Absolute fear would then be the first encounter of the other as other: as other than I and as other than itself. I can answer the threat of the other as other (than I) only by transforming it into another (than itself), through alternating it in my imagination, my fear, or my desire.
Jacques Derrida [1]

The history of society and culture is, in large measure, a history of the struggle with the endlessly complex problems of difference and otherness. Never have the questions posed by difference and otherness been more pressing than they are today.
Mark C. Taylor [2]

 1

    The pressing of the philosophical problem of otherness and difference is now evidenced in all minority discourses. For the oppressed subjects in a long history, such as woman, Jews, subaltern, (post-)colonial cultures, and so on, the time has come to rewrite and rediscover their own identities. However, in their efforts to do so, they are inevitably trapped in a paradoxical situation. Their search for a new identity through reversing the relationship between master and slave, as Hegel suggests, would not escape the dominating desire embedded in the same centric logic. The reclamation of subjectivity is always done at the expense of distorting the previous other. The political ambiguity (and guilt) as the result of constructing a reversed other therefore never stops haunting the souls who long for liberation. For this reason, the questions need to be readdressed for those who consider "encounter" to be the task free from distortion and domination: What is other? Is the other reducible to something other than itself? How could the other be properly understood and confronted?

     As an Oriental response to these questions, this paper deliberately takes a Buddhist stance, particularly that of the Yogācāra school. How is other viewed in Yogācāra philosophy? Although modern studies have been devoted to the epistemological issue about the existence of other minds raised by Yogācāra philosophers Vasubandhu (fifth century) and Dharmakīrti (seventh century), the critical -- yet still implicit -- relevance of the problem of otherness in Buddhism to the post-modern situation has not yet been elaborated. [3] It is strategically necessary, as this paper attempts to do, to place Yogācāra conception of otherness under the highlight of the post-modern discourse.

    Before directly going into Buddhist meditation on this issue, a brief scan of the problematic of otherness in the modern context could be helpful. The problem of other can be seen in the conflicting contrast between the notion of "system" emphasized by the structualists and the notion of "difference" favored by the post-structuralists. While the structuralists  are much concerned with the inclusiveness and regularity of system, [4] the post-structuralists are rather worried about the totalizing and oppressive character of system. For the post-structuralists or the so-called "post-modernists", to defend the irreducibility of other is inseparable from their ethical and political concern. They do not want to see that everything is, in the final analysis, reduced to or "swallowed up" by system. In order to justify their ethico-political stance, they are forced to go further to provide the epistemological or phenomenological analysis for the question, "How is it possible for other to be thought or perceived?"

    In their inquiry, however, they trace the difficulty of problem back to the philosophical predicament of Cartesian dualism and solipsism: No difference is conceivable in identity. The various efforts done later by the "hermeneuticians of suspicion" -- Nietzsche, Freud, Marx -- are for this reason directed to rescuing difference and otherness from the metaphysics of identity. They take either genealogy, psychoanalysis, or politico-economical analysis, as a deconstructive tool to bring down this metaphysics. The reason for them to do this is that "violence", as Derrida calls it, occurs in the metaphysics of identity for its domination of nature and man. [5] To disclose the

metaphysical making of sameness is hence required as the first step for us to truly recognize the other. In the Western history of metaphysics, as Heidegger contends, this "sameness" has been given different names: Physis, Logos, En, Idea, Enargeia, Substantiality, Objectivity, Subjectivity, the Will, the Will to Power, the Will to Will, and so on. [6] When we look to the East, we find a similar development parallel to the West. In the Indian history of orthodox metaphysics, this sameness or identity is called Brahman, Ṛta, Ātman (Self), svabhāva (self-nature), prakṛti (primordial nature), etc. According to Buddhist philosophy, this conception of sameness is nothing but an illusive fabrication that causes sentient beings falling into the suffering cycle of life-and-death (saṃsāra). Suffering and metaphysics of sameness are as inseparable for Buddhism as for Adorno and Derrida. [7]

However, the Buddhist critique of the metaphysics of the sameness does not necessarily lead to the conclusion the Western thinkers have arrived, namely, affirming the existence of the irreducible other. For Buddhism, this notion of "irreducible other" also needs to be examined carefully.

