the naturalness of the principle of self-consciousness and self discipline."(80) From these two passages we have good reason to conclude that fixing is his later substitution for zhijue as an equivalent of liangzhi. This statement already suggests the answer to why zhijue disappears from Liang's writing after Eastern and Western Cultures. First of all, the term ap pears to be a theoretical hodgepodge referring simultaneously to the three qualitatively different objects. This confusion has eliminated the validity of zhijue as a major philosophical concept. I believe that this is the first reason for his discarding the concept of zhijue in his later works. More profoundly, this conflation suggests that Liang vacillated in choosing his position in dealing with the relation between Chinese and Western cultures. A half century later, he admitted that when writing Eastern and Western Cultures, he was still in the midst of a theoretical transition from Buddhism to Confucianism. He was not yet an authentic Confucian.(81) This fluctuation between theories is partly responsible for the different ways in which zhijue is used. When he eventually converted to Confucianism, it became necessary to find a new concept to express the unique meaning of zhijue as an equivalent of liangzhi. That is the second reason why he substitutes lixing for zhijue. Liang's Concept of Lixing The change from zhijue to lixing leads to a series of theoretical consequences. This section will concentrate on two of them, namely a t new social perspective and the relation between lixing and lizhi. Lixing and Its Social Function. For Liang, the introduction of fixing as a philosophical topic and his growing interest in the social aspects of Confucianism meant following the same road. Originally, Liang says, he was quite disgusted with the Confucian doctrines both of "name and position" and of "rectification of names." "I didn't recognize their real significance, although I knew definitely that they had little to do with logic." Afterwards, he realized that "social organization was the backbone of a culture, and Chinese society is an ethics-based (lunli benwei) society. We should approach its particularity from this perspective." Ultimately he found that Confucius had already thoroughly explored the problem of social organization. The emphasis on "name and position" and "rectification of names" reflects Liang's great insight into both the prominent position of fixing and the fundamental importance of ethics in society.(82) Liang believes this is a significant point of which the Chinese--and, in fact, all humanity--should take note: I often say that if the Chinese have not lived in vain for several thousand years, if the Chinese have made any contribution at all, then it is because they first understood why a human is human. That is to say, very early the Chinese ancients understood humanity.... And the sum total of the spirit of the Chinese people is the bringing into play of this lixing.(83) Liang defines fixing as a "clear, bright, peaceful, and harmonious mind" (qingming anhe zhixing).(84) According to Liang, lixing will manifest itself in two ways. The first is "a mind that goes forward or upward"(85)--a mind that refuses to surrender to mistakes, that differentiates right from wrong, that appeals to fairness, and that advocates justice. In brief, it is a mind that dislikes the "checks and balances" of practical life, a mind that is devoted simply to perfecting the person. The second manifestation is "honesty in interpersonal relations."(86) It starts with love among family members. People who have this emotional attachment may expand their love of family to include other people, birds and animals, and even grass and stones. Through this all-encompassing love, human beings will realize the enjoyment of life in a harmonious community, and even in a harmonious universe. Lixing becomes the cornerstone of Chinese ethical society for two reasons. In the first place, fixing bestows a precious inner discipline and ethical consciousness, and therefore is able partially to fulfill the task of religion to unite the entire nation. This is primarily due to the efforts of Confucius himself, who always encourages people to examine themselves, to ponder everything, dependent on their own minds, and to cultivate their own capabilities of differentiation.... Confucius offers people no doctrine except the idea of self-reflection. He teaches people to believe in nothing but their own fixing. Since the establishment of the Confucian school, the Chinese nation has been imbued with this teaching, and has willingly chosen a way to substitute religion with morality.(87) Second, fixing is a moral imperative, "a force to motivate moral action." It points out a definite direction for people's lives, and demands of all the members of an ethical group that "you should do so and so" unless you do not wish to see your group, including yourself, continue to survive.(88) One may ask, how can fixing constantly sustain the vitality it needs to maintain social order? Or, to put it differently, how is it that the Chinese people have tended to follow the guidance of fixing for several thousand years? Liang's answer: It is because there exists in Chinese society a (physical) representative of fixing, namely the scholar/gentleman (shiren). Traditional Chinese society was composed of four levels: scholars, peasants, artisans, and merchants. I he scholars led all four levels. They made extremely important contributions to society, although they did not undertake any physical work. They represented fixing in their sustaining of education and [personal] cultivation and the maintenance of social order and stability.(89) Here, the triumph of fixing ultimately means universal control over society by "scholars." Due to their efforts, fixing prevails throughout the Chinese homeland, and the other social levels are assigned their proper positions in the social organization. The Relation between Lixing and Lizhi. Along with the introduction of the concept of fixing, Liang develops a new model for the relation between benneng, lizhi, and lixing. This model not only dissolves the antagonism between lizhi and zhijue, but also allows a reconsideration of the relation between Chinese and Western cultures. Now, in Liang's view, benneng is a kind of innate ability (or tendency) that is passed to an individual through biological inheritance. It can be neither eliminated from an individual's experience nor acquired by the individual during his or her lifetime. "Because the life of animals in particular depends on benneng, so an animal's benneng should be taken as the typical form of benneng."(90) In contrast to benneng, both lizhi and fixing characterize human life. They are the "two aspects" of the operation of thinking (xinsi zuoyong) in human beings. Liang says, "The aspect of knowing is called lizhi, while the aspect of feeling is called fixing. In actuality, they are intimately and inseparably connected. For example, in mathematics, the mind that does the calculating is lizhi, while the mind that seeks accuracy is lixing."(91) It is obvious that this relationship is strongly shadowed by Bergson's second model of intuition and intellect. First, both Bergson and Liang start their analysis from a statement of benneng and its difference from intellect and intuition, or lizhi and fixing Second, both invent a new term--"consciousness" in Bergson and the "operation of thinking" in Liang--to designate the essential unity of the respective original two concepts. Third, for both, intellect and intuition, or lizhi and zhijue (as the equivalent of liangzhi) are no longer antagonistic, but rather supplement each other in building an ideal unity of human wisdom. Moreover, since Liang often treats fixing and lizhi as respective representatives of the two cultures, his new model is evidence of an effort to combine the features of both cultures: Should there appear in China a [new mode of] social organization/group (tuanti), it must be something fused out of concrete facts from both China and the west.... I his is an organization based on fixing. It not only sufficiently ensures the development of the human spirit [fixing], but also contains the advantages of Western culture [lizhi].(92) At the same time, there are two fundamental differences between the respective models of Bergson and Liang. In the first place, Bergson's intuition is still an epistemological concept that represents a method of knowing more advanced than intellect, whereas Liang's fixing is an ethical-moral-social concept that highlights features of human experience more profoundly than lizhi. Thus, the goal of Bergson's unity is a perfect knowledge of reality, whereas that of Liang's unity is the comprehensive development of human experience as a whole. In the second place, for Bergson, intellect refers to matter, while intuition refers to life experience. The superiority of the latter is explained by the difference between them. In contrast, Liang compares the relation between fixing and lizhi to that of substance (ti) and function (yong). By means of the well-known relation between these two concepts in traditional Chinese philosophy, Liang shows that the superiority of fixing to lizhi lies in another place: What we call lizhi is a wonderful function of the human mind; what we call fixing is a good virtue of the human mind. The latter is substance, while the former is function. In order to know the human mind as such, we have to differentiate one from the other, although they are inseparable in essence.