2

From the beginning, Buddhist considers "other" as that which is desired and constructed for the purpose of appropriation. This view is clearly stated in the Saṃyukta-Āgama 12.38: [8]

That which is intended (ceteti) and imaginatively constructed (pakappeti) becomes the object (ālambana) upon which consciousness abides to persist. The object being there, there comes to be a station of consciousness. Consciousness being stationed and growing, rebirth of renewed existence takes place in the future, and from there birth, decay-and-death, grief, lamenting, suffering, sorrow, and despair come to pass. Such is the arising of this entire conglomeration of suffering. [9]

In this passage, several points need to be noted: (1) In the world of life-and-death, everything is structured intertextually and inter-conditionedly. This is called "depending  origination" (pratītya-samutpāda). (2) Between consciousness and its object there is no exception to the principle of depending origination. Both of them must be mutually conditioned. In other words, "consciousness" does not exist autonomously without confronting something as its "object", and vice versa. (3) Furthermore, "object" (ālambana) results from intention and imaginative construction. This is equal to say, as Mahayanists claim later, that object is empty because it is necessitated by the intention and desire of consciousness.

    It also needs to note that in early Buddhism consciousness is characterized as something nourished by "foods" (āhāra): solid food, contact, volition and consciousness. This view is radically different from the Cartesian conception of consciousness as the attribute of a substantial mind. On the side of Buddhism, consciousness is metaphorically depicted as being appetitive,

arising from and growing in the context of physical contact and ideological pursuit. Consciousness is understood as something always in need of constantly consuming "other", and conversely the other is constructed as an object for consumption.

    This appetitive character of consciousness introduces us to see how desire or Eros (tṛṣṇā) is accompanied by consciousness. Desire, as stated in Four Noble Truths as the cause of samsaric suffering, plays a decisive role in rebirth. In the twelve-link formula of depending origination, desire is said to incite the arising of appropriation (upādāna); appropriation goes on to cause the arising of becoming (bhava), birth, decay and death. This is a soteriological explanation of the cycle of life-and-death in early Buddhism. According to the same formula of dependent origination, the arising of desire is preceded by the process of cognition: feeling, sensory contact, senses, the embryonic form of mind-body (nāma-rūpa), consciousness, and so on. This explanation also makes a point  in de-substantializing the notion of desire. If desire is conditioned by something else for its arising and hence empty by nature, it must be subjected to elimination. But in reading  this dogmatic explanation, we should not overlook the dialectical relationship between desire and cognition: desire is conditioned by (defiled) cognition, and conversely cognition is also conditioned by desire. This is seen in the chain of the second link, saṃskāra (volition and karma), and the third link, vijñāna (consciousness). [10] Consciousness is said to be the embodiment of one's previous karmas which can in turn be traced back to appropriation and desire.

Instead of grounding the whole world upon the Transcendental Mind as an Archimedean point, Early Buddhists rather conceive consciousness as that which is intertextually conditioned by the past. This way of thinking leads us

to disclose the genetic structure of the intentionality of consciousness in order to see the essence of object in cognition. They are clearly aware of the fact that the object of cognition is always already something manifested in the horizon of consciousness. Accordingly, the contemplation of an object must be preceded by analyzing the horizon of consciousness as genetically constituted by saṃskāra. However, Early Buddhists are not saying here that the essence of object can be perceived in the realist manner if the genetic structure of consciousness has been laid bare. On the contrary, they rather argue that the essence of object is nothing but the result of the objectification of consciousness embodied in saṃskāra. Put in other words, for Early Buddhists the "other" encountered in the horizon of consciousness is merely a construction of intentionality; to encounter an "other" is therefore the same as to encounter one's own past. The "other" standing out there is nothing but the "other" coming from within.

3

How is the other encountered from within? How is the other perceived as an other out there? In responding to these questions, the Yogācāra philosophers in the fourth and fifth centuries turned to the investigation of the depth of consciousness. They found that the dualistic schema of the knowing subject and the known object, which is assumed in realist epistemology, is in fact based on and effected by an inaccessible, subliminal matrix of consciousness. They called it ālaya-vijñāna (storehouse-consciousness), ādāna-vijñāna (appropriating-consciousness) or sarvabījakavijñāna (consciousness-containing-all-seeds). They claimed that all sources of knowledge subsumed under the categories of the knowing "I" and the known "things" genetically arise from the storehouse-consciousness. Our perception and knowledge are merely representation  of the storehouse-consciousness.