(93) Here "substance" and "function" are understood as an agent and its tools. Lizhi is free from connotations of good or bad, because it can be applied by any people for any purpose. On the contrary, lixing is categorically good, because it brings about only good consequences. For example, weapons were effective tools in the Sino-Japanese war. The Chinese army, with lixing, could apply them in the cause of justice, whereas the Japanese army, without lixing, could apply them in the cause of injustice. In the hands of the Japanese army, the more advanced a weapon was, the more severe the evil it could cause. As far as the prospects for a good future for humankind are concerned, fixing is more important than lizhi. Moreover, fixing will naturally and automatically lead to success in any issue related to lizhi, or to finding the correct way to resolve the problem of knowledge. On this, Liang states: The ancient Eastern philosophers simply focus their doctrine on the cultivation of personality and human life [lixing].... By refusing to concern themselves only with theoretical knowledge [lizhi], they lay a strong foundation for that very theoretical knowledge. In contrast, should you ignore the [moral] practice and practical problems, and be engaged just in the theoretical knowledge as such, you would fail in [the effort to establish a correct! theoretical knowledge.(94) In reality, this understanding is close to Zhang Zhidong's motto: "Chinese learning for substance, and Western learning for function." It is clear that, after a long and difficult journey, Liang eventually arrives at a Confucian standpoint. He believes that he has already found a way that is both idealistic and realistic for dealing with the relation between the two cultures and that will lead China out of its backward circumstances. Conclusion 1. At least three philosophical schools are involved in the formation of Liang's zhijue and its relation to lizhi, benneng, and so forth. Bergson is mainly concerned with the theory of knowledge. He contributes two models pertinent to the relation between intuition and intellect. The first insists on the antagonism between intuition and intellect, while the second seeks a complete scientific system based on the unity of the two. They respectively stimulate Liang to construct his own two models. Weishi Buddhism studies the function of feiliang in the process of cognition and points out the importance of "significance," although treating both of them as something negative. Both feiliang and significance permeate Liang's early concept of zhijue. Finally, mainstream Confucians have established a tradition of the ethical antagonism between liangzhi and deliberation. No less important, Wang Gen and his Taizhou school replace liangzhi with spontaneity, a composit of liangzhi and benneng. The tradition provides Liang with a core element for zhijue as an equivalent of liangzhi and helps him to remodel Bergson's epistemological antagonism as an ethical one. At the same time, the revision of Wang Gen is partially responsible for Liang's opinion of zhijue as an equivalent of benneng. 2. In Liang's early works, especially Eastern and Western Cultures, the concept of zhijue has three meanings: it is a method of knowledge, an equivalent of benneng, and an equivalent of liangzhi. Liang criticizes the first of these from the beginning and later discards the second, but never negates the content of the third. Due to this alternation of meanings, zhijue hardly functions as a strict philosophical concept. This may explain why it disappears from Liang's later works. Along with the completion of his transition to Confucianism, Liang retains only the content of zhijue as an equivalent of liangzhi, and gives it a new name, fixing. 3. In his later period, Liang replaces the antagonism of zhijue and lizhi with the unity of fixing and lizhi. In this new model, on the one hand, fixing and lizhi are understood as two aspects of the human "operation of thinking"; on the other hand, they are respectively defined as substance and function. Liang does not fail to stress the dominant position of fixing in the new relationship. This proves once again that Confucianism is still a fundamental element in Liang's later thought. NOTES I wish to express my profound gratitude to my teacher, Professor Donald J. Munro, who helped me to revise this essay not once, not twice, but five times. Without his generosity and encouragement, it would not have been possible to present this essay at this time. My thanks are also extended to the two anonymous readers whose constructive criticisms and suggestions greatly improved the quality of this essay. (1) Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Continuum, 1994), pp. 357-361. (2) Liang Shuming, Shuming sanshi qian wenlu (The writings of Liang Shuming before the age of thirty) (Shanghai: Dongfang Wenku, 1924), p. 18. (3) Liang Shuming, "Juyuan juyi fun" (On tracing the origin and solving the doubt), in Liang Shuming, Shuming sanshi qian wenlu, pp. 1-20. (4) Liang Shuming, "Weishi jia yu Bogesen" (The Consciousness Only School and Bergson), in Liang Shuming, Shuming sanshi qian wenlu, pp. 97-102. (5) Liang Shuming, Dongxi fang wenhua jiqi zhexue (Eastern and Western Cultures and their Philosophies) (Shanghai: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1921); hereafter Eastern and Western Cultures. (6) Liang Shuming, "Jingshen taolian yaozhi" (Essence of spiritual cultivation), in Liang Shuming Xiansheng jiaoyu wenlu (Mr. Liang Shuming's writings on education), ed. Tang Xianzhi (Zouping: Xiangcun Shudian, 1935), pp. 67-95. (7) Guy S. Alitto, The Last Confucian (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), p. 191. (8) Liang Shuming, "Jintian women yinggai ruhe pingjia kongzi" (How should we evaluate Confucius today), in Dongfang xueshu gaiguan (A general survey on Oriental academic thought) (Chengdu: Bashu Shushe, 1986), pp. 72, 60. (9) Zheng Dahua, Liang Shuming yu xiandai xinru jia (Liang Shuming and contemporary Neo-Confucianism) (Taibei: Wenjin Chubanshe, 1993), p. 77. (10) Gustavus W. Cunningham, A Study in the Phi/osophy of Bergson (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1916), p. 41. (11) Henri Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. T. E. Hulme (New York and London: Knickerbocker Press, 1912), p. 65. (12) Ibid., p. 66. (13) Ibid., p. 73. (14) Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell (Lanham: University Press of America, Inc., 1983), p. 155. (15) Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 2-3. (16) Ibid., p. 69. (17) Ibid., p. 15. (18) Ibid., p. 67. (19) See Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 346. (20) Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 7. (21) Ibid., pp. 2-3. (22) Ibid., p. 69. (23) Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 30. (24) Ibid., p. 139. (25) Ibid. (26) Ibid., p. 150. (27) Ibid., p. 165. (28) Ibid., p. 166. (29) Ibid., p. 167. (30) Especially in Creative Evolution, the concepts of intellect and intelligence are actually interchangeable. See A. D. Lindsay, The Philosophy of Bergson (Edinburgh: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1911), p. 216. Also see Arthur Mitchell's Introduction to the UPA Edition of Creative Evolution, p. xxvi. (31) Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 140. (32) Ibid. (33) Ibid., p. 151. (34) Ibid., p. 176. (35) Ibid., p. 177. See also Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 3-4. (36) Ibid., p. 178. (37) Ibid., p. 176. (38) Ibid., p. 267. (39) Ibid., p. 177. (40) Ibid., p. 178. (41) Ibid. (42) He Lin, "Hengli Bogesen" (Henri Bergson), in Xiandai xifang zhexue jiangyan ji (Collected lectures on contemporary Western philosophy) (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1985), p. 21. The wording of the three internal quotes is taken from The I Ching or Book of Changes, trans. Richard Wilhem, rendered into English by Cary F. Baynes, 3d ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 373, 296, 714. (43) Liang Shuming, "Zhongxi xueshu zhi butong" (The difference between Chinese and Western learning), in Zhaohua (Discussions in the morning) (Changsha, 1941). (44) As far as the influence upon Liang's understanding of Bergson is concerned, the Buddhism here specifically means Weishi Buddhism. (45) With regard to the subjective side of knowing, mainstream Western philosophy and psychology believe that cognition is based on a "sensual organ." It possesses a capacity of "sensation." The function of this capacity is to perceive "sense data." These three terms, respectively, refer to the different aspects of cognition and therefore, in most cases, should not be confused. However, as with many