    The notion of storehouse-consciousness was originally employed by the early Yogācārins to account for the continuity of "personal" existence during the meditative state of nirodhasamāpatti (cessation of all kinds of mind and mental factors). Later the notion was used by the Yogācārins to explain the karmic continuity of "personal' existence in rebirth. The question they asked is: Why is the sentient being born in this life-world rather than that life-world? The main cause is "karma". But through what vehicle and in what form is karma transmitted to next life? Since the six kinds of sensory and apperceptive consciousness are not qualified as the receptacle of karmas, they are forced to excavate the underlying structure of consciousness which is inaccessible to reflection. [11] This finally leads to the discovery of ālayavijñāna.

    The discovery has its significance in disclosing the archaeological and semiological structure of subject. No longer able to hold its autonomous status, the knowing subject is now claimed to result from the linguistic and karmic matrix of the ālayavijñāna. The crucial questions for Yogācāra philosophers are: What are the characteristics and structure of ālayavijñāna? How do we know them? According to The Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, the structure of ālayavijñāna is shown in the "stuffs" it appropriates (upādāna): (1) the sense-faculties and their bases, and (2) the sediments (vāsanā) of discursive world (prapañca) and language (vyavahāra) which are constituted through cognition (vikalpa), signifier (nāma) and signified (nimitta). [12] That means,

ālayavijñāna biologically clings to physical body, taking body as its base, and serving as the support of body, while it appropriates the sediments/seeds of language and discursive world as its contents. This second characteristic gives us an important clue to discern the linguistic structure of ālayavijñāna.

    How is the ālayavijñāna structured linguistically? As mentioned above, this subliminal consciousness  is also called "consciousness-containing-all-seeds". The notion of "seed" (bīja) in this context refers to the cause of both existence and cognition. In addition to the biological "seeds" which cause the arising of the physical body, two other kinds of seeds are also included in the ālayavijñāna : seeds of karma and seeds of language. The seeds of karma result from the maturation of past karmas, while the seeds of language result from the delight in "discursive world" (prapañca). [13] It is particularly due to the latter (the linguistic sediments of discursive world) that an other is fabricated as an other.

    Here we have to clarify the concept of prapañca before we go on analyzing the Yogācāra's conception of cognition as the effect of language. The term prapañca has different renderings by modern scholars: "the manifold of named things", [14] "Plurality", [15]"verbal elaboration, the

phenomenal world", [16] "vain talk, diffusive trivial reasoning", [17] and so on. Among these expositions, Lambert Schmithausen's interpretation is most worthy of note:

'Prapañca' is used both in the sense of the process of proliferation, especially conceptual proliferation, or even of (emotionally involved) proliferating or diversifying conceptual activity, as also in that of what is the result of such a process ("diversity") or the object of such an activity. [18]

 According to this interpretation, prapañca is synonymous of saṃvṛti (conventional world) and saṃsāra (the world of life-and-death), both of which refer to the world fabricated by linguistic act and cognition. [19] In

Yogācāra Buddhism, this world is also called "the fabricated" (parikalpita), the life-world with which we live and interact. It is further explained that the fabricated world is constituted in the structure of the grasping subject (grāhaka) [20] and the grasped object (grāhya). Both subject and object interact  with each other in this psycho-lingusitically fabricated world.

    In the discursive world, the subject grasps the object and the signifier (nāma) signifies the signified (nimitta). But what is the signified? Those which are signified arise from the transformation of the "seeds" in ālayavijñāna. Like the magic show on the street, the audience does see a "lion", for example, and says that "I do see a lion", though in fact it is nothing but the illusory image fabricated with stuffs and trick. The image of "lion", for example, is signified by the word "lion". And this image as the signified is actualized by the seeds of ālayavijñāna which in turn result from the "perfuming" effect (vāsanā) of language and discourse. Between discourse and ālayavijñāna (seeds) there exists causal circularity.

    According to Yogācāra, consciousness is the consciousness-perfumed-by-language. [21] But how is the consciousness "perfumed"? Obviously, "perfuming" as a metaphoric expression can not be clearly defined. One of the possible interpretations is to construe "perfuming" as "encoding" in the semiological sense and to construe "actualizing" or "transforming" the seeds into the perceptual image as a reverse process, namely, "decoding". However,

this encoding-decoding model could be oversimplified, because it fails to see the complexity in the metaphoric and metonymic process (condensation and dispalcement) operating in between language and the Unconscious. [22] On the other hand, the Lacanian project of discovering the metaphoric-metonymic structure of the Unconscious seems foreign to the Yogācāra tradition. On the contrary, Yogācāra takes a rather literal and pragmatic approach.

    According to the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra and the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, [23] the effect of language is working on two states of consciousness: the awake state and the dormant state. In the awake state of consciousness, language arises with perception simultaneously. [24] For example, when one perceives a table, one knows that "it is a table". In the dormant state of consciousness, one merely perceives something without conception and verbal expression. [25] The examples given by Yogācāra are those who are incapable of verbal communication, such as animals and babies. According to Yogācāra, consciousness can never be regarded as tabula rasa. Even a baby's consciousness is always already embodied of the past karmas and language. It is therefore important in Yogācāra practice to discern the function of language not only in the structure of consciousness, but also in the pre-structure of consciousness.

    The language in the preconscious/preconceptual state is also called manojalpa, "preconscious/preconceptual language". [26] Yogācāra argues, it is due to the conceptualization of "preconscious/preconceptual  language"  that the "identity" (svabhāva) of any perceived object is asserted. Only if this process of conceptualization is fully discerned and disclosed, one is able to realize the emptiness of "identity" and consequently eliminates his clinging and ignorance. In the Yogācāra manual of mecditation, the disclosure of "preconscious/preconceptual language" becomes a methodic entrance to enlightenment. [27]

    It is important to see that, according to Yogācāra, there is a correlative and corresponding relationship between the structure of "conscious language" and the structure of "preconscious language". The former is usually listed in the standard Yogācāra taxonomy of hundred dharmas. This doctrine sounds like psycho-linguistic atomism, claiming that all states of affairs can be reduced to the corresponding structure of language, which is further divided into two levels: conscious language and preconscious language. But how is this theory of correspondence justified? To Yogācāra, theory shall be verified by practice only, not by any other theory. When a Yogācāra student practices meditation of calming (śamatha) and discerning (vipaśyanā), s/he is instructed to meditate upon an object-image or any state of affair in order to realize that all states of affairs are nothing-but-consciousness (vijñaptimātra), nothing-but-preconscious-language" (manojalpamātra) or nothing-but-designation

(prajñaptimātra). [28] The workability of meditation is taken by Yogācāra as the criteria to verify their doctrine.

4

    In gazing at the face of other, Yogācāra Buddhists are directed inwards to the pscycho-linguistic intertextuality and inter-conditionality which determines our ways of gazing and acting. For them, the others we encounter in mundane experience are mere object-images hypostatized from the pyscho-linguistic factors which are embedded in the storehouse-consciousness. They argue that the other and its reverse side, subject, are psycho-linguistically fabricated. To disclose the psycho-linguisticality of other is the tantamount to the same disclosure of subject, and hence gazing at other is the same as gazing at oneself.

    But is there something called the real "Other" left when the fabricated other and self have been disillusioned? Could we reach at the real Other insofar as we have attended enlightenment? These questions  are concerned with the practical implication of Yogācāra philosophy. In contrast to the postmodernist's efforts to save the irreducible Other, Yogācāra thinkers rather propose an/other way of gazing at the other: meta-gazing (paramārtha-satya). Instead of being the path to secure the ontological status of the other, Yogācāra's meta-gazing is taken to discern and purify the psycho-linguistically embodied mechanism of mundane gazing (saṃvṛti-satya). This concealed mechanism of mundane gazing is the real "Other" that needs to be disclosed. For all Yogācāra thinkers and Buddhists in general, the so-called "Absolute  Other" or "Transcendental Other" in the onto-theological sense does not exist. The reality of the real is nothing but the fabricationality of the fabricated. Thus it is said in the Diamond Sūtra:

As stars, a fault of vision, as a lamp,
A mock show, dew drops, or a bubble,
A dream, a lightning flash, or cloud,
So should one view what is conditioned. [29]

This is the reality all we have.

    But still there is difference between mundane gazing and meta-gazing: To the former, mingling language with desire leads one to fall into the unhappy cycle of life-and-death, but to the latter the detachment of desire from language makes possible the playful prapañca (discursive world). As the problematic of other is concerned, the other appears to the Yogācāra like the mirror reflecting all sorts of discursive networks without mutual hindrance and clinging when it is encountered with meta-gazing. This is called "freedom", "liberation", or "truth".