Chinese scholars of his time, Liang rarely takes pains to distinguish them. In his work, "xianliang" sometimes has all three meanings, sometime simply one or two of them. (46) Liang Shuming, Eastern and Western Cultures, p. 73. (47) Ibid., p. 72. (48) He Lin, "Songru de sixiang fangfa" (The method of thinking of Song Confucians), in Zhexue yu zhexue shi lunwen ji (Collected essays on philosophy and the history of philosophy) (Beijing: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1990), p. 177. (49) Liang Shuming, Eastern and Western Cultures, p. 73. (50) See ibid., p. 72. (51) He Lin indicates that, for Liang, "zhijue simply means a capability to know significance" (Zhexue yu zhexue shi lunwen ji, p. 177). (52) Ibid., p. 72. (53) Mencius 7A.15. D. C. Lau's translation: "What a man is able to do without having to learn it is what he can truly do; what he knows without having to reflect on it is what he truly knows" (Mencius, trans. with an introd. by D. C. Lau [London: Penguin Books, 1970], p. 184). This version fails to identify both "liangneng" and "liangzhi" as technical terms or philosophical concepts. (54) Cheng Hao, "Da Hengqu Zhang Zihou Xiansheng shu" (A letter to Mr. Zhang Zihou), in Ercheng ji (Collected works of the two Chengs) (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1981), p. 460. For an English translation, see Fung Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, trans. Derk Bodde (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), 2:524. (55) Mencius 2A.7. (56) Wang Yangming, Chuanxi lu (Taibei: Liming Wenhua Shiye Gongsi, 1986), p. 165. English translation modified from Wing-tsit Chan, trans., Instructions for Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Writings (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 251-252. (57) Wang Yangming: Daxue wen (Questions on the Great Learning) (Taibei: Liming Wenhua Shiye Gongsi, 1986), p. 191. English translation slightly modified from Fung Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, 2:603. (58) Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 140. This citation refers to Bergson's concept of instinct. (59) Ibid., p. 714. (60) I haven't got a clear knowledge of the textual allusion of the expression "qudang" This translation is based on my understanding of the content in the Analects 11.21. (61) Huang Zongxi, Mingru xuean (The writing of Ming Confucians) (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1985), p. 722. (62) Liang Shuming, Eastern and Western Cultures, p. 115. (63) Ibid. (64) Ibid., p. 116. (65) Ibid. (66) Ibid., p. 79. (67) See ibid., pp. 25-32. (68) He Lin writes, "On the one hand, he [Liang] tends to regard zhijue as a method; on the other hand, he denounces it as a suspicious and unreliable method for seeking truth" (He Lin, Zhexue yu zhexue shi lunwen ji, p. 178). This statement strongly supports my basic opinion on Liang's zhijue as a method. (69) Liang Shuming, Eastern and Western Cultures, p. 125. (70) Ibid., p. 128. (71) Ibid., p. 144. (72) Ibid., p. 125. (73) Ibid., p. 121. (74) Ibid., p. 125. (75) The Analects, trans. James Legge, bk. 9, chap. 5. (76) Liang Shuming, Eastern and Western Cultures, p. 127-128. (77) Ibid., p. 3. (78) Liang Shuming, Renxin yu rensheng (Human mind and human life) (Hong Kong: Sanlian Shudian Xianggang Fendian, 1985), p. 82. (79) Ibid., p. 70 n. 15. (80) Liang Shuming, Zhongguo wenhua yaoyi (The essence of Chinese culture), 1st ed. (1949). The quotation is from Liang Shuming Xiansheng nianpu (A chronicle of Mr. Liang's life), comp. Li Yuanting et al. (Guilin: Guangxi Shifan Daxue Chubanshe, 1991), p. 188. (81) See Liang Shuming, Renxin yu rensheng, pp. 78-79. (82) Liang Shuming, Zhongguo wenhua yaoyi (Hong Kong: Xianggang Jicheng Tushu Gongsi 1963), p. 115. (83) Liang Shuming, "Essence of Spiritual Cultivation." For an English translation, see Professor Alitto in The Last Confucian, p. 186. (84) Liang Shuming, Zhongguo wenhua yaoyi, p. 134. (85) Ibid., p. 135. (86) Ibid. (87) Ibid., p. 107. (88) Liang Shuming, Xiangcun jianshe lilun (The theory of rural reconstruction) (Chongqing: Xiangcun Shudian, 1939), p. 132. (89) Ibid., p. 43. (90) Liang Shuming, Renxin yu rensheng, p. 43. (91) Liang Shuming, Zhongguo wenhua yaoyi, p. 128. (92) Liang Shuming, Xiangcun jianshe lilun, p. 175. (93) Liang Shuming, Renxin yu rensheng, p. 108. (94) Liang Shuming, Jinian Xiong Shili Xiansheng (In memory of Mr. Xiong Shili) (Taibei: Mingwen Chubanshe, 1988), p. 61. Yanming An Doctoral candidate in the Department of Asian Languages and Cultures at the University of Michigan