Abstract

    The pressing of the philosophical problem of otherness and difference is now evidenced in all minority discourses. For the oppressed subjects in a long history, such as woman, Jews, subaltern, (post-)colonial cultures, and so on, the time has come to rewrite and re(dis)cover their own identities. However, in their efforts to do so, they are inevitably trapped in a paradoxical situation: Their search for a new identity through reversing the relationship between master and slave, as Hegel suggests, would not escape the dominating desire embedded in the same centric logic. The reclamation of subjectivity is always done at the expense of distorting the previous other. The political ambiguity (and guilt) as the result of constructing a reversed other therefore never stops hunting the souls who long for liberation. For this reason, the questions need to be readdressed for those who consider "encounter" to be the task free from distortion and domination: What is other? Is the other reducible? How could the other be properly understood and confronted? As an Oriental response to these questions, this paper deliberately takes a Buddhist stance, particularly that of the Yogācāra school, to see how other is viewed in the Yogācāra tradition.

    This paper concludes that, in gazing at the face of other, the Yogācāra Buddhists are directed inwards to the pscycho-linguistic intertextuality and inter-conditionality which determines our ways of gazing and acting. For them, the others we encounter in mundane experience are mere object-images hypostatized from the pyscho-linguistic factors which are embedded in the storehouse-consciousness. They argue that the other and its reverse side, subject, are psycho-linguistically fabricated. To disclose the psycho- linguisticality of other is the tantamount to the same disclosure of subject, and hence gazing at other is the same as gazing at self.

Notes

1. Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. by Gayatri C. Spivak, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976, p. 277.

2. Mark C. Taylor, Altarity, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987, p. xxi.

3. Thomas E. Wood provides a detail study on the Yogācāra's doctrine of other minds. See his Mind Only: A Philosophical and Doctrinal Analysis of the Vijñānavāda (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991).

4. See Todd G. May, "The System and Its Fractures: Gilles Deleuze on Otherness", in Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 24.1, 1993, 3-14.

5. Jacques Derrida makes this point through his reading of Levinas. See Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics", in Writing and Difference, trans. by Alan Bass, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978. Also see John McGowan, Postmodernism and Its Critics , Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991, p. 91.

6. Martin Heidegger, Identity and Difference, trans. by Joan Stambaugh, New York: Harper & Row, 1969, p. 66.

7. Theodor W. Adorno says, "Auschwitz confirmed the philosophy of pure identity as death" . See Negative Dialectics, trans. by E. B. Ashton, New York: Continuum, 1983, p. 262.

8. As Noritoshi Aramaki (荒牧典俊) has pointed out, a three-or four-link formula of depending origination (pratītyasamutpāda) is given in this Āgama: consciousness, birth, decay-and-death, or consciousness, name-form (nāmarūpa), birth, decay-and-death. See Noritoshi Aramaki, "On the Formation of a Short Prose Pratītya-samutpāda Sūtra", in《雲井昭善博士古稀記念: 佛教と異宗教》, Kyoto: Heirakuji Shoten, 1985, 87-122.

9. See Mrs Rhys Davids, trans., The Book of the Kindred Sayings, part II, p. 45. The translation is slightly modified with consulting the Tsa a-han ching ( 雜阿含經 ), T.2.100.a-b.

10. Saṃskāra, derived from √kṛ (do, make, create) with prefix sam, means "predispositions, the effect of past deeds and experience as conditioning a new state; conditionings, conditioned states, which is also meant by saṃskṛta." See Franklin Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary, Vol. II, pp. 542-543.

11. Lambert Schmithausen provides an excellent textual-exegetical study on this issue. See his Ālayavijñāna: On the Origin and the Early Development of a Central Concept of Yogācāra Philosophy, Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1987. Also cf., William S. Waldron, "How Innovative is the Ālayavijñāna?", Part I & II, Journal of Indian Philosophy 22: 199-258, 1994; 23: 9-51, 1995.

12. Chieh shen-mi ching (解深密經), T.16.692.b. Also cf., Schmithausen's translation: "[Ālayavijñāna] is based on a twofold upādāna: 1) upādāna of (or: consisting of) the [subtle] material sense-faculties together with their [gross] bases and 2) upādāna of (or: consisting of) the Impression of the diversity of (/proliferous involvement in) the everyday usage of phenomena, names, and conceptions (*nimitta-nāma-vikalpa-vyavahāra-prapañca)". See, Ālayavijñāna, p. 71.

13. In the Basic Section of Yogācārabhūmi, ālayavijñāna is taken as the bījāśraya (the basis in the form of seed ) of sensory perceptions. It is understood as the basis of apropriations as well as the maturation of karma. See Yogācārabhūmi (瑜伽師地論．本地分五識身相應地)：「種子依謂即此一切種子執受所依異熟所攝阿賴耶識。...一切種子識謂無始時來樂著戲論熏習為因所生一切種子異熟識 。 」T.30.279.a-b. Also cf. Schmithausen, Ālayavijñāna, Part I, p. 110.

14. In the Prasannapadā, Candrakīrti gives a lengthy exposition for the notion of prapañca: "Thus karmic action and the afflictions arise from hypostatizing thought. Hypostatizing thought springs from the manifold of named things (prapañca), i.e., from the beginninglessly recurring cycle of birth and death, which consists of knowledge and objects of knowledge, words and their meanings, agents and action, means and act, pot and cloth, diadem and chariots, objects and feelings, female and male, gain and lose, happiness and misery, beauty and ugliness, blame and praise." See Mervyn Sprung, Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way, Boulder: Prajna Press (1979), p.172. Nāgārjuna declares in the opening verse of the Madhyamakakarika that the complete cessation of the prapañca is called nirvana. See ibid. p. 33.

15. Th. Stcherbatsky took a monist interpretation in his translation of Prasannapada that Nagarjuna's notion of nirvana is "characterized as the bliss of Quiescence of every Plurality". See The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, reprint, 1989, p. 88.

16. T. R. V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1955, p. 348.

17. D. T. Suzuki, Studies in the The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, Boulder: Prajna Press, reprint, 1981 (1930), pp. 137, 433.

18. Lambert Schmithausen, Ālayavijñāna, Part II, note 510 (p. 356).

19. The linguistic, cognitive and imaginative character of prapañca is seen in Kumarajiva's Chinese rendering, 戲論, which literally means "drama discourse" or "the fabricated world in play".

20. Yogācārabhūmi(瑜伽師地論．本地分):「復次，依有情世間及器世間，有兩種法能攝一切諸戲論事，謂能取法與彼所依所取之法。」T.30.347.b. Also see Yokoyama Koitsu (橫山紘一) , 〈種子〉,《平川彰博士古稀記念論集 ： 佛教思想諸問題》, Tokyo: Shunju-sha, 1985, p. 179. In the paper, Yokoyama takes a textual - historical approach to explore the process in which the notions of "words" (abhilāpa) and "seed" (bīja) come to combine as one concept.

21. 言說熏習心. T.16.694.c.

22. It is not easy to summarize Lacan's theory. Here I simply borrow Samuel Weber's exposition: "...[B]oth metonymy and metaphor are "functions of a uniform movement of the signifier," which, on the one hand , can only function in and through its concatenation, and on the other, is always dependent upon what is not part of the chain, the signifier to which it refers...[A]nd this would seem to suggest a priority of metonymy over metaphor." Samuel Weber, Return to Freud: Jacques Lacan' s Dislocation of Psychoanalysis, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 66-67.

23. Yogācārabhūmi (瑜伽師地論), T.30.701.a.

24. 言說隨覺 (*vyavahāra-anubodha).

25. 言說隨眠 (*vyavahāra-anuśaya). See Chen-kuo Lin, The Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra : A Liberating Hermeneutic, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Temple University, 1991, pp. 144-148.

26. The Chinese translation of manojalpa is 意言. Hayashima Osamu (早島理) offers an excellent analysis and textual sources on this issue. See 早島理,〈唯識　實踐〉,平川彰等編 ,《講座．大乘佛教－唯識思想》, Tokyo: Shunjusha, 1982, pp. 161-174.

27. 《攝大乘論．入所知相分第四》: 「由何云何而得悟入? 由聞熏習種類、 如理作意所攝、似法似義有見意言。」 T.30.142.c.

28. 橫山紘一,〈種子〉, p. 187.

29. Edward Conze, Buddhist Wisdom Books, London: Unwin, 1958 (1988), p. 68.